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## Whither the Sovereign State?

### An analytical and Normative Take on The Future of the State

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#### Abstract

*The subject of sovereignty may appear simple, but it is in reality complex in nature. From the time of man's creation and settlement, sovereignty has evolved, assuming diverse shades of meaning and patterns of manifestation. In contemporary times, the nature of sovereignty is not static either. The problem therefore is locating the nexus between, or commonality of sovereignty among stateless people and geographical states. The main objective of the paper is to analyze the futuristic dynamics of sovereignty, given the axiomatic view that the state is tied to sovereignty. The paper anchors its analysis on the people of Zomia in Asia and empirical view of modern state sovereignty. The central theme of the paper is explored with four guiding questions. i) Will the meaning of 'sovereign state' change overtime? ii) Is the state a perpetual being that will continue to retain its sovereignty? iii) Does the state have a future? iv) Will the state continue to evolve? On the premise that change is a constant phenomenon, and no state of affairs is permanent, conclusion is drawn to the effect that the nature of sovereignty will continue to change in future. Nevertheless, to prevent powerful states from violating the sovereignty of smaller states, it is recommended that the United Nations continue to emphasize the sanctity of sovereignty among member-states.*

**Keywords:** Sovereignty, State, Statelessness, Violation, Nationalism, Evolution.

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#### Introduction

An understanding of the meaning and concept of 'the state' is a precursor to any analysis of state sovereignty. Scott's (2017) descriptive insight into the earliest states in the Mesopotamia region is illustrative of the gradual evolution of states, their sovereignty status, political life and pastoral management. The author's account tends to affirm the constancy of change over the millennium, by which is meant the composition, transformation and organization of states and whether or not they maintain sovereignty. Deduction from Scott's (2017: 46) views seems to suggest with empirical evidence that states in earliest times began to emerge wherever individuals found that resources for their survival were relatively in abundance. Consequently, more people would converge for daily subsistence either by farming or hunting or trading or some other gainful activity.

This paper is essentially hinged on the evolving nature of sovereignty as it pertains to states across the globe. To a large extent, there is some commonality of features as well as some discrepant variations in the composition of states, considering the vagaries of culture and historical claims. Consequently, it is appropriate to query as follows: will the meaning of 'sovereign state' change over time? Is the state a perpetual being such that it continues to retain its sovereignty? Does the state have a future? Will the state continue to evolve in characteristic components? The paper dwells on the 'being' or continual evolution of the sovereign state.

## **The State and Statelessness**

Among scholars, there has been no clear-cut and inclusive definition of what constitutes the state. The 'being' of the state has been a gradual historical evolution from time ancient times. However, certain characteristic elements tend to provide a mental description and meaning of the state. Given that feasible existence of attributes such as formal institutions, class structure, power system, regulatory control, legal system, geographical territory and organized community is observable, to this extent, a state is on ground (Laski, 1967:15). Yet, other writers strongly acknowledge the characteristics of people population, government and sovereignty as congruent features of the state (MacIver, 1966:22). The working meaning of 'the state' contrasts sharply with the term 'statelessness.'

Statelessness would mean that a characteristic population of people is not subjected to any legal control system, territorial power of jurisdictional and enduring control. It implies therefore that the people, who would have constituted the state, could migrate elsewhere (to another territory) as environmental factors may dictate. Ringmar (2018) tends to liken statelessness to borderlessness. Observations have revealed that among 'stateless people' (Scot, p.5), in times past, a great majority were farmers and slaves while some others were either involved in trade or identified with the tendency to associate with political leadership for which the court held sway in the early century. Evidently, in earliest times, 'stateness,' (Scot, p.7) that is, the capacity of a geographical entity with its people to wear the qualities of a state identity was not the norm. Stateness could therefore be assumed to be a gradual evolution as the centuries wore on.

There are certain variances, which are evident in some states to distinguish ancient state from modern state. But then, some characteristic elements may still be revealed as the commonality between an ancient state and a modern state. An empirical case is Zomia of the Asian stock. The empirical case of Zomia is sticking, considering its family of languages, culture, uniqueness of its terrain and other ethnic identities, all of which are distinct from the identities of other people. The argument of stateness here is the collective features with which the people identity as one indivisible entity. Further, geographical terrains such as mountains, hills, valleys and riverine features could contribute to the isolation of a people from others, and help to unite them as a nationality. This trend is significantly featured in Ringmar (2018), Scot (n.d.) and Greenfeld (n.d.).

The Zomia case is in contrast to nomadic societies thus, prompting the question: are nomadic societies sovereign states? Nomadic societies are not sovereign states on the grounds that nomads do not reside in one geographical space for any long length of time. They have no commanding political class neither have they democracy as such, nor do they relish building a permanent state. They are simply on the move to jungles and across jungles. The nomads therefore rightly define a borderless race, but devoid of sovereignty in the sense in which it is identified with the modern state. Perhaps their uniqueness in terms of periodic flight, dictated by economic opportunities and ability to chart their destiny, may be termed as a type of pastoral sovereignty to the effect that they have the capacity to determine their own future.

One of the major hallmarks of modern states is recognizable borders, marking off both a geographical and cultural distinction between one set of people and another. Borders then signify the territorial limit of one state's sovereignty. Ringmar's (2018) discourse on borderlessness is hinged technically on pros and cons. Principally, because of national interest and the need to protect national identity, it is inconceivable within the international community to give global recognition to, and acceptance of borderlessness. Ringmar (2018:92) argues therefore that "Without borders there can be no sovereignty and no wars."

Evidently, the argument for borderlessness tends to diminish the significance of sovereignty, and having experienced sovereignty and its concomitant accolades, many states may not, and are unwilling to voluntarily relinquish their sovereignty even if for the sake of national security. This view is further reinforced in Ringmar (2018:93) who agrees that “Borderlessness leads to homelessness and anxiety,” a type of insecurity to which no reasonable national government may wish to expose its subjects. Besides, borderlessness exposes states to vulnerability of danger from nomads. Borderlessness implies statelessness which is what Zomia relatively exhibits by its nature according to J. C. Scot in *The Art of Not Being Governed* (see page 19).

Maintenance of borders is tantamount to the sanctity of sovereignty. This argument finds reinforcement in the fact that maintenance of geographical borders or boundaries tends to entrench state identity, uniqueness and the promotion of political sovereignty. Again, Ringmar holds the view that borders generate more crisis as nations strive endlessly and strategically to protect as well as control their hegemony. Within territorial borders, political authority contingent upon specific nationals is exercised. Entrenching borderlessness would result in the loss of sovereignty and political authority. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke had argued in support of the legitimacy of political authority. Rightly, political authority is a discernible feature of political sovereignty. In essence, both political philosophers tend to concur emphatically that the state could perpetually exercise sovereignty since it (the state) is legitimate and has power and authority to protect as well as control its subjects within the recognizable and definite geographical territory (Thomson, 1995:214).

States in earliest times never indeed had lasting permanence as issues of pervasive territorial conquest were common. As such, sovereignty was not sustainable. At best, expansion of state and imminent collapse were rampant at the emergence of a more powerful foreign army, thus compelling subjects to flee in search of safety in another territory. Arguments have, however, been adduced to assert that in earliest times states, as we know them in contemporary times, were never in any structured shape except that people occupied territories loosely hence the notion of statelessness (Scot, n.d.) as discussed early in the paper. Arguments are conflicting, owing to perceptions. Nonetheless, sovereignty was found to creep into practice, influenced by the need to exercise control not only over the subjects, but to maintain independence and the capacity to ward off external aggression.

### **Sovereignty and its Nature**

Among international relations researchers, claims about the nature and status of state sovereignty have been largely inconsistent. For example, views about sovereignty during and after the Cold War are opposed, depending on critic’ or proponents’ predisposition (Thomson, 1995). Sovereignty is a complex concept, considering the unique cultural geographical, historical, social and religious features of the state adapting it. Sovereignty, having both internal and external dimensions, is a natural phenomenon for all states. Indeed, the natural desire of every individual to be independent finds collective expression in the political leadership of states across the world. By internal dimension, sovereignty is state supremacy in the exercise of power far above any individual or groups.

In extant political science literature, sovereignty has been classified accordingly as political sovereignty, legal sovereignty, and popular sovereignty (Anifowose, 1999:89). A discussion of the status of a state’s sovereignty is broad, but may be restricted to any of the classes of sovereignty mentioned above. In more technical terms, de facto and de jure sovereignty has featured in political discourse to determine the liberty of states and their people, and to emphasize the limits of authority and power within the state.



The state in this sense is exemplified by constituted government with the ultimate and acknowledged responsibility to make and enforce laws within its geographical jurisdiction. By external dimension, however, sovereignty is the state's freedom from foreign powers and undue political coercion by any foreign country or a coalition of countries (Warbrick, 1991). As far as the state is not under any subjection to another state, it is independent of foreign control and can be seen as a legitimate and unique national identity. It is relatively difficult to find in modern times states that exhibit absolute sovereignty and absolute independence from other states in the global political system (Berg & Kuunsk, 2010:47; Ewing, 1963:178). That a state possesses sovereign powers does not provide it the license to cause aggression or occupation of another territory outside its jurisdictional control. Such act may trigger the sympathy of other states in support of the state being unfairly aggrieved. Consequently, state external sovereignty has a limited sphere of exercise otherwise war may be provoked.

Anifowose's (1999) and Ewing's (1963) preceding views again stimulate the concept of nationalism because of the characteristic of national identity with which each state is naturally associated. The sovereignty of any state is not devoid of the collectivity of the people with the consciousness of similarity of root, commonality of language and a sense of belongingness. These views are further reinforced in Greenfeld (n.d. p.7) who succinctly established the concrete feature of homogeneity, individual membership of a population to qualify for national identity. Some convergence of views is found in Greenfeld's (n.d.:p.3) dimension of thought on nationalism, which tends to be in consonance with the foregoing. Accordingly, nationalism is about a people's identity thereby giving motivation for sovereignty.

As Kenneth Pomeranz argued in *The Great Divergence*, the need for economic expansion has compelled nations and more recently, China to make incursion into territories outside their natural domain. Whether such incursion will not in some ways violate the internal sovereignty of host states is another issue entirely. However, the need for trade and commerce among nations, particularly the compulsion to move goods across borders, would mean that the sanctity of sovereignty in its hallowed form is or may be eroded. It portends that no state can all by itself independently and adequately provide economic resources that its people need. This logic is currently akin to globalization, although with precautionary, some logic of protectionism. Pomeranz's (2000) seems to centre around trade and globalization, with attention to China and Europe essentially. In the main, implications of foreign trade on the internal sovereignty of states can still be inferred.

### **Empirical View of State Sovereignty**

There are evidently mixed empirical views about sovereignty in modern times. Because of diversity of views, arising from perceptual thoughts, there appears to be no strong universal, pragmatic stance on the current status of sovereignty. Perceptions, largely influenced by people's political experience, tend to shroud the modern concept of sovereignty. However, an empirical verdict in Rothe and Mullins (2010:79) tends to show that state sovereignty is still firm as could be seen in states' protection of sovereignty by being wary of signing and ratifying treaties.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwaiti territory in 1990 is a violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty by all conventional ethical standards. Iraqi action culminated in the Allied War of 1991 in which case, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti issue is a classic empirical case (Warbrick, 1991). The Iraqi invasion is a territorial aggression and contravention of the brotherhood agreement among the Arab League of Nations that no Arab state should maltreat a sister state or its neighbor. Iraqi's invasion would have permanently subjugated both Kuwait and its people if other nations had not intervened on Kuwait's behalf. The international cooperation among nations in contemporary times still facilitates the fostering of state sovereignty.

However, a strong sense of commitment to conventions and treaties at the auspices of the United Nations and other regional blocs is considered sufficient, to an extent, to promote and strengthen state sovereignty while modern states continue to evolve in diverse patterns and sophistication.

Violation of internal sovereignty by foreign powers is an international breach that the international community needs to re-examine more closely for world peace. More recently, which is a 2023 case, Russia's action against Ukraine's sovereignty is an illustration of the frequency of occurrence in world history of foreign aggression (Radpey, 2023), resulting in loss of lives and property, forced migration, hardship and increase in the number of refugees. Between 2018 and 2019, Rojava in Syria was invaded by Turkey, which is equally considered a contravention of state internal sovereignty.

Nevertheless, the weakness or strength of the state lies on how it handles and maintains its institutions, and this interaction has implications for sovereignty. For illustration, Pomeranz (2000:14) adduces that the state may be either strong or hostile or weak to protect the interests of investors when there is evidence of clash of economic interests. The example of India and China is cited, and of course, many developing African countries, including Nigeria fall into the category. Is it therefore a question of weak or strong economic sovereignty of the state, if we perceive sovereignty as exclusive authority of the state? It has been indeed shown that China and India were wont to stifle attempts by foreign investors at making incursion into their economy (Pomeranz, 2000).

## Conclusion

Change across the world is a constant phenomenon to which all elements, tangible and intangible, must submit. In the same vein, the sense in the word 'sovereignty' is equally subjected to shades of change overtime. With growing globalization and improved development of the system of transportation and communication, the concept of state, and state sovereignty will continue to undergo transformation in meaning and dimension. Even so, sovereignty is still susceptible to contract and expand in its experimentation among nations contingent upon emerging world order, sophistication in knowledge and the extent to which members of international organizations cooperate and agree on the balance of power, of course, the need to protect the vulnerable. Classical evidence still remains that in contemporary times, no state exercises absolute sovereignty. Nevertheless, sovereignty is inseparably interwoven with nationality, which further validates the intricacy of state sovereignty.

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# An Assessment of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in North Central Nigeria

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## Abstract

*Beyond much argument, one of the challenges faced by nascent democracy in Nigeria is the pervasive insecurity of lives and property, as evidenced by the spate of armed robbery attacks, willful assassinations, ethnic and religious conflicts, in addition to the seeming inability of security agencies to handle criminal acts. This paper examines the recurring decimal of flawed ethno-religious and political conflicts in North Central Nigeria. The paper argues that from the inception of democracy in 1999, Plateau State, for instance, has been a theatre of many violent clashes. Put succinctly, the State which had previously relished relative peace suddenly became a place harbouring bandits, kidnappers and all categories of criminals amidst ethno-religious and political crises. Invariably, the situation was characterized by maiming, bombing, genocidal attacks, senseless killings and destruction of business investments, leading to loss of properties worth billions of Naira. By way of qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources, the paper found that measures at restoring peace were futile in over a decade of ethno-religious and political conflicts. It would seem that democracy has increased the culture of impunity while political differences are presumed to have exacerbated violence in the conflict zone. It concludes that the upsurge of violence is a serious concern. In recommendation, the way out is for the government to exercise the political will to address conflicts through dialogue and prompt administration of justice without compromise.*

**Keywords:** Democracy, Conflict, North Central Nigeria, Plateau State, Ethno-Religious

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## Introduction

The significant obstruction to the ongoing democratic governance as expressed by Ojo (2010)<sup>1</sup> is the issue of recurrent general insecurity of lives and property, as could be seen from incessant assassinations, banditry, ethnic and religious conflicts as well as armed robbery attacks, in addition to the visible security agencies inability in handling many activities relating to criminal cases. Though, Nigeria after attainment of political independence has remained a multi-ethnic nation state with well over four hundred ethnic groups in existence as Salawu (2010)<sup>2</sup> argued. The country for a long period of time has been grappling with the problem of ethnicity as well as the problem of ethno-religious conflicts since she belongs to numerous religious sects. In fact, in the past years, ethno-religious conflicts, which is a form of urban violence, has been reported virtually in major towns in Northern Nigeria. Without mincing words, the religious contradictions that Nigeria faces are enormous.

Essentially, the country is heterogeneous society, with the two monotheistic religions-Islam and Christianity which enjoys the loyalty of most Nigerians. As an instrument of politics in Nigeria the historical antecedent of employing religion dated back to the colonial era. Though the British colonialists was said to have left Nigerians on the imperative of secularity in a multi-religious society, but evidence available pointed to the fact that the colonial administration deliberately made use of

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<sup>1</sup> Ojo, Y. Taraba: Bombers Explore New Targets, New Territories. *The Daily Times*, 2010:10

<sup>2</sup> Salawu, B. Ethno-Religious Conflict in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies. *European Journal of Social Sciences* 13(3) 2010:345-353

religion as an instrument of pacification. The administration of the British colonial masters under wrote Islam in the Northern part of colonial Nigeria and used it as the basis of political authority in native administration (Agbaje 1990:288).<sup>3</sup> However, the predicament of the country is also worsened by daily increment in the number of unemployed youths who are ready tools for obnoxious activities (Nigerian Tribune 2002).<sup>4</sup> Be that as it may, the upsurge in violence is the most significant factor hindering constitutional democracy not only in Nigeria but across the continent of Africa which invariably calls for serious attention.

The paper using primary and secondary sources examines series of disturbing violent ethno-religious and political conflicts that have occurred in North Central Nigeria with all efforts at restoring peace still in futility.

## **Review of Related Literature**

Nnoli (1978:5)<sup>5</sup> defines ethnic groups as ‘social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries’. He expressed further that, the crucial communal factors may be culture, language or both. Far more importantly, Suberu (1996:4)<sup>6</sup> conceptualizes an ethnic group as a “social collectivity whose members not only share such objective characteristics as ancestral myth, language, culture, core-territory, religion, and/or political organisation, but also have some subjective consciousness or perception of common descent or identity”. This ethnic identity results from contact with other groups. But he argues that ethnic pluralism is necessary but an insufficient condition for ethnicity. Therefore, ethnicity is a ‘social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups’. It emerges when the members of an ethnic group become characterized by a common consciousness of their identity in relations to other groups with in-group and out-group differences becoming marked with time. Such exclusivist, identity-based discrimination undoubtedly results in conflicts over scarce economic resources and socio-political goods. However, ethnicity hardly exists in pure forms.

Nnoli (1978) and Suberu (1996)<sup>7</sup> contend that it is a consequence of ethnic group identity mobilization and politicization especially in a competitive ethnically plural environment or context. Similarly, Wolff (2006:35)<sup>8</sup> observes that ethnicity on its own does not cause conflict as several factors are always at play in each conflict situation, arguing that identity is a fact of human existence, and that it is what people make of it or to what use they deploy it that makes the difference between ethnic cohesion, harmony or conflict. The manner in which activists define the in-group and out-group relationship (the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ sentiment) is crucial in conflict dynamics: “The more confrontational the definitions – that is, the more ‘our’ poor situation is a result of ‘their’ oppression, or the more superior ‘we’ are compared with ‘them’ – the more likely are inter-group relations to take a turn for the worse”.

## **Historical Background**

Nigeria presents a complex of individual as well as crisscrossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic (communal) are the most salient and the main bases for violent conflicts in the country. This is both from the point of view of the identities most commonly assumed by citizens especially for political purposes and the identities often implicated in day-to-day contestations over citizenship as well as competitions and conflicts over resources and privileges. To

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<sup>3</sup> Agbaje, O. “The ‘U.S. Intelligence Report’”, *The Guardian*, Tuesday, June 14, 2005

<sup>4</sup> Editorial Comment, *Three Years of Democracy*, Nigerian Tribune, 2002:10.

<sup>5</sup> Nnoli, O. *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. 1978:5

<sup>6</sup> Suberu, R., *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience*, in D. Turton (ed.) *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: James Currey Times of Nigeria. May 1, 2006 Retrieved on 15 October, 2021 from <http://dailytimes.com.ng>

<sup>7</sup> Suberu, R., *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict*

<sup>8</sup> Wolff, S. *Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/Connections/Pop2006.pdf>. 2006 Retrieved 31-10-2021.

emphasize the inter-connectedness of ethnic, regional, and religious identities and the fact that they are often mutually reinforcing, they are sometimes compounded or hyphenated as ethno-regional and ethno-religious. The latter references have historical, geographical and political origins. They evolved from the old regional structures of the Nigerian Federation, where identities were shaped by leaders of the dominant ethnic groups – Hausa/Fulani in the Northern region (predominately Muslim), Igbo in the Eastern region and Yoruba in the Western region – that exercised some form of hegemonic control over the regions. As a result, ethno-regional identities were, and continue to be, used as shorthand references to the dominant ethnic groups acting as regional ‘hegemons’.

This is the sense in which conflicts among the three dominant groups are generally referred to as ethno-regional. With the division of the country into six semi-official geo-political zones in the late 1990s, which not only have ethnic referents but have also gained currency in the political lexicon, the usage of ethno-regional categories is likely to expand, but so far the old regional references remain dominant. Similarly, the category of ethno-religious identities initially owed its origin to regional formations. It has been useful for differentiating the predominantly Muslim North from the predominantly Christian South.

The category has also helped to differentiate the dominant Muslim group in the North from the non-Muslim minorities in the region. Indeed, unlike in the South where majority groups are distinguished from minority groups on the basis of ethnicity, majority-minority distinctions in the North have been more religious than ethnic (Osaghae and Suberu 2005).<sup>9</sup> Thus, a member of the Hausa/Fulani majority group in the North who is Christian is as much a minority in the overall scheme of things as say an Idoma or Igala, (both of which are Northern minority groups) and is actually likely to enjoy lesser privileges than an ethnic minority person who is Muslim. Since the early 1980s when the Maitatsine riots ushered in a regime of religious fundamentalism in the Northern parts of the country, ethno-religious categories have been more frequently used to describe conflicts that involve an intersection of ethnic and religious identities.

Again for partly historical reasons, this has been true of the North where religious differences play a major part in ethnic differentiation. Thus, conflicts between Hausa/Fulani and minority ethno-religious groups are described as ethno-religious. However, the increased politicization of religion by the state, including the adoption of Islamic penal law by several Northern states in the Fourth Republic, has led to the generalization of ethno-religious conflicts all over the country. In the recent past, other ‘primordial’ identities that have gained wide currency and greater political significance, especially in contestations over citizenship, are those of ‘indigenes’, ‘non-indigenes’, ‘migrants’, and ‘settlers’. These categories have ethnic, communal, religious and regional origins, and have evolved from an entrenched system of discriminatory practices in which non-indigenes, migrants and settlers are shunted out or denied equal access to the resources, rights and privileges of a locality, community, town or state, to which sons and daughters of the soil’ have first or exclusionary access. The system produces and sustains a hierarchical, unequal, and ranked system of citizenship that has provoked violent conflicts all over the country, and goes to the very heart of the ‘National Question’.

Although these identities have grown in significance in the recent past, which obviously has to do with the aggravation of the ‘National Question’, they have deep historical roots in pre-colonial patterns of inter-group relations, and the discriminatory practices and ethnic inequalities entrenched by both the colonial regime and continued by post-independence administrations. These have cumulatively provoked various forms of self-determination agitation by different groups. Ethnicity is generally regarded as the most basic and politically salient identity in Nigeria. This claim is supported by the fact that both in competitive and non-competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity. Indeed, according to an authoritative 2000 survey on “Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria”, ethnicity “is

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<sup>9</sup> Suberu, R. 2006:10

demonstrably the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria” (Lewis and Bratton 2000:27).<sup>10</sup> The survey found that almost one-half (48.2%) of Nigerians chose to label themselves with an ethnic (including linguistic and local-regional) identity, compared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and 21.0% who chose a religious identity (Lewis and Bratton 2000: 24-25).<sup>11</sup> Ranking next to ethnicity is religious identity. In fact, in parts of the North commonly referred to as the ‘core’ or ‘Hausa-Fulani North’ - which is roughly coterminous with those states that adopted Sharia law in the Fourth Republic - religious identity is more critical than ethnic identity and in fact serves to activate ethnicity. This ushered in segregation pattern along ethnic and religious lines in most States in Northern Nigeria specifically pronounced in Bauchi and Jos (Gambo 2009).<sup>12</sup>

In examining the Jukun-Tiv conflict Best & Idyorough (2003)<sup>13</sup> observed different pattern of settlement in the course of the study. They reported settlement along ethnically homogenous lines such as Tiv people in Wukari Township; settlement based on wage employment and also settlement which emerged along the major roads after the conflict. The measurement of segregation in populations has been the focus of a large amount of research and a variety of segregation indices have been proposed and examined. The degree of segregation can vary substantially from place to place even within cities. For instance Doherty and Poole (1997)<sup>14</sup> in Northern Ireland examined the segregation between Protestants and Catholics. Residential segregation has major political and policy implications in Northern Ireland because of the legacy of communal division and conflict. The extent of segregation in Northern Ireland as a whole has been a focus particularly in media discussions which have attempted to evaluate the extent to which Northern Ireland has become a more communally-divided society in terms of residence.

The general consensus has been that segregation in general has increased through time in a ‘ratchet effect’, with large increases particularly after outbreaks of violent conflict, with little or no decrease when violence declines. Undoubtedly, violence has been an important element in driving changes in the geographical distribution of population since 1969 but other forces driving changes in the distribution, such as counter-urbanization as seen in other cities (Power and Shuttleworth 1997)<sup>15</sup>, cannot be discounted. Besides a focus on segregation in Northern Ireland as a whole, there have also been analyses of residential patterns in sub-units such as Belfast and its various parts, as well as selected towns and rural areas. This was made manifest when residential segregation in the Belfast Urban Area (BUA) and sub-areas came into limelight. The analysis was extended by Poole and Doherty (1996)<sup>16</sup> who outlined segregation patterns in towns and in locations such as the border. High levels of segregation were found in Belfast, Derry, Lurgan, Portadown, and Armagh with lower levels in locations like North Down and parts of East and North Antrim. This approach moves quite a way to recognizing that residential segregation varies between places and that presenting information on Northern Ireland as the ‘given unit’ of analysis conceals significant local variations.

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<sup>10</sup> Lewis, P. and Bratton, M. *Down To Earth: Changes in Attitudes Toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria*. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems and Management Systems International.2001.

<sup>11</sup> Lewis, P & Bratton, M (2001)

<sup>12</sup> Gambo, Y.L. *Impact of Violent Ethno-Religious Conflict on Residential Property Value Determinants in Northern Nigeria*. M.Sc. Thesis Submitted to Department of Estate Management University of Lagos .2009

<sup>13</sup> Best, S. and Idyorough, A. *Population Displacement in the Tiv-Jukun conflict* n Nnoli, O. (Ed.) *Communal Conflict and Population Displacement in Nigeria*, PACREP BOOK Series No.1, 2003:167-207

<sup>14</sup> Doherty, P. and Poole, M. A. *Ethnic residential segregation in Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1971–1991*. *The Geographical Review*, 87, 1997:520–536.

<sup>15</sup> Power, J., and Shuttleworth, I. *Population, segregation and socio-economic change in the Belfast Urban Area (BUA) 1971-1991*, *International Journal of Population Geography*, 3 1997:91-108.

<sup>16</sup> Power, J & Shuttleworth

## Conceptual Clarification

For a thorough understanding of few concepts that emanate in this paper such as ethnicity, conflict and religion it is of essence to make conceptual clarification.

### Ethnicity

Ethnicity according to Nnoli (1978:5)<sup>17</sup> refers to as a social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups. He further held that ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by communal character (i.e. language and culture) of their boundaries. Also, Otite (1990)<sup>18</sup> defined ethnicity as categories of people characterized by cultural criteria of symbols including language, value systems and normative behaviour, and whose members are anchored in a particular part of the new state territory. These definitions are adopted for the purpose of this study.

### Conflict

Conflict<sup>19</sup> is as an activity which takes place when individuals or groups wish to carry out mutually inconsistent acts concerning their wants, needs or obligations. Conflict denotes clash, contention, confrontation, battle, struggle, controversy or quarrel. Conflict may either be violent or non-violent. Conflict often manifests in violent form. Violence denotes employment of illegal methods of physical coercion for personal or group ends. Ethno-Religious conflict is the clash, contention, confrontation, battle, rivalry, controversy or quarrel among ethno-religious groups. Ethno-religious conflict stem from an irreconcilable posture with regards to symbolic values to the groups concerned. These symbolic values, which cannot be compromised, are religion and language. Conflict Management is concerned with the processes for controlling and regulating a conflict to ensure that it does not escalate. It is also concerned with techniques involved in the avoidance, prevention, containment and satisfactory resolution of the catalytic factors in a conflict. In the context of this study, it involves the actions or inactions of government and civil society organizations to avoid, prevent, and tackle ethno-religious conflagration.

As noted by Wolff (2006:2)<sup>19</sup>, the term ‘conflict’ is used to describe “a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just, goals”. He further argues that sometimes, conflict is as a result of the struggle for power and material gain by leaders and followers alike. Because of such vested interests, the conflict entrepreneurs prefer conflict to cooperation and privilege violence over negotiations. To have a thorough grasp of conflict, therefore, one must cautiously examine the various actors and factors and their interrelationship in each conflict situation. The material value or economic viability of the territory is also vital in conflict dynamics. For example, if the territory is rich in natural resources such as oil, gold, diamond, timber or if there are cultural attachments to the territory, there would be more stakes in it. Similarly, it has been put forward that most conflicts in Nigeria are premised on land space and resource competition; disputed jurisdiction of traditional rulers; creation and location of local government council headquarters; scarce political and economic resources; micro and macro social structures of Nigeria; population growth; and disregard for cultural symbols. Conflict may either be non- violent or violent. Notably, what constitutes violence and non-violence varies depending on the context or perception of the legitimate use of force or challenge of authority. Max Weber in conceptualizing the state contended that violence is legitimate in the rule over men. To Wolff (2006)<sup>20</sup> violence is the illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire of others. The criminal model of violence differentiated between legitimate and illegitimate violence. It places emphasis on the identification of criminal in the target domain. In this perspective, the problem of violence is ascribed to outlaws and

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<sup>17</sup> Nnoli, O. 1978:6

<sup>18</sup> Otite, O. *Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria*, Ibadan: Shaneson Limited.1990

<sup>19</sup> Wolff, S. *Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/Connections/Pop2006.pdf>. 2006 Retrieved 17 October, 2021.

<sup>20</sup> Wolff, S. *Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press



thugs who unleash terror on the law-abiding citizens and cause social and political instability in the society.

This model tends to ignore the socio-cultural factors that breed violence. In an attempt to provide an analytical framework for a deep appreciation of the causes of violence and conflicts, it is pertinent to analyze the various forms in which violence manifests. Violence can be categorized as either small or large-scale depending on the intensity. Large scale violence is difficult to control and its consequences are hard to predict.<sup>21</sup> Violence has also been categorized as physical and psychological. Psychological violence is an act of violence in the absence of a violent act. The destructive effects are gradual and cumulative. It involves brainwashing, indoctrination and threats. On the other hand, physical violence is an act that palpably involves physical means such as bombardment, whipping, stabbing to death, overpowering, poisoning, forceful intrusion, malevolent intrusion among others. Its destructive effects are swift and direct. It must be mentioned here that the distinction between the two is for the purpose of analytical clarity, as the borderline between both is little and sometimes difficult to draw. Beyond the conceptual and categorical perspectives, violence has been part of human history. In this perspective, the social contract theorists held that man prior to the emergence of the contemporary state lived in a state of nature. According to Thomas Hobbes, in the state of nature “life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” Several other theories and models have been developed to explain violence.

The micro and macro approach to violence is one of the several approaches. This approach draws a web of casual links between the personal biological impulse and psychological disposition on the one hand, and global structures, processes, and behaviour on the other. At the micro level the propellant of violence is identified as individual psychological factors and biological impulse, while at the macro perspective socio-cultural factors are adduced for violence. Studies have also shown that violence has been perceived as an instrument of survival under difficult circumstance. In this perspective, the frustration-aggression theory is the most explored. The exponents of the theory identified major conditions in which the individual or group deploy violence. To them, the obstruction or blockade of efforts by the individual intended to achieve desired ends such as power, wealth, social status, security, equality and freedom leads to frustration that breeds violence.

Also, a causal link has been drawn between unfulfilled rising expectation and violence. In this perspective, it is contended that tension or violence arises from unfulfilled expectation to people who had experienced hardship or enslavement but suddenly promised improved material condition or freedom. Furthermore, a relationship has been drawn between relative deprivation and violence. In this sense, the objective material condition is believed not to nurture violence but rather the sense of deprivation in relation to others around them, or their own past condition is believed to be responsible for violence with the intent to redress the situation. The greed and grievance analytical framework ascribes violent conflicts to grievances arising from limited economic opportunities, poverty and inequalities. There are two strands of contentions in this analytical framework. The first perceive violent conflicts as under-girded by irrationality originating essentially from hatred. In the second perspective, violent conflict is hinged on a number of grievances such as systematic discrimination and gross human rights violation, inequality in economic and political power, or dearth of resources especially in multiethnic state. In this regard, violence is perceived as instrumental like any means for seeking redress. Violent conflict has also been explained from the industry perspective. It is believed that the dominant propellant of violence is economic benefits and commercial interest rather than grievance. This presupposes that the preoccupation of the belligerents and insurgents is the economic spoils and booty that they appropriate from the protracted violence. Another theoretical explanation for the etiology of violent conflicts is systemic pathologies arising from the dialectical changes in the structures and processes of society. According to Potholm (1979:149 cited in Deeka 2003)<sup>21</sup> when a system does not deliver what its leaders had promised and the political elites continue to ask the masses

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<sup>21</sup> Deeka, M. Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People and the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria in Tunde Babawale (ed.) *Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2002

to make sacrifices that the elites themselves are unwilling to make much of the aura of legitimacy gained during the decolonization period will be dissipated. In another theoretical prism, eruption of violent conflicts is linked with group pluralism and interactions to achieve their diverse objectives.

In seeking relevance or retention of political power, the elites manipulate and massage religious and ethnic sentiments. Many of the ethnic clashes and sectarian conflagrations are rooted in the context of the group conflict theoretical assumption. Violence has also been perceived as structural and institutional. Structural violence is the form of violence rationalized on the basis of a great range of social injustice and inequalities prevailing in a state. In this perspective, reformers, leftists and even terrorists rationalize their violence and opposition against the state on the basis of seeking to correct the prevailing social injustice and inequalities in the state. The form of violence in this context often involves a direct physical attack in response to and defence against acts perceived as unjust and inequitable in the society. On the other hand, institutional violence is a quiet violence that arises due to systematic deprivation in the way of transactions within a state. Several other factors such as over population, impotence, loss of power, displacement, the quest for social values, as well as natural phenomena such as natural disasters, earthquake, environmental scarcities, disease outbreak, drought, and famine can be identified as contributory to violence.

## Religion

Religion is an elusive and imprecise concept. It is difficult to define with precision and objectivity because it is emotion laden (Egwu 2011).<sup>22</sup> Religion has been variously defined as a body of truths, laws and rites by which a man is subordinated to transcendent being (Adeniyi 1993).<sup>23</sup> Again religion denotes a set of symbolic forms and actions that relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence. Drawing similar concern, Peter (1988)<sup>24</sup> conceptualized religion as system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting mood and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. Religion has further been defined as attitude towards superhuman powers. According to Christopher Dawson (cited in Agarwal et.al 1994:236)<sup>25</sup> “wherever and whenever man has a sense of dependence on external powers which is conceived as mysterious and higher than man’s own, there is religion, and the feeling of awe and self-abasement with which man is filled in the presence of such powers is essentially a religious emotion, the root of worship and prayer”. Also, religion has been conceived as “the attempt to bring the relative, the temporary, and the painful things in life into relations with what is conceived to be permanent, absolute and cosmically optimistic”.

To Sapir (cited in Agarwal et.al 1994:237)<sup>26</sup> religion is a man’s never ceasing attempt to discover a road to spiritual serenity across the perplexities and dangers of daily life. In conceptualization religion has remain a “spontaneous response to the awe-inspiring extra-ordinary manifestation of reality”. In a broader perspective, religion can be understood in two related, yet distinct ways, material and spiritual. In the material perspective, it is conceived as religious establishments (i.e. institutions and officials) as well as social groups and religious concerns. On the other hand, in the spiritual perspective, religion is concerned with models of social and individual behavior that help believers to organize their everyday lives. It is in this way that religion is characterized as transcendence, supernatural realities and sacred.

<sup>22</sup> Egwu, S.G. *Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria*, Jos: (St.Stephen Inc. Book House. 2011).

<sup>23</sup> Adeniyi, M.O. “Religion and Politics: An Eye-Bird’s View of Development in Nigeria” in Akamidu, R.A. et.al (eds.) *Religion and Politics in Nigeria*, Ilorin: Nigerian Association for the Study of Religion (NASR) 1993.

<sup>24</sup> Peter, V.V. “Religion” in Barnard, A. et.al (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, New York: Routhledge.1988.

<sup>25</sup> Agarwal, A et. al. *Principles of Political Science*, (Fifteenth Edition), New Delhi: R. Chand & Co. 1994

<sup>26</sup> Agarwal, A et. al. *Principles of Political Science*

## **Ethno Religious Conflicts Trends in Northern Nigeria**

It has been recorded that most of the violent conflicts in Northern Nigerian have been either purely religious or ethno-religious (Mohammed 2004).<sup>27</sup> The incessant increase in violence in intra-religious conflicts is a very worrisome and this has caught the attention of clerics. It is surely a very dangerous dimension to religious intolerance, even within a particular religion. In some cases, ethnicity has been the basis for violent intra-religious conflicts adding a new dimension to religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria. The tendency to identify some ethnic groups with a particular religion easily gives credence to the use of religion for the manipulation of other differences. It is a fact that, many modern secular nations fraternize with some religions, depending on the peculiarity of such countries especially the wishes of the majority of the citizens. Similarly, a number of theocratic states whose political system is generally guided by the dictates of a dominant religion still find it convenient to accommodate one or more prominent minority religions. North-West Report maintained same position. 'It reported that: "there is a definite feeling, especially in Kano, that the zone's identity is mainly religious, particularly Islamic, and that such identity should be protected at all cost. The options are: The acceptance of such identity, or the division of the country. The constitutional means of dividing the country is a preferred option. If otherwise, then Sharia should be applied to Muslims only and the rest of the citizens in the Sharia implementing states should live according to the rules of the majority"'. There are two types of religious conflicts in the geo-political region. They are the conflict between followers of two different religions and conflict between followers of the same religion, particularly between Muslims.

The identifiable causes of inter religious conflict range from extremism to politicisation of religion. A factor that contributed to this development is the politicisation of religion that took place at both national and local levels. The attempt at the national level by the Ibrahim Babangida's administration in the late 80's to enlist Nigeria into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) had raised the spectre of religions division at the national level. The expansion of Sharia legal system by some state governments further heightened the tension between Muslims and Christians. The situation is made worse with the presence of religious armed groups, the Hisbah to monitor the implementation of the Sharia legal system at local level. The activities and proliferation of the new generation Christian Churches in terms of aggressive preaching and indiscriminate constructions of Church buildings in residential areas that are dominated by Muslims have the potential of generating conflict in some states in the region. Bako (1994)<sup>28</sup> viewed inter religious conflict consisting of different ethnic groups belonging to Islam and Christianity, battling along majority/minority and indigene/settler divides within a frame work of ethno religious domination and struggle for liberation.

This form of religious conflict he added, exists between minority Hausa- Fulani Muslim groups resident in predominantly non Hausa Christian areas, in the Northern towns and cities. Example of such conflicts he substantiated, are those between the Hausa and Southern Kaduna ethnic groups from Kafanchan; the Hausa and the Kataf; the Hausa and the Sayawa; the Hausa and the Jukun; the Hausa and the Birom among others over the ownership of towns, sharing of religious space, land, market, fishing ponds, rulership chieftaincies and participation in local government election. The increase in religious intolerance and the use of religion for political ends was made possible because of the public perception that access to power and resources at the national level became politicised along religious and ethnic lines. This claim supported by Human Rights watch report. "The country is divided along religious lines, with the boundaries between Muslim and Christian often overlapping with some of the most important ethnic and cultural divides". The intra religious tension, especially among Muslims is another palpable generator of conflict. The cause of such conflict report has both international and local dimensions. The overseas training Muslims receive either in the Middle East or the Izala group represents the Saudi brand of Islam and the Muslim Brothers represents Iran's brand of Islam. Related

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<sup>27</sup> Mohammed, S.A. The Impact of Conflict on the Economy: The case of Plateau State of Nigeria [www.odi.org.uk/events/nigeria\\_2004/](http://www.odi.org.uk/events/nigeria_2004/) (Accessed 31 October, 2021)

<sup>28</sup> Bako, S. Urbanization and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria. Proceeding of International Symposium on Urban Management and Urban Violence in Africa, Ibadan 7th-11th Nov. 1994

to this is the struggle for legitimacy between the traditional Islamic scholars and the young and western educated Muslims. In the opinion of Bako (1994)<sup>29</sup>, in Northern Nigeria, Muslim intra sectarianism has manifested itself eloquently in the large scale Maitatsine insurrections which took place in the northern cities of Kano, Maiduguri, Kaduna, Gombe, Yola and Funtua between 1980 and 1993. Recently the Boko haram, an Islamic sect known for its detest for Western education had raided the cities of Maiduguri and Bauchi agitating for implementation of Islamic law in Northern region of the country. Bako maintained that a Christian movement similar to the Maitatsine can be identified in the 'militant,' born 'again' movement among the urban poor and proletarian groups opposed to the dominant, orthodox Christian movements, though he concluded that their operation is less organized and violent than the Maitatsine.

Another glaring factor that sparks up ethno religious violent conflicts is indigene/settler divides. In many parts of Nigeria, the issue of indigeneity has seemed to create new kinds of parochialism where none had existed before. The settler question in urban areas in Nigeria has produced violent conflicts in varying capacities as witnessed in Kasuwan Magani (1980), Zango Kataf, Gure Kahagu (1984), Kafanchan, Kaduna, Ilorin, Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi (1991), Zango Kataf (1992), Tiv and Idoma (1993), (Egwu 2011).<sup>30</sup> Dung asserts that these conflicts often start as local conflicts but later spread to other areas. He further states that religious factors have also played a crucial role in the generation and expansion of these conflicts, especially in situations where the religious and political boundaries overlap. The issue of indigene/settler divides began to take on increased importance not long after Nigeria's independence "with regional policies that discriminated against the indigenes of other region in areas as diverse as employment and the acquisition of land" (Alanamu 2004).<sup>31</sup>

The Indigene/settler fracas most often than not culminate into ethno-religious violent conflicts in the North. Example of 'religious conflicts are: Maitatsine insurrections which took place in the Northern cities of Kano, Maiduguri, Kaduna, Gombe, Yola and Funtua between 1980 and 1993; Kano riot (1984) as a result of the coming of Rev. Bonke; Tungdo – Wudugu (1989); Hausa/Fulani and Sayawa in Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi State (1991, 1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011); Bauchi religious crisis (1991, 2006, 2007 in Yelwa Kagadama); Hausa and Kataf (1992); Hausa and Berom in Jos (1994); Kaduna sharia conflict (2000); Jos/Plateau State (2001,2002, 2008, 2010 and 2011), (Ojo 2010).<sup>32</sup> The increasing level of violence informed largely by intolerance, hatred and stereotypes in Northern Nigeria has risen to such fratricidal levels. The role of religion as reinforcing with ethnicity as instrument for assertiveness is provoked not as an end in itself but by social and economic conditions to resist extinction, domination and marginalization, it is the combination of perceived ethnic threat and personal vulnerability that force people to fall back on community, groups, religion and other cleavages.

Unarguably once Nigeria's most serene city, Jos is now synonymous with senseless violence, largely occasioned by misgivings and primordial sentiments and prejudices among inhabitants. The directive given to the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Jos sometimes ago to carry out a comprehensive research into the crisis and similar cases across the country can only have the desired results if the government musters enough political will to tackle the issues leading to and fueling the situations. When it began, it was a time the entire country was trying to come to terms with the prospects of democracy early into the Fourth Republic. A monster called indigene/settler syndrome tore the Jos people apart. The Birom and Hausa were engaged in a supremacy feud over Jos North Local Government. Simultaneously, religion became an issue. When it did, the scope of the problem was amplified as dwellers from other parts of the country were compelled to line up behind the two

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<sup>29</sup> Bako, S. Urbanization and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria

<sup>30</sup> Egwu, S.G. 2011:15-16

<sup>31</sup> Alanamu, S. A. "Ethno-Religious Conflict in Nigeria" in *African Profile*, vol.1 No.1 2004:51

<sup>32</sup> Ojo, E.O. *A Survey of Ethno-Religious Crisis and its Implications for Nigeria's Nascent Democracy, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* (Volume 12, No.2, 2010:13

original parties to the conflict (Gomos 2011).<sup>33</sup> Predictably; the mixtures of ethnicity and faith have taken the strife to unimaginable, deadly heights.

Whole villages have been leveled. Neighbours who had lived in harmony for decades have turned on one another with murderous fervour. That has led to the loss of thousands of lives. Numerous buildings and other valuables have been razed. Social and economic life is at its lowest. The city and indeed state that used to hold a lot of attraction for tourists now find it hard to sustain even the love of the indigenes. Fear has become a common denominator. On 5<sup>th</sup> of June, 2011, two suspected bombers who were on a morbid mission to one of the churches in the city were allegedly blown up by their own device before they could reach their destination (Uhunmwangho S.O. (2011).<sup>34</sup> As the report was being disseminated, church services were promptly terminated and worshippers dispersed. Law enforcement agents now comb worship centres in Jos on Fridays and Sundays to safeguard them. For a nation whose citizens boast of belonging to either Christianity or Islam, two of the world's greatest faiths, that indeed is a sad commentary (Egwu 2011).<sup>35</sup> On the surface, the order given to NIPSS by the Federal Government of Nigeria should bring hope to Nigerians and even the international community many of whom are apprehensive about the fate of the city.

The profile of the team - several competent scholars practitioners and researchers in peace and conflict, sociology were deployed in order to attain sustainable development in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general which were from diverse ethnic, religious, geographical and political backgrounds - is an added boost. Equally noteworthy is the government brief, which includes devising workable peace, enhancing strategies, building a stakeholder model by applying strategies for sustainable development, participatory crisis analysis and strengthening community-based groups towards achieving societal harmony. Nigeria is a key player in African Affairs and an important participant in global matters. The country, which is fondly called "the giant of Africa", is the most populous and potentially one of the well-endowed nations. Base on the 2006 Population and Housing Census report, its population is put at over 144 million (NPC, 2006). It is one of the world's most ethnically diverse nations. It comprises multi-ethnic nationalities put between 250 and 450 (Aghemelo and Osumah 2009).<sup>36</sup> Some of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria are larger than many independent states in Africa.

At the early 1960s, of the estimated 3,000 ethnic groups in the world about 1000 were represented in Africa and about 445 in Nigeria (Akali 1997).<sup>37</sup> Of the numerous ethnic groups, there are three dominant ones: these are the Hausa in the Northern region, the Igbo in the Eastern region and the Yoruba in the Western region. Other minority ethnic groups include Kanuri, Tiv, Bini, Isoko, Nupe, Ibibio, Jukun, Gwari, Igbira among others. The three dominant ethnic groups have been net beneficiaries of the political power at the national level. The overwhelming majority of the Northern population is Muslim, which is estimated to be over 50 per cent of the total population. Christianity is strong in the Southern region, accounting for perhaps 35 per cent of the total population of the country, while the balance of the population remains animists. The challenge of managing Nigeria's political and ethnic plurality has not been an easy task. The ethnic problem has posed a number of threats to the legitimacy of the national government and its ability to offer leadership appropriate to the demand of nation-building. The mobilization of ethnic sentiments and solidarity seeking to gain or retain relevance has fueled anxiety, suspicion, fear of domination and outright conflicts. Granted that conflict is an inevitable phenomenon in social and political settings and thus, not peculiar to any part of the

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<sup>33</sup> Gomos, E, Before The Jos Crises Consume Us All in Vanguard of 3<sup>rd</sup> February, 2011

<sup>34</sup> Uahunmwangho, S.O (2011). Challenges and Solutions to Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Case Study of the Jos Crises. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 13, No.5), Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, Pennsylvania.

<sup>35</sup> Egwu, S.G. 2011:19-20

<sup>36</sup> Aghemelo, T.A. and Osumah, O. Nigerian Government and Politics: An Introductory Perspective, Benin City: (MaraMon Bros & Ventures Ltd, 2009)

<sup>37</sup> Alkali, R.A. The World Bank and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria: Lesson for Vision 2010, Africa Review, Vol.1, No.1, 1997

world, its nature, dimension, consequences and management vary from one country to another. Nigeria is one of the nations in the world whose political landscape has been inundated, suffused with and deeply enmeshed in spectrum of recurring complex conflicts ranging from resource, communal, to political and ethno-religious conflicts. Political and ethno-religious conflagrations have severally drawn the country to the precipice of disaster. It has engendered huge human carnage, internal displacements and refugee crisis, loss of investments, strained inter-communal or inter-ethnic relations, threatened internal security and public order. There is the high level of inter-ethnic and inter-religious vendetta in the country, to the point that it seems that Nigeria is now exhibiting the symptom of a collapsing state, whose members are perpetually at war with one another.

Thus, the recurring political and ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have become matter of great concern to the international community. On account of the nature of the conflicts among other security threats in the country, United States National Council Intelligence Report on May 28, 2005 predicted that the nation may explode (disintegrate) within 15 years (Agbaje 2005).<sup>38</sup> Indeed, the nation has undergone series of profound civil disturbances and recurrently seeking ways to manage her persistent and complex problems and ethno-religious conflict. Several efforts such as deployment of huge security operatives, peaceful dialogue amongst religious groups and setting up of probe panels have been made to manage the perennial conflict but with little or no positive transformation.

### **Conclusion**

The unending conflict and crises in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria since 1999 is a major test on our nascent democratic experiment as all effort to restore peace in the area has proved abortive. For some, it would appear that our brand of democracy has imbued in the people the culture of impunity while for others; it is political differences and intolerance that has fueled some of the violence that has erupted in Jos. Therefore, the government of the day should harness all the administrative, political and military resources at its disposal to ensure that the current debate on sustainable development in African is maintained and also halt this perennial bloody contention that clearly stands out in our traumatized country, Nigeria in particular and African in general. The paper concludes that the upsurge of violence is a serious concern and there should be a way out of it for democracy to thrive in Nigeria. The government needs to introduce dialogue, proper administration of justice and the political will to deal with erring parties without compromise.

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<sup>38</sup> Agbaje, O. "The 'U.S. Intelligence Report'", *The Guardian*, Tuesday, June 14, 2005

## La Coopération en matière de défense en Relations Internationales: le cas des Accords de Défense Franco-Tchadiens

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### Résumé

*De par sa situation géographique, située au centre du continent africain, la République du Tchad continue de constituer, depuis son indépendance, un atout géostratégique à la France. Sa capitale N'Djamena sert de plaque tournante de communication aérienne à long rayon d'action entre les diverses contrées africaines. En effet, cet Etat a servi de baromètre aux accords de défense en gardant les relations étroites avec la France depuis l'étape de l'Empire français d'Afrique centrale, à l'ère de colonisation. La France y a gardé sa base militaire, installée à N'Djamena, depuis la colonisation pour servir la politique militaire française en Afrique francophone. Dans le cadre de maintien du Tchad dans l'Empire français, l'administration militaire coloniale a eu deux missions principales : le maintien de l'ordre et, la protection du pouvoir. C'est à ce titre que les garnisons militaires ont été gérées par les soldats français jusqu'en 1965 date à laquelle, elles furent intégrées à l'armée tchadienne. L'instabilité politique au Tchad a contraint le Gouvernement de Paris à intervenir directement à travers des différentes campagnes militaires. Les Accords de Défense entre les deux Etats ont permis à la France de décider et de maintenir le devenir politique du Tchad. Cet article est le produit des données de source primaire, collectées à travers des interviews avec des personnes de différentes formations, des administrateurs, des anciens soldats, des personnalités traditionnelles, etc., qui ont vécu ou travaillé avec les coopérateurs français. Les personnes interviewées ont été sélectionnées selon leur niveau d'éducation et la fonction occupée. Les interviews ont été conduites entre 2018 et 2021. Les données de source secondaire, des livres et journaux académiques et des publications de la presse ont été aussi utilisées pour enrichir le texte. Les données recueillies des interviews ont été analysées et recoupées avec celles de sources secondaires dans l'intention de s'assurer de la véracité des informations. Le cadre de référence théorique, la géostratégie, nous a servi de guide dans nos analyses et évaluation des faits.*

**Mots clés :** Tchad, armées françaises, intervention, occupation

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### Introduction

Le Tchad a été toujours un centre d'opérations militaires pour l'armée française depuis l'accession à son indépendance, le 11 août 1960. L'engagement militaire, exclusivement français, est maintenu dans cette ancienne colonie d'Afrique centrale, grâce aux Accords de Défenses signés entre le Tchad et la France. Les interventions militaires les plus importantes menées par Paris, à travers des différentes opérations, sont : la Mission de Réforme Administrative (MRA), Limousin, Bison, Tacaud, Manta et Epervier.

La situation géographique spécifique du Tchad et surtout sa localisation dans la région du Sahel, lui impliquent certaines caractéristiques politiques évidentes sur le plan intérieur ainsi que dans ses

relations avec ses voisins. Les difficultés chroniques dans ces deux domaines semblent justement être issues, de tout temps, de cet environnement spécifique ont été perçues comme telles, notamment par l'ancien Président de la République Jacques Chirac : « *Le Tchad est un espace défini par les frontières de ses voisins* » (Bayart, J-F, 1981 :8).

L'analyse de coopération militaire permet de connaître les décalages entre les textes et les faits, malgré les clauses abusives, de nombreux traités et conventions signés entre la France et le Tchad. Même si le succès semble être en termes stratégiques connus, certaines élites politico-militaires ne disposent pas une marge de manœuvre pour faire face à la France. C'est ainsi que la coopération militaire se maintient sur la longue durée. Ainsi, on peut s'interroger même sur le bilan de cette coopération militaire en examinant l'assistance technique. C'est là que se situe la spécificité de la coopération militaire au Tchad avec deux dimensions<sup>39</sup>, celle du politique et celle de militaire.

### **La Coopération en matière de défense en relations internationales**

En réalité, la coopération en matière de défense en relations internationales cache plusieurs aspects de la diplomatie qui inclue la sécurité et la sûreté des citoyens et, la protection des investissements des pays concernés. Cette coopération sert aussi d'outil de dissuasion dans des négociations.

La puissance militaire est l'un des instruments préconisés dans la conduite de la diplomatie par les adeptes du réalisme. Les réalistes font de la puissance militaire d'un pays, sa considération dans la prise des décisions sur la scène internationale. Ils considèrent que les enjeux principaux de la diplomatie reviennent à l'augmentation, à la détention et à la démonstration du pouvoir sur la scène internationale (Rourke, 2009 : 17).


Le contact de l'Afrique avec l'Occident, de la traite atlantique à la globalisation en passant par la colonisation, la loi du plus fort semble être la règle principale dans la conduite de la diplomatie. Depuis le début de la guerre globale contre le terrorisme, déclarée par les Etats Unis en 2001, les bases militaires des grandes puissances ne cessent de se reprendre à travers le monde. Le Mali, le Niger, le Cameroun et le Tchad font partie des Etats africains qui abritent des bases militaires des différents pays occidentaux, voir la carte ci-dessous. Parmi ces bases, la présence des Etats-Unis et l'Opération Barkhane sont vivement remarquables (KEENAN, 2017).

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<sup>39</sup> La prise en compte directe par l'Elysée via le secrétariat de Jacques Foccart dont la naissance est complexe, objet de discorde entre les ministères des Armées, des affaires étrangères et de la coopération.



**Carte:** Les bases militaires étrangères dans la région saharo-sahélienne (2017)



**Source:** Jeremy Keenan, *War Game in the Sahel*<sup>40</sup>.  
Modifiée par Baboussoua Awal,  
Département de Géographie,  
UAM de Niamey et nous, février 2019

En plus, les aides militaires offertes par les puissances occidentales ne visent pas à éradiquer le terrorisme dans le Sahel mais plutôt à assurer l'intérêt des Etats donateurs. Autrement dit, depuis la chute du régime de Kadhafi au Lybie en 2011, l'Europe a enregistré une forte croissance en termes d'émigrants qui empruntent le Sahara pour accéder à la mer rouge. Par leur présence, les Européens arrivent à réduire le nombre de migrants surtout avec l'aide du Niger qui a accepté l'ouverture des centres d'accueil sur son territoire. Les pays européens trient ceux qu'ils veulent sur leur territoire et renvoient le reste vers leurs pays d'origine.

Avec le chaos en Lybie, l'absence de l'Etat au nord du Mali et surtout l'incapacité des armées nationales des pays sahéliens à assurer la surveillance totale de leurs territoires nationaux, les puissances ont jugé nécessaire leur présence dans la région. Grâce aux moyens aériens, les militaires ont pu réduire l'occupation d'un vaste espace dans le Sahel par les jihadistes. Ce présent article se limite à l'examen chronologique des activités de forces armées françaises sur le sol tchadien dans le cadre de la coopération en matière de défense.

### **Le fondement historique des interventions militaires françaises au Tchad**

La politique militaire occupe une place de choix dans le rétablissement de liens entre la France et son ancienne colonie, le Tchad, dès l'indépendance. Cette politique permet d'exposer l'histoire de la vision militaire de la France et son influence sur ses anciennes colonies. L'armée étant un élément important de la diplomatie occupe une place de prédilection dans la coopération entre la France et les pays francophones du continent africain.

La France a connu des expéditions lointaines qui ont exigé la création des troupes d'infanterie et d'artillerie dont la mission principale est la défense des ports et des comptoirs créés sur les autres

<sup>40</sup>. <http://newafricanmagazine.com/war-games-sahel> consulté 14/02/2017

continents. Ainsi, le développement des établissements coloniaux français entraîne une extension corrélative des Troupes de Marines. Mais, ces troupes n'en participaient pas moins à la défense du territoire français. L'héroïsme de l'infanterie de marine au cours de la guerre de 1870 face à la Prusse le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre a trouvé son symbole dans le fait d'armes Bazeilles qui est pieusement commémoré chaque année en France, (Djimtola, Gagsou et Golvang, 2008 : 162).

Une armée dédiée uniquement à la colonisation est créée par la *loi du 7 juillet 1900* et est dénommée Troupes Coloniales (TC). Elle a constitué une partie de l'armée de terre soumise à un régime spécial caractérisé par une autonomie complète à la fois statutaire et budgétaire. Son organisation est définie par la même loi et elle a aussi connu des modifications profondes dans les rapports entre la France métropolitaine et les différents territoires d'outre-mer. Ces territoires sont placés sous la juridiction française, d'où de changements d'appellation : coloniale. Les troupes deviennent, elles aussi d'outre-mer en 1958 pour reprendre leur ancienne dénomination de Troupes de marines en 1960 (Djimtola et al., 2008 : 163).

En 1958, la suppression du ministère de la France d'Outre-mer et la création de la communauté ont abouti à une réorganisation des organes centraux chargés de la direction de troupes de marine. Le Ministre des armées est devenu l'héritier du ministre de la France d'outre-mer. Le principe de maintien de l'autonomie statutaire et budgétaire a constitué un moyen commode de transfert des cadres et de troupes originaires des ex colonies aux armées nationales africaines (Djimtola et al., 2008 : 164).

### **Formation/Naissance d'une Armée Tchadienne**

Le Tchad, comme les autres anciennes colonies, a vu naître sa propre armée à l'aube de son indépendance. Cependant, le seul régiment en service au Tchad jusqu'en 1955, était le Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais du Tchad (RTST). Le passage glorieux de ce régiment colonial était jalonné par les campagnes de guerre inscrite à son drapeau : au Tchad 1900, au Ouaddaï 1909, au Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti 1913, au Cameroun 1914-1916, à Koufra 1941, au Fezzan 1942.

Toutes ces villes et dates rappellent les victoires de l'armée française dans la bataille, d'où les Tchadiens ont joué un rôle très actif pour la libération de la France. Certains ont été décoré, comme : le Sergent-chef Némir, le tirailleur Kailao André, l'Adjudant Doursam Idriss, le lieutenant Mouniro et le lieutenant Koli-Yorgui. D'autres ont trouvé la mort ainsi que les français à savoir le Commandant Lamy, le capitaine Cointet, le Colonel Moll (Djimtola et al., 2008 : 165). Tels sont les Tchadiens qui ont fait preuve de leur courage et de leurs mérites dans l'armée française. Il faut noter qu'en 1955, deux nouveaux corps, issus du Régiment de Tirailleurs sénégalais du Tchad sont créés. Il s'agit du groupement saharien du Tchad, devenu 72<sup>e</sup> régiment d'infanterie de Marine (RIMA) et la base militaire de Fort-Lamy. Il a été renforcé en 1957 et a pris l'appellation de 70<sup>e</sup> régiment d'infanterie marine. Ensuite, il est constitué en trois bataillons, dont les unités sont stationnées à Fort-Lamy, Fort-Archambault, Abéché et Moussoro (Gali Ngothé Gatta, 1985 : 38).

L'histoire du Tchad depuis l'indépendance a été, dans une large mesure rythmée par le fait de militaire (Mahamat, Saleh, Y, 2002 : 25). L'armée française et la guerre ont joué un rôle prépondérant dans l'évolution politique de ce pays. Les militaires français investissent la sphère de l'Etat en orientant la gestion du domaine public. Cette ingérence de la France dans la vie politique tchadienne traduit l'essence de la politique néocoloniale des pays impérialistes européens vis-à-vis de leurs anciennes colonies.

Certes, l'indépendance politique a été accordée officiellement aux anciennes colonies mais cependant, une forte dépendance économique est conséquemment établie. Les relations postcoloniales entre la France et ses ex-colonies sont exceptionnelles et extraordinaire. Elle se trouve dans tous les aspects et domaines de la vie des nouveaux États autrefois ses colonies. Cependant, les forces armées sont plus ciblées par Paris afin de maintenir le contrôle total de l'Etat.

## Une armée nationale tchadienne

Une fois que l'indépendance acquise, l'Etat tchadien, tout comme les autres Etas africains de colonies françaises ont érigé leurs armées nationales sur la base et avec les éléments des anciennes troupes coloniales. Les types et mécanismes de relations qui existaient entre ces unités militaires coloniales et la métropole ont profondément marqué la nouvelle armée nationale.

Au moment de l'accession à l'indépendance, la France a légué au nouvel Etat, l'embryon d'une armée avec une seule compagnie. C'est cette compagnie d'ailleurs qui a servi de garde au drapeau que le Tchad a reçu le 11 août 1960<sup>41</sup>. Pour le premier défilé, la France a rappelé ses officiers tchadiens en formation ou en mission. Il s'agit de lieutenant Doumro, Ribey, Moudalbaye, Koli Yorgui, Kimtolngar, Sou-do et Tolmbaye en mission ; Rodai, Malloum - qui deviendra plus tard le Chef de l'Etat en 1975, en formation à Fréjus en France (Gali, 1985 :19). Ces officiers français ont été prêtés au Tchad uniquement pour la circonstance, ainsi qu'une compagnie de 200 hommes pour soutenir sa souveraineté. Ils avaient en tout et pour tout, comme équipement des armes individuelles et radio de transmissions.

Véritablement, l'armée nationale tchadienne n'a pas existé, elle naît sur la cendre de l'armée coloniale. Mais, l'acte de reconnaissance a été signé le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier, par l'Ordonnance N° 02/PC-D du 27 mai 1961. Les textes d'application sont : « *Arrêté N° 1174/PC-D du 9 juin portant recrutement, les Décisions N° 4520/GENEDEF zone 2 du 2-12-1961, IM/1403/DAOM/INT du 23-5-1961, 2725/EM/FTOM/15 du 27-6-1961 et enfin le Décret N° 119/PG-CM du 12-5-1962* <sup>42</sup> », portant règlement et discipline dans l'ANT. Organisée à l'image de celle de la métropole, la jeune armée se compose de l'armée de terre, de l'air, de la gendarmerie, de la garde nationale et nomade et des services interarmes. Cette armée n'a pas seulement la mission militaire mais a des actions d'ordre social<sup>43</sup> aussi.

Ainsi, 750 éléments tchadiens de l'armée française ont été transférés à la jeune République du Tchad. Selon la puissance coloniale, pour mission d'encadrement, conformément aux accords d'assistance technique de 1960, dont 32 officiers ont été mis à la disposition du pays. Ce n'est qu'en 1964, lors de la constitution du premier bataillon et plus tard, un recrutement national a eu lieu au prorata de la population de chaque préfecture. Au bout de deux ans, on a libéré 75% des recrues, les 25% qui restaient ont été des techniciens au génie civil, (Mahamat, Saleh, Y. 2002 :26).

Dans le domaine de la formation et de l'équipement de cette nouvelle armée, en application de l'accord d'assistance militaire signé le 15 août 1960, la France a apporté son concours en personnel militaire. Le premier but a été l'organisation et l'instruction des forces armées du Tchad. Ainsi, l'encadrement a été surtout fait à l'Ecole des enfants de troupe du Général Leclerc de Brazzaville, ensuite dans les différentes écoles militaires en France, (Mahamat, 25). Ce n'est qu'en 1969, qu'une Ecole des officiers a été créée à Fort-Lamy. Les seuls cadres et unité formés par la suite en dehors du Tchad et de la France, l'ont été au Zaïre et à Madagascar. Elle était stationnée à Fort-Lamy avec son Etat-Major national. Tous ces jeunes officiers étaient du même moule et connaissaient bien la même tradition coloniale.

Le rôle de cette armée tchadienne, c'est, en temps de paix, de s'instruire, de s'éduquer et de se former. Elle doit être apte à défendre les frontières et protéger les citoyens du pays. Elle maintient aussi l'ordre et la sécurité, véritable problème dont ce pays a fait face. Mais, théoriquement elle n'était pas un bon élève car, elle était née malade. En effet, quand cette armée a été chargée d'administrer le BET, après le départ des quelques officiers français qui étaient restés, elle n'avait pas pu. Pour la première fois, le pouvoir a constaté une certaine faiblesse, dont il était obligé d'appeler la France au secours. C'est à

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<sup>41</sup> Hélé Davidi, entretien du 16 avril 2021 à N'Djaména.

<sup>42</sup> Documentation française, archives militaires citées par Mahamat Saleh Yacoub, p.26.

<sup>43</sup> Lopma Osée, entretien du 14 mai 2021 à N'Djaména.

partir de là, que le contexte oblige à percevoir la France comme un outil qu'il faut utiliser pour sécuriser le territoire.

### **Le contexte des différentes opérations militaires française au Tchad**

Après le retour du général de Gaulle à la magistrature suprême française, il a proposé aux territoires africains de l'union française de Ve République une communauté d'Etats. C'est l'expression de la politique gaulliste à l'égard du tiers monde en général et du Tchad en particulier. Ce cadre juridique est à l'origine de différents accords dont ceux de défenses connaissent une existence très courte qui aboutit alors à deux ans aux vents des indépendances en 1960.

Ces accords militaires ont lié le Tchad à la France dans une période suivant immédiatement l'indépendance. Ainsi, ils ont été négociés empiriquement sous pression de circonstances, ne répondant pas ainsi aux réalités de nouvel Etat. En principe, ils ont établi un équilibre entre l'aide apportée par la France au Tchad et les avantages particuliers dans divers domaines. Ces accords étaient en réalité fondés sur le maintien de relations militaires et politiques inégalitaires, héritage de la colonisation (Hansen, A, 2000 : 19). Ainsi, la coopération militaire est une suite logique présentée comme une grande réussite du régime gaulliste.

Elle se traduit par une continuité de présence sur le plan humain, à savoir le maintien et l'envoi des milliers des coopérants militaires au Tchad. Alors que l'objectif de luttes pour l'indépendance était de se libérer de l'emprise des anciens colons. Cette continuité juridique et relationnelle est l'un des éléments les plus visibles de la période postcoloniale. L'adoption de ce cadre de défense a impliqué la présence des coopérants militaires français. Mais, ce cadre n'est pas apte à s'adapter à l'évolution politique territoriale (Lavroff, G, 1980 : 263).

Ces accords conclus n'ont pas porté le titre d'Accord de défense, mais celui d'accord concernant l'Assistance militaire entre la République française et la République du Tchad (Lecornec, J, 1963 : 179). Cette distinction dans les termes ne procède pas une nuance de style accidentelle portée, elle exprime très exactement une différence de contenu. On comprend donc que les renforts militaires français ont été envoyés au Tchad non pour amplifier les moyens de protection mais pour établir la sécurité. Ainsi, la sécurité dont on parle ne concerne que la sécurité de président qui soit en bon termes avec la France et non celle de peuple. Dans ce cas il s'avère que l'Armée française au Tchad est un instrument de maintien de la présence postcoloniale.

Bref, cette question a été introduite au parlement français par un député de l'opposition. Selon la réponse du Secrétaire d'Etat : ces forces sont au Tchad en vertu de l'accord d'assistance militaire dont le parlement a autorisé la ratification par la loi du 28 juillet 1960. Cet accord s'insère lui-même dans le cadre de notre politique envers le tiers monde (Moyangar, N, 1970 : 67).

Faisant partie des éléments de puissance d'Etat sur la scène politique internationale, les Forces armées deviennent carrément un instrument diplomatique au service de l'intérêt national. Armé du soutien de son peuple, exprimé par l'Assemblée Nationale, le Gouvernement français continue la mise en œuvre de sa politique coloniale sous une forme déguisée dans ses territoires d'antan devenus politiquement indépendants. Les autorités de Paris ont ainsi profité de l'absurdité dans les Accords d'Assistance et expérimenté de nouveaux champs de guerre, l'exploitation d'espace pour les aviations, essai des tirs des nouvelles armes, y compris les armes nucléaires. C'est ainsi que la violation de territoire a été sans cause.

Les anciennes colonies françaises, surtout celles d'Afrique, perdent leur autonomie territoriale au profit de la France. Les techniciens français sont placés dans tous les sphères de l'administration locale y compris les forces armées et la police. Au Tchad, la France adopte une option d'une armée unique afin de maintenir la puissance de la métropole. Cette armée doit établir son dispositif de défense bon lui semble. Elle n'a pas de frontière et évolue en fonction des besoins opérationnels, spécifiques dans son organisation, son implication dans de zones géographiques et stratégiques.

Le déploiement et des opérations des troupes de la Légion Etrangère française deviennent les plus importantes. Dans les années 1980, faisant suite à l'opération Epervier, en place depuis le 13 février 1986, depuis le 31 juillet 2009 sous le commandement du colonel Bruno, les « éléments français au Tchad » (EFT), d'environ un millier d'hommes, sont stratégiquement basés à N'Djaména, Faya-Largeau et Abéché<sup>44</sup>.

La France est présente au Tchad avec tout son parapluie militaire et politique. Les événements de septembre 1963, octobre 1965 et la présence des rebellions au BET en 1966, ont justifié fortement cette protection qui a trouvé sans aucun doute son fondement juridique dans les accords du 11 août 1960.

La présence française au Tchad servait à protéger le pouvoir politique tchadien en place qui doit en retour protéger les intérêts de la France à tout prix. Raison pour laquelle, au début de l'indépendance, quand le président Tombalbaye était en bon terme la France a été avec lui. Elle l'a aidé à lutter contre les rebellions de Frolinat. Mais, en 1973, quand le président Tombalbaye s'est détourné de la France à partir de sa nouvelle orientation politique, la France l'a abandonné<sup>45</sup>. En fait, l'intervention militaire devrait trouver une solution aux multiples problèmes du pays ; bien au contraire, elle a entraîné le Tchad dans un conflit infernal où a régné le chaos.

Dès le commencement de la rébellion dans le nord du pays, le président Tombalbaye fait appel à la France dans le but de protéger son poste. Cet appel marque le début de la première intervention française au Tchad.

### **La Première opération militaire française au Tchad : Mission des Réformes Administratives (MRA)**

Suite aux différentes crises politiques qui ont secoué le pouvoir de Fort-Lamy dans les premières années de l'indépendance, le président Tombalbaye se rend compte des failles au sein de son administration. Justement, la France n'a pas préparé des gens pour le remplacer. Cette situation de manque voire même l'absence de personnel, a amené le Tchad dans ses limites administratives. Il fallait par tout moyen résoudre cette question par des réformes administratives.

La Mission des Réformes Administratives (MRA) est une intervention à la fois militaire et administrative. Elle a été couplée d'une orientation de réformes administratives. La première demande de Tombalbaye a reçu un véritable corps expéditionnaire, et une mission civile afin de remettre de l'ordre dans son administration sous la conduite d'un ancien gouverneur d'outre-mer. L'accord était assorti d'une condition : une réforme administrative profonde a été entreprise, parallèlement à l'intervention militaire. Trois mille hommes ont été envoyés à Fort Lamy, soit la moitié de l'effectif de l'armée tchadienne de l'époque, dans laquelle on a trouvé 630 officiers et sous-officiers français en coopération. Le général Cordatellas était désigné Délégué militaire de la France, auprès de la MRA au Tchad.

La MRA a été une force d'assistance technique composée d'une soixantaine d'administrateurs civils et de militaires. Ces techniciens français sont introduits dans des ministères, des préfectures, des sous-préfectures, voire même des cantons, (Goya, 1980 : 2). Certains d'entre eux ont tant des privilèges d'accéder au président de la République sans passer par son cabinet. C'est le cas de Pierre Lami, membre du Comité de défense civil-militaire, traite directement avec le président Tombalbaye.

Les cadres français de la MRA ont pour rôle principal de superviser le travail des cadres tchadiens. Cependant, plusieurs dizaines de sous-officiers ont été dans les villages pour satisfaire les doléances

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<sup>44</sup> Voir page officielle du Ministère de la défense, disponible sur : [www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/operations\\_exterieures/tchad/dossier\\_de\\_reference/16\\_04\\_10\\_les\\_element\\_s\\_francais\\_au\\_tchad\\_eft](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/operations_exterieures/tchad/dossier_de_reference/16_04_10_les_element_s_francais_au_tchad_eft) consulté le 23 mai 2021.

<sup>45</sup> Saleh Allamine, entretien du 18 avril 2021 à N'Djaména.

des populations par la construction des ouvrages sociaux notamment des puits, des pistes, des greniers à mil, des dispensaires, des soins médicaux ou des stations de pompage<sup>46</sup>.

Du côté militaire, la France s'est engagée à fournir jusqu'à 650 cadres dans le centre de formation de Moussoro, pour le recyclage des compagnies d'infanterie, et de l'école d'officiers à Fort-Lamy, puis à l'intérieur des différentes unités de combat. A la fin de 1969, l'Armée Nationale Tchadienne (ANT) a été une armée franco-tchadienne où beaucoup de commandants de compagnie et de chefs de section ont été des Français. Aussi, la MRA a fourni, dans le cadre de sa mission, un groupement à Abéché dans l'est et à Faya-Largeau à la base opérationnelle pour le Borkou Ennedi Tibesti (BET).

Malgré cette double mission, l'immobilisme du gouvernement tchadien a été incapable d'exploiter pour combler le vide administratif, béant depuis des années dans les troubles. Les mesures préconisées par le gouverneur Lami, au nom de la MRA ont découragé une élite non qualifiée tchadienne, en la matière. Ces élites ont émis que la reprise en main des postes clés de l'administration tchadienne par les membres de la MRA est un retour à la colonisation. Cette observation des élites tchadiennes a fini par avoir d'effet important sur les autorités françaises qui n'ont pas manqué de réagir. Face au mécontentement des Tchadiens, le Gouvernement a réduit les objectifs de la MRA. Désormais, la mission de la MRA se limite aux tâches purement militaires (Chapelle, 1980 : 259).

Les forces terrestres armées françaises au Tchad ont été regroupées en deux états-majors tactiques (EMT). La première, formée d'une compagnie d'infanterie et d'un escadron blindé léger sur véhicules Ferret, est basée à Fort-Lamy alors que la seconde formée de deux compagnies sont implantées à Mongo et à Fort-Archambault (Sarh) respectivement. Ces quatre unités sont renforcées par un EMT, venu de métropole pour combattre le Frolinat, et possède un soutien limité au strict minimum (Chapelle, 1980 : 261). Cet EMT possède entre six et neuf avions à hélice, servant d'artillerie volante. Le dispositif sécuritaire français au Tchad a été renforcé afin de prouver son efficacité dans ses différentes opérations.

La première grande offensive militaire, par la France, a lieu respectivement au centre et à l'est du pays. Ces opérations ont été conduites à partir de la base française de Mongo. (Goya, 1980 : 2). La MRA a pour mission de réduire les bandes rebelles afin de les mettre à la portée des forces de sécurité nationales et de faciliter la reprise d'une activité civile normale.

Des troupes françaises ont connu des accrochages limités avec des rebelles de Frolinat. Dans une des batailles avec une bande de 250 rebelles, le Frolinat a enregistré des dizaines de morts alors que les français ont décompté 11 morts et 25 blessés (Goya, 1980 : 3). Cette bataille a été un choc pour le Frolinat, qui doit désormais éviter le combat direct. Ainsi, la MRA a multiplié les opérations de traque des bandes pendant un an.

Depuis son arrivée en 1969 au Tchad et au fur et à mesure de la progression de sa mission, la MRA renforce ses projets d'aide à la population dans le but de remettre en place, une administration locale, y compris les chefferies traditionnelles et des sultans suspendus ou supprimés pendant l'époque coloniale. Un maillage de petites milices villageoises est constitué pour combler le vide laissé par le Frolinat qui est en train de perdre progressivement le contact avec la population. En mars 1970, la situation sécuritaire est presque maîtrisée dans les régions citées ci-dessus.

La MRA a été successivement dirigée par les Commandants, Lami, Paillard, Claustre et Clément et d'Administrateurs et des coopérants militaires. Elle a pour but d'apporter du secours aux populations par des mesures immédiates d'encadrement. Mais compte tenu des désaccords avec le pouvoir de Fort-Lamy, elle a commencé à réduire les nombres des coopérants militaires français ainsi que son budget.

Sur le plan économique, la MRA a un gros budget de 250 millions de FCFA, avec une disposition presque totalement libre de ses fonds. Elle a subi un double contrôle, de la cour des comptes et de l'ambassade de France. Ce contrôle étroit s'est fait de pair avec la réduction de moitié de son budget et a été réduit à 80 millions. Le commandant de la MRA pour la zone est du Tchad, Hocquet est appelé

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<sup>46</sup> Ahadji Garondé Djarma, entretien du 28 mai 2021 à N'Djaména.

à une gestion rigoureuse en personnel, coopérant militaire et civil et du trésor (Gali, 1985 :133). Dans le même temps, les coopérants de la MRA étaient passés de 175 à l'époque de Paillard, à 40 coopérants, et ensuite à 25 au temps de Hocquet.

Hormis les 2 régions de Mongo et de Fort-Archambault (Sarh), la MRA a aussi fait des réalisations dans le Kanem, particulièrement la construction des dispensaires et des écoles et, notamment l'établissement de la piste à bétail ou couloir de passage **Abéché – Ati – Ndjamena**. A ces projets s'ajoute aussi la réalisation de plusieurs d'autres puits. Certains projets ont été suspendus à cause des questions sécuritaires car il devient de plus en plus difficile de se déplacer librement.

Après des résultats appréciables des opérations militaires, la MRA a orienté ses activités vers le nord du pays. Six cents coopérants militaires sont mobilisés pour l'occupation du nord du Tchad. Cependant, il est à noter que la MRA n'a pas atteint son objectif principal qui consiste en la stabilisation de l'ancienne colonie française. Les autorités de Paris mettent en places d'autres opérations, en vertu des accords de défense (Decraene, 1969 : 6). L'Opération Limousin est constituée pour prendre le relai.

### **L'opération Limousin 1968**

Lancée le 14 avril 1969, l'Opération Limousin est une campagne de l'armée française contre une insurrection sur le sol tchadien. Cette opération a mobilisé des troupes au sol, environ 2 000 hommes. Sa mission principale est de mettre fin à une rébellion contre le Gouvernement tchadien. L'Opération Limousin est une armée de taille qui opère de la même façon que celle qui a pris part dans la guerre d'Algérie (Dufour et Fusibet, 2011 : 3) : des forces spéciales capables d'opérer dans des espaces désertiques.

L'Opération Limousin inaugure ses interventions lors de l'attaque de la gendarmerie de Mangalmé en 1968. Un militaire français perd sa vie dans cette opération. Le 15 mars de la même année, un autre coopérant, sous-officier français est tué à Oum-Hadjer<sup>47</sup> (Bouquet, 78). En cette même année, deux médecins coopérants français ont été aussi tués par les hommes d'Ibrahim Abatcha, leader du Front National de libération du Tchad (Bouquet, 1980 : 28). A la même époque, la ville de Bardai, au Nord du Tchad dans le Tibesti a été sur le point de tomber aux mains des rebelles.

Dans cette situation, le gouvernement français par l'intérim qu'a effectué, le Président de l'assemblée, Poher a décidé l'intervention, le 16 et 18 avril 1968, par un transport aérien d'urgence (Bouquet, 1980 : 80). En fin août 1968, une autre vague de coopérants a débarqué à Faya-Largeau. Malgré cela, la situation n'a fait qu'empirer. Un recours à une solution locale est fait. Le Général Arnaud reçoit une mission de former l'armée Tchadienne profondément désorganisée. Le Gouverneur Pierre Lami doit s'occuper uniquement de l'administration civile.

L'opération Limousin a connu cinq grandes missions au Tchad (i) Mission Ephémère, (ii) Mission Moquette, (iii) Mission Gouro, (iv) Mission Bedo et (v) Mission Picardie II. Ces missions, en plus de la poursuite de l'intérêt national de la France, avait aussi pour objectifs de venger les coopérants tombés sur le sol tchadiens victimes<sup>48</sup>.

À l'été 1968, une première mission appelée Mission Ephémère de l'Opération Limousin a été lancée. Elle a été très rapide pour permettre de dégager le poste d'Aouzou assiégé, depuis plusieurs semaines par les rebelles. Cela n'a pas amélioré la situation du gouvernement tchadien qui, en mai 1969, à demander une aide plus conséquente. L'objectif de cette mission était de permettre à une administration et une armée locales renouvelées de reprendre le contrôle de son pays. Dans l'esprit du général de Gaulle, cette lutte contre la rébellion ne doit pas durer plus de quelques mois et, autre nouveauté a été d'employé des soldats professionnels (Bayart, 1980 : 76).

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<sup>47</sup> Une sous-préfecture dans le Batha, situé à la frontière du Ouaddaï.

<sup>48</sup> Tchanigué Tchang, entretien du 22 mars 2021 à N'Djaména.

La deuxième mission de Limousin a lieu durant le mandat de Georges Pompidou, cette mission a perduré, jusqu'en septembre 1972, avec pour conséquences la mort de 39 soldats français dans les combats contre les Toubous, dont le propre fils du Général Cordatellas, tué dans l'oasis de Gouro (Chapleau, 1990 : 422).

La mission Bedo de l'Opération Limousin a débuté par une phase de sécurisation du territoire du pays, avec des patrouilles dans le Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti. Dans cette patrouille, les soldats français en provenance dans la ville de Mongo, au centre ont été rapidement confrontés à un groupe de 250 rebelles. Petit à petit, l'armée française a réussi à gagner du terrain. Cependant, le 11 octobre 1970, un convoi français tombe dans une embuscade, sur la piste Faya-Bardai. Cette embuscade de la Palmeraie de Bedo<sup>49</sup> a coûté la vie aux 11 soldats et 25 autres ont été blessés (Dufour, 2011 : 4). Pour rendre plus effective et efficace, l'Armée française est renforcée en personnel et en matériels aussi. L'Opération Limousin est rebaptisée Opération Bison.

### **L'opération Bison 1970**

L'Opération Bison qui a débuté en 1970 s'est déroulée en deux phases. La première qui a couvert tout le deuxième semestre de l'année 1970, a été intensivement défensive. Le nouveau régime libyen du colonel Kadhafi a apporté son soutien au Frolinat, en juillet 1970. Le Frolinat s'est senti assez fort pour lancer une série d'offensives sur tous les postes avancés du BET. Avec les renforts venus de Fort-Lamy et de Fort-Archambault, les Français sont parvenus à dégager les postes encerclés (Goya, 1980 : 4).

Les populations locales ont été surprises de voir les troupes françaises intervenir directement dans le pays. Alors qu'en quarante ans de présence au BET, elles ont établi des relations dignes et paisibles avec les populations. L'Opération Bison a connu deux grandes missions, Kouroudi et Languedoc respectivement. Ces deux missions de l'Opération Bison ont pour objectif d'anéantir les combattants de Frolinat, estimés à 320 hommes et mènent des attaques dans le pays Moubi.

La deuxième phase de l'Opération Bison débute en mois de juin 1971. Cette opération a pour but d'élever l'Etat tchadien à un niveau de sécurité nécessaire et à son développement. Elle a également pour souci de ne pas perdre les investissements en cours. La France a décidé donc d'envoyer des coopérants militaires pour la formation de troupes et des officiers tchadiens. Au début, elle a hésité de préserver la souveraineté et l'unité du Tchad en intervenant indirectement.

Cette phase offensive de l'Opération Bison a pour but de débusquer les rebelles dans le massif du Tibesti. Le Général Cortadellas, commandant de mission, passe à l'offensive avec un effectif de 900 coopérants militaires et 350 soldats tchadiens. Comme logistiques, les troupes ont à leur disposition, 150 véhicules, 18 hélicoptères et 8 avions pour traquer les rebelles dans toute la zone de Tibesti (Dufour, 2011 :13). Le Frolinat subit d'énormes pertes pendant cette phase d'Opération Bison qui a duré de janvier à juin 1971.

Bien que Frolinat ait été presque décimé, la Libye de Kadhafi n'a pas hésité à accorder son soutien de nouveau à la rébellion tchadienne. Cette ingérence du Président libyen a entraîné la rupture des relations diplomatiques par les autorités tchadiennes entre les deux Etats. Pour répondre à cette rupture, Kadhafi décide de reconnaître le Frolinat, comme l'unique représentant du peuple tchadien (Chapelle, 1980 : 265). Le Secrétaire Général de Frolinat, Abba Siddick, son entourage ainsi que d'autres exilés politiques tchadiens élisent domicile en Libye. Frolinat obtient autorisation d'ouvrir des bases et camps d'entraînement pour ses troupes. Une séquence de trente minutes pour la propagande à la radio nationale libyenne est aussi accordée au groupe rebelle tchadien.

Suite aux négociations sous la supervision du Président nigérien, Diori Hamani, en 1972, les deux Etats renouent leurs relations diplomatiques, mais la Libye n'a pas abandonné son soutien au Frolinat (Chapelle, 1980 : 266). Le Président Tombalbaye amorce une initiative, qualifiée de payante, en se rendant à Tripoli. Pendant son séjour, en décembre 1972, le Président Tombalbaye obtient, au titre de

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<sup>49</sup> Localité située entre Faya et Bardai.



la coopération, une promesse de **23 milliards de francs CFA**, et celle de l'expulsion du Frolinat de la Libye<sup>50</sup>.

Après l'expulsion officielle des rebelles en juin 1973 par les autorités, la Libye a continué de constituer la base arrière à la rébellion tchadienne. La Libye ayant le soutien de Frolinat, occupe pacifiquement la bande d'Aouzou. Elle fixe alors son drapeau sur le poste militaire et distribue des cartes d'identité à la population locale<sup>51</sup>. La bande d'Aouzou est d'une importance capitale tant pour la Libye que pour le Tchad qui, revendiquent la possession. Le sous-sol de cette bande regorge d'importantes ressources minières, tel que l'uranium. Au plan stratégique, elle est un espace marqué par d'éventuel conflit contre l'axe Caire-Khartoum et indispensable à la protection du territoire.

Dans une interview sur l'occupation d'une partie du territoire tchadien, le Président Tombalbye, interrogé, répondit à la presse, tout simplement en affirmant : « *mon gouvernement s'occupe de cette question* » (Chapelle, 1980 : 266). Certains journalistes ont suggéré que l'indifférence du gouvernement tchadien confirme les rumeurs sur la vente de la bande d'Aouzou à la Libye pour un montant de **23 milliards de francs CFA**, comme prix.

Pendant trois ans, de 1969 à 1972, la France a mené une intervention militaire en appui de l'Etat tchadien contre le Frolinat. Cette guerre a été l'une des premières du genre après la décolonisation pour remporter la victoire de l'armée contre l'insurrection locale. Mais, l'action des milliers de soldats français ont été engagés, dont 141 tués ou blessés à constituer une question de mémoire suite aux différentes offensives de Frolinat (Abzac et al., 2004 : 60).

La France a utilisé des nombreuses techniques pour combattre les hommes de Frolinat, de la destruction de villages, de palmeraies, oasis aux troupeaux mitraillés et des puits empoisonnés. Ces différentes approches militaires n'ont pas permis aux résultats escomptés car les rebelles de Frolinat ont continué à poser des menaces au Pouvoir de Fort-Lamy. Une autre opération est constituée une fois de plus

### **L'Opération Tacaud 1978**

L'Opération Tacaud est une réponse à l'humiliation subie par l'armée française dans sa lutte contre la rébellion tchadienne. Le 21 avril 1974, le Commandant Galopin est arrêté et fusillé par Hissene Habré. Suite à cette affaire, le Général Malloum demande à la France de retirer ses troupes du sol tchadien. Il essaie aussi de renégocier directement avec le Frolinat mais ses efforts sont sans succès. La situation se dégrade de plus en plus dans le Tibesti. Le Frolinat occupe désormais militairement les villes comme Faya, Fada, Koro-Toro et Ouminga. Le Général Malloum se tourne vers Paris pour solliciter de l'aide. Des accords de coopération militaire sont de nouveau signés en 1976. Des militaires français sont une fois de plus redéployés dans le cadre de l'Opération Tacaud.

L'Opération Tacaud a joué un rôle prépondérant dans la bataille de Salal contre les Forces Armées populaires (FAP) et d'Ati contre le Changement Démocratique Révolutionnaire (CDR) de Acyl Ahmat Akhabach. Pour mettre fin à ces forces, l'opération Tacaud a mené plusieurs batailles entre autres : la bataille de Salal, la bataille d'Ati, la bataille de Djedda (Abzac et al., 2004 : 61).

La première bataille de l'Opération Tacaud commence par le renseignement/surveillance aérienne. L'objectif principal de cette bataille est de reprendre le poste administratif de Salal, sur la route de N'Djamena-Moussoro. Pour ce fait, un détachement d'hélicoptères français a été envoyé pour renseigner les positions rebelles. Mais, l'un des hélicoptères a été abattu et l'autre a pu repérer la position (Oki, 2020 : 325). Les forces françaises découvrent qu'elles doivent faire face au moins aux 500 combattants de (FAP) de Goukouni Weddeye. Le commandement de l'opération opte alors de mener sa mission en quatre phases. Le 27 avril 1978, le Général Bredèche, commandant de l'opération Tacaud, ordonne le repli et demande le renfort, en jaguar de chasse, du côté de Dakar en direction de N'Djamena. Des violents combats sont déclenchés à l'arrivée du renfort. L'Opération Tacaud sort

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<sup>50</sup> Helé Davidi, entretien du 17 avril 2021 à N'Djaména.

<sup>51</sup> Lopma Osée, entretien du 27 mai 2021 à N'Djaména.

vainqueur en reprenant le poste administratif de Salal et se lance aussitôt à la conquête des localités d'Arada et de Guereda.

La bataille d'Ati a eu lieu le 18 mai 1978 contre les combattants de l'armée volcan de Acyl Ahmat. Une mission de reconnaissance de l'opération Tacaud a montré les positions des rebelles lourdement armés dissimulés dans la ville. Les premiers éléments de force Tacaud envoyés dans la ville ont été accueilli par un feu nourri d'armes lourdes qui a fait un premier mort dans les rangs français. Ainsi, les Jaguar ont intervenus pour nettoyer la zone, mais les combattants du Volcan se replient. Le bilan a été lourd pour l'armée d'Acyl, soit 80 tués. Un mort et 5 blessés des éléments ont été enregistrés du côté des troupes françaises. Ces troupes étrangères ont connu plus de dégâts dans la bataille a suivi celle d'Ati.

La bataille de Djedda a été une grande perte pour l'Opération Tacaud. Après une mission de reconnaissance, les forces françaises se lancent à l'offensive. Pendant la bataille, un nombre considerable des officiers et soldats français ont perdu la vie. Parmi les officiers tombés sont les Lieutenant-colonel Léon Pachebat, Robert Jacquel, Jacques François et le Capitaine Serge Linemann. Un avion de chasse a été aussi abattu, le Jaguar n°A106EC111, le 13 mai 1978 (Oki, 2020 : 328). Les combattants du Volcan, en signe de victoire, regagnent en cascade leur base d'Arada. D'autres éléments se mettent en route vers Faya-Largeau. Le bilan des pertes de l'opération Tacaud contre le FAP a changé la donne dans la suite du conflit qui oppose le Tchad et la Libye à travers le Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition GUNT. C'est ainsi qu'une autre opération est née sur des cendres de l'Opération Tacaud : l'Opération Manta.

### **L'opération Manta 1983**

L'Opération Manta a été déclenchée le 8 août 1983 pour faire face au le Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition soutenu par l'aviation libyenne. Le Président Habré demande une intervention de la part de la France pour s'attaquer à la Libye de khadafi et le Gouvernement d'Union nationale de Transition (GUNT). Au début des opérations françaises, l'Opération Manta a connu quelques problèmes logistiques dans ses efforts d'empêcher la progression libyenne. Des mesures sont rapidement prises pour mettre le dispositif aérien en place. La compagnie Minerve est mise à contribution dans l'acheminement du carburant destiné aux avions de chasse pour la couverture aérienne à partir de l'aéroport de N'Djamena (Spartacus, 1984 : 15).

Composé de 30 hélicoptères et une section de missiles et radars installés à N'Djaména, le dispositif aérien de Manta est prêt pour les opérations. Une « ligne rouge » a été décrétée au niveau du 15<sup>e</sup> parallèle dont le franchissement entraînant automatiquement une riposte des troupes Manta. Les Libyens sont bloqués au nord et la situation se fige pendant quelques temps, malgré cela l'aviation libyenne a franchi la « ligne rouge ». Intercepté par une patrouille de Mirage FIC au nord de Salal, l'équipage libyen modifie sa trajectoire vers le nord du Tchad.

En janvier 1984, les troupes du GUNT ont franchi la fameuse « ligne rouge » pour attaquer le poste de Ziguey à la frontière nigérienne. Une colonne de Toyota qui a fait l'otage de deux humanitaires de MSF a été pris pour cible par des tirs des avions au Zigeuy (Abzac et al., 2004 : 62). Lors de cette attaque, les deux humanitaires libérés mais le Mirage de capitaine Croci est touché et bloqué suite à un impact dans le circuit hydraulique, le pilote s'éjecte et meurt. La mort de Croci a laissé un goût amer à bon nombre des pilotes et son nom a été donné à l'aéroport d'Abéché, sous le nom de l'aéroport militaire Croci. Aussi, en mission de reconnaissance, un Jaguar piloté par le Commandant Bernard Voelckel a été écrasé dans une dune de sable à 8 Km de puits de Siltou à Oum Chalouba. Face à cette menace, la « ligne rouge » a été remontée au 16<sup>e</sup> parallèle.

Suite à la demande unilatérale du Colonel Kadhafi, le retrait des troupes Manta du Tchad a été envisagé pour avril 1984. Les troupes libyennes sont loquées au nord du Tchad et les dissensions se font sentir entre les forces de GUNT et les troupes libyennes. Le 17 septembre, Paris et Tripoli ont annoncé un accord de désengagement total des forces françaises et libyennes, pourtant le problème de la bande d'Aouzou n'a toujours pas été réglé. Les troupes de l'opération Manta se retirent progressivement jusqu' au novembre 1984. Cependant, les troupes libyennes ont traîné les pas en justifiant leur délai

par les travaux d'infrastructure en cours à Ouadi Doum entre Faya-Largeau et la bande d'Aouzou, une piste d'une longueur de 2000 m.

Bien que l'accord de retrait de Manta n'ait pas aussi été respecté par la France, Paris a néanmoins continué à faire son désengagement. Les principales caractéristiques de l'opération Manta sont la lourdeur de ses effectifs, 3 000 officiers et soldats et, son poids logistique mobilisés qui inclus des avions et d'autres engins stationnés à l'aéroport de N'Djaména. L'Opération Manta est la plus importante depuis la fin de la guerre d'Algérie que la France a utilisée. Elle a été aussi la première opération défensive aérienne projetée en dehors du territoire national français. Compte tenu des faibles capacités d'accueil et des problèmes de maintenance dus au climat, aux sables du désert tchadien, l'interception est restée aléatoire. L'Opération Manta a été essentiellement aérienne mais, elle a été quand même défensive au sol car elle s'est avérée dissuasive. Elle a consacré la partition du Tchad à travers une « ligne rouge » imaginaire, la fameuse 15<sup>e</sup> et 16<sup>e</sup> parallèle. La traversée de la ligne rouge par GUNT déclenche une nouvelle opération de la part de Paris : Opération Epervier.

### **L'Opération Epervier 1986**

L'Opération Epervier prend le relai à l'Opération Manta dans la même mission consistant à prévenir la prise du pouvoir central par le GUNT. Soutenues par les forces armées libyennes, les troupes du GUNT, sous le leadership de Goukouni Weddeye, franchissent la « ligne rouge », 16<sup>e</sup> parallèle, et se préparent à marcher sur Ndjamen. Le Président tchadien, Hissene Habré, sollicite le soutien de la France et des Etats-Unis pour intervenir de nouveau.

L'avancée libyenne par une vaste offensive amène l'Opération Epervier à vite faire recours à la bataille aérienne. La menace de l'aviation libyenne avait été négligée par le passé. Elle devient de plus en plus redoutable dans leur projet de prendre la capitale tchadienne. Les libyens ont même entrepris la construction d'une piste pouvant recevoir leurs avions de chasse à partir de Ouadi Doum afin de pouvoir survoler tout le territoire tchadien (Al-watan, 1986 :12).

La première mission, dénommée Tryonix, de l'Opération Epervier a consisté à l'attaque de Ouadi Doum, et comme objectif principal, la destruction de la piste aérienne libyenne. Pour détruire cette base, il a fallu faire appel à une équipe aérienne de Libreville au Gabon et de Bangui en République Centre-Africaine. La mission est organisée et dirigée par l'Adjudant-Chef Saint Lanne (Al-watan, 1986 :48). Les avions sont alors équipés de bombes anti-piste, conçues pour être larguées sur la base libyenne de Ouadi Doum. Ainsi, après le largage des bombes par des fusées à très grande vitesse, la piste est sérieusement endommagée. L'aviation libyenne va aussi tenter de se venger, en ciblant l'aéroport de Ndjamen.

L'aviation de la république libyenne s'approche de la capitale N'Djaména à basse altitude, après avoir franchi la frontière via l'espace aérien nigérien. Un bombardier largue ses bombes et l'une d'entre elles a fait un cratère la piste (Al-Watan, 1986 :14). Il a fallu l'intervention rapide du génie militaire de l'armée de l'air pour remettre la piste en service. Suite à cette attaque, les forces françaises de l'Opération Epervier ont renforcé le dispositif de défense aérienne.

L'ensemble de ce dispositif aérien est constitué de six Jaguar, huit Mirage, un Breguet Atlantic et sept Transall basés à N'Djaména. Aussi, on compte six Jaguar, six Transall et un Breguet Atlantic à Bangui, ainsi que deux Transall à Libreville (Al-watan, 1986 :16).

L'opération Epervier a vu l'activité aérienne s'intensifier au-dessus du Tchad par le survol du Commandant Morel et du Capitaine Merouze en mission Tobus afin d'évaluer les dégâts provoqués par le raid. C'est la plus longue mission de reconnaissance de l'opération Epervier jamais réalisée par le Mirage IV au Tchad.

L'apport américain dans cette Opération Epervier a été exclusivement en logistiques. L'opération Epervier a été la plus longue au Tchad et a pris fin le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1986. Elle est remplacée par l'Opération Barkhane, conformément à l'accord de coopération technique signé entre la France et le Tchad. Selon

cet accord, la France doit apporter un soutien logistique et un appui en renseignement aux forces armées et de sécurité tchadienne dans un défi de lutte contre le terrorisme au Sahel.

## **Conclusion**

Le vent des indépendances en 1960 n'a pas apporté grand-chose aux anciennes colonies françaises d'Afrique. La France n'a jamais préparé ses colonies à prendre en mains, une fois indépendantes, leur propre destin. Elle a plutôt développé les liens de dépendance entre elle et les pays nouvellement indépendants, notamment à travers la monnaie (Franc CFA) et des accords de coopération y compris celui de défense. La question qu'on peut se poser est de savoir comment les anciennes colonies peuvent tirer profit des accords de sécurité avec leur colonisateur ? Est-ce juste une façon de surveiller ses possessions d'antan que la France décide d'avoir des accords de sécurité avec ses anciennes colonies ?

La première décennie de l'indépendance a été tumultueuse au Tchad surtout par l'échec de l'Etat à bâtir le nationalisme. Autrement dit, le gouvernement de Tombalbaye n'a pas pu dissoudre en une entité nationale les différentes nations formées par des groupes ethniques majoritairement musulmans et sont dominant au nord du pays. Les sudistes, majoritairement chrétiens dominent l'administration publique. Le manque des cadres qualifiés à la fonction publique et surtout le sentiment d'être négligés par le gouvernement ont poussé la population du nord du pays à la rébellion. Dans le but de lutter contre la rébellion et en même réorganiser l'administration publique, le Président Tombalbaye a fait appel à la France.

Les autorités de Paris mettent en place un organe de coopérations formées des militaires et quelques administrateurs. La première vague des coopérants sont venus sous l'égide de la Mission des Réformes Administratives (MRA). La MRA a beaucoup travaillé sur l'administration et la question du développement rural. Les défis sécuritaires grandissants poussent les Français aux activités militaires que civiles. La MRA est vite substituée par des différentes missions qui se sont suivies. L'armée française a reçu l'ordre d'intervenir contre les troupes du Front de libération nationale du Tchad (Frolinat).

L'opération Limousin (1969-1972) considérée, comme la première dans l'histoire de l'armée française en Afrique a été la plus vaste anti-insurrectionnelle, depuis la guerre d'Algérie. L'Opération Limousin a été suivie par l'opération Bison. Dans cette guerre (pour les deux camps), les pertes ont été importantes, une centaine de soldats français tués au Tchad en 3 ans. L'armée française est parvenue à ramener le calme sur une partie du pays, mais sans réellement en finir avec la rébellion tchadienne, opérant dans le nord et dans l'est du pays.

Sur le plan militaire, la domination a été flagrante. Elle passe par la présence de bases militaires au Tchad notamment les bases Adji Kossei, Croci et Faya Largeau. Ces bases sont toujours présentes de nos jours sous le statut d'Opération Extérieure Française. Les accords de défense constituent l'instrument de la domination militaire pour garantir le soutien au chef d'Etat, en cas de menace. L'armée française est intervenue à sept reprises sur le sol tchadien en l'espace d'un demi-siècle. Certaines opérations françaises n'ont duré que quelques jours, d'autres ont donné lieu à des déploiements beaucoup plus longs.

Cette présence militaire est un « *coup de force* », devenue symbole « *France-Afrique en kaki ou béret vert* », sur le territoire national tchadien qui, depuis six décennies, est le terrain privilégié de la France militaire. Il ressort qu'aucun pays en Afrique n'a bénéficié d'autant d'interventions militaires françaises que le Tchad.

Le bouleversement du Nouvel ordre mondial en cours impacte sur la politique France-Afrique, surtout dans la coopération militaire. L'hégémonie que jouissait l'Occident sur la scène internationale depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide dans les 1990, sous le leadership des Etats Unis, commence à être érodée ; économiquement par la Chine et militairement par la Russie.

L'intervention de la Russie en 2015 en Syrie pour sauver l'effondrement du régime Assad persécuté par une rébellion soutenue par l'Occident a été prise pour une victoire russe sur l'Occident par les pays du Tiers Monde. Et récemment, la guerre en cours en Ukraine, depuis le 24 février 2022, signale que l'hégémonie américaine n'est plus dominatrice dans le système international. Les pays peuvent se révolter et décider d'avec qui entretenir des relations.

Les pays francophones, en particulier ceux de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, décident de couper alors la corde ombilicale d'avec la France, la seule puissance impérialiste qui garde toujours ses autrefois anciennes colonies sous son contrôle par les liens de la monnaie (Franc CFA) et la coopération dans tous les domaines. Les coopérateurs français sont même déployés dans la fonction publique et les Forces de Défense et de Sécurité.

Il est constaté qu'une fois affranchis, ces pays africains renouent des relations avec d'autres superpuissances en particulier la Russie. Ce scénario décrit la situation dans laquelle un esclave s'affranchit lui-même mais, se jette encore dans les bras d'un autre maître ou propriétaire. Si la présence de plusieurs puissances sur la scène internationale permet aux africains de se libérer, pourquoi ne pas chercher à se définir son avenir soi-même au lieu de se jeter dans les bras d'un autre prédateur ? L'Afrique ne peut-elle pas prendre son propre destin en mains ?

La transition sur la scène internationale, de l'Ordre unipolaire au multipolaire a fait de la France son dommage collatéral. Ses anciennes colonies, en occurrence le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger, sont en train de rompre des liens impérialistes qui les lient à la France. La présence militaire de la France au Sahel est ainsi en train de prendre sa fin. Les troupes françaises ont quitté le Mali, le Burkina Faso et en processus de retraite du Niger.

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# Health Workers' Attitude towards the Use of Social Media for Consultations and Drug Prescriptions in Lagos

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## Abstract

*The advent of technological innovation has ushered in new consultation mode that has virtually eliminated distance between doctors and patients. This becomes more crucial for rural areas where medical personnel and infrastructure are in short supply. The study therefore sought to examine the health workers' attitude towards leveraging social media platforms to extend care to distant patients without physical contact. This was achieved by examining health workers' view on relevance of social media in consultations and prescriptions; and exploring the range of prescriptions deployed through the social media. The design was cross-sectional and involved doctors in general medical practice in Federal Government establishments in the Lagos Mainland Local Government Area of Lagos state. One hundred and two of the respondents who have had at least five years of medical practice were purposively selected. To validate their responses, four pharmacists with at least five years of work experience in private pharmacy stores were interviewed using in-depth interview guide. Descriptive statistical method of analysis was used for quantitative data while content analysis was used for qualitative data. The results showed that close to two-thirds of the respondents utilize social media platform to reach their patients, although a good number of them expressed some ethical concern. Deployment of social media for prescriptions extended across different classes of drugs like analgesics, antibiotics and anti-malarias. A national guideline on the use of social media in consultation and prescription could facilitate the practitioners' willingness to engage more patients that a far from the point of care.*

**Keywords:** Consultation, Health workers, Patients, Prescription, Social media

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## 1. Introduction

The use of modern technology like smartphones is essential for effective doctor-patient communications in the 21<sup>st</sup> century health care. This becomes quite compelling in developing countries like Nigeria where healthcare personnel are in short supply and not well distributed between rural and urban areas. Social media that would incorporate phones and WhatsApp could be used to mitigate the short supply of health workers and reach patients distant from their caregivers. Good cell phone penetration is evident in Nigeria, as the nation's active telephone lines have hit 145.4 million (Adeleke, 2016). Social media could therefore, be used to enhance the efficiency of health and medicine in the country. It could be employed as effective tool across a range of social learning and communication in health and healthcare in patient care, monitoring, rehabilitation, communication, diagnosis and teaching (Kamel Boulos, Wheeler, Tavares, Jones, 2011; Kamel Boulos, Brewer, Karimkhani, Buller & Dellavalle, 2014).

Due to the high level of confidentiality in patient management, applications that could be easily personalized like phone calls, Short Message Service (SMS) and WhatsApp could be combined for management of patients distant from the health care worker. WhatsApp in smartphones allow such events as viewing patients' radiological images and communicating with colleagues, permit healthcare professionals to execute several tasks at point-of care (Koehler et al., 2013) even for distant patients. This becomes important among populations that are not so literate to fill online medical forms that could tell details of their medical history. While the phone conversation will be used to get medical history of the patient, the WhatsApp could be used to take pictures of abnormalities like injuries, results of investigations, drugs or prescriptions used in the past. As innovative as it appears, however, the absence of physical examination is a drawback on this mode of consultation. More so, handling of patient information must be with utmost care and in compliance with the prescribed privacy principles to avoid unauthorized use or disclosure (Johnston et al, 2015). This is because issues of confidentiality may arise when online consultations are compromised unless strict security and protocols are in place (Kahan, Seftel & Resnick, 2000).

Previous studies on the benefits of communications applications in clinical practice had been rather scanty, however, research on the use of the social media by medical staff had been rather negligible (Ozdalga, Ozdalga & Ahuja, 2012; Ventola, 2014; Patel et al, 2016). The study therefore, sought to examine the attitude of doctors towards the use of social media for consultation in Lagos state.

### **Research Questions**

What is the attitude of health workers towards use of phones, SMS and WhatsApp for consultation and prescriptions?

What is the range of drugs covered in consultation and prescription with the use of phones, SMS and WhatsApp?

The paper consists of five (5) sections which include: introduction (section 1), review of relevant literature and use of appropriate theoretical framework to explain the study (section 2), methodology adopted for the study (section 3), presentation and discussions of the results (4) and conclusion and recommendations (section 5).

## **2. Literature Review**

### **The Attitude of Health Workers towards Use of Phones, SMS and WhatsApp for Consultations and Prescriptions**

Inadequate skilled health professionals and poor financing of health care are some of the factors mitigating against access and proper management of health challenges in developing countries (Qiang et al., 2011). The areas of this shortcomings include personnel, medical equipment, health care financing, high out-of-pocket expenditure and community-based integrated system for disease prevention, surveillance and treatment (HERFON, 2006; Obansa & Orimisan, 2013). The shortfall in personnel and equipment perhaps, explains the high morbidity and mortality of preventable diseases in developing countries. According to World Health Statistics (2022), malaria cases increased by 6% and mortality from malaria increased by close to 10% in one year alone, between 2019 and 2020. More so, top ten causes of deaths in low-income countries still include preventable diseases such as diarrhoea cases, malaria, lower respiratory tract infections, tuberculosis and Human Immunodeficiency Disease. Doctors could leverage on technology of phones and WhatsApp to reach patients outside the point-of-care to widen the horizon of access to health care. This conceivably, could reduce the number of admissions within healthcare facilities, and could help minimize the time spent in resolving some



clinical cases, since history and images of emergency cases can be discussed without meeting physically (Johnston et al., 2015; Martinez, Rogers, Numanoglu, & Rode, 2018).

A major challenge here is the absence of internet prescription guideline for medical practitioners in Nigeria. However, the United States Federation of State Medical Boards published, “Model Guidelines for the appropriate use of the Internet in Medical Practice” in 2002 (FSMB, 2002). The FSMB Guidelines further stated that “e-mail and other electronic communications and interactions between the physician and patient should supplement and enhance, but not replace, crucial interpersonal interactions that create the very basis of the physician-patient relationship” (FSMB, 2002). Guidelines issued by the American Medical Association states that a physician who prescribes medications via the Internet must establish or have an established valid patient-physician relationship (AMA, 2003). Globally, there is a rising demand for an effective, efficient, and trustworthy healthcare delivery system (Wanless 2002). This demand according to WHO (2006), was more in developing countries like Nigeria with more rural areas, inadequately trained healthcare personnel, healthcare facilities, and the limited number of healthcare programs. This could be ameliorated by doctors in urban areas incorporating social media consultations with patients distant from the point-of-care. However, little is known on healthcare professionals’ use of and attitudes towards using smartphones in clinical practice (Koehler et al., 2013), making this study an invaluable article.

### **The Range of Medications Health Workers are willing to cover using Phones, SMS and WhatsApp Consultation and Prescription**

Doctors have in the past communicated with their patients face-to-face in areas such as health promotion and encouraging adherence to medications, among others (Liu & Li, 2020). However, some health workers deployed smartphones in the areas of information sharing with co-workers and speedy communications with patients (Benedictis et al., 2019; Yahya & Yahya, 2019). The use of smartphones by health workers for health care services becomes quite visible during pandemics, such as COVID-19 when social distancing became imperative to reduce transmission of the virus (Barayev et al., 2021). Also, consumers increased the use of smartphones during pandemic as people sought for self-help to mitigate the morbidity and mortality of the pandemic. Previous studies corroborated this search for self-help as people explored the internet to possibly have a clue of their health-related challenges and even procure products and services (Algunmeeyn, El-Dahiyat, Altakhineh, & Azab, 2020; Bonyan, Al-Karasneh, El-Dahiyat, & Jairoun, 2020; Bukhari, Rasheed, Nayyer, & Babar, 2020; Zeenny, Ramia, Akiki, Hallit, & Salameh, 2020). The majority of products procured from online services include dietary supplements (50.4%), painkillers (19.8%), among others (Jairoun et al., 2021).

In Nigeria, perhaps, the high prevalence of self-medication among Nigerians could be an indication for the need for doctors to involve in methods of consultation that could reach their patients far from the point-of-care, such as, through the use of phones and WhatsApp consultations. The use of self-medication is a common phenomenon and had been applied for common health challenges like fever, body pains, indigestion, diarrhea, vomiting, cough, and upper respiratory tract infections (Arikpo, Eja & Enyi-Idoh, 2010). In the southern part of Nigeria, a study on self-medication of the population ranges from 60 to 90% in some communities (Oyelola, Razaq & Eniola, 2010). Self-medication is common among those with chronic illnesses, younger age and undergraduate students; with more than half of the students being involved in self-medication with antibiotics, while a quarter of the female students use antibiotics for menstrual symptoms (Filho, Antonio, Lima-Costa, & Uchoa, 2004; Arikpo, et al, 2010; Olayemi, Olayinka, & Musa, 2010; Sapkota et al, 2010). This abuse of antibiotics could lead to a bigger global challenge of antibiotics resistance. These undergraduates had more than three quarters

of them using social media websites as a major means of interaction, gaining social identity as well as social capital (Heiberger & Harper, 2008, Pempek et al., 2009, Mazman & Yasemin, 2011, Junco et al, 2012). Doctors could therefore utilize this platform to minimize self-medications and reduce future antibiotics resistance by employing social media involving phones and WhatsApp to reach this group of population in healthcare delivery.

### **Technological/Media Determinism Theory**

The media technological determinism theory was attributed to Marshall McLuhan in 1962. Technological determinism underscores how technology and media assume the role of key mover in history and social change (Kunz, 2006). New technologies transform society, institutions, social interaction and individuals. People, therefore, change their patterns of communication to fit with the new available technology of communication. The theory is apt for the study because technology had made the world we live in, a global village. Therefore, doctors do not need to be in physical contact with their patients to review their cases, hence the advent of telemedicine which uses technology for consultation and treatment in real-time (World Health Organization, 2010). The social media, however, is the new mode of communication and many people are on the platform. The health profession can be revolutionized by applying social media in the areas of consultations and prescriptions. To achieve this however, the health professionals should be ready to embrace this change in communication in their practice. This has capacity to reach people far from the point of care, and also provide easy access to second opinion among health specialists. This could mean a new way of redistribution of experts to areas of short supply.

### **3. Methodology**

The research is a descriptive design, employing cross-sectional study of one hundred and two medical practitioners selected from federal government health institutions in Lagos Mainland Local Government Area of Lagos state. Respondents were purposively selected and were doctors working as General Medical Practitioners with more than five years of experience. Data analyses utilized descriptive statistics involving Likert scale. In-depth interview was conducted at Pharmacy outlets in Lagos Mainland Local Government Area, involving four pharmacists purposively selected. This was done to validate respondents' claims. Sample size was determined by Cochran formula. The Cochran (1963:75) formula allows you to calculate an ideal sample size given a desired level of precision, desired confidence level, and the estimated proportion of the attribute present in the population. To calculate the sample size based on the sample required to estimate a proportion with an approximate 95% confidence level (95% – Z Score = 1.96), the Cochran formula is utilized:

$$n = \frac{Z^2 pq}{d^2}$$

Where:

n= required sample size,

p= proportion of the population having the characteristic,

q= 1-p and

d= the degree of precision.

With a prevalence of 6% derived from a pilot study of health workers attitude towards use of social media in consultations and applying 95% confidence interval at 5% level of precision the Cochran formula will yield

$$n = \frac{1.96^2 * 0.06 * 0.84}{0.5^2}$$

=77.5 which is upgraded to 102.

#### 4. Presentation of Results

A total of 102 respondents, who are doctors working in Lagos Mainland local Government Area, were involved in the study

**Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents**

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Age group (years)</b>		
18 – 30	36	35.3
30 – 39	43	42.2
40 – 49	16	15.7
≥50	7	6.9
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	44	43.1
Female	58	56.9
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Single	28	27.5
Married	71	69.6
Separated	1	1.0
Divorced	2	2.0
<b>Years of practice</b>		
<10	65	63.7
10 – 19	24	23.5
20 – 29	9	8.8
≥30	4	3.9

Source: Field survey, 2022

The highest frequency of the respondents, 43(42.2%) were in the age range of 30 – 39 years. Over half of the respondents (56.9%) were females. Almost 70% (69.6%) were married. Close to two-thirds (63.7%) have less than 10 years of practice.

**Table 2: Use of phones, SMS and WhatsApp for consultations and prescriptions; and major constraints**

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Class of drugs prescribed on phones, SMS and WhatsApp for consultations and prescriptions</b>		
None	6	5.9
Mainly analgesics	12	11.8
Analgesics and some antimalarials	26	25.5
Analgesics, Antimalarial, Antibiotics	48	47.1
Any drug depending on urgency	10	9.8
<b>Main constraint for use of phones, SMS and WhatsApp for consultations and prescriptions</b>		
Patients' clarity in describing illness behaviour	60	58.8
Poor knowledge of past medical history	10	9.8
Holding back of vital information	26	25.5
Patients' literacy level	6	5.9

Source: Field survey, 2022

Close to half (47.1%) of the respondents employ social media consultation across analgesics, antimalaria and antibiotics with almost a tenth prescribing any class of drugs depending on urgency of the case. However, the greatest worry of the respondents (58.8%) was patients' clarity in describing illness behavior.

This finding was corroborated with the statement of a pharmacist in one of the pharmacy stores who had this to say:

*We surely see patients come with SMS prescriptions on their phones and sometimes in their WhatsApp platforms from doctors. They are mainly painkillers, antimalarias, antibiotics, antihypertensives and even antidiabetic drugs. However, we do not endorse certain prescriptions like sleeping pills. For any drugs that can make one sleep, I must demand and keep hardcopy prescriptions in case of legal implications (Pharmacist, 45years with 16 years practicing experience).*

Another Pharmacist in a private pharmacy store had this to say:

*The number of prescriptions from doctors through patients' phones is actually on the increase. Some will send it as SMS, some will write it on the hospital prescription and send it through WhatsApp, others even take the picture of the drug package and send it through WhatsApp. I feel strongly that, there should be some regulation to avoid certain clash of interest. (Pharmacist, 52years with 18 years practicing experience).*

**Table 3: Attitude towards the use of phones, SMS and WhatsApp for consultations and prescription**

Variable	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I use phones, SMS, WhatsApp to reach some patients in need	18 (17.6)	46 (45.1)	18 (17.6)	15 (14.7)	5 (4.9)
These digital devices can be better organised to help health workers in distant areas	24 (23.5)	48 (47.1)	21 (20.6)	5 (4.9)	4 (3.9)
I use the digital devices usually for sick friends and close relations	9 (8.8)	60 (58.8)	12 (11.8)	15 (14.7)	6 (5.9)
I limit my prescriptions to analgesics and antimalarials only	10 (9.8)	54 (52.9)	15 (14.7)	19 (18.6)	4 (3.9)
I extend prescriptions across all drugs depending on urgency and patients' medical history	3 (2.9)	27 (26.5)	20 (19.6)	24 (23.5)	28 (27.5)
There is fear of legal implications should things go wrong	47 (46.1)	45 (44.1)	4 (3.9)	2 (2.0)	4 (3.9)

Source: Field survey, 2022

Almost two-thirds of the respondents agreed that they used phones, SMS, WhatsApp to reach some of their patients in need (62.7%), mostly, their close friends and relations (67.6%) and especially when prescriptions involve analgesics and antimalaria (62.7%). Close to a third (29.4%) could extend phones, SMS and WhatsApp consultations across any class of drugs to respond to emergency situations. However, majority of the respondents (90.2%) entertained fears about the legal implications in the use of phones, SMS and WhatsApp consultations more so, when there is likelihood of treatment failures.

**Discussion of Findings**

The average health worker is confident of prescribing medications for common illnesses in the environment such as for pains, malaria and infections. Perhaps, this could be due to the fact that some of these common preventable illnesses still make up the top ten causes of deaths in economic disadvantaged countries (World Health Statistics (2022). Medications for these illnesses can be obtained over the counter in the locality. However, the greatest worry among health workers utilizing this mode of consultation is the inability of the patients to describe their illness behaviour in a meaningful way. This could be the reason why close to two-thirds are more confident of managing their sick friends and close relations, who they are familiar with their medical history. Despite the level of emergency, close to half of the practitioners will not extend their online prescription beyond the management of pains, antimalarials and antibiotics. This corroborated the findings of Jairoun et al. (2021), which highlighted dietary supplements and painkillers as major medications people order online. The online prescription limitation by health workers might not be unconnected with the fear of medico-legal implications expressed by majority of practitioners, who felt that they might not be protected when things go wrong. In developing countries such as Nigeria, with high rate of migration of health workers to developed countries, online consultation could bring some relief to a great number of patients, and stakeholders should therefore, work on the legal framework to give it legitimacy.

## **5. Conclusion and Recommendations**

Social media is a new mode of communication mostly among the young population. However, its application in healthcare management has not been well researched in the country. The COVID-19 era has shown the importance of minimizing contacts with certain widespread illnesses such as pandemics. So, online consultation could be the last resort in challenging times. However, literacy level could influence the description of illness behaviour which could affect the efficiency of consultation. The increasing awareness of patients' rights within the health-services environment is a growing concern among health practitioners. There is need, therefore, to have a national guideline for the appropriate use of social media in Medical Practice consultations with the necessary legal framework. A database of health workers willing to participate in social media consultations could be established, and subsequently create public awareness on how to engage them. With this, social media consultations could be the future for general medical practitioners, more so in reaching clients far from point of service.

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# Réchauffement Climatique: Enjeux Sur La Santé Humaine Et Animale

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## Résumé

*De nos jours, la planète est témoin – des difficultés de milliers de personnes qui – font face déjà -aux effets des phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes, aggravés par le réchauffement climatique. Les désastres, issus du réchauffement climatique, sont un signe d'alarme pour l'humanité. Les conséquences humaines et animales du réchauffement climatique actuel sont mises en évidence dans ce travail. Les moyens de les atténuer et de s'y habituer ont été également proposés. L'activité humaine est essentiellement responsable de ce réchauffement climatique, surtout des activités impliquant la combustion des combustibles fossiles, issues des gaz à effet de serre. Ce phénomène fait en sorte que trop de chaleur est retenue près de la Terre et cela nuit sévèrement aux environnements aquatiques de même que terrestres. Les cancers, les maladies cardiorespiratoires et métaboliques, les allergies résultent de la trop grande concentration des particules dans l'atmosphère. La gestion des incidents caniculaires implique la mise en place des services d'urgence et des mesures préventives. Parmi les personnes les plus exposées au réchauffement climatique, sont des enfants, des personnes âgées, des personnes socialement démunies. Le monde animal dans sa totalité subit le réchauffement climatique, dont l'homme est l'auteur. La réduction de la pollution et de celui du CO<sub>2</sub> sont bien possible au prix de mesures drastiques, résultant de la réduction de la consommation d'énergies fossiles responsable de la production de CO<sub>2</sub>. L'encouragement des contrôles épidémiologiques, ainsi que la mise en place des matières d'enseignement et d'apprentissage en santé environnementale, accompagnés –par des recherches biomédicales sont des impératifs qui doivent être envisagés dans le monde actuel.*

**Mots-clés :** atmosphère, caniculaires, chaleur, CO<sub>2</sub>, combustibles fossiles, énergies, la Terre, gaz à effet de serre, particules, planète, pollution, réchauffement climatique, santé environnementale, épidémiologiques.

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## 1.1 Introduction

À partir du moment où le coût humain du réchauffement climatique continue d'être ignoré, notamment les déplacements, les inondations, les sécheresses, les tremblements de terre, les morts, la chaleur excessive, les maladies, le chômage, la faim, etc., il devient effectivement urgent d'agir pour sauver notre planète. En ce moment, plusieurs éléments révèlent que le climat de la planète change rapidement et que les activités humaines sont responsables de ce changement. La répartition des précipitations, la fréquence et l'intensité des événements extrêmes, l'élévation du niveau de la mer, la hausse des températures devraient impacter de manière désastreuse sur les principaux déterminants de la santé humaine, particulièrement sur l'habitat, la qualité de l'air et de l'eau, la sécurité des approvisionnements alimentaires, etc. Le terme réchauffement climatique est un terme que l'on emploie généralement pour décrire les changements qui se produisent au niveau du climat de la Terre. Le terme est également employé pour faire des références aux effets humains et animaux provenant de ces changements. Souvent employé de manière interchangeable avec le terme « changement climatique », le terme « réchauffement climatique » fait également référence à la hausse des températures moyennes mondiales. Les êtres humains, la faune et les écosystèmes du monde entier subissent cette hausse des températures moyennes. Et comme ces impacts sont plusieurs, le terme « réchauffement climatique » est employé de même pour justement tenir compte de ces impacts additionnels. Durant les dernières trois décennies, le terme « réchauffement climatique » est le plus régulièrement employé pour désigner les changements du climat de la Terre, provoqués essentiellement par les activités humaines depuis la période préindustrielle. Ces activités humaines, surtout et en particulier, la combustion de combustibles fossiles et la déforestation, exacerbent la présence du dioxyde de carbone (CO<sub>2</sub>) dans l'atmosphère.

Ceci nuit horriblement à la santé humaine de même qu'animale. La plupart des climatologues sont d'accord que l'influence humaine est la cause dominante des tendances au réchauffement climatique, notées depuis le 20<sup>e</sup> siècle. Comme le monde entier fait face actuellement au problème du réchauffement climatique, les objectifs de cette étude sont d'examiner ses conséquences humaines et animales et de proposer des moyens de les prévenir et de s'y adapter.

En termes de méthodologie, des données ont été recueillies à travers les rapports des organismes gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux, les travaux de recherche universitaires, les ouvrages, et les revues. Des données ont été également recueillies à travers des entretiens anonymes avec des personnes ressource, ainsi qu'à travers des reportages dans les médias. La méthode de triangulation a été adoptée dans l'analyse des données ainsi recueillies. Nous avons délibérément adopté les théories de la coopération pour cadre théorique. Stein (1990) affirme que la coopération internationale devient de plus en plus exigible, surtout pour régir des biens communs à l'échelle internationale.

Ce travail comporte, de ce fait, l'introduction générale et le contexte de l'étude dans la première partie. La deuxième partie porte sur les conséquences du réchauffement climatique sur l'environnement humain et animale, sur la santé humaine et animale et sur la biodiversité. Les mesures de surveillance et d'adaptation au réchauffement climatique se trouvent dans la troisième partie, alors que les efforts des différents organismes mondiaux dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique font objet de la quatrième partie. Nous venons à la cinquième partie avec la conclusion et des recommandations.

## **1.2 Le contexte de l'étude**

La répétition des épisodes caniculaires, la sévérité des tempêtes et des tourbillons, les incendies massifs et incontrôlables sont tous, issus des altérations actuelles du climat -à l'ère de l'industrialisation au début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, et surtout, durant les trois dernières décennies. Ces périodes ont été marquées par un accroissement moyen des températures +1,5°C. L'élévation du niveau des mers, provoquée par la fonte de glaces et la dilatation de l'eau, en furent l'une – des conséquences du réchauffement climatique. Pour Leroy Ladurie (2011), plein d'arguments tendent à soutenir que ces modifications rapides du climat ne sont pas du même niveau que les altérations qui se sont affichées depuis l'an mille. Swynghedauw (2009), ajoute que ces altérations climatiques, qui sont d'origine anthropique ou humaines, sont associées à la combustion fossile, instigateur majeur de l'accroissement du CO<sub>2</sub> dans l'atmosphérique et de l'effet de serre. Masson-Delmotte (2011), de son côté, affirme de même, que ces altérations climatiques qui se sont affichées depuis l'an mille, ont amplifié les températures dans la troposphère que dans la stratosphère, conduisant à empêcher les variations du rayonnement solaire. La météorologie et le climat sont pour l'essentiel contrôlés par des processus troposphériques, une des responsabilités principales de la troposphère. Effet de serre ou encore gaz à effet de serre sont des termes trop souvent employés lorsqu'il s'agit du réchauffement ou changement climatique. D'après *Club de Rafale* (2020), une serre est une installation totalement vitrée et destinée à faire végéter des plantes, ayant besoin de chaleur et de soleil. Les rayons du soleil arrivent à pénétrer les parois ou les murs en vitres. Ces vitres, par contre, freinent l'échappement de la chaleur. Et- ce faisant, l'intérieur de la serre devient plus chaud qu'à l'extérieur, tout comme une voiture au soleil avec les fenêtres fermées. L'intérieur de la voiture se réchauffe avec les rayons du soleil et la chaleur reste enfermée à l'intérieur. Ce phénomène est décrit comme étant « l'effet de serre ». Pour pouvoir vivre sur la Terre, il faut absolument l'effet de serre, qui est un fait naturel. Sans le phénomène de l'effet de serre, la température moyenne mondiale ne sera pas du tout agréable à vivre. Le phénomène de l'effet de serre est provoqué par des gaz surnommés « gaz à effet de serre » ou les « GES ». Les gaz à effet de serre (GES) sont les gaz qui ne laissent pas échapper la chaleur dans l'atmosphère, près de la Terre. Certains de ces gaz se trouvent naturellement dans l'atmosphère, comme le dioxyde de carbone (CO<sub>2</sub>), le méthane (CH<sub>4</sub>) et la vapeur d'eau (H<sub>2</sub>O). D'autres GES, comme l'hexafluorure de soufre (SF<sub>6</sub>), le trifluorure d'azote (NF<sub>3</sub>), des hydrofluorocarbures (HFC) et des perfluorocarbures (PFC), ont été développés par des scientifiques pour l'industrie. Les activités humaines font augmenter la quantité de ces gaz dans l'atmosphère, provoquant ainsi le réchauffement de la Terre. (*Club de Rafale*, 2020). L'effet de serre est un phénomène très sensiblement liés aux variations de la

composition de l'atmosphère, dans la mesure où l'augmentation de la quantité de gaz à effet de serre rejetée dans l'atmosphère provoque un déséquilibre dans la composition de l'atmosphère, - conduisant ainsi à une augmentation de l'effet de serre, car la chaleur se trouve piéger à la surface de la Terre. Eh bien, ce déséquilibre provoque bien entendu le réchauffement de la Terre, dont nous souffrons tous aujourd'hui. Selon Ademe (2019), agence publique pour la protection de l'environnement, on assiste à l'amplification des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, provoquées par des activités humaines, depuis les années 1850 et la planète en souffre, car les gaz à effet de serre s'accroissent donc dans l'atmosphère. La croissance de la population mondiale est un facteur considérablement gênant et qui devient, jour au jour, incontrôlable. Ce phénomène de la croissance de la population n'arrête pas d'intensifier les dépenses énergétiques liées aux transports, à l'industrie, à l'agriculture, avec le phénomène de déforestation contribuant à réduire les capacités de l'assimilation végétale du CO<sub>2</sub>.

### 2.1. Réchauffement climatique et l'environnement humain et animal

Ademe (2019) estime que d'ici à la fin du siècle, le niveau moyen des mers et des océans pourrait monter jusqu'à 82 cm, si les émissions de gaz à effet de serre ne sont pas mieux contrôlées, et ceci pourrait entraîner des conséquences insupportables. Les conséquences importantes du réchauffement climatique menacent toute la planète: tremblements de terre, dégradation de la biodiversité, canicules, tempêtes plus fréquentes et plus fortes, fonte des glaces polaires, sécheresses intenses. La hausse de 17 cm au XX<sup>ème</sup> siècle, selon le GIEC (Groupe d'Experts Intergouvernemental sur l'Évolution du Climat) pourrait s'élever de 50 à 130 cm au XXI<sup>ème</sup> siècle. Le phénomène du réchauffement climatique, persévéra longtemps, après 2100. (*5e rapport du GIEC*, 2014). Dans ses rapports spéciaux sur les conséquences d'un réchauffement planétaire de 1,5°C, le GIEC fait le constat que le niveau des mers, qui est demeuré stable depuis 3 000 ans, s'est accru de 1 à 3 mm/an depuis 1900. La submersion marine, qui crée des menaces sur l'habitat humain, comme éprouvé en Chine, en Inde, au Bangladesh, en Indonésie, au Vietnam, en est la conséquence. (GIEC, 2021). Des « tsunamis de montagne » qui ont fait des ravages en Alaska et au Pérou ont été provoqués par le débordement des lacs liés à la fonte des glaciers. Les réchauffements climatiques sont à l'origine des « mégafeux entre août 2019 et janvier 2020 en Australie, qui ont détruit 117 millions d'ha, provoquant l'évacuation de 100 000 habitants, et faisant au moins 34 morts, avec plus d'un milliard de mammifères, d'oiseaux et de reptiles qui ont disparu. (Philips N et al., 2020). Les émissions de gaz à effet de serre sont également à l'origine des incendies de forêt, qui détruisent des habitations dispersés et des villes, des sécheresses successives et des vents secs.

L'environnement humain ne peut pas être évalué en dehors des externalités climatiques, issues des combustibles fossiles. Lorsque l'on carbonise les combustibles fossiles, - on émet des gaz à effet de serre, comme le dioxyde de carbone, des gaz qui retiennent la chaleur dans l'atmosphère favorisant le réchauffement climatique. (*Fact Sheet Climate Change FAQ*, 2021). L'usage de combustibles fossiles – charbon, pétrole et gaz naturel – revient très cher au climat, à l'environnement et à la santé et ces coûts sont effectivement reconnus comme des externalités. Toute chaîne d'alimentation en combustibles fossiles, dès l'extraction, aux activités du raffinage et finalement à l'utilisation propre ou à la combustion, toutes ces étapes reproduisent des externalités. Il existe d'autres externalités environnementales énormes émanant des combustibles fossiles et ayant des conséquences importantes énormes sur l'environnement humain et animal. Parmi ces autres externalités environnementales, il y a:

- La pollution de l'air : le dioxyde de soufre, les oxydes d'azote, les particules, le monoxyde de carbone et le mercure, qui sont tous issus des combustibles fossiles, sont très nocifs pour l'environnement, car ils produisent des polluants atmosphériques dangereux pour l'environnement et la santé humaine. (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008). La pollution provenant des combustibles fossiles peut avoir pour conséquence des pluies acides, provoquant une eutrophisation, c'est-à-dire, la production d'un excès de nutriments qui peut nuire aux écosystèmes aquatiques en abaissant les

niveaux d'oxygène. Les polluants atmosphériques peuvent également provoquer des dommages aux cultures et aux forêts, ainsi qu'à la faune. (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2021).

- La pollution de l'eau : les combustibles fossiles provoquent la pollution de l'eau, notamment les marées noires aux fluides de fracturation. Les eaux utilisées, qui en résultent de chaque puits de fracturation, contiennent souvent des substances comme l'arsenic, le plomb, le chlore et le mercure qui peuvent contaminer les eaux souterraines et l'eau potable, pouvant être toxiques (*Yale News*, 2016).

- La pollution plastique : Selon Centre For International Environmental Law (2019), les matières plastiques qui sont fabriquées contiennent plus de 99 % des éléments de combustibles fossiles. Et, (UN Environmental Programme (2021) porte à notre connaissance que chaque année, 300 millions de tonnes de déchets plastiques sont produites à l'échelle mondiale. 14 millions de tonnes de ces matières plastiques, selon (UN Environmental Programme (2021), se retrouvent finalement dans l'océan, faisant périr la faune sauvage et n'excluant pas la chaîne alimentaire, qui est constamment polluée. Les plastiques contribuent également aux réchauffements climatiques dans la mesure où les industries du plastique produisent des milliers de tonnes d'équivalent de dioxyde de carbone chaque année. D'après *Beyond Plastics* (2021), c'est bien le cas de l'industrie américaine du plastique, qui produit 232 millions de tonnes d'équivalent de dioxyde de carbone par an, ce qui fait que les émissions de gaz à effet de serre de cette industrie devraient surpasser celles des centrales électriques au charbon d'ici 2030.

- Les D déversements de pétrole : Des déversements de pétrole, qui causent des ennuis énormes aux communautés et à la faune, qui mettent en ruine les habitats, qui érodent les rivages et qui conduisent à la fermeture des plages, de parcs et de pêcheries sont tous provoqués par l'extraction, le transport et le raffinage des combustibles fossiles (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2021). La marée noire de BP Deepwater Horizon de 2010, qui demeure la plus grande marée noire de l'histoire, a déversé 134 millions de gallons de pétrole dans le golfe du Mexique, faisant disparaître 11 personnes et d'un grand nombre d'oiseaux, tortues, poissons, mammifères marins et plantes, et coûtant à BP 65 milliards de dollars en pénalités et en coûts de nettoyage. (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2020).

## **2.2. Réchauffement climatique et biodiversité**

Le terme 'écosystème' a été inventé par Arthur Tansley en 1935, qui reconnaît que les organismes et les environnements dans lesquels ils vivent doivent être considérés ensemble, car ils font partie d'un seul système écologique. (Robbins, 2012). La biodiversité désigne la totalité des êtres vivants ainsi que les écosystèmes dans lesquels ils vivent. Lorsque l'on parle de la biodiversité, l'on parle également des interactions des espèces entre elles et avec leurs milieux. La biodiversité, bien que ça soit aussi bien ancienne que la vie sur Terre, le concept n'a pris de l'importance que dans les années 1980 avec la convention sur la biodiversité biologique signée lors du sommet de la Terre de Rio de Janeiro (1992) et qui reconnaît pour la première fois la nécessité de conserver la biodiversité au profit de la totalité des êtres humains. Grâce à la biodiversité, l'homme arrive à avoir de l'oxygène, de la nourriture et de l'eau potable. Grâce à la biodiversité, l'homme arrive également à avoir des matières premières et des énergies nécessaires pour ses activités humaines. L'agriculture bénéficie également de la biodiversité. Ceci se manifeste dans la contribution des animaux pollinisateurs ou des organismes prenant part au renouvellement des sols. Il est à noter que la biodiversité ou la nature demeure, non seulement un réservoir pour l'Homme, mais elle demeure aussi la protectrice des risques environnementaux, tels que la préservation et la restauration de prairies inondables, qui permettent de réduire l'effet des inondations, tout en absorbant l'eau. Ce surplus d'eau sert à faire alimenter par la suite les nappes souterraines et à servir d'appui lors de période de sécheresse. Au niveau de la recherche, des inventions ont été réalisées tout en suivant les formes ou le fonctionnement des êtres vivants. La biodiversité est une trésorerie assez importante et très extraordinaire pour les médicaments et ceci explique bien son rapport nécessaire avec la santé humaine. La biodiversité prend soin du mieux-être de l'Homme au sein de la nature, contribuant essentiellement au succès de la production agricole. Pour ce qui concerne

le microbien, la biodiversité est impliquée dans la genèse des maladies auto-immunes et infectieuses (Woolhouse et al., 2005). La disparition des espèces va croissante. Il est estimé qu'une espèce animale ou végétale disparaît toutes les 20 minutes, ce qui fait 260 000 espèces multicellulaires annuellement. Il est également estimé que l'activité humaine ou anthropique est à l'origine de la disparition des végétaux, des mammifères, des poissons, des oiseaux, des batraciens et des reptiles, des insectes, etc. Actuellement, l'espèce humaine constitue 90% des mammifères, alors qu'elle constituait 0,1% il y a 10 000 ans. (Bœuf, 2014). Il est très bien possible de conserver certaines espèces, car la déperdition de ces espèces n'est pas inéluctable, d'où la justification d'une veille sanitaire spécifique. (Haines & Ebi, 2019)... La diminution de la biodiversité afflige des populations, car cette diminution impacte sur la santé, l'eau, le recyclage des déchets, la productivité, (McMichael, 2013). L'émergence de nouveaux agents pathogènes, Les microorganismes aquatiques, bactéries du sol, cyanobactéries, plancton et tout ce qui est du monde microbien souffrent tous du réchauffement climatique. (Marxsen, 2016).

### 2.3. Réchauffement climatique et la santé

Avec la pollution de l'air, provoquée par la combustion des combustibles fossiles, de multiples problèmes de santé, notamment la mort prématurée, les maladies cardiaques, l'asthme, le cancer, etc., peuvent survenir. (New York University School of Law, 2021). L'éthylbenzène, le toluène, l'xylène et le benzène sont des additifs que l'on retrouve dans l'essence et la combustion de ces additifs reproduit des composés aromatiques cancérigènes et des particules ultrafines qui sont nuisibles à la santé. EESI. (2020). Au niveau mondial et selon le rapport livré par (Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health (2021), la pollution de l'air dû aux combustibles fossiles est à l'origine d'un décès sur cinq. En 2018, 350 000 personnes ont subi la mort prématurée aux États-Unis, la cause principale étant la pollution de l'air, résultant de la combustion des combustibles fossiles. L'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), dans un rapport, révèle que le changement climatique est à l'origine d'au moins 150 000 décès par an, chiffre qui est sensé doubler d'ici à 2030. (Kasotia, 2017). Les territoires, contribuant le moins au réchauffement climatique, sont les plus sensibles aux maladies provoquées par la hausse des températures et il se peut que le nombre de morts provoqués par les effets du réchauffement climatique s'élève souvent dans ces pays. Les zones côtières situées sur la façade de l'Océan Pacifique, de l'Océan Indien, ainsi qu'au niveau de l'Afrique subsaharienne sont encore les plus affolés par les effets du réchauffement climatique.

Le GIEC, dans son résumé à l'intention des décideurs, affirme que la combustion de combustibles fossiles est responsable de l'accroissement des concentrations de dioxyde de carbone (CO<sub>2</sub>) dans l'atmosphère dans une moindre mesure mais qui est néanmoins importante aux changements climatiques. Le documentaire produit par l'ancien Vice-président des États-Unis, Al Gore, un documentaire qui fait état d'une réalité gênante, a également provoqué l'attention du public sur le changement climatique. Un documentaire qui explique comment la combustion des combustibles fossiles, comme le charbon, le gaz et le pétrole, a fait croître les quantités de carbone de dioxyde dans l'atmosphère. Le réchauffement climatique peut engendrer des graves modifications de l'environnement, ce qui pourrait avoir de graves conséquences sur la santé humaine. Il peut également entraîner une élévation du niveau des océans, une situation inquiétante dans les zones côtières et qui conduit souvent à des modifications des précipitations et à l'augmentation des risques de sécheresse et d'inondations, avec la biodiversité fortement menacée. Les habitants des régions de Nunavut et du Canada éprouvent déjà les effets, avec les chasseurs Inuit, peuple autochtone de l'Arctique, qui s'efforcent de vivre à cause des situations causées par la réduction de l'épaisseur de la couche de glace. L'explorateur Will Steger explique comment les chasseurs de l'île de Baffin se retrouvent dans des pistes périlleuses tout en cherchant de s'approcher des mammifères marins. (Kasotia, 2017).

Le réchauffement climatique a plusieurs conséquences graves sur la santé, telles que les maladies infectieuses, surtout dans les régions tropicales, selon le GIEC, car la hausse des températures, en Afrique, encourage la multiplication de moustiques et les populations feront davantage face à des maladies comme le paludisme, la dengue et d'autres infections transmises par les insectes. Ces effets

sont également perçus dans d'autres pays. Néanmoins, pouvoir adapter aux changements de température dépend de la région. Les sociétés développées peuvent facilement avoir accès aux avancées technologiques, alors que les pays en développement n'ont ni le savoir-faire, ni les ressources et les systèmes de santé publique nécessaires pour prévenir ces situations horribles. Les vagues de chaleur en sont d'autres conséquences mortelles. Des températures anormalement élevées peuvent infliger des effets néfastes aux populations surtout vulnérables, comme les personnes âgées, les enfants et les malades. L'été 2023 est le plus chaud jamais mesuré dans le monde, confirme l'Observatoire européen Copernicus. (Thirouard, 2023). Quelles en sont les conséquences? La qualité de l'air a été largement compromise, déclare l'Organisation météorologique mondiale à Genève. Des quantités gigantesques de polluants à l'origine des incendies en Europe ont été rejetées dans l'atmosphère aux Etats-Unis. Les canicules à répétition ont poussé des concentrations d'ozone supérieures aux limites précisées par l'OMS. Il y a également des poussières du Sahara estimées d'être des particules fines, envahissant de plus en plus le ciel. L'Afrique n'a pas été épargnée de la hausse des températures éprouvée durant l'été 2023. Le Maroc et l'Algérie ont éprouvé des records de températures, alors qu'une sécheresse prolongée sévit au Kenya et toute la Corne de l'Afrique depuis des nombreuses années. Une sécheresse, qui a conduit à la mort de millions de têtes de bétail et qui a dévasté des récoltes entières. Les pays africains ont éprouvé des catastrophes naturelles, inondations et cyclones, qui s'intensifient ces dernières années. (Thirouard, 2023).

La perte de la productivité agricole en est encore une des conséquences graves du réchauffement climatique. Des sécheresses peuvent surgir suite au réchauffement climatique et ceci aura des conséquences sur les conditions de vie des populations, surtout en Afrique. D'ici à 2020, 75 à 250 millions de personnes séjournant en Afrique seront privées d'accès à un approvisionnement suffisant en eau et feront face à une crise alimentaire, avec la chute de productivité agricole à 50%. Une crise alimentaire, dont 130 millions de personnes en Asie seront affectées, pourrait être provoquée par la montée des températures et ceci pourrait avoir des conséquences graves sur la population africaine, selon le rapport du GIEC. (Kasotia, 2017).

Asthme et autres maladies respiratoires. Les personnes éprouvant des problèmes cardiaques sont plus vulnérables à la hausse des températures, surtout celles qui séjournent déjà dans des endroits chauds. Ceci est ainsi, car, afin de pouvoir maintenir la température du corps à un niveau permis, leur système cardiovasculaire doit marcher à un niveau de pression plus haut.

Il est à noter cependant que les réchauffements climatiques ne jouent pas un rôle absolu dans la transmission des maladies infectieuses. Les activités agricoles, les déplacements multiples des êtres humains et des animaux, la distribution des produits alimentaires interviennent tous dans la diffusion des maladies infectieuses. Au fait, dans une étude, le réchauffement climatique se trouve au dixième position des éléments d'émergence d'une nouvelle infection (Woolhouse et al., 2005). Généralement d'origine animale, seul une minorité des agents pathogènes est capable de provoquer des épidémies de grande envergure. Le climat ne demeure qu'un des indices de l'épidémiologie.

### **3.1. Mesures de surveillance et d'adaptation**

L'adaptation implique avoir la capacité, pour un système humain ou naturel, de s'adapter au changement climatique, surtout en ce qui concerne la variabilité et les extrémités du climat. L'adaptation implique également, non seulement avoir la capacité de s'emparer des opportunités qui s'offrent ou de lutter contre les conséquences, mais aussi avoir la capacité de s'échapper aux préjudices potentiels ou de les affaiblir. (World Bank, 2020). L'adaptation est donc une altération effectuée au niveau des processus, des pratiques ou des structures et qui offre l'occasion d'atténuer ou de compenser des préjudices potentiels, tout en profitant des opportunités liés aux changements du climat, introduisant des modifications destinées à minimiser la vulnérabilité des populations face aux effets du changement et de la variabilité climatiques (IPCC, 2001b). L'IPCC en anglais (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) ou le GIEC en français (Groupe Intergouvernemental sur l'Evolution du Climat) a été créé en 1988 par l'Organisation Météorologique Mondiale (OMM) et le Programme des

Nations Unies pour l'Environnement (PNUE). Réunissant 145 pays, le GIEC a pour but d'établir un rapport de synthèse clair et objectif sur l'état des connaissances relatif au climat. La lutte contre le réchauffement climatique implique la réduction de la combustion d'énergies fossiles, auteur de l'accroissement de CO<sub>2</sub> dans l'atmosphère. Quant à Valérie Masson-Delmotte, coprésidente du Groupe 1 du GIEC, les efforts que mènent des États dans la lutte contre la consommation d'énergies fossiles ne sont pas assez: « ce à quoi l'on assiste pour le moment n'est que renoncement » (Masson-Delmotte, 2011). Il est prévu que l'espérance de vie s'élève jusqu'à au moins 2030 dans les pays de l'OCDE (Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économique), (Watts et al., 2019)).

Le recours à d'autres sources énergétiques outre que les combustibles fossiles conduit vers la décarbonation de l'économie, c'est-à-dire l'application de techniques minimisant la production de dioxyde de carbone. La décarbonation de l'économie implique le choix des sources d'énergie solaire, aérienne, etc. et ceci exige des altérations et des examens assez approfondis de ces sources d'énergie, afin de pouvoir s'assurer de leur propre efficacité au niveau de l'isolation des habitations, du rendement des moteur, etc.). La décarbonation de l'économie implique également de profondes évolutions du style de vie des populations, à savoir : (l'économie de l'énergie, le comportement dans le travail, les déplacements, les loisirs, etc.). A présent, les indicateurs révèlent bien que rien n'a changé dans nos comportements. On se comporte toujours de la même manière, vivant et travaillant sensiblement, avec un retour du climato scepticisme. Les mesures sont justement évaluées par rapport à leurs bénéfices pour les 20% des plus pauvres, comme le propose le Conseil Économique Social et Environnemental en raison du fait que les statuts des individus sont caractérisés par des inégalités. (Lelieveld, 2015). La capacité de pouvoir arriver à atténuer bien rapidement et de manière très significative et généralisée le degré de pollution, comme c'était le cas de la pandémie du Covid-19, est une mesure à ne pas négliger. (Cui, 2019).

Le soin pour la santé humaine, effectué à des niveaux différents, à savoir la non-utilisation des transports motorisés, la baisse des consommations alimentaires, particulièrement celles d'origine animale, la surévaluation des activités physiques, etc., ne doit pas être confondu avec le bien-être de la planète et l'amélioration de la condition animale. Beaucoup de personnes tendent à commettre cette erreur grave et impardonnable. (Pat, 2020).

#### 4.1. Les accords de Paris de 2015 – La COP 21.

Dans le cadre de ce travail, et surtout dans le but de mettre en lumière les différents efforts déployés par les instances mondiales dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique, nous focalisons sur le (Conference of Parties) COP 21, ainsi que le premier sommet africain sur le climat au Kenya, L'affaire du climat passait à l'échelle globale en février 1979, lorsque la première conférence mondiale sur le climat eut lieu à Genève. Pour la première fois, la communauté scientifique internationale avertissait les gouvernements sur le phénomène des changements climatiques, d'origine anthropique ou humaine. Le protocole de Kyoto, établi lors de la Convention cadre des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques CCNUCC (1997), est le premier accord exigeant, établi à l'échelle internationale et précisant en détail des engagements chiffrés des partis dans la lutte contre les émissions de GES. La COP 21, désignée également comme l'accord de Paris, est un traité internationalement juridiquement contraignant et portant sur le réchauffement climatique. Adoptée le 12 décembre 2015 par 196 parties lors de la COP 21, il est rentré en vigueur le 4 novembre 2016. Le COP 21 est une Conférence des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques. La Conférence s'est déroulée à Paris en France, d'où la désignation « l'accord de Paris ». L'objectif principal de la COP 21 est de retenir « l'augmentation de la température moyenne mondiale bien en dessous de 2°C au-dessus des niveaux préindustriels » (United nations, 2023). Suivant la COP 21 ou l'accord de Paris, les pays développés doivent être en mesure d'apporter une aide financière aux pays pas très bien munis et qui sont plus vulnérables, tout en soutenant pour la première fois les contributions volontaires des autres pays intéressés. Le soutien financier de la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique est également assez important, car il faut des ressources financières importantes pour arriver à s'adapter aux effets destructifs et minimiser les

conséquences du réchauffement climatique. Tous les pays sont partie prenante de l'effort. Dans le cas des pays développés, la réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre est exigée, alors que dans le cas des pays en voie de développement, la limitation de la croissance des émissions de gaz à effet de serre est recommandée. Les efforts et les contributions des partis sont révisés périodiquement et une communication est émise à cet effet. Pour se conformer à l'accord de Paris, la France a adopté le Plan Climat de 2017, qui vise la neutralité carbone au milieu du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, c'est à dire que les émissions de CO<sub>2</sub> soient équilibrées, avec les absorptions et le stockage de CO<sub>2</sub> (dans les forêts, les sols...). L'accord de Paris accorde aussi une place importante à l'adaptation au changement climatique. L'évolution du climat fait appel à des risques énormes, mais l'adaptation au changement climatique veut aussi dire la transformation des territoires, les innovations techniques, etc. Pour s'adapter, les solutions naturelles (aménagement avec la nature en ville, restauration des écosystèmes...) sont à privilégier.

#### **4.2. Premier sommet africain sur le climat**

Pour la toute première fois, un sommet sur le climat a eu lieu en Afrique et Karumba (2023) nous informe qu'ils étaient tous à Nairobi, Kenya. Le fait que les chefs d'Etats africains étaient à Nairobi entre le 4 et 6 septembre pour ce tout premier sommet africain sur le climat, est-ce là, une vraie manifestation d'une volonté politique contre le réchauffement climatique ou bien, ils étaient tous là pour d'autres raisons outre que la question du réchauffement climatique ? D'après Karumba (2023), Antonio Guterres, le secrétaire général des Nations unies, Sultan Al-Jaber, le président émirati de la conférence des Nations unies sur le climat (COP28), John Kerry, l'envoyé spécial américain pour le climat, les représentants des grandes institutions financières internationales ou encore Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission européenne, ont participé à ce premier sommet africain sur le climat. Peut-on estimer ici que l'enjeu est de porter à la connaissance du monde entier que l'Afrique se montre très sérieux au sujet du dérèglement climatique et de montrer qu'elle peut être une force de proposition. Elle a intérêt, car l'Afrique est un des continents le plus menacé du réchauffement climatique.

Son Excellence, Monsieur William Ruto, le président kényan, et hôte du sommet, va éclaircir un peu la situation, lorsqu'il partage sa vision collaborative dans le financement du climat, une collaboration qui va permettre de définir la nouvelle architecture de financement du climat. À la fin des années 2000, le Kenya s'est lancé dans une stratégie de croissance verte. Des sources renouvelables sont issues de près de 90 % de son électricité aujourd'hui. Alors que le Djibouti inaugure sa centrale éolienne et devient le premier pays africain 100% énergie verte. (Abdoulaye, 2023).

Avec le premier Sommet africain sur le climat prenant sa fin mercredi 6 septembre à Nairobi Kenya, les chefs d'Etats africains, dans une déclaration collective, ont exprimé ce que le continent africain attend des grands pays pollueurs, tout en laissant dévoiler ses désirs à devenir un acteur important dans la décarbonation de l'économie mondiale, une position collective, que ses représentants devront faire avancer à la COP 21, nouvelle conférence sur le réchauffement climatique aux Emirats arabes unis en novembre. De son côté, la Zambie, pays enclavé et fortement endetté d'Afrique australe, signe des accords le 11 septembre pour la restauration et la protection de son couvert forestier sur 40 000 kilomètres carrés, soit environ 5 % de son territoire.

#### **5.1. Conclusion**

Réduire des émissions de gaz à effet de serre demande, de la part des pays industrialisés, ainsi que de la part des pays en voie de développement, des initiatives sérieuses et bien gérées à court terme de même qu'à long terme. Comme l'affaire du réchauffement climatique touche tout le monde, les citoyens et tous ceux qui sont impliqués dans la combustion des combustibles fossiles surtout, il revient à nous tous de changer notre style de vie, de manière à ce que nous devenions beaucoup plus conscients de l'environnement, car si l'environnement n'est pas très bien protégé, les conséquences retombent sur notre santé humaine. Ceci ne doit pas nous poser des problèmes, il suffit d'avoir la volonté nécessaire et la discipline exigée.



## 5.2 Recommandations

Pour arriver à limiter les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et à s'adapter, nous faisons des recommandations suivantes :

- Avoir un engagement sérieux et une volonté politique de la part des dirigeants en matière de réchauffement climatique
- Les mécanismes politiques pour réduire les externalités des combustibles fossiles
- il faut une vraie transformation de nos styles de vie.
- Il faut mettre en place des politiques nécessaires à la protection de l'environnement.
- Il faut un engagement sérieux des entreprises dans la combustion des combustibles fossiles, tout en s'engageant dans la recherche de nouvelles sources d'énergie renouvelable respectueuse de l'environnement.
- Une norme fédérale sur l'électricité a des sources d'énergie renouvelable.

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# Investigating the Associated Cost Effect of E-Banking Channel Downtime during Covid-19 Pandemic using Multi-Server Queuing System

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## Abstract

*One of the essential elements of remaining competitive in the business world especially in the financial service industry is queue management. The financial service providers including banks are saddle with the responsibility of ensuring effective queue management and prompt service delivery to customers. To achieve this, banks must ensure maximum uptime of all their electronic channels importantly the Automated Teller machine (ATM). Although, in doing this, they will incur deployment cost of the e-channels among other operational cost but avoid losing customers to competition. The objective of this study is to determine the balance between cost of satisfactory service to the customer and cost to the banking system using the Multi server queuing model M/M/s. This study was underpinned by theory of reasoned action (TRA) and Technology Task fit theory (TTF). In gathering the required data, Firstly observation of the branch office under study was conducted during the business office hour. The arrival of customers, service time of servers and the time spent in queue/system was also considered. Secondly, the inter arrival and service time was analysed adopting Multi-Server queue model (M/M/s) approach with forecasting of improvement in the system. Based on collected data, the analysis result shows that providing a four (4) service point will be cost effective. To this end, it has been revealed that the proposed four (4) service point will be suitable for the branch under study compared to the three (3) service point adopted by the bank due to COVID-19 pandemic as it remodel its business processes to deal with the changes while additionally, ensuring optimal uptime of the alternative e-banking channel to guarantee excellent service delivery to customers. Additionally, the queuing model can be integrated with simulation (Khan et al., (2021); these two models have been suggested to be effective in solving the everyday challenges faced by customer in the service environment.*

**Keywords:** E-Banking, Queuing system, Covid-19, Single queue multiple server (M/M/S), Economic cost

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## 1. Introduction

Queuing to be served is a common and general experience in everyday life especially in service outlets such as banks, petrol/gas service stations, hospitals, bus stops, train stations, Airports, Food restaurant and other service outlets. When customers in a service facility outdo the number of available server a

queue is formed; or the facility is not efficiently and effectively run or a server exceed the expected turnaround time to service a customer (Sharma, 2007). There are situations in which service outlets are idle when the number of available servers exceeds the number of customers to be served. Taha (2011) defines queue has a waiting line in a service facility and the capacity of the service facility will be termed to be infinite if no limit on the number of customers that can allowed while it will be finite if the number of customers allowed on the facility is limited. Koko, Burodo, and Suleiman (2018), explain that waiting line has two key elements: the population source of customer which can either be finite or infinite and the service facility. The service industry where arrival and serving time are random and performed by human resources is a complex decision environment (Al-Jumaily & Al-Jobori, 2011; Laia et al., (2020). However, incapacity of banks to ensure their service facilities and e-channels serve customers without delay is a major issue as it leads to discomfort and economic cost of waiting customers (Khan et al, 2021).

The outbreak of COVID-19 which has spread across the globe affected all countries which Nigeria was not an exemption. Based on preliminary observation the outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria was on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February 2020, when the first index case was reported. This has impacted greatly on the banking industry as all Nigeria banks were advised to beef up preparedness capabilities across branches nationwide in observing the COVID-19 protocols by ensuring customers and staffs maintain high level of hygiene. Banks on the other hand, had to put in place measures to attract and retain their customers such as provision of canopy outside their banking premises and monitoring of the alternative e-banking channels so as to optimize service delivery for profit making. Despite ensuring that alternative e-banking channels such as Automated Teller Machine (ATM), 24/7 online self-service and customer fulfillment call center, mobile banking, internet banking, point of sale (POS) are functioning by banks with the intention of reducing crowd and waiting time of customers, this did not yield the desired result as customers are still seen cluttering under the provided canopy outside the banking premises either waiting to see the customer service officer or a teller. The waiting line experience continued in almost all Nigeria banks; time customers spent waiting to be served can be of use on other important things. Kilif and Ozkan (2020) evaluated the queuing system in the bank using Fuzzy logic. The queue group and average waiting time on the queue was determined according to number of customers waiting to be served, customer score and the credit score parameter (CRO). The study did not put into consideration the economic cost of keeping both bank and non-bank customers waiting, the focus of this study was to ensure a balance between cost of satisfactory service to the customer by determining how long an arriving customer has to wait in a queue before being served and cost to the banking system as it will assist the bank management to determine the actual number of servers needed to achieve cost effectiveness.

## **2. Literature Review**

This section highlights the theories that underpin this study, the conceptual, empirical review of relevant literature and the observed gap.

### **2.1 Theoretical Framework**

This study is underpinned by the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and Technology Task fit theory (TTF), due to their applicability and relevance to the study.


#### **Theory of Reasoned Action**

Theory of reasoned action (TRA) is a widely studied and accepted theory in explaining human behaviour (Venkatesh, Ramesh, & Massey, 2003). Human behavioural intention can be explained by two key factors: personal factor which reflect attitude towards behaviour, and subjective norm which reflect human perception of social pressure (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975). An individual's feeling (positive

or negative) towards a targeted behaviour is the first antecedent of behavioural intention which reflect attitude. An individual will exhibit certain behaviour after evaluating it positively.

This theory is important to this study as it explains and predicts the rationale behind the behaviour exhibited by customers’ in the light of adapting to the pandemic situation. Customers can be balking, renegeing or jockeying customers in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic. This will assist the bank’s management to decide the queuing model to adopt for the branch as they are saddled with the responsibility of employing the required number of servers to reduce churn rate and loss of customers to competitor since the banking hall can only be access by limited customers at a time being one of the COVID-19 precautionary measure. However, TRA only explains attitude, intention and behaviour it did not consider the influence of technology on individuals’ perceptions. Hence, the need to introduce Task technology fit theory to address this weakness.

**Figure 1: “Pure form” Theory of Reasoned Action**




Source: (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975)

**Task Technology fit Theory**

Task technology fit theory (TTF) is used in measuring the effectiveness of technology in a system by analyzing the relationship between technology and the task supported by technology. This theory is widely recognized and it is suggested to be one of the most important evolutions in information system (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995). Technology is embedded into our everyday activities. The functionality and reasoning of individual and organization continues to be shaped by evolving technology (Hanelt, Bohnsack, Marz, & Antunes Marante, 2021). Applying this theory in different environments will yield different specific task characteristics. To this end, applying this theory into this area of study assisted to define the extent to which technology will assist the servers to accomplish their tasks in order to meet and exceed the expectations of the customers, which will in turn increase customer retention and profitability (Malik et al., 2021). Additionally, the adoption of technology by customers will address their need as most financial transactions can be done through the alternative e-channels without visiting the banking premise and this will further assist control the queue.

**Figure 2: Task technology fit model**



Source: (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995)

## **2.2 Empirical Framework**

Queuing system emanated in the research work of a Danish engineer by the name Agner Krarup Erlang in 1909 (Winston & Goldberg, 2004). He created models to describe the system of Copenhagen Telephone Exchange Company, the study reveal that telephone traffic demand fluctuates and report to address delay in automatic dialing equipment was later published. After his publication Erlang work was extended to general problems situation, business application and to various service sectors. There are lots of advantages attached to modeling a service industry as a queue system and this is not limited to: diagnosing problem, identifying constraints. Afolalu, Ikumapayi, Abdulkareem, Emeterere, and Adejumo (2021) used queuing theory to determine sustainability in the telecommunication system. They explained that when customers has complain their first point of contact is the customer center and the ability of the customer call center representative to resolve their issue will determine if they will continue usage of the telecommunication network. They further use the stochastic queuing approach to optimize the call center operation by determining the required optimal call center operators during peak periods using four performance indexes which are: perceived agent behavioral pattern, perceived agent competency, perceived agent friendliness, perceived agent politeness and resolution on the first call.

Kilif and Ozkan (2020) model a banking system by proposing a fuzzy logic based approach to improve staff utilization. In the study, individual queue group and the average waiting time were determined according to the number of waiting customers, customer score and credit score parameters. It was revealed that customers who were not customer of the bank wait longer on queue and as such should be given priority sequence numbers according to their credit scores. The research was not limited to investigating how long a customer wait in queue at the bank's ATM but also how long it takes the bank's staff to provide service using the Toxic substance distribution (TSD) approach. Finally, they used queuing theory to ascertain the ideal banking and waiting time, the investigation was to assist administrative staff estimate how many customers will wait in queue and those that will walk away per day. This study empirically is an improvement on Kilif and Ozkan (2020) research work, the focus was on how the approach of the multichannel queue model (M/M/S) will assist banks faced with the challenge of delivering excellent service and retaining their customer during pandemic or change in the business environment.

## **3. Methodology**

### **Research Design**

This study employed a descriptive research design involving a cross sectional survey of the transaction counts per tellers in one of the commercial bank in Nigeria during the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic when lockdown was enforced in the country and also during post Covid-19 when the lockdown was relax. The objective of the study was to ensure a balance between cost of satisfactory service to the customer by determining how long an arriving customer has to wait in a queue before being served and cost to the banking system using a Multi-Server queue model (M/M/S) approach. In this system, there are multiple servers in parallel handling arriving customers. For this approach employed it is assumed that arrivals follow Poisson probability at an average rate of  $\lambda$  customers per unit time with service time exponentially distributed with an average of  $\mu$  customers per unit time. The method employed for data collection was direct observation and a primary data retrieved from the bank's teller daily transaction monitoring report. A systematic sampling technique was adopted for the study. The average customer arriving to be served at the bank was 320 per week and 70 customers /day.

**Method of Data Analysis**

The method adopted for this study is a multiple channel queuing system according to Kendall and Hill (1953) and Lee (1966) with one or more server available to attend to customers arriving at the banking hall using a first come first served queue discipline (FCFS), this is represented as M/M/s where ‘s’ is indicate servers. The arrival of customers to the banking facility can be characterized by: size and behaviour of arriving customer. This study focuses on the M/M/s approach to model the service performances of a bank’s branch in Lagos, Nigeria. Lagos was chosen due the population capacity and being the hub of information, communication and technology. Also, Lagos State has the highest number of account holder (CBN, 2022).

Meanwhile, the bank’s name is not stated in this research work for confidentiality of data. The data used for the study was primary data and observation done to determine the inter arrival and service rate, the data was retrieved from the database of the bank which include the average number of customers that visited that visited the branch on a daily basis; table 1 shows the transaction counts of the 2 tellers who worked during the Covid-19 pandemic lockdown. The variables considered were arrival and service rate/hour, average number of customers waiting on queue in the system, average time a customer spends on queue and in the system and probability that the system is idle.

Considering the economic analysis of a queuing system, the information gotten from the queue was used to investigate the cost model for the bank queuing system. There are two types of costs associated with queuing system which are: operating cost and the opportunity. The bank’s branch considered was the only branch opened during lockdown which was a strategic action by the government to reasonably control the widespread and communal transmission of the disease, other bank’s branch in the same environment during this period were closed to customer. The branch had two front line tellers and three bulk room tellers for normal operation but during COVID-19 only half of the workforce worked, others were asked to work from home. To achieve optimal utilization of the servers and minimization of customer’s waiting time which affects customer’s satisfaction. It is important to check the performance of the tellers during the lockdown to the present moment that a lot of the precautionary measures have been eased down.

There are some underlying assumptions for modeling of the queuing system for the tier 1 bank’s branch under consideration:

1. An infinite calling population
2. The queue discipline follows a first come first served principle
3. Arrival of customers to the banking facility will be model to follow Poison probability distribution.
4. Service time follows exponential distribution
5. Each server serves  $\mu$  customer per unit time
6. Every server is identical in performance

**Multi- Channel queuing model equations**

The result of each equation after analysis is presented in Appendices A where  $(\lambda) = 12$  customers/hour., service rate  $(\mu) = 5$  customers/hour, and number of server;  $c=3$  (the number of servers was increase to 4, 5, 6) to better investigate the effect of covid-19 on the waiting time of customers

$\rho = \frac{\lambda}{c\mu}$  (Utilization factor)..... (1)

Equation 2 is the probability of zero customers in the service facility



$$\rho_0 = \frac{1}{\left[ \sum_{n=0}^{c-1} \frac{1}{n!} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\right)^n + \frac{1}{c!} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\right)^c \frac{c\mu}{c\mu - \lambda} \right]} \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

Equation 3 is probability that a customer had to wait at the service facility:

$$\rho_w = \frac{1}{c!} \left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\right)^c \frac{c\mu}{c\mu - \lambda} \rho_0 \dots\dots\dots (3)$$

Equation 4 is the average number of customers in the service facility:

$$L_s = \frac{\lambda\mu \left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\right)^c}{(c-1)! (c\mu - \lambda)^2} \rho_0 + \frac{\lambda}{\mu} \dots\dots\dots (4)$$

Equation 5 is the average number of customers in queue

$$L_q = \frac{\lambda\mu \left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\right)^c}{(c-1)! (c\mu - \lambda)^2} \rho_0 \text{ Or simply expressed as } L_q = L_s - \rho \dots\dots\dots (5)$$

The average time spent in the service facility by customer is expressed in equation 6:

$$W_s = \frac{\mu \left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\right)^c}{(c-1)! (c\mu - \lambda)^2} \rho_0 + \frac{1}{\mu}; \text{ which can simply be expressed as } \frac{L_s}{\lambda} \dots\dots\dots (6)$$

The average time a customer spends on queue

$$W_q = \frac{\mu \left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\right)^c}{(c-1)! (c\mu - \lambda)^2} \rho_0; \text{ simply expressed as } W_q = W_s - \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ or } \frac{L_q}{\lambda} \dots\dots\dots (7)$$

**Cost model for Queue Theory**

In investigating the optimal number of servers to employ in a service facility, there are two opposing cost of concern; the service cost and waiting time cost. Considering the economic effect of these two costs, it helps to manage the tradeoff between increase in total cost of rendering excellent service and decrease in cost of waiting by customers. The total cost is mathematically express below:

TC = CS \* C + CW \* L<sub>s</sub>, where

TC = Total cost

CS = Cost of server

**Table 1: COST OF SERVER**

COST OF SERVER (hour)	
Salary (₦)	4,399.56
Cost of Diesel/ litre (₦)	3,333.00
Total (₦)	7,732.56

Source: Researcher 2023

Where:

Salary= ₦80,000 per month; Cost of diesel per litre = ₦250 and the generator uses 80litre per day

C = Number of servers

CW (cost of waiting): is a proxy number, constant and an estimate.  $L_s$  = average customers in the system either waiting or currently in service.

#### 4. ANALYSIS AND RESULT

The arrival of customer was 5minutes interval with service time of 12minutes per customer, the mean arrival rate ( $\lambda$ ) = 12 customers/hour., service rate ( $\mu$ ) =5 customers/hour, and number of server; c=3 (3 tellers).

Table 2 shows the snapshot of total number of customers that visited the banking hall for week 1 which the servers were able to serve. Server 1, Server 2 and Server 3 were able to serve 373, 366 and 374 customers respectively for week 1. The number of customers the servers could attend to on the first day of the week was higher compared to other days of the week.

**Table 2: Performance of Servers for week 1**

Number of customers ( Time: 9.000am-3.00pm )						
Number of server	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Total
1	106	90	57	56	64	373
2	114	70	59	52	71	366
3	93	92	68	57	64	374
<b>Grand Total</b>						<b>1,113</b>

Source: Primary data, 2023

Table 3 shows the snapshot of total number of customers that visited the banking hall for week 2 which the servers were able to serve. Server 1, Server 2 and Server 3 were able to serve 373, 366 and 374 customers respectively for week 1. The number of customers the servers could attend to on the first day of the week was higher compared to other days of the week.

**Table 3: Performance of servers for week 2**

Number of customers ( Time: 9.000am-3.00pm )						
Number of server	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Total
1	84	62	66	69	78	359
2	62	61	63	65	75	326
3	65	64	62	65	75	331
<b>Grand Total</b>						<b>1,016</b>

Source: Primary data, 2023

**Table 4: Performance and Summary of Analysis for the Servers**

No. of Server	3	4	5	6
Rate of Arrival ( $\lambda$ )	12	12	12	12
Service Rate ( $\mu$ )	5	5	5	5
Utilization ( $\rho$ )	80%	60%	48%	40%
Ave. no of customers in the bank ( $L_s$ )	4.98	2.8	2.5	2.4
Average customer waiting in queue ( $L_q$ )	2.6	0.6	0.6	0.03
Average time/hr. customers spent in the bank ( $W_s$ )	0.42	0.25	0.25	0.2
Average time/hr. customers wait in queue ( $W_q$ )	0.21	0.05	0.05	0.0025
Probability of zero customer in the bank ( $\rho_0$ )	5.62%	8.30%	8.90%	9.03%
Probability that a customer wait ( $\rho_w$ )	64.70%	28.68%	27.20%	3.99%
Total cost of waiting/hr. TC(₦)	146,900.88	100,482.24	100,762.80	106,011.36

Source: Researcher, 2023

#### 4.1 Discussion of Findings

From Table 4 summarizing the performance of the servers and economic effect of customers waiting for service, increasing the number of servers from 3 to 4 servers shows a decrease in waiting line from 0.42 ( $W_s$ ) and 0.21 ( $W_q$ ) to 0.25 and 0.05 respectively. Also, the probability that customers waited before being served reduced from 64.7% to 28.68%. It was further observed that each server was busy 60% which implies 40% of idle time, with the total cost also reducing from ₦146,900.88 to ₦100,482.24 which indicate optimality. Furthermore, increasing the number of servers from 3 to 5 revealed that the average time customers spends in the system and on queue was the same as when the servers were 4; 0.25( $W_s$ ) and 0.05( $W_q$ ) respectively but the probability that customers waited before being served reduce from 64.7% to 27.2% but total cost increased slightly compared to when the servers were 4 from ₦100,482.24 to ₦100,762.8. For 5 servers, idle time was 52% but this does not indicate optimality. The addition of 2 more servers to the existing 3 server was at an additional cost. Furthermore, increasing number of server to 6 reduced waiting time of customers but at an increased cost of N106,011.36 with idle time 60% as the system was only utilize 40% (i.e.  $\rho = 40\%$ ).

Spies, Grobbelaar and Botha (2020) reviewed the application of TTF theory. The aim of the study was to investigate and summarize areas of studies that applied TTF theory. The study revealed that past studies focused mainly on assessment of real life phenomena but applied in various discipline majorly healthcare. The study revealed wide range of applying the theory and the potential it holds for both industry and academia in framing future research adopting TTF theory. The adoption of the theory for this study assisted in understanding the effectiveness of technology in assisting servers to accomplish their task timely and offer required service to the customers which affirms the application of the theory to diverse discipline and research work. It also further explains the need for banks to improve on their sensitization medium about the advantage of acceptance and usage of e-banking.

In addition, based on the outcome of the investigation the required number of tellers as and when due in this tier 1 bank under consideration is 4 service points. Increasing to a 6 service point will further reduce the probability that a customer wait before being serve to 3.99% but it will not be cost effective to the bank in terms of the total economic cost that will be incurred and since the focus of this research work was to ascertain a balance between cost of satisfactory service to the customer by determining how long an arriving customer has to wait in a queue before being served and cost to the banking system in terms of the number of servers needed to achieve cost effectiveness which was proven in table 4 that customers can be served as and when due without waiting for too long with 4 service points.

During the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic the branch of the tier-1 bank under consideration used only 3 service points which revealed 0.42 ( $W_s$ ) and 0.21 ( $W_q$ ) which is the average time customers spent in the bank and on the queue respectively with cost implication of N146,90088 Presently with the ease of Covid-19 precaution, providing 4 service points in the branch will be cost effective to the bank and also to the customers as they do not need to wait in line for long before being serve. Boniface, Donatus, Mong, Chinyeaka and Amaechi (2018) proposed a 7 server points for Diamond bank Plc in Eziukwu branch at Aba in Abia state considering the economic effect at that time. Ahmed et al., (2018) proposed a 3 service point with average waiting time to be 14.55 minutes for customer in Bangladesh. Khan et al., (2021) investigated the approach of queuing theory and discrete event simulation in the healthcare units of Pakistan highlighting mismanagement of resources and queuing system for poor quality of healthcare delivery. In the economic analysis of queuing, the two opposing cost of concern-service cost and waiting time cost are critical in determining the successful running of the service facility by the bank's management. The study has revealed that providing a 4 service point will be cost effective while ensuring optimum uptime of the various e-banking channels to guarantee excellent service delivery to customers.

## 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

In this study, the branch of a tier-1 commercial bank was the focus. A Multi-channel queuing model with arrival time following a poison distribution and service time following an exponential distribution to reflect the nature of queuing system at the branch and the cost analysis both to the bank and the customers was considered. It was reveal that increasing the number of server to 4 reduces the waiting time of customers in the bank and on queue to 0.25/hour (15min) and 0.05/hour. (3min) respectively; as against during the Covid-19 lock down where 3 servers were utilized. The waiting time of customers in the bank and on queue then was 0.42/hour (25min) and 0.21/hour (12min) respectively. There was also a balance between cost of satisfactory service to the customer and cost to the banking system as it assists the bank management to determine the number of servers needed to achieve cost effectiveness and customer satisfaction to reduce churn rate. The following recommendations become apt in the light of findings:

- i) The bank's management for this particular branch under study should adopt a 4 server model to ensure a balance between costs of delivering satisfactory service to the customers and economic cost to the bank.
- ii) There is also need for improve sensitization on the advantage of accepting e-banking among the banks' customer and also ascertaining the relevant factors that will influence the acceptance.
- iii) The queuing multi-server model can be replicated in other banks since focus is on profit and excellent service delivery which can only be achieved by employing the right number of people to serve the customers right.
- iv) Queuing model can also be productive when combine with simulation; these two models will be effective in solving the everyday challenges faced by customer in the service environment.

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# Assessment of the Challenges and Opportunities of Peacebuilding and Development Approaches to Humanitarian Response in Nigeria

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## Abstract

*This paper examines the multifaceted landscape of peacebuilding and development approaches to humanitarian responses in Nigeria. The country, characterized by protracted conflicts, internal displacement, and stark development disparities, presents a unique context for such interventions. The paper therefore seeks to assess the challenges and opportunities of peacebuilding and development approaches in humanitarian response in Nigeria. The methodology adopted is contextual analysis/thematic approach. Through a comprehensive analysis of challenges and opportunities, the paper sheds light on the complex dynamics at play. The paper identifies key challenges of peace building and development. It also reveals a range of opportunities. It adopts the Do No Harm framework and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework: Goal 16. This paper concludes with the notion that while Nigeria's humanitarian landscape is undoubtedly challenging, it brims with potential for positive change. It recommends that humanitarian actors should invest in rigorous conflict analysis to help them understand the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts as well as enable the design of conflict-sensitive programs.*

**Keywords:** Peace building, Challenges, Opportunities, Development

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## INTRODUCTION

Nigeria, a country known for its rich cultural diversity and intricate societal dynamics, has unfortunately grappled with a series of humanitarian crises over the years. These crises have emerged from a multitude of sources, including internal conflicts, natural disasters, and complex socio-political issues (Peters & Kelman, 2020). Humanitarian efforts have emerged as crucial lifelines during these challenging times, acting as a beacon of hope to mitigate suffering, re-establish a sense of stability, and catalyse sustainable development. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of humanitarian responses is contingent on effective merging peacebuilding and development strategies. This integration presents both daunting hurdles and promising opportunities. Striking the right balance between addressing immediate needs and laying the foundation for long-term peace and prosperity demands careful coordination and resource allocation. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA, 2023) highlights the significance of this approach emphasizing the pivotal role that peace and development play in navigating Nigeria's complex humanitarian landscape.

The interplay between humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, and development in Nigeria serves as a microcosm of the intricate challenges prevalent in today's global crises (United Nations, 2016). Although humanitarian aid is essential in providing immediate relief to the affected populations, it frequently falls short in tackling the underlying causes of conflicts and vulnerabilities. There is a pressing need to embrace comprehensive strategies that extend beyond crisis response. These strategies should be geared toward establishing the groundwork for enduring peace and sustainable development (OECD, 2020). This multifaceted approach acknowledges that resolving contemporary crises, such as

those witnessed in Nigeria, demands a combination of short-term relief efforts and long-term initiatives that address the root causes of instability, ultimately fostering resilience and progress in affected regions.

Nigeria faces a multitude of challenges, with protracted conflicts, internal displacements, and the fallout from violent extremism standing at the forefront (UNHCR, 2021). Within this complex context, numerous obstacles such as security threats, restricted access to affected areas, and resource constraints frequently hinder the effective execution of integrated approaches (UNDP, 2019). The alignment of international interventions with local contexts and priorities presents an ongoing and crucial concern (Humanitarian Response, 2020). Striking the right balance between addressing global humanitarian standards and tailoring responses to the specific needs and dynamics of Nigeria is paramount for achieving meaningful and sustainable progress in the face of these multifaceted challenges.

Nigeria's experience with humanitarian responses has not only been marked by challenges but also reveals a promising array of opportunities. The country is home to a diverse range of civil society organizations, community-driven initiatives, and government-led endeavors dedicated to peace and development (UNOCHA, 2021). By tapping into these valuable resources and actively involving local stakeholders in humanitarian endeavors, there exists a potential to achieve outcomes that are finely tuned to the specific contexts of communities (Park & Yoon, 2016). When humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development strategies are harmonized, they create a foundation of resilience. This, in turn, empowers communities to better withstand future shocks and adversities (European Commission, 2021). By strengthening the fabric of local engagement and fostering collaborative efforts, Nigeria can unlock its full potential for enduring progress, ultimately driving towards a more stable, prosperous, and resilient future. The paper is divided into five sections. The first section is the introduction, which provides a background to the study. The second section highlights the methodology adopted for the study, while the third section discusses the theoretical frameworks and also discusses the subject matter. The fourth section concludes the paper and the fifth section provides relevant recommendations.

## **CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION**

### **Peace Building**

Peacebuilding is a multifaceted and enduring endeavor aimed at tackling the underlying drivers of conflicts and establishing an environment conducive to lasting peace and sustainable development. This intricate process encompasses a variety of actions, initiatives, and frameworks with the goal of diminishing the likelihood of a return to conflict, promoting reconciliation, and reconstructing communities scarred by violence (United Nations, 2009)

According to Lederach (1997), peacebuilding is a holistic notion that encompasses the processes of change within conflicts, as well as the dynamics of relationships, culture, institutions, and systems that are both influenced by and can influence conflicts. The author underscores the significance of not only dealing with the immediate surface-level aspects of conflict but also delving into the root causes that underlie it.

Peacebuilding is characterized as the endeavor to avert the inception, escalation, persistence, and reoccurrence of conflicts by addressing the fundamental drivers that may lead to violence. This encompasses a diverse array of actions aimed at fortifying social, economic, and political institutions while fostering positive interactions and relationships among communities, groups, and individuals (International Alert, n.d.).

According to Richmond (2009), peacebuilding is characterized as a process that entails the reconstruction of institutions, infrastructure, and social, political, and economic connections within a society affected by conflict. The primary objective is to prevent the reappearance of violent conflicts



and to tackle the fundamental sources of violence. Richmond underscores the significance of addressing both the structural and relational dimensions of peacebuilding.

### **Development**

According to Amartya Sen (1999), development is depicted as an extensive and continuous transformation that leads to the enhancement of living conditions, human abilities, and overall quality of life. It encompasses not solely economic advancement but also encompasses social advancement, the mitigation of poverty and disparities, the advocacy for human rights, the preservation of the environment, and the facilitation of participatory governance.

According to Todaro and Smith (2014), development is a multi-faceted undertaking characterized by significant shifts in social frameworks, prevailing mindsets, and national establishments. It encompasses not only a rapid expansion of economic prosperity but also endeavors to diminish inequality and eliminate extreme poverty. This definition emphasizes that true development involves comprehensive alterations in various aspects of a society, including its economic, social, and institutional dimensions.

### **Humanitarian Service**

According to OCHA (the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), humanitarian action is characterized as the initiatives carried out to mitigate the distress of individuals impacted by disasters and crises. These actions are steered by the fundamental principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The paramount objective of humanitarian action is to preserve lives, alleviate anguish, and uphold human dignity, both during and following emergency situations.

Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell (2014) define humanitarian as a moral imperative centered on the preservation of human life, the mitigation of suffering, and the safeguarding of human dignity. It is characterized by the equitable provision of aid and support to individuals in need, irrespective of their backgrounds, particularly in the midst of crises, conflicts, or disasters. This definition underscores the ethical foundation and impartial nature of humanitarian efforts, emphasizing the primary aim of aiding those affected by adversity.

According to The Sphere Project (2018), humanitarian action can be described as the endeavor to address the requirements of individuals who find themselves in vulnerable situations and to advocate for the recognition and protection of their rights during times of crisis, emergency, or disaster. This response is guided by the core principles of humanitarianism, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and humanity, emphasizing the importance of providing assistance and support without discrimination and with a strong commitment to the well-being and dignity of those affected by adversity.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This paper adopts the Do No Harm framework and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework: Goal 16. The "Do No Harm" framework, developed by Mary Anderson is a valuable tool for assessing and guiding humanitarian and development interventions in conflict-affected areas (Anderson, 1999). It emphasizes the importance of minimizing harm and unintended negative consequences while maximizing the positive contributions of aid and development efforts to peace and stability. In Nigeria, a country grappling with complex and protracted conflicts, the "Do No Harm" framework can be applied to assess the challenges and opportunities. The framework encourages a deep understanding of the local conflict dynamics, power structures, and grievances. An assessment can analyze how humanitarian responses might inadvertently exacerbate existing tensions or contribute to conflict resolution. It emphasizes the importance of involving local communities in decision-making

processes. An assessment can evaluate the extent to which humanitarian interventions in Nigeria engage with and empower local actors, including civil society and community leaders. The framework promotes conflict-sensitive programming, where interventions are designed and implemented to mitigate conflict risks. An assessment can examine whether humanitarian responses in Nigeria take into account the potential consequences of their actions on conflict dynamics. "Do No Harm" encourages feedback mechanisms that allow affected communities to voice their concerns and needs. An assessment can evaluate the existence and effectiveness of feedback mechanisms in humanitarian responses.

The SDGs, adopted by the United Nations (2015), provide a comprehensive framework for achieving sustainable development in various dimensions, including poverty reduction, health, education, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. The SDGs emphasize the interconnectedness of these goals and the need for integrated approaches. In the context of assessing peacebuilding and development approaches in humanitarian responses in Nigeria, the SDGs framework can evaluate the extent to which humanitarian responses align with the broader development objectives outlined in the SDGs. It can identify areas where humanitarian actions contribute to specific SDGs, such as SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions). Given the interconnectedness of peacebuilding and development, the assessment can explore how humanitarian responses integrate peacebuilding components to address the root causes of conflict while advancing development goals. For example, efforts to promote access to education in conflict-affected areas contribute to SDG 4 (Quality Education). The SDGs provide a framework for measuring progress toward development objectives. The assessment can examine whether humanitarian responses in Nigeria incorporate robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to track their contributions to SDGs and adjust interventions accordingly.

Implementing the "Do No Harm" framework requires a deep understanding of local conflict dynamics, which can be complex and resource-intensive. Many humanitarian organizations may lack the necessary expertise and resources for comprehensive conflict analysis. The SDGs were designed to be universally applicable, but they may not fully account for the unique challenges and contexts of conflict-affected regions. Implementing SDGs in such settings can be challenging, and some goals may seem aspirational or unrealistic in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

By integrating the "Do No Harm" framework and the SDGs framework, the assessment can provide a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and opportunities in humanitarian responses in Nigeria

Peace is necessary because it is a fundamental condition for the well-being, security, and prosperity of individuals, communities, and nations. Peace provides the foundation for social, economic, and political stability, and it is essential for the protection of human rights and the prevention of violence and conflict. In peaceful environments, people can pursue their goals, access education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, and live without fear of violence or oppression.

Peace and development are mutually reinforcing, and they often go hand in hand. Peace and stability create an environment where development can thrive. When there is peace, governments can focus on improving the well-being of their citizens, and foreign investments are more likely to flow into the country, which can boost economic growth. Development efforts can address some of the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and lack of access to education and healthcare. Sustainable development initiatives can help create opportunities and reduce grievances that might lead to violence.

### **Challenges in Peacebuilding and Development Approaches in Humanitarian Responses**

A significant hurdle in the realms of peacebuilding and development lies in the complex and constantly shifting nature of conflicts. These conflicts typically entail the participation of various stakeholders with divergent interests and motives, rendering the quest for enduring resolutions a formidable task. According to Smit (2017), the intricacy of modern-day conflicts demands a more sophisticated comprehension and adaptable strategy, a task that humanitarian actors may encounter difficulties in

accomplishing. The multifaceted dimensions of conflicts necessitate a deeper examination of their root causes, dynamics, and the intricate web of actors involved. Achieving sustainable solutions in such contexts demands not only a comprehensive understanding but also the flexibility to adapt to evolving circumstances and dynamics on the ground. Humanitarian organizations, while well-intentioned, may encounter challenges in keeping pace with these complexities.

Sustainable peacebuilding and development initiatives rely heavily on the active participation and ownership of local communities. Regrettably, humanitarian organizations frequently encounter challenges in effectively engaging local stakeholders in decision-making processes (Ginty & Peterson, 2015). This struggle to involve local communities can result in the imposition of external agendas, potentially alienating those most affected by the interventions and eroding the legitimacy of such efforts. Meaningful engagement with local communities not only ensures that initiatives are rooted in the specific needs and aspirations of the people but also empowers them to take charge of their own development and peacebuilding processes. When local ownership is lacking, there is a risk of interventions being perceived as top-down, paternalistic, or even neocolonial, which can erode trust and hinder long-term success.

Sufficient funding and resources are fundamental for the success of peacebuilding and development initiatives. Unfortunately, humanitarian organizations frequently grapple with financial limitations and are under pressure to demonstrate rapid outcomes (Hilhorst, 2016). This pressure often leads to the adoption of short-term strategies that may not effectively tackle the root causes of conflict and can fall short in promoting sustainable development. The pursuit of quick results, driven by funding constraints, can inadvertently undermine the long-term objectives of peacebuilding and development efforts. Sustainable progress often demands a more comprehensive and holistic approach that addresses the structural, socio-economic, and political factors contributing to conflicts. When constrained by short-term funding priorities, organizations may prioritize immediate needs over addressing these deeper issues, potentially perpetuating cycles of instability.

Operating in regions affected by conflict carries inherent risks for humanitarian organizations. Security challenges can severely restrict access to vulnerable populations and impede the execution of essential peacebuilding and development initiatives (Labbé & Daudin, 2015). Striking the right balance between reaching out to affected communities and safeguarding the well-being of their personnel is a paramount concern for these organizations. Security concerns encompass a broad spectrum of potential threats, ranging from armed conflict to criminal activity, and may vary significantly depending on the specific context. Organizations must continually assess and manage these risks to ensure the safety of their staff while still delivering much-needed assistance and support to those in need. The ability to operate effectively in conflict-affected areas often requires a combination of security measures, negotiations with local actors, and adaptation to evolving circumstances.

The involvement of numerous stakeholders in humanitarian responses, spanning international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and local entities, often presents coordination challenges. When coordination and collaboration are lacking, there is a risk of redundancy, resource duplication, and a fragmented approach to peacebuilding and development, as highlighted by de Coning (2007). Effective coordination is vital to maximize the impact of humanitarian efforts and ensure that resources are optimally utilized. It promotes synergy among different actors, streamlining their activities and avoiding unnecessary overlaps. Furthermore, coordination can facilitate the sharing of expertise, information, and best practices, ultimately leading to more efficient and comprehensive interventions.

Humanitarian responses are frequently subject to the influence of political agendas and interests, a factor that can compromise the neutrality and impartiality of aid organizations, as observed by Slim

(2015). This external interference has the potential to erode the credibility of peacebuilding and development initiatives, and in some cases, even exacerbate conflicts. When humanitarian efforts are swayed by political motives, there is a risk that aid distribution may become biased, favoring certain groups or regions based on political considerations rather than genuine need. This can lead to a loss of trust among affected populations and undermine the perceived legitimacy of aid organizations. Additionally, when humanitarian assistance is perceived as politically motivated, it can exacerbate tensions and contribute to a deepening of existing conflicts.

The timing and sequence of peacebuilding and development interventions hold significant importance. In certain situations, hastily transitioning to development activities without first addressing immediate humanitarian needs can prove counterproductive (Harris & Dombrowski, 2002). Achieving the delicate equilibrium between providing emergency relief and embarking on long-term development efforts is an enduring challenge. Rushing into development without adequately addressing urgent humanitarian concerns can lead to several negative outcomes. It may neglect the immediate suffering of affected populations, potentially exacerbating their vulnerability. Moreover, development initiatives may not gain the necessary traction or support if the foundational humanitarian needs are left unmet. Focusing solely on immediate relief efforts without considering the transition to development can perpetuate a cycle of dependency and hinder the building of resilience within communities

### **Opportunities in Peacebuilding and Development Approaches in Humanitarian Responses**

One of the significant opportunities within the realm of peacebuilding and development is the capacity for conflict prevention. Humanitarian responses have the potential to adopt proactive approaches that identify and address the root causes of conflicts before they escalate (Lederach, 1998). By targeting issues such as poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, humanitarian actors can play a pivotal role in mitigating the conditions that often lead to the outbreak of conflicts.

In peacebuilding and development strategies, there is often a significant emphasis on empowering local communities. This empowerment entails a range of activities, including capacity-building, education, and the promotion of local leadership and decision-making, as highlighted by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006). Empowering communities in these ways equips them with the skills, knowledge, and agency to address their own needs and actively contribute to peacebuilding initiatives. Empowered communities are better positioned to take charge of their own development, engage in meaningful dialogue, and participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives. This not only enhances their self-reliance but also fosters a sense of ownership over the peacebuilding and development efforts in their regions. Local empowerment can lead to more sustainable and context-specific solutions, as communities are best placed to understand their unique challenges and opportunities.

Humanitarian responses have the potential to play a crucial role in fostering social cohesion by uniting diverse communities, promoting dialogue, and facilitating reconciliation, as highlighted by Doyle and Sambanis (2011). The process of building social cohesion involves bridging divides and mitigating tensions among different groups, ultimately contributing to the promotion of peace and stability. In conflict-affected areas, humanitarian efforts often serve as neutral spaces where individuals from various backgrounds can come together to access essential services, assistance, and support. This interaction can provide opportunities for dialogue, collaboration, and the rebuilding of trust among communities that may have been divided by conflict. Humanitarian initiatives that intentionally focus on reconciliation and social cohesion can help heal wounds, address grievances, and promote understanding among different groups. These efforts contribute to the development of resilient and harmonious societies, which are better equipped to withstand future shocks and adversities.

Peacebuilding and development strategies offer valuable opportunities for conflict transformation, a process that entails addressing the underlying causes of conflicts through dialogue and negotiation (Lederach, 1998). By engaging in constructive dialogue and negotiation processes, conflicting parties can work towards more sustainable peace agreements and a reduction in violence. Conflict

transformation focuses on altering the dynamics that perpetuate violence and tension. This can involve addressing issues such as inequality, political exclusion, historical grievances, and social divisions. By actively involving stakeholders in negotiations and promoting dialogue, peacebuilding and development efforts create spaces for parties to air their concerns, seek common ground, and work towards peaceful solutions.

Humanitarian responses can serve as a critical foundation for long-term development and reconstruction endeavors, as emphasized by Fanning (2019). By simultaneously addressing immediate humanitarian needs and investing in essential areas such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare, organizations can help establish the necessary conditions for sustainable peace and prosperity in conflict-affected regions. Immediate relief efforts, such as providing food, shelter, and medical assistance, not only alleviate suffering but also create a sense of stability and security among affected populations. This forms the basis upon which development initiatives can be built. Investments in infrastructure enhance the resilience and capacity of communities, facilitating economic growth and access to basic services. Education and healthcare interventions lay the groundwork for human capital development, empowering individuals and communities to participate in and benefit from long-term development processes.

Peacebuilding and development efforts frequently necessitate international cooperation and collaboration among various stakeholders. Humanitarian organizations, governments, and international actors can join forces to pool resources, exchange expertise, and coordinate their activities (UNOCHA, 2022). This collaborative approach can significantly amplify the effectiveness and impact of interventions. By working together, these diverse entities can leverage their respective strengths and resources to address complex and multifaceted challenges. International cooperation can foster a more holistic and integrated response, which is often essential when dealing with the intricate nature of conflicts and crises. Collaboration among humanitarian organizations, governments, and international bodies can enhance the efficiency of resource allocation and ensure that interventions are coherent and complementary. It can also promote information-sharing and the adoption of best practices, leading to more effective and context-appropriate solutions.

Humanitarian responses can incorporate conflict-sensitive programming, a critical approach aimed at ensuring that aid efforts do not inadvertently worsen existing tensions or conflict dynamics (Goodhand, 2005). By diligently assessing and understanding the potential implications of their interventions within the context of conflict, organizations can actively contribute to broader peacebuilding efforts. Conflict-sensitive programming involves a series of measures, including conflict analysis, risk assessment, and the consideration of local dynamics and power structures. It helps humanitarian organizations make informed decisions about the design and implementation of their projects to mitigate potential negative impacts on the conflict environment.

Trust-building is an essential element of both peacebuilding and development efforts. Humanitarian organizations play a pivotal role in building trust with affected communities through several key strategies (Slim, 2015). These strategies include delivering aid impartially, actively involving local stakeholders in decision-making processes, and demonstrating a steadfast commitment to providing long-term support. Impartial aid distribution ensures that assistance reaches those in need without discrimination or bias, reinforcing the perception of fairness and trustworthiness. Engaging local communities and stakeholders in the planning and execution of humanitarian interventions not only fosters a sense of ownership but also ensures that interventions align with the specific needs and preferences of the affected populations. A demonstrated long-term commitment to supporting communities beyond immediate crisis response helps establish a bond of trust. It communicates a genuine dedication to the well-being and development of affected communities, building confidence that extends beyond short-term relief efforts. Trust, once established, can serve as a solid foundation

for sustainable peacebuilding and development. It enhances collaboration, cooperation, and community resilience, contributing to the long-term stability and prosperity of conflict-affected regions.

One fundamental aspect of practical humanitarian response in Nigeria is conducting comprehensive needs assessments. In the north-eastern region, the conflict with Boko Haram has resulted in significant displacement and food insecurity. Humanitarian organizations, including OCHA, conducted assessments to determine the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their immediate needs, such as shelter, food, and healthcare. These assessments helped shape the humanitarian response (OCHA, 2020).

Additionally, Coordination among various humanitarian actors is equally vital for an effective response. The Nigeria Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) serves as the primary coordinating body in the country, bringing together UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and government representatives to ensure a coherent and collaborative response (OCHA, 2019). For instance, in the response to COVID-19, HCT facilitated coordination between the Nigerian government and organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) to ensure the effective distribution of medical supplies and the establishment of treatment centres (OCHA, 2019).

## **CONCLUSION**

The assessment of challenges and opportunities in peacebuilding and development approaches within humanitarian responses in Nigeria highlight the complexity and significance of these efforts in a country grappling with protracted conflicts, displacement, and development disparities. Challenges, such as the intricate nature of conflicts, limited local ownership, resource constraints, security risks, coordination difficulties, political interference, and the timing of interventions, highlight the multifaceted hurdles that humanitarian actors face. However, these challenges should not overshadow the substantial opportunities that exist to address them. The opportunities presented by peacebuilding and development approaches in Nigeria are notable. These approaches can help prevent conflicts by addressing root causes, empower local communities to take charge of their development and peace processes, promote social cohesion and conflict transformation, lay the foundation for sustainable development and reconstruction, foster international cooperation, ensure conflict-sensitive programming, and build trust with affected populations. While Nigeria's humanitarian landscape is undoubtedly challenging, it is also brimming with potential for positive change. With a context-specific, adaptable, and holistic approach, humanitarian organizations, in collaboration with local stakeholders and international partners, can leverage these opportunities to make significant strides in building peace, stability, and sustainable development in Nigeria. By doing so, they can contribute not only to the immediate relief of suffering but also to the long-term transformation of a nation striving for lasting peace and prosperity.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. To address the challenge of limited local ownership, humanitarian organizations should prioritize engaging with local communities in all stages of program design and implementation
2. To overcome the challenge of complex conflict dynamics, humanitarian actors should invest in rigorous conflict analysis. This will help in understanding the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts and enable the design of conflict-sensitive programs.
3. Humanitarian responses should adopt a holistic and integrated approach that combines relief, recovery, and development efforts. This involves bridging the gap between humanitarian and development actors to address both immediate needs and long-term development goals

4. Donors and international partners should be encouraged to invest in long-term solutions, recognizing that sustainable peace and development require sustained financial support.
5. Improved coordination among humanitarian actors, government agencies, and international organizations is vital to address challenges related to coordination and collaboration effectively

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# Intelligence Approach to Nigeria's Intervention in the Niger Republic Military Coup of July, 2023: An Option of Military Operations Other Than War

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## Abstract

*Nigeria and Niger Republic are both West African countries bound by same regional collective security intervention agreement which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an African sub-regional organization is billed to keep and promote. The United Nations' Security Council, the administration department of the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS work in synergy to ensure that peace and security are maintained amongst member states. There are common economic, social and security interests amongst the West African countries (ECOWAS), supervised by the African Union (AU), notwithstanding the sovereign status of each state. The social and economic integrations of the member states have positively affected their collective security welfare such that injury to one becomes the concern of the other member states. The main thrust of the paper is, whether war should be the most appropriate interventionist approach in a member state which militarily seized power from a democratic government and not mere rhetorics of the historical analysis of coups in the Niger Republic, considering other available military operations other than war. Considering casualties, financial cost and the effect on the infrastructures of the affected collaborating states, war as an option other than other military operations should be seen as counterproductive. The study therefore used a descriptive and historical research method and mostly internet, library and newspapers information for the analysis therein. From historical antecedence of previous military interventions undertaken by ECOWAS, headed and funded by Nigeria in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Darfur and Sudan among others, the observed negative effect on Nigeria was phenomenal, hence, it is recommended that Nigeria, in its intervention to forestall illegal government occasioned by military coup should adopt pacific settlement approach rather than war.*

**Keywords:** Intervention, War, Intelligence, Diplomacy and Coup

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## INTRODUCTION

The fundamental responsibility of government in every country is to protect lives and properties of the citizens. The lives and properties of the people are inherently fundamental to the citizens which must be protected legitimately by the group of people entrusted with the responsibility of "care". Aristotle, in his effort to elaborate the concept of governance by his teacher, Plato, concluded that government is a social contract between the few persons into whose hands the society or citizens entrusted their civil rights for protection and promotability (conversion) for legal, social and political rights (Eze Osita, 1984). These few persons are legitimately and politically positioned either through an electioneering democratic system or by a parliamentary nomination / appointment approved by such a given political system. The import of this, is that every government in-charge of the protection of lives and properties of the people must be legally, politically and morally accepted by the people in line with the laid down procedures of ascending the seat of government (Ball, A. R. 1976). Any forceful occupation of the seats of government either through military coup de 'tat, self-declaration and enthronement outside the laid down legitimate procedures within such a country, to that extent of

illegitimacy; the said government will not be recognized and should be seen and declared as illegal and without authority to so act on behalf of the citizens (Brighton; Harvester, 1993).

Niger Republic is one of the central states in the Sahel region of Africa and the third to be besieged by the Military junta through a coup d'état on 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2023 led by the leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani. The military took over the administration of President Mohamed Bazoum, the democratic elected President of Niger Republic in April, 2021, but sworn in on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of April, 2021, after a botched coup, two days to his assumption of office. Perhaps, the Niger's military takeover (coup) may not be surprising to some political scientists and other international affairs activists because of the security dilemma in the Sahel States of Africa. It is on record that from 1960 when Niger Republic got independence up till 2010, that four (4) military coups were successfully recorded, which left Niger Republic under "Military Rule" for 22 years (ACLED – acleddata.com).

Considering the fact also that Niger Republic is predominantly under the insecurity influence of Jihadist activity since 2018 with recorded fatal violence in 2021, looting and destruction of properties were on their daily increase by the "IS Sahel", a Jihadist operations of the Islamic states, now popular in the Central Sahel States of Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and other surrounding Islamic neighbouring states to includes but not limited to Algeria. The fact that Mali and Burkina Faso took over power militarily in 2020 – 2021 and 2022, respectively also induced the Niger Republic Coup d'état of 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2023. The state of economy in Niger Republic directly affected the livelihood of Nigeriens with an induced increase level of poverty arising from poor / low gross domestic products with a resultant corruption and insecurity.

Considering the efforts of the Bazoum's administration in the first six months of 2023, where it was recorded (acleddata.com), political violence is observed to have decreased by 39% when compared to the last six months of 2022, attacks on the civilians decreased by 49%, fatalities decreased by 16% and operations by the "Nigerien Security Forces" increased by 32% to counter the insecurity operations by ISIS and JNIM. Giving the situation report by "ACLED" as shown above, the military coup d'état in Niger to oust the legitimate regime of President Mohammed Bazoum on 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2023 may not be justified by all the democracies in the world, hence; the swift intervention by the "ECOWAS" to ensure that democracy is allowed its place in the Niger Republic. The decision to intervene was taken in Nigeria – Abuja, in a summit. The seizure of political power by the military junta was announced by the military junta on a televised broadcast and same was internationally condemned by the United States of America (USA), France, European Union (EU), ECOWAS and other international powers, perhaps; in exception of Russia because of its domestic military training in Niger Republic inclusive of Mali and Burkina Faso. The concerns of the author, which of course is the main thrust of this article is that: In as much as ECOWAS intervention decision is applauded, it should be approached by other military operations option other than war (Article 7 & 19, ECOWAS summit, May, 1981).

## **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

**Military Operations Other Than War:** War is seen as the last resort in the settlement of conflicts amongst states, intra-states, inter-states and even amongst individuals in the course of their relationship with one another "war" arises where grievances which emanate from unsettled crises have been severed from unabated self or group interests (Dougherry & Pfaltgraf, 1981). War, as an extended politics; better still, an act of violence tactically pushed to resolve unsettled conflict. Wherever such conflict

has occurred implies the use of military weapons. It is certain that conflict is unavoidable as it is a natural consequence of human interaction. Though not the focus of this discussion, but a fulcrum on which military intervention hinges. Thus, A. Mazrui (1980), noted the importance and vulnerability of violence in his book, “A Case for Violence”. Conflict should be diplomatically managed to avoid military intervention with the option of war (politics by other means) as heralded by Clausewitz.

Military intervention in most cases implies the use of military weapons – arms of destructions targeted at pushing violence to its utmost bounds (Clausewitz), as explained by Celestine Oyom Bassey (2005), in his book “Contemporary Strategy and the African Conditions” pg. 133.

Military interventions at international (continental), regional and sub-regional are not new to international politics. Examples are the United Nations – NATO Military Intervention in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, ECOMOG in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Darfur, to mention but a few. Intervention to peace and security keeping by the interventionists organs or groups must take into a valid and analytical considerations, the cost, ends and means of such military intervention to avoid a defeated goal or goals for which the intervention is made. Considering this state of dilemma, it is pertinent to observe that the theory and practice of waging wars had been influenced by military operators, military strategists and military technocrats of contemporary periods. In this dilemma, SUN TZU, a Chinese Military, General, philosopher, writer and strategist proposed a “MODERATION” in the prosecution of war. The philosophical ideals of “SUN TZU” form the background to this paper presentation. “How?” SUN TZU in his entire Military career had never seen war as the best option for settling disputes or conflicts. He recommended avoiding war if possible. However, he also opined that if war becomes inevitable; that such war should be fought and “won quickly”. SUN TZU believed that long wars are harmful even for the supposedly “winner”. Following this school of thought on war, how soon does ECOWAS think this war against the Nigerian military could be won?

**Intervention:** Arising from this background, this paper attempts to suggest that military interventions should be approached with intelligence through other means other than war (MOOTW). Nigeria, under the guide of “ECOWAS” military intervention in Niger Republic should intelligently adopt other military options other than war as advocated by SUN TZU. Though the Chinese general never excluded war as an interventionist military approach, yet it should be considered as a last resort approach with modicum of force as against the approach offered by Clausewitz – “absolute total war” (that is war beyond all bounds of restraints). Nigeria should consider the import of “economy of force” in such global intervention, giving the geographical position of Niger Republic and the seeming sympathy other neighbouring states are presently posing on the one hand and its foreign allies on the other hand.

ECOWAS is applauded for its timely intervention to discourage an illegitimate government of General Abdourahamane Tchiani of Niger Republic through a military coup d’état to oust out the democratic government of President Mohammed Bazoum because the sub-regional action falls intadem with the cardinal objectives of the United Nations (UN), in its first article where it states that the main objective of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security”. In actualizing this objectives, chapter six (vi) of the Charter provided for “Pacific Settlement” options varying from negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration through judicial settlement. In the same vein, chapter seven (vii) of the same UN Charter recommended the use of political and economic measures as well as armed force to coerce the sovereign states in utter violation to keep international “peace and security”. In line with the continental and sub-regional peace and security pact of sub-regional African countries, the

“Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)” was formed on 28<sup>th</sup> May, 1975 at Lagos – Nigeria.

The decision of ECOWAS to intervene in Niger Republic is in line with its cardinal objectives as well as in “Article 51” of the United Nations which authorizes all member states the right for collective self-defence against any external aggression. ECOWAS, under a triangular peace and security policy is empowered to strengthen states’ capacity to respond to present and emerging threats to deliver security and justice services to states and its peoples. Similarly, Article 53 (1) of the United Nations empowers regional security and peace arrangements or agencies for enforcement where appropriate. However, the regional security organization shall only intervene militarily upon the approval of the security council of the United Nations. Military operations other than war (MOOTW), strongly advocates for pacific settlement measures other than war option.

The concept of “MOOTW” has gained ground in modern military operations rather than the option of war. It is designed to prevent conflict, restore peace by terminating conflict before escalation into war. It should be noted that “MOOTW” would assist with the rebuilding of peace after the resolution of conflict. This ideology is clearly explained by Hedley Bull, who stated that “war” should not be seen as just a conflict, but a deteriorating extension of it (Vasquez John A. 1963).

Military operations other than war (MOOTW), is a compendium of a variety of military operations employed to “deter” war; they are seen as national politics by other means other than war. MOOTW is a security arrangements conducted to deter not only “war” but to resolve conflict, promote peace or support civil authorities aimed at pursuing national goals of a country and in the process counter potential threats to the nation’s security interest.

MOOTW is clearly distinguished from “war” in that MOOTW, unlike “war” does not involve sustained large scale combat military operations which are usually declared when the civil instruments of national power are perceived to have failed to achieve national objectives (Orme, J. 1998/99). Military operations other than war (MOOTW) have peculiar characteristics which makes it attractive to so many in the business of conflict management. For instance, MOOTW even when combat operations are employed, the MOOTW could hardly be exclusively military. It is important to state here that every military interventions either sub-regional or continentally, they are conducted within a given political situations, hence; MOOTW are more sensitive to political, social and economic considerations than actual war (Raymond Aron, 1966). As earlier stated, pacific settlements falls within the political considerations which “MOOTW” wouldn’t hesitate to employ when considering intervening in conflicts in sovereign states other than actual war (J. Garba, 1987). National interests are usually paramount in whatever military intervention involved by any given sovereign state, as such military intervention is determined by the political, economic and social goals of the leading interventionists. A change in the motives of such military intervention would always attract a global political condemnations, hence; a careful choice of the modus operandi of the military operations.

**Intelligence – Military Intelligence:** One of the keywords for this article is “intelligence of the military” in the intervention of conflict or crisis at all levels where their military operations are to be conducted in line with the “Rule of Engagement (ROE)”. Military Intelligence is important due to so many reasons of uncertainty. In the first instance, the country to be intervened, for instance, the “Niger Republic” is a sovereign state operating to actualize certain political, economic and military goals

which may have motivated the military coup d'état leading to military overthrow. If “corruption and poverty” as claimed by the military junta that struck in Niger Republic is overwhelming, then; the civilian supports for the illegitimate takeover will be fantastic and this political psychology would as well affect the neighbouring states negatively. It therefore behoves on the military interventionists to acquire such psycho-military intelligence to be able to intervene militarily by other means other than war (MOOTW). This fact is amplified by Richard L. Russell, a professor of National Security Affairs, Centre for strategic studies, South Asia and a Special Adviser to US central command, according to this intelligence expert, he stated that:

*“the root causes of intelligence failures solely or largely lie in the CIA’s poor human intelligence collection and analysis practices”.*

Intelligence is further limelighted by Johnson in his definitions as seen in his book, “Modern Concepts of Crisis Contemporary Definition and Usage” – Wikipedia.org. – crisis. According to him, intelligence has to do with a cluster of government agencies that conduct secret activities including counter intelligence, covert action and foremost, the collection and analysis of information from a mixture of open and covert sources.

Juxtaposing from the above definition, military intervention by any security and peace keeping force(s) needs/ need tactical and strategic gathering of intelligence in consonant with the types of military operations in view, of course; taking into cognisance the political polyvalent environment of the globe. Intelligence in any military operations inclusive of those other than war (MOOTW) is foremost, even before the finances to secure the operations. Some military strategists see “intelligence” as a prime factor that determines the modus operandi of any war in its rudest form or in any military diplomacy other than actual war. The reason being that “failed intelligence” can foretell factors and trends which may “threaten” its sovereignty, stability and the well-being of its citizens (L. O. Jokotola, 2011).

In approaching military intervention in Niger Republic with the obvious aim of achieving its goals in line with the international conventions on war as stated by L. O. Jokotola (2011), in his principles of military operations without war; the following principles need to be observed viz:-

6. Providing medical and other relief materials to the civilians;
7. Using weapons of equal quality used by the intervenee state;
8. Fighting a just war (not motivated by ulterior gains / interests);
9. Allowing free movement to civilians; avoiding the use of WMD;
10. Liberalization of the civilian captives; and
11. Providing humanitarian attention to the war captives etc.;

Nigeria and indeed ECOWAS must consider both product and organization that are responsible for producing intelligence as advocated by Copley and Johnson (1962). From the forgoing, military intelligence involves the foreknowledge or information obtained by a professional body designated for it through a process involving procurement, processing, interpretation and dissemination to designated consumers for policy decision. The process of gathering intelligent information enables the intervening states the ability to access the capacity and capability of the “intervenee state”, which of course will project the interventionists’ military power to procure the needed weapons – arsenal, process the validity and reliability of all the intervening factors for practical consumption in their decision-making. According to McGeorge, the process of military intelligence gathering is cumbersome and cost

intensive that one's national security should be intensified and unified before opting for a coercive military intervention.

Though intelligence is an integral components of military operations other than war (MOOTW), the article does not intend to treat it as a subject matter but complimentary to the substantive issue of discussion. However, intelligence in military operations remains an "analytical product that is very significant to security planning and operations" that ECOWAS, vis-à-vis; Nigeria must never undermine in their attempts to intervene in the Niger Republic military takeover (administration) at both MOOTW in peace time and war time.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This paper used the Rational Sequential Theory to explain the foundations or fundamental principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW), using intelligence as a guide / guard. This theory is most relevant to the discussion in view.

### **Rational Sequential Theory:**

There are two variants of this theory which explains the relevance of critical decision making of any nation in terms of warfare or intention to involve in any military intervention in another sovereign states. The variants of "Rational Sequential Theory" of decision making are related to this study than that of "Herbert Simon's" Rational Comprehensive Theory, though a semblance.

#### **i. Hofer / Schendel Model**

Hofer / Schendel Model of the rational sequential theory was formulated in 1978 to address the importance of critical analysis of decision in a national complex issues. It is often referred to as a "Top-Down" decision making model. The model takes into cognisance the uncertainty nature of certain decisions where the expected goals are to be determine by uncertainty, hence; the "Hofer / Schendel" strategic theory advocates for rationality and prudence in strategic national issues. Relating this to the position of Nigeria as a leading member of ECOWAS, the President of Nigeria, Senator Bola Tinubu the Commander-In-Chief needs to evaluate the political, economic and social interests / national goals to be achieved in engaging the Nigerian Army in such military intervention in a foreign sovereign state, the "Hofer / Schnedel" variants of the "Rational Sequential Strategic Theory" also informs the Chairman of the African sub-regional organization - "ECOWAS" that more lives, infrastructures and development indices would be gained to the advantages of both the intervenee and interventionists states with the use of military operations other than war (MOOTW). In other words, this model / theory emphasizes on "choice" of alternatives rather than "goal formulation". Choice situation as to (threats to our national unity, economy and polity, given the complexities of global politics, opportunities, weakness and strength) – TOWS

#### **ii. Higgin's strategic Model**

Higgin's variant of the Rational Sequential (Top-Down) theory was formulated in 1982 to explain the importance of decision making where alternatives are as uncertain as the sources of such alternatives. Here, emphasis is laid on the identification of information system. This model is

closely related to the quality of “intelligence” needed in strategic options. Intelligence and indeed its sources are veritable approach upon which the success of military intervention on security and peace keeping mission thrive.

The Higgin’s strategic model of the “Rational Sequential Theory” directs all decision making process to first and foremost identify the setting of objectives in comparison with the predicted or expected capabilities / capacities of the outside and unforeseen factors. Relating this to the present stand of “ECOWAS” to intervene in the military situations in Niger Republic, Nigeria, vis-à-vis, ECOWAS needed to set up their priorities / objectives in line with the perceived military capabilities and capacities of Niger Republic. According to “Hofer / Schendel’s Model” it is quite uncertain to assess the foreign sovereign state’s capability because of the complexities of international political paradigm. Based on these uncertainties, the best approach to be adopted in such intervention should be “military operations other than war (MOOTW)”. This was earlier addressed by Robert Osgood in his book, “The Uses of Military Power in the Cold War” (Robert Osgood, 1969).

### **Nigeria and Military Intervention in Niger Republic**

As has been observed earlier in this article, military takeover of the democratic led government of President Mohamed Bazoum by the military junta led by the leader of the presidential Guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani is said to be motivated by a high degree of corruption by politicians which had phenomenally resulted into unprecedented state of general poverty. Unseating a democratically elected government by the military junta is seen as illegal, unwarranted and as such should be discouraged; perhaps, this accounted for an unequivocal condemnation by a wider democracy.

Under this unjustifiable act, the “contagion theory” of military coup d’état, there is a pandemic clarion call that such illegality should be discouraged and stopped, lest it spreads across to the other states. For instance, to safe guard the military coup, the belligerents fortified their forces under the aegis of “Defence Security Forces (FDS)” comprising of all the military branches in Niger Republic, now forming the “national Council” for the safeguarding of the homeland (CNSP).

The pertinent questions that seek a million answers are:

1. “Whether Nigeria as a leading member of ECOWAS is justified in participating in the protection of the African Sub-regional democracy?” Or
2. “Whether Nigeria as a member of ECOWAS has limitations in its strategic actions against the Nigerien Military takeover of a legitimate government of President Mohammed Bazoum?”
3. Further still, whether ECOWAS can unilaterally carry out any military intervention with an option or the use of war without the United Nations’ Security and Peace enforcement network?

The million answers to these omnibus questions would be treated under the legal framework of military interventions in any crisis sovereign country.

### **LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

The question as to “whether Nigeria as a member of ECOWAS has the justification to participate to protect the African Sub-regional democracy?” is in absolute affirmative. The various protocols, conventions, principles and Charters of the United Nations (UN, 19445), Organization of African Unity (AU, 1963) and the Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975) all attest to the



right of Nigeria to participate in any regional peace keeping, protection of sovereignty and economic emancipation of Africa. For instance, Charter VII of UN authorizes member states of the regions the rights to participate in the protection of regional security and peace keeping. Article "53 (1) of the UN" is to the effect that "UN", where appropriate will utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement of regional peace and security.

In line with the provisions of the world apex security network as to the eligibility of member states to participate in military intervention in the affected regions of Africa, is Article 11 (2) of the OAU Charter that authorizes regional / sub-regional cooperation of the member states for which Nigeria is inclusive. The unity and solidarity of the African States are important objectives of the "OAU" to be enforced by sub-regional organizations such as the "ECOWAS". Articles 4 & 5 of the OAU (AU), enshrined the rights of members states to protect their sovereignty, to promote freedom (democracy), to fight and collectively resist in human treatments from either internal or external aggressors as also expatiated by the AU's Agenda 2063" in its aspiration column "4".

From the above cited provisions of the legal documents of both "UN" and "AU", Nigeria is legally justified to participate in the sub-regional Africa's Security and Peacekeeping Organization.

However, the constraints in this liberty or freedom to so participate will be treated under the second question posed above, the question as to whether Nigeria has limitations in its strategic participation in the ECOWAS military intervention in the Niger Republic is also in the affirmative.

First and foremost, Niger Republic is a sovereign state and as such independent. However, its sovereign status has been conceded to regional intervention organisation since it ratified regional cooperation agreement of the UN Charter, especially "VII" of the UN Charter. It therefore follows that "ECOWAS" within which Nigeria intervenes needs peaceful negotiation – permit from Niger Republic. The other side of this scenario appears to see such permit as invalid since the government (military junta) are belligerent group and to that extent lacks the legal rights for the grant of such permit. Under this state of affairs, the interventionists groups – ECOWAS etc. may lack the moral justification to forcefully intervene by war.

Again, rules of international law may not have encouraged Nigeria as a leading member of ECOWAS to unilaterally order the standby military troop at Gambia to intervene through military operations of war.

### **The Triangle of Peace & Security Network**

The "Triangle", otherwise known as the "Triangular" or "Trio" Peace and Security Network is a global security network arrangement in which the United Nations Security council at the apex, the continental security network and the sub-regional security network work in synergy to command a legitimate military intervention by war. ECOWAS and indeed Nigerian government need an approval from the United Nations' Security Council. It would amount to illegality on ECOWAS to militarily intervene in Niger Republic unilaterally without approval from the apex global security body.

In the same breathe; Nigeria cannot mobilize its military to Niger Republic without approval by the sub-regional security network (outfit). Domestically, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria needs such approval by the national Assembly – both in a joint sitting before such military intervention

by war can be viewed as legal (S. 54 CFRN). Considering the geographical location of Niger Republic and its population size as small as that of Lagos State in Nigeria, a full military intervention by the use of military force would amount to an unjust war (ICJ – UN) and would be seen generally as an unjust war, hence; ECOWAS – Nigeria should apply other military operations other than war. Niger Republic shares boundaries with Libya to the North-East, Chad to the East, Nigeria to the South, Benin Republic and Burkina Faso to the South-West, Mali to the West and Algeria to the North-East. This geographical trajectory is so complex that any military (war) attacks on Niger Republic may result into a serious network security issues in Nigeria. From the analysed geographical trajectory, then Nigeria, vis-à-vis, ECOWAS should adopt those pacific settlement options and other military operations other than war (MOOTW), using correct intelligence as both deterrence, preventive and defeat shields in the hands of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces (Kippur, 1973).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

War, though an extension of politics (Clausewitz, 1976), should not be an option for dispute settlement because it is evidently counterproductive. The present military takeover in Niger Republic is condemned by members of the international community in all ramifications because it is against the principles of democracy and fundamental human rights. Given that conflict is inevitable in human existence, yet war can be prevented from escalated conflicts; using pacific settlements method, preventive diplomacy and other military operations other than war under the choice of appropriate intelligence.

At all times when situations for military intervention arise, some pertinent questions in the mind of planners should actually include but limited to these:

- Is the country intending to intervene guided by some principles?
- Have we gotten the necessary intelligence fora?
- Domestically, is our socio-eco-political parameters equated with the call for such intervention? and;
- Are we prepared to maintain the international standards such intervention call for?

When these questions are properly assessed from all the various point of view, the choice of other military modes of operations other than war would definitely be the available choice for any of such intervention.

Deducing from all the analysis presented in this discuss, it is trite to assert that military operations other than war have become acceptable by many advanced military powers as popular or gaining prominence in the global environment. It is hereby recommended that military commanders should accord high premium to MOOTW in course of their various military training. The military should imbibe the doctrine of MOOTW at all levels (Clark, 2014). It is also expected that regular opportunities for MOOTW training be provided for the armed forces considering the volatile nature of African politics.

Finally, the commander-in-chief of Armed Forces of Nigeria should always follow due process of law on issues such as external incursion / invasion by external / internal aggressors in other to forestall unjust military intervention by war. This action of due process should not ignore the place of good intelligence information (Operation F. Barbarosa, 1941).

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# Perception of Credibility of Social Media Sources of News among Journalists in Nigeria

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## Abstract

*New dimensions and twists associated with the use of social media for journalism practice are directly linked to the question of credibility of news sources among journalists in Nigeria. This formed the kernel of this exploratory study. Anchored on the tenets of cultivation theory, this study investigated perception of credibility of social media sources of news among journalists in Nigeria. Out of the 578 journalists proportionately selected from the major media organisations in Lagos State and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, as participants, 567 actively participated in this study. Data were analysed by means of content analysis and descriptive statistics. Highlights of the findings reveal that journalists in Nigeria use social media as news sources infrequently. It was also found that they perceive news on social media as unreliable. Findings also show a significant relationship between how journalists perceive the credibility of news on social media and their age, gender and years of experience. The study concluded that irrespective of the perceived credibility of news on social media, journalists cannot ignore the platform. Therefore, journalists and members of the public should continue to draw from benefits of social media without compromising the ethics of the journalism.*

**Keywords:** Credibility, Journalism, New media platforms, News, Social media

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## 1. Introduction

Social media has changed the landscape of news production and publishing. There is a clear generational shift from utilising social media to communicate with friends and family to sharing and receiving breaking news. With social media, participatory journalism, the creation of an online community, instantaneous feedback, and easy and fast news delivery, wider access to news stories is made possible and easier. Supporting this, Buchanan (2016) argues that with social media, journalists could obtain news and gather news stories from both professional and personal sources. Although social media has enabled a unique and new means of news production and sharing for journalists, users need to question the credibility of news on social media.

The credibility of news stories refers to the quality by which a news story is adjudged as trustworthy and true. Adikpo (2019) gave a more elaborate definition of the credibility of news. According to Adikpo, news credibility is an assessment of the news in terms of its correctness, impartiality, objectivity, trustworthiness, completeness, and lack of biases. This implies that news credibility compasses far more than what it connotatively adjudged but rather all that deals with the reliability of the source. Some studies have shown that journalists are continually faced with the challenge of deciphering the credibility of news stories. Various measures, tools and models have been proposed, like News Landscape (NELA) and Toolkit Snoopes, among others to help determine the credibility of news (Nagura, Seki, Kando, & Aono, 2006; Horne, Dron, Khedr, Adali, 2018). Also, journalists have been trained to cite news sources to increase news credibility. Sources here refer to persons,

institutions, publications, documents that tell the news or provide information in building the news stories. Journalists have been told that adding sources to their news increases credibility of news stories. Yet, there are times when news sources have to be anonymous.

However, debates over how the anonymity of news sources could reduce the credibility to news stories have emanated. For instance, Pjesivac and Rui (2014) investigated how anonymous sources affect the credibility of news stories and found that anonymous sources dampen the credibility of news. They discovered that both Americans and Chinese viewed news reports that relied only on anonymous sources as less trustworthy than those that used both anonymous and recognised sources. According to previous research by Duffy and Freeman (2011), many reporters favour anonymous sources. For reasons of trust, security, and privacy, it is essential that news sources sometimes remain anonymous. Furthermore, Durry and Freeman believed that there are instances when anonymous sources were appropriate in light of concerns regarding loss of trustworthiness and the potential for dishonesty or lack of transparency in the reporting.

Sometimes, sources of news stories are identified while reporting news on new media, yet the news may not be credible. For instance, Melican and Dixon (2008) found that people, journalists inclusive, had different perceptions of the credibility of news regardless of the sources. A comparison was done between Internet news sites associated with traditional forms of media and non-traditional Internet news sites. Findings revealed that people found non-traditional Internet sources of news as less credible than Internet news sites associated with traditional forms of media (Melican & Dixon, 2008). Similarly, AlKhalifa and AlEidan (2011) focused on the credibility of news content on Twitter. They used two automatic approaches to assess the credibility of news stories on Twitter. The first approach was based on the similarity between tweets on Twitter and the authenticity of the news sources. The second approach was on the similarity with verified news sources in addition to a set of proposed features. AlKhalifa and AlEidan found that tweet on Twitter for the first approach was seen as more credible than the second approach.

Also, non-traditional Internet/ social media sources were perceived as far less credible as all other news sources (Melican & Dixon, 2008). Thus, researchers have proposed methods to rate the credibility of news, whether traditional or non-traditional social media sources. These methods include the commonality of the news contents among different news publishers, agreement versus disagreement levels, (Nagura, Seki, Kando, & Aono, 2006); the News Landscape (NELA) Toolki (Horne, Dron, Khedr & Adali, 2018) and Snoopes among others. These have become necessary following the proliferation of fake news, misinformation and disinformation on social media. Moreover, Journalists, information analysts, and news consumers must also evaluate and verify news. Due to the expanding quantity of news sources and the diverse techniques of purposefully fake sources, this duty has gotten complicated. This notwithstanding, Schifferes, Newman, Thurman, Corney, Goker & Martin, (2014) opine that as a far-reaching source of news, social media news has raised concerns as to the reliability of news on the platform. Journalists seek to discern important information and credible sources expeditiously, yet they face the challenge of detecting misinformation, manipulated images, and the propagation of misleading leads. This has brought the challenge of credibility of news on social media, which has aroused the concerns of researchers, media audience, media organisations and journalists.

For instance, a few studies have tried to compare the credibility of web news sources with traditional/conventional news sources. For instance, Kim and Johnson (2009) discovered that independent web-based newspapers were more reliable for political information than conventional or online media. Political characteristics such as campaign interest, political activity, and voting also predicted trustworthiness of online sources. Reliance on online and conventional sources was greater. Chung, Nam, and Stefanone, (2012) investigated factors that contribute to the credibility of online news sources. Traditional and technological factors were pinpointed as factors contributing to online news credibility. However, Chung, Nam, and Stefanone concluded that these factors differed based on credibility and users' perceptions. Yet, empirical evidence as to the perceptions of social media users on the question of the credibility of news on social media is still lacking.

While a number of studies on media audience perceptions of the credibility of news on social abound, less scholarly attention has been given to the perceptions of journalists in this regard. More so, the factors influencing the perception of journalists regarding the credibility of news on social media have been generally ignored. Gaps still emanate in existing studies on the credibility of news on social media, especially in a country like Nigeria which experiences the exponential spread of fake news emanating from social media. It is against this background that the following objectives of the study have been raised.

1. Determine the frequency at which journalists in Lagos State and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, Nigeria, use social media as news sources.
2. Ascertain the extent to which journalists perceive news on social media as credible
3. Find out the factors influencing the perception of journalists of the credibility of news on social media

The research is divided into seven (7) sections. The study began with an introduction, which set the tone for the study. Then the literature review which was in line with the objectives of the study. The next was methodology, which was followed by the presentation of results from the investigation. Then the results were discussed using findings from the current study and previous studies. The last two sections were conclusion and recommendations.

## **2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

### **Cultivation Theory**

Professor G. Gerbnew originally proposed forward the cultivation theory, sometimes called the cultivation hypothesis or the cultivation analysis, in the 1960s (Asemah, Nwammuo, & Uwaoma, 2017). However, it was not until 1976 that George Gerbner and Larry Gross fully developed it. The primary premise is that individuals are more inclined to accept the social reality shown on TV the longer they spend 'living' in the world of television. The cultivation hypothesis describes how people's perceptions of social reality change due to their time spent in front of the TV. According to this hypothesis, watching television is modern culture's most popular form of entertainment. Heavy television watchers watch four or more hours daily, whereas light viewers watch less. Gerbner (1972) argues that viewers place more stock on and trust in the information presented on television. Television events shape how we see society. As a result, people will have a positive impression of society if they see it reflected positively on television. The long-term impacts of television are thought to be minimal, subtle, and indirect.

Although cultivation theory is basically in relation to the effects of television on the audience, it can be applied to this study. What television was to many in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s is what social media is to many people, journalists inclusive. With cultivation theory, message credibility and meaning rest in the messages. (Potter, 1993). However, it can be argued that the meaning of any message or how credible a message is, can be determined from the receiver's point of view. By implication, the question of the credibility of news on social media platforms is dependent on the users' (journalists, in the context of this study) perception based on the cultivation effect. Journalists use social media for social communication, sharing, entertainment, news reading, gathering, reporting, etc. The average individual uses social media multiple times daily (Herhold, 2018; Olise, 2021). Social media has been ingrained in the lives of people, including journalists. Nearly all journalists in Herhold's study claimed they could not work with multiple social media platforms. This portrays journalist reliance on social media. Besides work, journalists in several studies have been found to use social media frequently for personal and professional reasons. The frequency of use of social media is usually associated with reliance on the media. However, studies that focus on the factors affecting the credibility of social media as news sources among journalists have not been adequately explored.

In the context of this study, cultivation theory holds that social media or any other media platforms can change people's reality (Herman, Morgan & Shanahan, 2023). For instance, when people rely on social media for news, their perception of events as well as journalists' credibility would be influenced, which in turn could lead to bias or misinformation. In fact, exposure to social media is capable of influencing the values and belief system of any group of people. This is also the postulation heavily canvassed in the tenets of cultivation theory, which this study is premised on.

### **Journalists and News Credibility on Social Media**

The concept of credibility involves several complex and multidimensional components. News Credibility refers to the state by which a news source is seen as dependable, truthful and believable. News Credibility, according to Appleman and Sundar (2016), consists of several constructs, including accuracy, authenticity, believability, truthfulness and dependability of the news. However, recent research in news credibility has been chiefly on source credibility or the medium's credibility (Hussain & Hussain, 2019). Metzger and Flanagin (2013) defined source credibility as the believability of a source, especially regarding perceived trustworthiness and the source's expertise. Visentin, Pizzi and Pichierri (2019) linked source credibility with the credibility of the news provided. It consists of trustworthiness, goodness, open-mindedness, experience, popularity etc. Scholars like Pjesivac and Rui (2014) have provided other constructs of source credibility, such as dynamism, composure, and sociability. Credibility of the medium, on the other hand, may be described as the ability of a given medium channel to provide correct and unbiased information.

Notably, Both the reliability of the message's source and the medium—whether it be social media, the internet, television, among others—play a role in establishing trust in what is being said. Assessment of social media credibility may be likened to medium credibility, while news on social media is a good example of source credibility. Kang (2010) provided two measurement criteria for social media credibility as source/ medium credibility and message credibility. Li and Suh's (2015) research further established that the three critical factors of news credibility are audience participation, medium reliance on the medium credibility dimension, and argument strength on the message credibility dimension.

Journalists may consider the suggested determinants of news credibility, the news source, and content of the news/ message before tagging any credible news source. This is a necessity by the proliferation of fake news and the exponential increase of social media users across the globe. In Nigeria, there are 85.49 million internet users and 27.00 million social media users as of January 2020 (Kemp, 2020). Most people rely on social media for news. Apparently, social media have become an important news source for audiences and journalists (Mehrabi, Hassan & Ali, 2009). According to EURO RSCG Magnet & Columbia University Survey of the Media (2005), about 64% of journalists either infrequently or frequently use news from online sources, especially social media, for news gathering and reporting. Also, over 90% of journalists claimed that social media have immeasurable impacts on their job performances (Middleberg/Ross Media Survey, 2002). Other studies have shown that social media have created a paradigm shift in the role of journalists in news sharing and reporting. Rather than selecting what the public should know, journalists in the new century are assisting their audiences in making sense of the material they are given (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001).

### **Journalists' Perception and News Credibility on Social Media**

News should be persuasive. In their news writing and reporting, journalists, attempt to disseminate news that is persuasive through the use of credible news sources. News credibility on social media platforms has become a major concern in the modern information age. Numerous studies have examined the credibility of news on social media. Nonetheless, few studies have identified factors that influence perceptions of the Credibility of news on social media. Studies (Westley & Severin, 1964) have pinpointed demographics (age, gender and educational qualification among others) as correlates of perceived news credibility on the new media platforms. Firstly, early research has discovered that the majority of Internet/social media users are highly educated and high-earning males (Stempel, Hargrove, & Bernt, 2000). Secondly, studies like Johnson and Kaye (2002) found that internet users



are becoming more demographically mainstreamed. It was also found that demographics exert less influence on news audience perceptions of news credibility on the Internet (Johnson & Kaye, 2002). Specifically, White and Andsager (1991) discovered that gender was not linked to perceived news credibility.

Yet, Flanagin and Metzger (2003) found that a mixed audience of male and female members had different opinions of news credibility on the internet. Again, Armstrong and McAdams (2009) investigated how gender cues influenced news credibility perceptions on blogs. They found that information seekers perceived male news authors as more credible than female authors. In contrast, Weibel, Wissmath, and Groner (2008) found that gender had a predominant effect on news credibility. News items read by female newscasters were perceived as being more credible. However, they found that age had no relationship with news credibility. Considering these conflicting and mixed results, it appears that demographics may have some relationship with perceived news credibility on social media. Hence, this present study will test the null hypothesis:

*Ho1: There is no significant relationship between journalists' demographics and perceived news credibility on social media*

Furthermore, Flanagin and Metzger (2000) found that the extent to which a person uses the Internet affects how credible they regard the Internet to be. On the other hand, Johnson and Kaye (2002) discovered that Internet users' trust in online information was unaffected by how much they relied on the medium. Usage and reliance is a strong predictor of believability and usage of online news (Johnson & Kaye, 2002). Believability, on the other hand, is often associated with credibility. Credibility consists of all the components of believability. By implication, the more time journalists use news on social media, the more likely they consider the news and the source as credible. Suppose journalists consider social media to be highly credible. In that case, there is likelihood that they would use social media for information, as well as increase their exposure to social media content (Wantu & Hu, 1994). Moreover, Umeogu (2012) argued that credible sources are more likely to create the expected effects on social media users (Umeogu, 2012). Yet, scholars like Cassidy (2007) claim that journalists have questioned the credibility of social media news. This may be because news on social media platforms suffers from a relative lack of professional gatekeepers to monitor content (Li & Suh, 2015). More so, social media information has been commonly criticised for low levels of fact analysis as there is little or no pressure for the presentation of credible and unbiased information (Johnson & Kaye, 2010). Considering this contending background, this study would test the hypothesis;

*Ho1: There is no relationship between journalists' reliance on social media and the perceived credibility of news in the media*

### **3. Methodology**

This is an exploratory research which investigated social media as news sources and the question of credibility among journalists in Lagos State and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, Nigeria, using both quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (interviews) methods. The population of the study was 5784 journalists, as given in the NUJ Compendium, 2017. Arising from the fact that virtually all media organisations in Nigeria have their head offices in Lagos State with an extension in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, it becomes clear that Lagos State and Abuja are the hubs of journalism practice in Nigeria. Thus, the geographical scope of this study was limited to Lagos State and Abuja, FCT. The sample of this study was 578, which constituted 10% of the entire journalist population in Nigeria. The justification of this sample size is in line with Nwana (1981) cited in Okoro (2001), that when the population is a few hundred, 40% or more will do; if many hundreds of thousands, 20% sample will do, if in a few hundred, 10% sample will do if is in several thousand, 5% or less samples will do. Nworgu (2006) sample formula of sample/population was also used for a stronger determination of the sampling fraction for this study. To complement the questionnaire for this study, interview was conducted among senior and renowned journalists, who craved anonymity, in Lagos State and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Those interviewed were purposively selected

among the 578 sample of the study. The interview was conducted by means of mobile phone calls. Thereafter, the recordings were transcribed and used to augment the data derived from the questionnaire.

The reliability of the questionnaire was ascertained using Cronbach Alpha, and a reliability coefficient of 0.91 was obtained. To validate the interviews, a small number of interviews were conducted using the e-mail and mobile contacts of some selected journalists in Edo state to check if responses were consistent between interview and re-interviews. About 75% of consistencies were observed. Data were collected from major media organisations in Lagos and Abuja using a proportionate sampling technique. In total, 576 copies of the questionnaire, which constituted a 98% retrieval rate, were achieved. No inclusion or exclusion criterion was used to avoid biases and embrace objectivity. After data collection, responses and themes were derived and coded. Data obtained were analysed using descriptive (frequency, simple percentages, means and standard deviation) and regression analysis with the aid of SPSS version 20.


#### 4. Results

**Table 1: Socio-demographic variables of respondents (n=567)**

<b>Variables</b>		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Gender of Respondents</b>	<i>Male</i>	348	61.4
	<i>Female</i>	219	38.6
<b>Age in Years</b>	<i>18-25 years</i>	60	10.6
	<i>26-33 years</i>	103	18.2
	<i>34-41 years</i>	202	35.6
	<i>42-49 years</i>	138	24.3
	<i>50 years and above</i>	64	11.3
<b>Religion of respondents</b>	<i>Christianity</i>	516	91.0
	<i>Islam</i>	44	7.8
	<i>Traditional</i>	3	.5
	<i>Non-believers</i>	4	.7
<b>Marital Status</b>	<i>Married</i>	356	62.8
	<i>Single</i>	121	21.3
	<i>In a relationship</i>	64	11.3
	<i>Separated</i>	1	.2
	<i>Divorced</i>	25	4.4
<b>Years of working Experience</b>	<i>0-5 years</i>	134	23.6
	<i>6-10 years</i>	91	16
	<i>11-15 years</i>	250	44.1
	<i>16 years and above</i>	92	16.2

Source: Field Survey, 2021

Certain socio-demographic variables of respondents provide enhanced understanding of some predictors of perceptions of journalists on the question of the credibility of news on social media. Thus, table 1 portrays data on the demographics of respondents. A preponderance of male (61.4%) could be seen in Table 1 over female journalists (38.6%). Age variations were noticed among respondents. However, majority of respondents were within the age range of 42-49 years (24.3%). In terms of the religion of respondents, an overwhelming percentage (91.0%) was Christians. Most respondents were also found to be married (62.8%) and had considerable years of work experience to their credit, between 11-15 years of work experience (44.1%).



**Figure 1: Frequency at which journalists use social media as news sources (n=567)**

Most participants have been found to use social media as news sources infrequently (43.3%, figure 1).

However, the qualitative data that emanated from interviewees revealed thus:

I usually incorporate what I get on social media into the mainstream. However, I do this after authenticating the source of the story. Thereafter, I use the news to support the information circulating on the mainstream. For instance, a displayed list of super Eagle or any other football team-National team list, once this is displayed on social media, I can use the same list to make a story after I verify from an inside source **(Male/ 6-10 years’ work experience/Married/23rd July, 2021)**.

I rarely use social media for news sources. Even before I do, a crew has to be sent to a location to verify the authenticity of the news **(Male/ 6-10 years’ work experience/Married/ 14<sup>th</sup> August 2021)**.

Usually, social media for me, as a broadcast journalist serves as a lead for me. I see them as there is no smoke without fire. I see the news on social media as smoke, while I dig for the news, which is the fire. However, after verifying news, I can categorically state that more than 80% of such news stories have proven false **(Male/ 16-20 years’ work experience/Married/23rd July, 2021)**.

I use social media for news when I have to. I first qualify such news as unconfirmed reports. Once confirmed, I can use it to support news stories **(Female/ over 20 years work experience/Married/23rd July, 2021)**.

**Table 2: The extent to which journalists perceive news on social media as credible (n=567)**

Variables	Very High Extent	High Extent	Low extent	Very low extent	Mean	Std. Dev.	Decision
You only consider news with a source on social media as credible	181 (31.9%)	245 (43.2%)	140 (24.7%)	1 (0.2%)	3.07	.755	High extent
You believe news on social media a credible source of information	1 (0.2%)	95 (16.8%)	330 (58.2%)	141 (24.9%)	1.92	.647	Very low extent
You trust the news on social media	1 (.2%)	63 (11.1%)	362 (63.8%)	141 (24.9%)	1.87	.591	Very low extent
You run a background check on the source of news on social media before you consider it credible	474 (83.6%)	63 (11.1%)	30 (5.3%)	0	3.78	.526	Very High extent
You usually share/recommend news on social media to your colleagues/ audience/ friends/family	64 (11.3%)	169 (29.8)	273 (48.1%)	61 (10.8%)	2.42	.828	Low extent
<b>Aggregate mean= 2.61</b>							

Source: Field Survey, 2021

Data in Table 2 indicates that most participants (83.6%) usually run a background check on sources of news on social media before they consider it credible to a very high extent ( $\bar{x}=3.78$ , Std. Dev=.526). Moreover, the majority of respondents (43.2%) only consider news with a source on social media as credible to a high extent ( $\bar{x}=3.07$ , Std. Dev=.755). However, participants believe news on social media a credible source of information to a very low extent ( $\bar{x}=1.92$ , Std. Dev=.647); trust the news on social media to a very low extent ( $\bar{x}=1.87$ , Std. Dev=.591) and share/recommend news on social media to your colleagues/audience/friends/family ( $\bar{x}=2.42$ , Std. Dev=.828). Apparently, journalist perceive news on social media as credible to a low extent ( $\bar{x}=2.61$ ).

Further highlights were thrown from the interviewees on the question of the credibility of news on social media. Mixed perceptions were observed. They had these to say:

News on social media should always be taken with a pinch of salt


**(Male/ 16-20 years' work experience/Married/23rd July 2021).**

News on social media have been largely credible, especially for the fact that they have generated reactions from parties involved or names in such stories, and they have also now become a story tool for social re-engineering to reconfigure the order of things in society **(Male/ 11-15 years' work experience/Single/ 20<sup>th</sup> July 2021).**

The credibility of news on social media is a 50/50 error margin. News emanating from social media should not be completely taken as a fact **(Male/ 11-15 years' work experience/Married/ 10<sup>th</sup> August 2021).**

It could often be a source of quick information, although it could also be misleading because people can concoct news, make it believable and share it around the platform. There is a tendency to read, like and share without subjecting the news to verification (Male/ 6-10 years’ work experience/Married/23rd July 2021).

News on social media should be taken with a pinch of salt. There is a need for caution if any news is to be used that emanates from social media (Female/ 6-10 years’ work experience/Single/ 27<sup>th</sup> July 2021).



**Figure 2: Factors influencing the perception of journalists of the credibility of news on social media**

Figure 2 shows the mean rating on a 4-point Likert scale (1 strongly disagree to 4 strongly agree) for the factors that influence the perceptions of journalists of the credibility of news on social media.

Statistically, the depth of knowledge in the news being shared on social media ( $\bar{x}=3.25$ ) has a key influence on journalists' perceptions of the credibility of news on social media. The authenticity of the news ( $\bar{x}=3.31$ ) was considered a factor. Similarly, an interviewee stated that:

“To me, an underlying factor for any story published on social media would be how authentic the news is. There are many times mainstream media have investigated stories from social media and found the stories to be true”

Other factors significant ( $\bar{x} \geq 3.00$ , figure 2) are the availability of videos that accompany the news ( $\bar{x} = 3.16$ ) and the depth of knowledge in the news being shared on social media ( $\bar{x} = 3.25$ ). However, journalists do not consider news on social media credible even if the news had high ratings by the public ( $\bar{x}=2.36$ ).

**Table 3: Relationship between journalists' demographics and perceived news credibility on social media**

**Test of Parallel Lines<sup>a</sup>**

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	Df	Sig.
Null Hypothesis	519.196			
General	304.636	214.56	10	.000

\* p-value  $\leq 0.05$

Ordinal regression analysis is used to predict the relationship between the perceived news credibility on social media (ordinal dependent variable) and journalist demographics (more than one independent variable- gender, age and years of experience). All assumptions for the test were met, and no multi-collinearity was found. The Logit link function shows that a change in perceptions of journalists occurs based on the predictor variables (gender, age and years of experience) entered in the model ( $X^2(10)=214.56$ ,  $p=.000$ ). Thus, a significant relationship is found between journalists' demographics and perceived news credibility on social media. The null hypothesis, "There is no significant relationship between journalists' demographics and perceived news credibility on social media" is rejected.

**Table 4: Relationship between journalists' use of social media news and perceived credibility of news in the media**

			Use of social media news	Perceptions of credibility of news on social media
Spearman's rho	Use of social media news	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.096*
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.022
		N	567	567
	Perceptions of credibility of news on social media	Correlation Coefficient	-.096*	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.022	
		N	567	567
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).				

Source: SPSS Computation, 2021

Spearman's rank-Order correlation was used to ascertain the relationship between journalist use of social media news and their perceived credibility of news on social media. Journalist use of social media news is a strong negative predictor of their perceived credibility of news on the medium ( $r_s=-.096$ ,  $p=.022$ ). A negative correlation coefficient indicates a negative relationship between journalist use of social media news and their perceived credibility of news on social media. As journalist usage of social media increases, the perceived credibility of news stories on the platform decreases. Confirming this, a participant interviewed reiterated that:

At some time, I reported a piece of news I came across on social media. However, my media organization investigated the story and found out it was false (**Male/ 0-5 years' work experience/Single/ 13<sup>th</sup> July 2021**).

### 5. Discussion of Findings

Frequency of use of social media as news sources is commonly associated with the perceived credibility of the source. A contending argument is that the more journalists use social media as news sources, the more likely they consider news on the platform as credible. Consequently, this study sought to find

out the frequency at which journalists use social media for news. Most journalists were found to use social media as news sources infrequently. This is not in consonance with the results of Salaudeen (2021) study, which found that 50% of journalists use social media for personal and professional purposes. However, certain psychological factors with regard to journalists' infrequent use of social media in the study showed that journalists had cultivated the habit of authenticating and verifying news from social media. Notably, since the cultivation theory presumes that the more time journalists spend on social media, the more likely they believe the content portrayed on those platforms, it becomes pertinent to investigate the extent journalists consider news on social media as credible. Moreover, social media have been found to shape users' views and beliefs (Lai, Chung, Po, 2015).

Findings in this study have revealed that journalists perceive news on social media as credible to a low extent. This became more evident as journalists were found to believe news on social media as a credible source of information as well as trust the news on social media to a very low extent. This agrees with the findings of Tandoc (2018) study, which found that participants rated the credibility of news sources on social media as low. However, this finding disagrees with that of Edogor, Jonah and Ojo (2015) study carried out in Nigeria. Edogor, Jonah and Ojo's (2015) participants averred social media information is credible. These differences in the former and present study can be attributed to the fact that while Edogor, Jonah and Ojo's study surveyed social media audiences, this present study focused on journalists who may be more experienced in the world of news. More so, according to the cultivation theory, long term exposure to media can shape perception. In this case, journalists' low perception of credibility of news sources on social media suggests that they may have limited trust in information they encounter on social media. Besides, the cultivation theory suggests that journalists' perceptions are influenced by the relationship between media portrayals and their own experiences (Asemah, Nwammuo & Nkwam-Uwaoma, 2017). Thus, if journalists in Nigeria have encountered misinformation on social media, it could lead to significant disparity between what they see on social media and their perception of reality.

In addition, journalists in this study were found to believe news on social media as a credible source of information to a very low extent and trust the news on social media to a very low extent. They even usually run a background check on sources of news on social media before they consider it credible to a very high extent. Again, despite mixed reactions from the interview sections, most journalists emphasized that "news on social media should always be taken with a pinch of salt". (Interviewees (senior and renowned journalists interviewed and labelled as their responses appeared on the analysis section) 1, 4 and 5). What could be responsible for such perceived low credibility of news stories on social media? The depth of knowledge in the news being shared on social media and the authenticity of the news was discovered to have a key influence on journalists' perceptions of the credibility of news on social media. However, from an ordinal regression analysis test performed, a significant relationship was found between journalists' perceived news credibility on social media and their socio-demographics (age, gender and years of experience).

Furthermore, findings showed that journalists' use of social media news is a strong negative predictor of their perceived credibility of news on the medium. Similarly, Cassidy (2007) study found that usage and reliance on social media are strong positive predictors of online news credibility ( $\beta = .54, p < .001$ ). From the findings in this study, as journalist usage of social media increases, the perceived credibility of news stories on the platform decreases. This implies that the more journalists use social media news stories, the less they consider news on the platforms as credible. However, this finding contradicts Safori, Rahman and Mohammed (2016) stipulations which are when individuals use more often a certain communication medium for information seeking, they are likely to rate the medium more credible than other media. Apparently, the reverse is in the case in this study, as journalists may have had underlying experiences in their use of social media, which have led to lesser beliefs in the credibility of news on social media. Perhaps journalists have frequently used social media news which turned out to be fake news, misinformation or disinformation.

## **6. Conclusion**

This study has been able to shed light on the urgent nagging question of social media as news sources and perceived news credibility on social media among journalists. Evidently, social media are an infrequent source of news for some journalists, although most journalists question the credibility of news sources on the platform for obvious reasons. Journalists perceive news on social media as untrustworthy and with low credibility. This perceived low credibility of news on social media among journalists emanated from the depth of knowledge of the news being shared on social media as well as the authenticity of the news on social media. In other words, journalists believe news on social media to a low extent as some of the news shared on social media is perceived to have a low depth of knowledge and lack authenticity. Moreover, the consensus of journalists' perceptions of authenticating news stories on social media points to the existence of the proliferation of fake and never-ending news on social media.

Furthermore, differences in journalists' perceived news credibility on social media are also a product of their socio-demographics and the frequency at which they use social media for news. Journalists' use of social media is a strong negative predictor of perceived news credibility. The more journalists use of social media increases, the more they consider news stories on the platform less credible. Apparently, experienced journalists encounter in their use of social media for news sources contribute to this. These factors may have positive and negative implications for modern journalism practice. Nonetheless, news credibility is a predominant and core issue in the era of fake news, misinformation and disinformation stimulated by large chunks of information spread on social media at exponential rates. Journalists' perception of and attitudes towards news on social media are the links to ensuring a balance in the world of news in an information age. Nevertheless, social media can never be out rightly ignored by journalists as they are potent channels for interactivity, collaboration, hype-textuality and anonymity.

## **7. Recommendations**

The following recommendations are made based on the findings of this study:

1. Despites journalists' infrequent use of social media, it is appropriate to continue to draw from the benefits that social media offers the profession while ensuring that the ethics of the profession are not compromised in any way.
2. News on social media cannot be completely disregarded as they are potent sources of quick and timely information. It is also good that journalists have formed the habit of authenticating news on social media; however, they could help to debunk any news that was found fake via social media and mainstream media. A lot has to be done in educating the public on how to authentic news stories on social media by journalists

Since the perceived credibility of news on social media is significantly related to Journalists' demographics, more studies need to be carried out to determine the underlying effects of demographics on journalists perceived credibility of news on social media.

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# Review of Women's Rights and Access to Justice in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Nigeria

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## **Abstract**

*This paper explores the intricate dynamics of women's rights and access to justice in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding Nigeria. Post-conflict settings often pose unique challenges to the realization of women's rights, given the complex interplay of sociocultural norm and socioeconomic conditions. Socioeconomic empowerment emerges as a central theme, illustrating how economic reintegration, education, healthcare, and political participation are instrumental in advancing women's rights. Access to education, vocational training, and economic opportunities empowers women to assert their autonomy and contribute meaningfully to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The paper adopts the feminist theory. It highlights the challenges and barriers to women's rights and justice access. It concludes with the notion that addressing the challenges and barriers faced by women in Nigeria require a comprehensive and collaborative approach involving government institutions, civil society organizations, grassroots movements, and the international community. It recommends that government should improve the legal framework to protect women's rights and provide access to justice.*

**Keywords:** Women's right, Justice, Post-conflict, Peace building, Nigeria

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

In the realm of global development and human rights, the issue of women's rights and their access to justice has garnered significant attention over the years (United Nations, 2020). This is particularly pronounced in post-conflict peacebuilding societies where the effects of conflict often exacerbate existing gender inequalities (UN Women, 2018)

Nigeria's history has been marked by numerous conflicts, including ethnic, religious, and political tensions, which have manifested in varying degrees of violence and instability. Notable among these conflicts are the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), the Niger Delta insurgency, and the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern region. These conflicts have had far-reaching social, economic, and political consequences, affecting women and men differently (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). Post-conflict societies often face numerous challenges in the aftermath of protracted conflicts and civil wars, as they strive to rebuild and transition towards lasting peace and stability (UNDP, 2008). One crucial aspect of this transition is ensuring the protection and promotion of women's rights and their equitable access to justice.

The conflicts have had a profound impact on the social fabric of the country, disrupting communities and exacerbating inequalities, particularly for women. In post-conflict Nigeria, women continue to face challenges related to physical security, displacement, and the loss of loved ones (Afolabi, 2022). The challenges are compounded by the persistence of discriminatory norms and practices that limit their participation in decision-making processes and access to resources (Ilesanmi, 2018). In Nigeria, women have historically played crucial roles in their communities, contributing to both social and economic development (Ette & Akpan-Obong, 2022)). However, the repercussions of conflict often exacerbate

gender disparities, leaving women disproportionately vulnerable to violence, poverty, and exclusion (Strachan & Haider, 2014).

Access to justice is a fundamental human right and a cornerstone of any functional society (UN, 2012). In post-conflict settings, it becomes even more critical as it contributes to the restoration of peace, reconciliation, and the reintegration of affected populations. However, accessing justice in such contexts is often riddled with complexities, ranging from a lack of trust in formal legal systems to logistical barriers such as distance and cost (Beqiraj & McNamara, 2014). Women, in particular, face unique challenges in accessing justice due to their marginalized status and the intersection of gender with other forms of discrimination, such as ethnicity or religion.

Socio-cultural norms and attitudes in Nigeria play a significant role in shaping women's experiences in post-conflict peacebuilding. Patriarchal values, deeply embedded in many Nigerian communities, often limit women's agencies and participation in decision-making processes. These norms can manifest in various forms, from early and forced marriages to the stigmatization of women who seek justice for gender-based violence (Ajayi *et al.*, 2022).

The issue of gender-based violence is particularly pertinent in post-conflict Nigeria. Women and girls are at heightened risk of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict-affected areas. Unfortunately, the prevailing culture of silence and the fear of reprisals deter many survivors from seeking justice. Sadly, perpetrators of such crimes often go unpunished due to a lack of awareness, resources, and support for survivors (Adejumo, 2022). The paper is divided into five sections. The first section is the introduction, which provides a background to the study. The second section highlights the methodology adopted for the study, while the third section discusses the theoretical frameworks and also discusses the subject matter. The fourth section concludes the paper and the fifth section provides relevant recommendations.

## **2. METHODOLOGY**

The methodology adopted for the study is purely qualitative. Data were gathered from publications adjudged to be of high ethical standard and relevant to the variables addressed in the paper. In essence, secondary sources were relied upon. Content analysis and thematic approach were largely engaged.

## **3. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **3.1. Conceptual Clarification**

#### **Women's Rights**

According to the United Nations (2021), women's rights constitute the set of rights and privileges advocated for women and girls across the globe. These rights laid the foundation for the women's rights movement in the 19th century and the feminist movement throughout the 20th century. They encompass fundamental entitlements such as the right to life, freedom, and personal security, protection from torture or any form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, equal treatment under the law, and the entitlement to engage in the cultural, social, and political affairs of their nation, among other rights.

Simone de Beauvoir, a pioneering feminist thinker, famously argued that women's rights are rooted in the fundamental idea of women being treated as autonomous individuals, not merely as an 'other' in relation to men (de Beauvoir, 1949). Carol Gilligan emphasized the importance of recognizing and respecting the diverse moral voices of women. She argued that women's rights should include acknowledging and valuing the distinct moral perspectives and ethical decision-making processes that women bring to society (Gilligan, 1982).

The National Human Rights Commission delineates women's rights as the rights and privileges asserted by women and girls across diverse societies globally, regardless of age. These encompass the

entitlement to live without experiencing violence, slavery, or discrimination, the right to receive an education, to possess property, to exercise the right to vote, and to earn a just and equitable wage.

Sen (1990) argues that the promotion of women's rights is vital for the advancement of development. He posits that women's rights encompass not only legal and political entitlements but also capabilities, which revolve around the liberty to live a life that aligns with one's own values and aspirations. From this perspective, women's rights are intricately linked to the empowerment of women, enabling them to engage fully in societal participation.

Friedan (1963) emphasizes the notion of women's rights as the entitlement to be regarded as equal human beings. She elucidated that women's rights encompass not only legal prerogatives but also economic and social rights, which encompass the right to pursue a career, access education, and exercise control over one's reproductive decisions.

### **Justice**

Nussbaum (2018) defines justice as the dedication to ensuring that individuals can experience a life that is authentically human. She emphasises the significance of equipping people with the capacities necessary to lead a life of dignity, which encompasses aspects such as health, education, political engagement, and economic prosperity.

Sandel (2009) defines justice as the virtue that revolves around providing each individual with what they rightfully deserve. In his work, Sandel delves into the ethical aspects of justice, especially within the context of contemporary concerns like distributive justice and fairness.

Sen (2011) defines justice as the elimination of various forms of limitations that obstruct individuals from realizing the lives they cherish. Sen's body of work consistently underscores the significance of facilitating people in attaining well-being and exercising their capacity for agency.

Young (2011) defines justice as an ongoing procedure centred on creating and upholding institutions and systems that provide individuals with what they rightfully deserve. Young's research primarily centres on addressing structural injustices and disparities within societies.

### **Peacebuilding**

According to Lederach (1997), peacebuilding is a holistic notion that encompasses the processes of change within conflicts, as well as the dynamics of relationships, culture, institutions, and systems that are both influenced by and can influence conflicts. He underscores the significance of not only dealing with the immediate surface-level aspects of conflict but also delving into the root causes that underlie it.

According to Richmond (2009), peacebuilding is characterized as a process that entails the reconstruction of institutions, infrastructure, and social, political, and economic connections within a society affected by conflict. The primary objective is to prevent the reappearance of violent conflicts and to tackle the fundamental sources of violence. Richmond underscores the significance of addressing both the structural and relational dimensions of peacebuilding.

According to the United Nations (2009), peacebuilding is described as a proactive effort to identify and bolster structures that contribute to the reinforcement and maintenance of peace, with the primary goal of preventing a return to conflict. This definition underscores the involvement of international entities, like the UN, in aiding conflict-affected nations in their peacebuilding endeavours.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This paper adopts the feminist theory. Feminist theory provides a robust framework for examining the challenges and complexities of women's rights and their access to justice in post-conflict peacebuilding societies, particularly in the context of Nigeria. One of the central tenets of feminist theory is

intersectionality, developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991). This perspective recognizes that women's experiences and vulnerabilities are shaped by the intersections of multiple identities, such as gender, race, class, and ethnicity. In the Nigerian context, these intersecting identities can result in distinct forms of discrimination and varying access to justice. For instance, women from marginalized ethnic or religious groups may encounter unique obstacles and exclusions when seeking justice within traditional and formal legal systems.

feminist theory highlights the enduring influence of gender norms and patriarchal structures on women's lives in post-conflict settings. Traditional gender roles and expectations often persist, limiting women's agency and opportunities for participation in justice mechanisms (Banda, 2004). These roles may relegate women to caregiving roles or portray them primarily as victims of violence, overshadowing their roles as decision-makers, leaders, and active participants in post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Gender-based violence (GBV) is another critical aspect that feminist theory brings to the forefront in post-conflict societies (Enloe, 2000). In Nigeria, GBV remains a pervasive challenge, with women and girls being particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence during and after conflicts (UNICEF, 2019). Feminist perspectives emphasize the urgent need for comprehensive legal and support mechanisms to address GBV, ensure justice for survivors, and challenge the culture of impunity that often surrounds such crimes.

Feminist theory underscores the importance of women's political participation and representation as essential components of justice and peacebuilding. In Nigeria, there is a notable underrepresentation of women in post-conflict governance and peacebuilding efforts (Oluyemi, 2016). Feminist theorists argue that women's voices and perspectives are indispensable for achieving lasting peace and justice. Without their active involvement, the development and implementation of policies and legal reforms may fall short of addressing gender-based disparities.

Feminist legal scholars have played a pivotal role in advocating for legal reforms that protect women's rights and challenge gender inequalities. In the Nigerian context, feminist legal activists have pushed for legislative changes aimed at improving access to justice for women (Ekhaton, 2015). These legal reforms encompass laws against domestic violence, discrimination and the adoption of international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

Feminist theory acknowledges and celebrates the agency of women and their capacity to challenge oppressive systems. In post-conflict Nigeria, women have often taken on leadership roles in grassroots movements advocating for peace and justice (Olaitan, 2018). Feminist perspectives underscore the significance of recognizing and supporting these grassroots efforts. They not only contribute to individual empowerment but also drive broader societal change by addressing the root causes of gender-based injustices.

While feminist theory provides valuable insights into the complexities of gender, power, and justice critics argue that the theory can sometimes make sweeping generalizations about gender dynamics and women's experiences without adequately accounting for diversity among women. In regards to the paper, these intersecting identities can result in distinct forms of discrimination and varying access to justice. This perspective enables a nuanced analysis of the diverse challenges faced by women from different backgrounds in post-conflict settings.

### **Socioeconomic Empowerment and Women's Rights**

Economic empowerment programs are instrumental in advancing women's rights by enabling financial independence and economic self-sufficiency (Kabeer, 2005). In post-conflict settings, such as Nigeria, women frequently confront economic marginalization stemming from the displacement of livelihoods and resources during periods of conflict. Initiatives that provide vocational training, facilitate access

to credit, and offer support for income-generating activities serve as crucial tools in aiding women to reconstruct their lives and assert their economic rights (Duflo, 2012). These programs empower women by equipping them with the skills needed to enter the workforce, fostering entrepreneurship, and enhancing their ability to support their families independently. Economic self-sufficiency reduces women's vulnerability to gender-based violence and discrimination, enhancing their overall well-being. By addressing economic disparities, these programs contribute to breaking the cycle of poverty and promoting gender equality. They empower women to participate more actively in decision-making processes and play a more significant role in shaping their communities and societies. In essence, economic empowerment programs are a vital step towards realizing women's rights and achieving sustainable development.

Education is undeniably a fundamental right and a cornerstone of women's empowerment. Quality education provides women with essential knowledge, skills, and avenues for personal and economic advancement (UNESCO, 2020). Empowered women are better equipped to make informed decisions regarding their lives, encompassing choices concerning health, family planning, and active participation in the workforce. In post-conflict environments, guaranteeing girls' and women's access to education is of utmost importance for immediate recovery and sustained empowerment (Plan International, 2019). Quality education not only imparts academic knowledge but also fosters critical thinking, confidence, and leadership skills, all of which are pivotal for women's empowerment. It breaks down barriers that hinder women's progress, enabling them to pursue diverse career paths and contribute substantially to their communities and societies. Education enhances women's ability to advocate for their rights and engage in social and political discourse, making it an indispensable tool for achieving gender equality and fostering sustainable development. Recognizing education as a fundamental right is central to promoting women's empowerment and advancing global efforts for gender equity.

Access to comprehensive healthcare services, particularly sexual and reproductive health, is fundamental for women's well-being and their rights to health and bodily autonomy (UN Women, 2020). Empowering women with knowledge and control over their reproductive health choices is integral to achieving gender equality. In many settings, socio-economic empowerment programs extend beyond economic aspects to improve women's access to healthcare services, especially in rural and underserved areas (WHO, 2019). These initiatives involve enhancing healthcare infrastructure, expanding coverage, and promoting women's health awareness. By offering access to sexual and reproductive health services, these programs enable informed decisions on family planning, childbirth, and overall health, contributing to women's autonomy and well-being. Improved healthcare access reduces maternal mortality and the burden of preventable diseases, enhancing their quality of life. Integrating healthcare into empowerment programs is essential for advancing women's rights and comprehensive gender equality.

Economic empowerment, as noted by Duflo (2012), plays a transformative role by increasing women's political participation and leadership opportunities. Access to resources and economic independence encourages active engagement in political processes. This leads to advocacy for women's rights and positions of leadership within communities and nationally. This positive feedback loop promotes women's political rights and representation, fostering more inclusive policies and legislation that advance gender equality and women's empowerment.

Socioeconomic empowerment, as emphasized by UN Women (2020), is closely linked to legal rights and the pursuit of gender equality. It enables women to overcome barriers to justice and assert their legal rights effectively. Economic empowerment programs often include legal literacy components, providing women with knowledge about their rights and the skills to navigate legal systems, which is vital for those who have experienced gender-based violence or discrimination. This empowerment allows them to seek justice and protection, breaking free from cycles of abuse and discrimination, contributing to a safer and more equitable society.



## **Challenges and Barriers to Women's Rights and Access to Justice**

Sociocultural norms that uphold gender discrimination and stereotypes remain formidable obstacles to women's rights and their ability to access justice, as highlighted by UN Women (2020). In numerous societies, entrenched traditional gender roles and expectations curtail women's autonomy and hinder their involvement in decision-making processes. These norms can give rise to discriminatory practices, including child marriage, female genital mutilation, and honour killings, which are often difficult to challenge due to deeply ingrained cultural beliefs, as noted by the World Bank (2020). Such norms perpetuate systemic gender inequality and limit women's opportunities for personal and professional growth. They also contribute to the prevalence of gender-based violence and discrimination, impeding women's access to justice and legal protection. To address these issues, concerted efforts are required to engage communities, challenge harmful practices, and promote gender-sensitive education and awareness campaigns.

Gender-based violence (GBV) indeed persists as a widespread and significant challenge, constituting a substantial impediment to women's rights and their ability to access justice, as noted by Amnesty International (2019). Women may confront various forms of violence, including domestic violence, sexual harassment, and human trafficking, which profoundly affect their physical and psychological well-being. Survivors often grapple with multiple barriers when it comes to reporting such incidents and seeking legal recourse. These barriers include the fear of retaliation, the stigma associated with being a victim of GBV, and the lack of accessible and supportive services to assist them in their recovery. These factors collectively create a climate of silence and impunity that allows GBV to persist and perpetuate gender inequality.

Economic disparities between men and women undeniably play a pivotal role in perpetuating unequal access to justice, as highlighted by the World Bank (2020). Women frequently encounter economic barriers that curtail their capacity to secure legal representation or access justice mechanisms. Limited financial resources can hinder their ability to navigate complex legal processes, making it challenging to assert their rights effectively. Poverty can create a cycle in which women remain trapped in abusive relationships or exploitative situations. The lack of economic independence can limit their options for escape or the pursuit of legal remedies, as emphasized by UN Women (2020). This precarious financial situation not only hampers their personal well-being but also perpetuates gender-based violence and discrimination.

Legal and institutional barriers indeed present substantial impediments to women's access to justice, as highlighted by Amnesty International (2019). Discriminatory laws or regulations, along with a lack of gender-sensitive legal procedures, can undermine women's ability to seek remedies for violations of their rights. Limited access to legal aid services further compounds these challenges, making it difficult for women to obtain legal representation and navigate complex legal processes. The complexity and cost of the legal system can also act as deterrents, disproportionately affecting women who may lack the financial means and legal knowledge to pursue their rights effectively, as noted by Amnesty International (2019). These barriers can perpetuate injustice and inequality, reinforcing gender disparities in legal outcomes. Limited awareness of legal rights and procedures poses a significant challenge, as underscored by UN Women (2020). Many women may not be aware of their rights or how to access justice mechanisms. Factors such as illiteracy and limited access to education can exacerbate this problem, rendering it even more difficult for women to navigate the legal system and assert their rights.

Support services for survivors of violence or discrimination, encompassing essential provisions like counselling, medical care, and shelter, are frequently inadequate or challenging to access, especially in rural areas, as emphasized by the World Bank (2020). Survivors often face significant hurdles in seeking immediate assistance and the necessary resources to cope with the aftermath of violence, as highlighted by Amnesty International (2019).

In rural and remote regions, the scarcity of such support services can leave survivors in distressing situations, with limited access to critical care and protection. This insufficiency of services perpetuates the cycle of violence and discrimination, as survivors may be unable to escape dangerous circumstances or receive the help they urgently require.

Cultural and religious practices are sometimes employed to justify and perpetuate gender-based discrimination and violence, as highlighted by UN Women (2020). In some instances, deeply rooted customs and religious beliefs may be misinterpreted or misused to reinforce traditional power imbalances and restrict women's rights. These practices can create formidable barriers for women who seek to challenge discriminatory norms. Women who speak out against such practices may face resistance from their communities or religious authorities, and they may be ostracized or even subjected to violence themselves. As a result, many women are hesitant to confront these deeply ingrained cultural and religious beliefs, fearing social repercussions and harm to their personal safety.

Impunity for perpetrators of violence against women indeed represents a formidable obstacle to achieving justice, as noted by Amnesty International (2019). When justice systems are ineffective, corrupt, or biased, they may fail to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions, sending a disturbing message that violence against women is tolerated and will go unpunished.

This culture of impunity not only denies survivors of violence the justice and protection they deserve but also perpetuates a cycle of abuse, as perpetrators are emboldened by the absence of consequences for their actions. It erodes trust in the legal system and discourages survivors from reporting incidents or seeking legal remedies.

## **CONCLUSION**

The review of Women's Rights and Access to Justice in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Societies in Nigeria has shed light on the multifaceted challenges and complexities that women face in the aftermath of conflicts. This review has explored topics like socioeconomic empowerment and women's rights and challenges and barriers to women's rights and justice access to provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand. Throughout the review, it has become evident that women's rights and access to justice are intertwined with broader efforts to rebuild societies after conflicts. Women's empowerment, whether through economic opportunities, education, or political participation, is not just a matter of gender equality but a crucial component of sustainable peace and development. When women are empowered, societies benefit from their contributions to governance, economic growth, and social stability. The review has also highlighted significant challenges and barriers that persist in post-conflict Nigeria. Sociocultural norms, gender-based violence, economic disparities, and legal obstacles continue to hinder women's ability to exercise their rights and access justice. These challenges are deeply rooted and require sustained efforts from both national and international actors to address. The review highlights the importance of recognizing women's rights and access to justice as integral components of post-conflict peacebuilding. Addressing the challenges and barriers faced by women in Nigeria requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach involving government institutions, civil society organizations, grassroots movements, and the international community. This collective effort is essential not only for achieving gender equality but also for fostering lasting peace, stability, and prosperity in post-conflict societies like Nigeria.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Improving women's rights and access to justice requires the government to enhance the legal framework and its effective implementation. This involves enacting and enforcing laws that safeguard women's rights, including protection from gender-based violence, discrimination, and unequal treatment. The legal framework should address both substantive and procedural aspects to ensure that women can seek redress for violations effectively. Moreover, mechanisms for reporting and prosecuting perpetrators should be strengthened, and essential support services for survivors should be provided.

In post-conflict settings, governments should prioritize economic empowerment programs tailored to women. These programs should go beyond conventional approaches and encompass vocational training, access to credit and markets, and support for income-generating activities. The goal is to enable women to rebuild their lives and communities after periods of conflict, promoting sustainable economic independence and contributing to peace and stability.

Combating gender-based violence (GBV) necessitates comprehensive strategies. Governments should not only enhance legal frameworks but also focus on the prevention and response to GBV. This includes implementing laws and mechanisms for reporting and prosecuting perpetrators. Equally important is providing essential support services for survivors, including access to healthcare, counseling, and safe shelters. To address the cultural norms that perpetuate violence against women, awareness campaigns should be launched to challenge these norms and promote a more inclusive and equitable society.

Promoting women's participation in decision-making processes is crucial for advancing gender equality. The government should actively work towards this by encouraging women's involvement in political leadership, peace negotiations, and community governance. This includes policies and initiatives that create an enabling environment for women's engagement, such as quotas, capacity-building programs, and efforts to dismantle institutional barriers that hinder women's participation.

Donors should play a significant role in advancing women's rights by prioritizing funding for programs that directly benefit women. It is essential for donors to align their efforts with national priorities and the specific needs of local communities. Funding should support initiatives that address the multifaceted challenges women face, including economic empowerment, education, healthcare, and protection from violence. By ensuring that their resources are effectively channeled to programs benefiting women, donors can significantly contribute to gender equality and women's well-being.

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**The Evolution of an Islamic Jihadist Group, the *Jama'tul Ahlus-sunna lidda'awati wal jihad*, Boko Haram: from local terrorism to an Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)**

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**Abstract**

*The Sahelo-Sahara region, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, became an attraction for jihadist groups since the end of Cold War in the 1990s. Most of mujahidin (jihadists) from Maghreb, who were fighting Soviets in Afghanistan, returned to their countries of origin. The Global War on Terrorism and the fall of an Islamic State in Afghanistan are among the factors that contributed to the rise of jihadist groups in the Sahel. The fall of Muammar Ghadhafi and the spread of the Libyan arsenals across the Sahel empowered the Nigerian jihadist group, Boko Haram, militarily. Boko Haram pleaded allegiance to the Islamic State, proclaimed by al-Baghdadi, and became its Province in West Africa. A multinational force was set up to fight the Boko Haram by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) members. Another similar force was put in place by 5 Sahel States (G5 Sahel), among which are Chad and Niger also members of LCBC. The diversion of Chadian troops from the Lake Chad Basin impacted negatively on the fight against Boko Haram. Using primary and secondary data, the paper analyzed the conditions that seemed to have facilitated the transformation of Boko Haram into a military power, its expansion and affiliation to the Islamic State. Also, exploring the theory of Collective Defense, the paper arrived at conclusions that security of a nation state requires the collaboration of its neighbors, especially when the threat does not confine itself to a same country. African states need to emulate the example of Nigeria in its efforts to fighting terrorism as it mobilized her neighbors, particularly in the North East geopolitical region, to collectively deal with the menace of Boko Haram terrorist group.*

**Keywords:** *Sahel, Jihad, Islamic State, Terrorism and Multinational*

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**Introduction**

The group *Jama'tul Ahlus-sunna lidda'awati wal jihad* also known as *Boko Haram* emerged in the city of Maiduguri under multitude circumstances, religious, socio-economics, political and, principally the absence of Government<sup>52</sup>. The group vanished after a confrontation with the Nigerian security forces in 2009 but reappeared a year later. Boko Haram came back stronger and well equipped. It established its training camps in Sambisa Forest from where it conducted and coordinated its attacks. In 2012, the Nigerian armed forces invaded the Sambisa Forest. Most of the jihadists ran into

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<sup>52</sup>. Refer to 'The Genesis and Expansion of the *Jama'tul Ahlus-sunna lidda'awati wal jihad* in the Lake Chad Basin: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Republic of Niger' published in Sokoto Journal of History and also available online.

Cameroonian territory. They established in the border zones and rearmed. They later returned to Sambisa and established an Islamic caliphate with Gwoza, a Sambisa riverine town, as the capital.

They began the expansion of the caliphate by launching attacks into Cameroon and Niger Republic. Chadian troops had to intervene in order to stop the invasion of the portion of Cameroonian national territory. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) reactivated the existing Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to fight Boko Haram which became more powerful because of the links it is having with other jihadist groups.

The creation of another Collective Defense by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger Republic, known as Group 5 Sahel (G5 Sahel) had serious damaging impacts on the fight against Boko Haram. A considerable number of Chadian troops are withdrawn and redeployed to G5 Sahel. The Nigerian jihadist group, split into two with one faction of Boko Haram pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP). The later became stronger and reconquered the islands in the Lake Chad from where they continue attacking the riverine countries, while the other faction retained the Sambisa Forest.

### ***Boko Haram, from Sambisa Forest to Border Areas***

Multitude factors explain the expansion of *Boko Haram*, from its epicenter in Nigeria to the neighboring countries, particularly within the Lake Chad Basin. Among few is the homogeneity of the populations-

#### **The homogeneity of the populations of the Lake Chad Basin**

The precolonial nationalism poses a threat to the national cohesion in the modern states of African continent. The homogenous population, scattered across two or more countries, feel attached to themselves than to the rest of the population of their respective states<sup>53</sup>. The *Mandara* group, when fleeing attacks from the *Seifawa* of Bornu empire, retreated from the Lake Chad riverain areas to the mountains, Mandara Mountain, and its surrounding (Asiwaju, 1984: 30). The *Mandara* found themselves divided between the colonies of du Cameroon and Nigeria during the European invasion.

With their capital in Mora, Cameroon, thirty-two (32) kilometers from Kirawa, a border town, *Mandara* refused to be identified as Cameroonians neither as Nigerians at the independence of the colonies (Asiwaju, 1984: 40), they just consider themselves as *Wandala*<sup>54</sup>. The homogeneity of the *Mandara* group contributed to the expansion of Boko Haram ideology to Cameroon.

*Yusufiyya* or *Boko Haram* ideology was also exported to Chad and Niger via the homogenous populations around the Lake Chad, particularly the *Arab Shuwa* and *Kanuri*. The groups *Kanuri* and *Arab Shuwa* of northern Borno are the same as those of Chad. The *Kanuri* in Niger are closer to their kinds and kits of Borno State, not only in terms of ethnic affiliation but also in geographical location, than to other citizens of Niger Republic. Apart from using the similarity of the population, the founders of *Boko Haram* did not fail to use Islam as a vehicle for propagating their ideology.

The *Salafi* played a vital role in the expansion of the ideology of Boko Haram across the Lake Chad basin. As discussed in the previous article, the reforms engaged upon by the *Salafi*, made *Izala* an

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<sup>53</sup>. Having discussed the homogeneity of the population of Kanem/Bornu, in our previous article, 'The Genesis and Expansion of the *Jama'atul Ahlus-sunna lidda'awati wal jihad* in the Lake Chad Basin: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Republic of Niger, we are limiting ourselves here to the border areas of Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad.


<sup>54</sup>. The word is the autonym of *Mandara*

attraction to the youth. Mohammed Yusuf made usurped the deployed efforts by the *Ahlu-Sannah (Izala)* to radicalize his followers.

Neighboring states of Nigeria, particularly Chad and Niger, are known to be the last, in the United Nations rating, in terms of Human Development Index (Thurston, 2016:22). Border populations of these two countries as well as those of northern Cameroon dwell in an extreme poverty. Founders of the group Boko Haram in their *Dawa*’ combined stipends and preachings. This strategy worked out as the dispatched missionaries are indigenes and live in the target communities<sup>55</sup>. The political situation of the neighboring states also contributed to the propagation of the ideology of *Boko Haram*, due to the security weakness caused by bad governance. However, efforts by Nigerian government in the fight against *Boko Haram*, especially the military operations forced the jihadists to retreat to Cameroon.

**Military Operations and Retreat of *Boko Haram* from Sambisa Forest**

The military operations in Maiduguri town as well as those in parts of Sambisa Forest forced *Boko Haram* elements to retreat to the neighboring countries. The group later declared a caliphate and begun expanding it authority across the Lake Chad Basin. It conquered territories without any consideration to the international borders. Coincidentally, activities of *Boko Haram* are confined within the borders of the precolonial states of Kanem/Bornu and Mandara.



**Map: Presence of *Boko Haram* in the Lake Chad Basin**


The precolonial Kanem/Bornu territory was partitioned across the Lake Chad riverine states. Kamen is nowadays entirely in the Republic of Chad while Bornu is in the Republics of Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. In the North, Kanem/Bornu borders Air and Kwarar, in the present days, Agadez Region of Niger Republic. Kanem/Bornu shares its -western border with Kano at present Katagum Emirate in Bauchi State. From South Mandara territory, presently from Bama in Borno State of Nigeria up to Maroua in the Far North Region of Cameroon. From East, it shares border with Kotoko territory with extend up to river Chari, presently border between Cameroon and Chad republics. Approximately, the distance between Kano State of Nigeria and Kusri in Cameroon, is about 650 km. The distance between Kwarar and Mandara is about 880 km (Zeltner, 1980: 127).

<sup>55</sup>. Ibid.



The Mandara group “was founded in the early fifteenth century by the coming together of various Chadic speaking peoples who gradually move their settlements southwards to avoid pressures from then recently established Saifawa state of Borno” (Asiwaju, 1984:30). The Mandara territory was entirely part of Cameroon, a German colony. The territory was entrusted to Britain and France at the end of the World War I by the League of Nations and later United Nations in 1945.

The partitioning of Mandara land into French and British territories did not impact on the homogeneity of the people who continue seeing themselves as one entity, especially the border towns: “The towns of Kirawa, Ashigashiya, Bakarise and Gakara refused to see themselves as divided between the British and the French” (Asiwaju, 1984:43). The Mandara nation, as we are to discuss in the upcoming paragraphs, facilitated the re-emergence of Boko Haram.



### **The Lake Chad Basin Countries**

*Boko Haram* leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who rejects democracy and bureaucratic systems of government and western educational system, *makarantar boko*, got admirers in the Nigeria's neighboring countries. The group clashed with the Nigerian armed forces in 2009. They were brought under control and the leader was killed.

However, the group re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of Imam Abubakar Shekau. It became stronger and established training camps in Sambisa Forest<sup>56</sup>. Members of the group have been infiltrating Maiduguri and subsequently travelling to other part of Nigeria in order carry attacks. Most of their victims are members of the Nigerian Defense and Security forces.

Between 2010 and 2012, thousands of Nigerians, including security agents, were killed by the group. Prisoners were set free in Maiduguri, Lokoja and Bauchi. The Nigerian Police Force Headquarters and the United Nations office in Abuja came under attacks. Churches and mosques were not spared<sup>57</sup>.

<sup>56</sup>. Desert Herald Magazine, Maiden edition, January 2010, p.23

<sup>57</sup>. Desert Herald Magazine, Maiden edition, January 2010, p.23

The fight against *Boko Haram* was done by the combination of the Defense and Security Forces, namely the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Police Force, the Intelligence Services and other paramilitary organizations. The Forces were operating under a Command known as Joint Task Force (JTF) against *Boko Haram*. The Nigerian armed forces were assisted by the local militia, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). The collaboration between JTF and CJTF initially played a vital role in the fight against the insurgency:

“The Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF) was tasked with stopping the *Boko Haram* violence. In the fight against *Boko Haram* the JTF was originally constituted by the personnel from numerous security forces, including the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Air Force, the State Security Service, the Nigerian Police, and intelligence units, and was intended to apply a whole-of-government approach to security. Despite its very poor human rights record, one of JTF’s high points was its struggle to win local support for military operations through strategic collaboration with the civilian-JTF, a group of local youth trained to initiate and undertake community self-help surveillance initiatives”<sup>58</sup>.

The JTF was tasked to restore order, code named “JTF-RO” in the North-Est of Nigeria, precisely in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. JTF-RO recorded success in the fight in Maiduguri and its environments before its disbandment in 2013. JTF-RO was accused of human rights violations and arbitrary execution by the International Community. Moreover, the Nigeria government claimed that JTF-RO was a temporary arrangement which can be disbanded in due course:

“Credible reports indicate that uniformed military personnel and paramilitary mobile police carried out summary executions, assaults, torture and other abuses throughout Borno, Kano, and Yobe states under the auspices of the Joint Task Force Restore Order (JTF-RO), the government claimed that JTF-RO members faced disciplinary charges for human rights violations, but none was verified. According to eyewitnesses, press reports, and civil society reports, JTF-RO personnel allegedly committed numerous killings in Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe states, often after attacks by *Boko Haram*. According to press and NGO reports, JTF-RO illegally detained and killed suspected members of *Boko Haram* in the Giwa barracks military facility in Maiduguri, Borno, and Sector Alpha and the Presidential Lodge facilities in Damaturu, Yobe. Former detainees alleged that torture and mistreatment by security forces led to the death of detainees in some cases. Authorities publicly denied the claims, describing them as inaccurate or unbalanced”<sup>59</sup>.

The creation of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division of the Nigerian Army was intended first to launder the image of Nigeria in its fight against *Boko Haram* as well as make military operations more coordinated and professionally oriented. The Federal Government of Nigeria believed that with adequate presence of the military in that region, the insurgent group will think twice before launching any attack in the zone<sup>60</sup>.

The 7<sup>th</sup> Division recorded tremendous success within the first year of its creation. It continued preserving the gains by the JTF-RO and launched its operations into the heart of Sambisa Forest: «By November 2013 troops of the 7th Division had intensified patrols deeply inside the forest areas of Damboa and Gwoza local government areas in order to reach remote and isolated towns as well as villages with a view to preventing further incessant attacks by the insurgents»<sup>61</sup>. The operations of the newly established Division forced the elements of *Boko Haram* to retreat to the border areas of the

<sup>58</sup>. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/7div.htm> 8/5/2020

<sup>59</sup>. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/7div.htm> 8/5/2020

<sup>60</sup>. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/7div.htm> 8/5/2020

<sup>61</sup>. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/7div.htm> 8/5/2020

neighboring countries, within the Lake Chad basin from where they got rearmed before returning the Nigeria and established a caliphate.

Reliable and verified sources confirmed the presence of Boko Haram elements, particularly in the border towns, Nigeria-Cameroon, of Kerawa, Amtcihde and Fotokol<sup>62</sup> from 2013 to 2014. Villagers dwelling in the surroundings of Grayya Mountain, a location situated in-between Amtchide, Kerawa and Kolofota confirmed to have sighted training camps of *Boko Haram* around the mountain<sup>63</sup>. *Boko Haram* elements with majority of then indigenes of Kanem/Bornu and Mandara land did not pose real treat to the local populations neither to the security agents of both countries, Nigeria and Cameroon, their retreat to Cameroonian territory. They were not carrying arms at that time and were secretly busy amassing weapons coming through Chadian territory.

Cameroonian authorities have seized arms confirmed to be smuggled from Chad and destined for *Boko Haram*. For example, on 26<sup>th</sup> March, 2014, Cameroonian soldiers were able, from the intelligence report by villagers, to lay their hand on arms hidden underground around Fotokol, the other side of Nigerian Gaboru Ngala. The arms stock includes 239 Kalashnikovs, a ton of grenades, one canon, one mortar, 9 multipurpose gun machines, 6 guns (Fabrique Nationale d'Arme) and 11 rocket-launchers<sup>64</sup>.

Similarly, on 12<sup>th</sup> September, 2014, it was discovered in the Town of Kousseri, a border town separated by river Logone-Chari from N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, arms which include 5 multipurpose gun machines, 24 rockets, 4 rocket-launchers and 6 Kalashnikovs. These arms were found in a villa belonging to a *Boko Haram* commander<sup>65</sup>. On the 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2014, Cameroonian Police arrested a vehicle coming from N'Djemena at the border. The occupants of the vehicle were transporting 15 multipurpose gun machines, 6 AK-47, one rocket-launcher (RPG) and thousands of bullets<sup>66</sup>.

These arms were suspected to have come from the Republic of Chad considering that this country went through civil wars and coups d'état. The arms might have been smuggled directly from Sudan and Central Africa Republic<sup>67</sup>, both countries going through civil wars. The fall of the Libyan President also played a vital role in strengthening *Boko Haram*.

### **The Fall of Gadhafi Regime and the Expansion of *Boko Haram***

The coming up of *Boko Haram* does not have tangible link with the Gadhafi regime. However, the fall of his regime in 2011 contributed to the expansion of the Nigerian jihadi group. The chaos of the post Khadhafi regime contributed to the insecurity in the Sahel region in general and to the expansion of *Boko Haram* in particular.

Colonel Gadhafi initiated a socialist revolution under the cover of Islam, « *Islamic socialism* »<sup>68</sup> in 1969 when he became President of Libya. A foreign legion, *al-Failaka al-Islamiya*, is constituted in 1972 to back up the revolution. Majority of the soldiers and officers of the foreign legion came from Sub-Saharan states, particularly Mali, Chad and Niger. This elite legion is in charge of the personal security of the President and carries out foreign operations<sup>69</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup>. Nigerian Towns equivalent Kirawa (Kerawa),Banki (Amtcihde) and Gaboru Ngala ( Fotokol)

<sup>63</sup>. Local sources.

<sup>64</sup>. <https://lamenparole.hypotheses.org/217> 20/5/2020

<sup>65</sup>. <https://lamenparole.hypotheses.org/217> 20/5/2020

<sup>66</sup>. <https://lamenparole.hypotheses.org/217> 20/5/2020

<sup>67</sup>. <https://lamenparole.hypotheses.org/217> 20/5/2020

<sup>68</sup>. <http://www.soldiers-of-misfortune.com/history/islamic-legion.htm> 18/01/19

<sup>69</sup>. <http://www.soldiers-of-misfortune.com/history/islamic-legion.htm> 18/01/19

At the fall of Gadhafi, the rebels went after *Al-Failaka al-Islamiya*. The foreign mercenaries fled with most parts of their arsenals. They then settling in Mali while few went back to their home countries via Niger<sup>70</sup>. Among the returnees who took arms and ammunitions are Nigerians<sup>71</sup>.

The chaos left behind by the Libyan revolution turns the country into arms market where jihadists are being supplied. According to the United Nations Report on the impacts of Libya on the Sahelian states, including Nigeria and Chad, jihadist groups, particularly, Aqmi and *Boko Haram* received huge quantities of arms from Libya<sup>72</sup>. Apart from receiving a boost in human and material resources from Libya, *Boko Haram* is having relations with other jihadist groups.

### **Links between *Boko Haram*, Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb and al-Shabab**

The absence of the state in Libya became an opportunity for the jihadists who conquered a portion of Malian territory between January 2012 and January 2013<sup>73</sup>. The occupation of northern Mali by jihadists gave a new life to *Boko Haram* during the period of her reconstitution. Relations between Nigerian jihadists and their counterparts from Maghreb are been mentioned in the report of UN mission on the evaluation of the impact of Libyan crisis on the Sahel<sup>74</sup>.

According to this UN report, transmitted to the Security Council, *Boko Haram* engaged in relationship with Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb. The document also underlined that seven *Boko Haram* members were arrested in Niger while travelling to Mali. Write ups on how to make explosives, on locations and contacts of Aqmi were also found on them<sup>75</sup>.

The links between *Boko Haram* and Aqmi is also substantiated during a terrorist in Niamey. Two French citizens were taken hostage in a restaurant on January 7<sup>th</sup>, 2011. A French journalist working for *Le Monde Afrique*, Jean-Philippe Rémy, reports that, according to the security sources, the attack was coordinated by *Boko Haram* elements residing in Niamey who supplied Aqmi with intelligence<sup>76</sup>. Relations between the two jihadist groups were referred to, during a meeting on the Sahel in Nouakchott, held on January 24<sup>th</sup>, 2012, when representatives from Nigeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Algeria denounced the «*connection* » between Aqmi and *Boko Haram*<sup>77</sup>.

Nigerian security sources further confirmed the relations between the two jihadist groups, Aqmi and *Boko Haram*. Intelligence reports indicate that some *Boko Haram* members were trained in Mali during the jihadist occupation. Aqmi also participated in the arms transfer from Libya to *Boko Haram* in Nigeria<sup>78</sup>. *Boko Haram* also maintained relations with *al-Shabab* in Somalia<sup>79</sup> but however is their

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<sup>70</sup>. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14693343> 18/01/2019

<sup>71</sup>. Nigerinan diplomatic source, décembre 2012

<sup>72</sup>. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-un-arms/arms-from-libya-le> 18/01/2019

<sup>73</sup> [www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131006-chronologie-aqmi](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131006-chronologie-aqmi) 22/11/2018

<sup>74</sup>. [www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20120126.OBS9814/nigeria-l-onu-fait-le-lien-entre-boko-haram-et-aqmi](http://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20120126.OBS9814/nigeria-l-onu-fait-le-lien-entre-boko-haram-et-aqmi). 23/11/2018

<sup>75</sup>.ibid

<sup>76</sup>. <https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/03/10/les-liens-troubles-entre-boko-haram-et-aqmi...> 23/11/2018

<sup>77</sup>. [www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20120126.OBS9814/nigeria-l-onu-fait-le-lien-entre-boko-haram-et-aqmi](http://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20120126.OBS9814/nigeria-l-onu-fait-le-lien-entre-boko-haram-et-aqmi) 23/11/2018

<sup>78</sup>. Nigerian security source, October 2012

<sup>79</sup>. <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/25/afrika/boko-haram-al-shabaab-somalia/index.html> le 23/11/2018

links with the Islamic State became worrisome to the Nigerian state in particular and the West African region in particular.

### **Links between *Boko Haram* and Islamic State**

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, former Al-Qaida Commandant, set up an Islamic State in Iraq and Levant in April 2013 (Henin, 2017: 152). He later proclaimed, on June 29<sup>th</sup>, 2014 an Islamic State (IS) with its territory in Iraq and Syria. On July 4<sup>th</sup>, 2014, in a sermon at Great Mosque, *an-Nuri* of Mosul, the neo-Caliph called on the Muslims across the world to pledge allegiance to him (Henin, 2017: *ibid.*).

The Nigerian jihadist group agitating for the creation of an Islamic State and having some portion of the Borno State<sup>80</sup> territory responded to the IS call through an audio message, confirmed by experts as Shekau voice, in March 2015<sup>81</sup>. The allegiance of *Boko Haram* to IS is significant to the Islamic international terrorism. Both *Boko Haram* and IS benefited from this allegiance. If IS registered its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Boko Haram* gained recognition from other international jihadist groups.

*Boko Haram*, after gaining recognition from IS and related jihadi groups, began its expansion to the 'francophone' West Africa. It received financial and logistic supports from IS during for the purpose of its expansion. The Nigerian jihadist group then got the latest technics of propaganda and the strategies to conduct media war<sup>82</sup>. IS got a province of its caliphate in Africa<sup>83</sup>. IS headquarters directed its newly acquired province to abide by the « *Rules of Engagement* » which include, « *putting an end to the suicide-bombings by children, stopping attacking mosques, Christians as well as destroying the churches* »<sup>84</sup>.

The new rules by the 'Caliph' al-Baghdâdi caused division amidst *Boko Haram* Generals. Abubakr Shekau rejected the conditions while Abu Musab al Barnawi, biological child of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of *Boko Haram* decided to abide by them. Al-Baghdâdi appointed al-Barnawi as his *Wali*, the governor, in West Africa. The later and his disciples relocated to the area surrounding the Lake Chad leaving Sambisa Forest to Shekau<sup>85</sup>.

The nomination of al-Barnawi is contested by Shekau. Even with their internal crisis, the two factions remained committed to fighting for the same cause which is to establishing an Islamic system of government. *Boko Haram* had before its affiliation to IS about 6 000 active combatants (Warner & Hulme, 2018). After the division, Shekau had 1 500 combatants while al-Barnawi got 3 500. Al-Barnawi faction is thence branded the '*Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP)*'. ISWAP remains the most important province of the al-Baghdadi caliphate (Warner & Hulme, 2018).

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<sup>80</sup>.Portions of the Nigerian territory were taken back by the Army in 2015

<sup>81</sup>.<https://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/07/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-isis/index.html> 30/11/18

<sup>82</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup>. Remi Caratol, *Jeune Afrique*, No 2900, du 7 au 17 aout 2016, p.26

<sup>85</sup>. Remi Caratol, *Jeune Afrique*, No 2900, du 7 au 17 aout 2016, p.26



**Positions of the two factions of *Boko Haram***

Relations between IS and ISWAP was considered as propaganda only, by military experts and politicians. In an interview on the « *rapprochement between Daesh and Boko Haram* », former French minister of Defense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, suggests that one should be cautious of the « *claims of belonging or allegiance. Some find it as a means to be heard* »<sup>86</sup>. Authentic or propaganda, the affiliation between Boko Haram and IS turns to be a reality on the battle field. The tactics and the manipulation of the weapons of latest generation proved that some of *Boko Haram* fighters came from elsewhere. According to our source at the *Nigerian Air Force* (Novembre, 2018) *Boko Haram* began using of drones during their operations, after its affiliation of IS.

The claim of the use of drones and also the presence of foreign fighters in the ISWAP is also substantiated by the Nigerian military authorities. During a conference<sup>87</sup> the Chief of Army Staff, Brigadier General, Tukur Buratai, associates the new attacks by Boko Haram to the use of mercenaries’ and drones. He notes that since 2015, Nigerian Armed Forces has drastically reduced the fire power of Boko Haram however, the new attacks against the military positions are being perpetrated by the mercenaries of ISWAP which also claims responsibly of these new attacks<sup>88</sup>. ISWAP further expanded its authority, from the Nigerian territory under its control to the neighboring countries by exploiting the sociocultural realities and the weaknesses of the respective governments of these states.

**Impacts of the Group 5 (G) Sahel on the fight against *Boko Haram***

The member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), formed a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) in early 1990s to fight armed banditry in their collective national border portions of their territories. MJTF was reactivated and redeployed to tackle the menace of Boko Haram. However, the creation of another Multinational Force by Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Mali, the “*Group 5 Sahel, (G5 Sahel)*”, got negative impacts on the operations of LCBC-MJTF. The

<sup>86</sup>. Jeune Afrique, No. 2865 du 6 au 12 décembre 2015, p.26

<sup>87</sup>. Tenue à Maiduguri, le 28 novembre 2018

<sup>88</sup>. <http://saharareporters.com/2018/11/30/%E2%80%98boko-haram-using-drones-mercenaries->, le 30/11/18

two intermediary countries, Chad and Niger, had to divert their attention and their resources to G5 Sahel.

### **Creation and Engagement of MNJTF against *Boko Haram***

The Lac Chad Basin became famous with exploration of oil field as well as a home for jihadist terrorism. The strategic position of the basin became an attraction for western superpowers who established their military bases in their fight against terrorism.

The MJTF is a supranational army made of the officers and soldiers from different nationalities. The entire troupes are under the authority of defense headquarters and operate as an army of one nation. Territories of member states constitute its area of operations. Before examining the formation of the MJTF, its legitimacy and rules of engagement, let's look at the notion of the collective defense and its practice worldwide in general and in Africa in particular.

### **The Establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF)**

The LCBC member countries established MNJF during the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the institution in Abuja in 1994 via the Decision No.8 (b). The force is put under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary of LCBC. Unfortunately, the mobilization of the officers and soldiers was disturbed by the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the possession of the Bakassi Inland (Umate, 2014). While contesting the occupation of « its island » in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Cameroon refused to contribute its share to the MNJTF (Umate, 2014).

With the exception of Cameroon, the other riverine States, Chad, Niger and Nigeria mobilized officers and soldiers of the national armies and polices and few civilians to form MNJTC troops. Baga-Kawar, a Nigerian riverine town to the lake Chad is chosen as the Headquarters of this supranational army. Each member country is to take in charge its own troops as per Decision No.4 (2) of the 10<sup>th</sup> Summit of Heads of State and Government held in N'Djamena, July 28<sup>th</sup>, 2000.

The absence of Cameroonian contingent in the MNJTF hindered its operations. A large portion of the basin, particularly the border areas of Cameroon-Chad and Cameroon-Nigeria were not accessible to the multinational force. The coming in 2011 of a new Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission changed the situation of the MNJTF. The force is reformed and engaged in the fight against *Boko Haram*.

### **Revival and Engagement of MNJTF in the Fight against *Boko Haram***

According to the LCBC Executive Secretary and Head of Mission of MNJTF, the idea of the revival of the MNJTF came from the proposed of inter-basin water transfer from River Congo to Lake Chad<sup>89</sup>. The conception of the idea of water transfer was conceived in 1994 but officially became a project in 2000 via a Decision No.6 of the LCBC Summit in N'Djamena. The realization of the studies as well as the execution of this giant project is to be done with the support of the Expatriates. All staff, locals and expatriates need proper security to carry out their duties. The MNJTF, according to the LCBC Executive Secretary, is to ensure this needed security.

The water transfer is to be done via Cameroonian territory and the material and human resources are to be protected by the MNJTF troops among which Cameroon is absent. As the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria was over, the LCBC ES worked hard to convince Cameroonian authorities to provide troops to MNJTF to be deployed on its own territory<sup>90</sup>. After series of consultations among

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<sup>89</sup>. Eng. Abdullahi Sanusi Imram, SE et Chef de Mission de La FMM, interview le 18 -19 janvier 2017

<sup>90</sup>. Eng. Abdullahi Sanusi Imram, ibid.

LCBC member states, the MNJTF took a new shape with Cameroon joining it in 2012 (Decision No.6 of Heads of States and Government, 2012).

The engagement of MJTF in the fight against *Boko Haram* began just after the Paris Summit on the Security in Nigeria presided over by the French President, François Hollande, on the May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2014. This Summit came up as a response to kidnapping of the over 270 Chibok girls in their school in the night of 14 to 15 April, 2014. Present at the Summit were Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, France, Niger and Chad. Also present were United States, United Kingdom and European Union<sup>91</sup>. It was decided during the Summit that a security regional cooperation be put in place and an international commitment be launched<sup>92</sup>.

The French initiative in tackling regional security challenges in Africa translates into the control of the former colonial power over her colonies. In fact, all of the Nigerian neighboring countries were French colonies and still under the influence the later, even as independent. However, the control over former colonies is not only done by France but also by other European states over their former colonies. For example, the Commonwealth organization is rather a colonial dependency rather than multilateral diplomacy. With the King as the permanent head of the Organization, Commonwealth remains the gathering of the British former colonies under the same umbrella. Nigerian Government, the major financier, disbursed a \$100 million Dollars in 2015 to start the redeployment of the multilateral force<sup>93</sup>.

### **Deployment and operations of the MNJTF**

LCBC member States and Benin Republic mobilized 11 450 officers and soldiers to form MNJTF troops. Benin mobilized 700 both officers and soldiers, Cameroon 2 500, Chad 3 000 Niger 2 000 and Nigeria 3 250. The troops are deployed on the border areas of Nigeria and her neighbors. Each contingent except the Benin troops is deployed on or at the border of its national territory. Four (4) sectors are created for the purpose of ensuring smooth operations as follows:

1. Sector I : Mora (Cameroon) : borders Cameroon - Nigéria and Cameroon - Chad
2. Sector II: Baga-Sola (Chad) covers borders Tchad-Nigeria and Chad- Niger.
3. Sector III: 'Baga-Kawar (Nigeria) borders, Nigeria - Chad – Niger.
4. Sector IV: Diffa (Niger) - borders Niger- Nigeria and Niger-Chad.


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<sup>91</sup>. Source : African Press Organisation (APO)/ Présidence de la République Française

<sup>92</sup>. Source : African Press Organisation (APO)/ Présidence de la République Française

<sup>93</sup>. Eng. Abdullahi Sanusi Imram,





### Deployment of the MNJTF troops

MNJTF has its Headquarters in Chad, N'djamena. Both the Head of the Mission and the Force Commandant have their offices in N'djamena. 95 officers and soldiers drawn from the LCBC member countries as well as some of the staff of the LCBC are deployed at the MNJTF Headquarters. Benin Troops, far from their national territory, and the presence justified by the military cooperation, are deployed to ensure only garrison activities<sup>94</sup>. They are not directly engaged in the direct combats with the *Boko Haram* fighters but only ensure the safety of military.

On the operational plan, MNJTF carries its operations in synergy with the Nigerian armed forces mobilized in the fight against *Boko Haram* under the Operation Lafiya Dole (OPLD). As discussed above, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division of the Nigerian Army was created on the August 19<sup>th</sup>, 2013 with the main mission to eliminate the *Boko Haram*. Another division, 8<sup>th</sup> Division with its Headquarters in Yobe State was also created with the same mission. Nigeria Air Force and Nigeria Navy, Police and other related agencies were also mobilized in the framework of the OPLD.

MNJTF is supported by the Chadian and Cameroonian Air Forces. The coordination of MNJTF and OPLD. Success of MNJTF is made possible by the operations of OPLD and vice versa. The presence of MNJTF around the borders of Nigeria prevented *Boko Haram* elements to flee from the Nigerian national territory. However, the set-up of the G5 Sahel weakened the MNJTF hence impacting negatively the fight against *Boko Haram*.

### The Creation of G5 Sahel and the Operations of MNJTF

Sahel Countries, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger set up a multinational force, "Groupe Sahel 5" or 'G5 Sahel' in Bamako, Mali on the July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017 in the presence of French President, Emmanuel Macron<sup>95</sup>. The main objective of the multinational force is to fight various

<sup>94</sup>. Eng. Abdullahi Sanusi Imram, SE et Chef de Mission de La FMM.

<sup>95</sup>. <http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/07/02/a-bamako-macron-promet-une-aide-financiere-et-logistique->

Islamic jihadist groups in particular al-Qaida in the Maghreb and other related group in the Mali and her neighbors. This G5 Sahel is a French initiative and got the supports of United Nations as well as other western States. Some analysts believe the set-up of G5 by France is to prepare its withdrawal from Mali as well as cutting down its expenditure on Operation Barkhane, €800 million of Euro annually<sup>96</sup>. However, French authorities denied this allegation<sup>97</sup>.

The first deployment of 5 000 troops of G5 become a disaster to the LCBC MNJTF. Chad Republic an important member State to both G5 Sahel and LCBC MNJTF had to divert its troops from the Lake Chad basin to its border with Libya as contribution of G5 deployment. About 6 000 troops (local and MNJTF contribution) were withdrawn from Baga-Kawar. According to Hissein Brahim Taha, Chadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the redeployment of the troops to Wour, in the region of Tibesti is part of the strategy within the contest of the fight against terrorism<sup>98</sup>. Since this withdrawal, attacks in Nigeria, Niger and Chad, area of deployment of ISWAP, have surged.

## Conclusion

The Nigerian Islamic group, the *Jama'tul Ahlus-sunna lidda'awati wal jihad* also known as Boko Haram emerged in early 2000 in the town of Maiduguri, Borno State of Nigeria. It expanded across the Lake Chad Basin by exploiting the same conditions in the neighboring that lead to its emergence. The illiteracy, lack of job opportunities, bad governance and Islamic radicalization are among the conditions that favored the emergence of Boko Haram. The fall of the Ghadhafi regime in Libya strengthened Boko Haram militarily. LCBC member countries put up a collective defense, MNJTF, to fight the local jihadist group, turned into an Islamic State West African Province. MNJTF recorded enormous results despite some challenges such as the withdrawal of some of Chadian and Nigerian troops to G5 Sahel.

The security challenges been encountered by the African states require collective measures. Terrorist groups, as the case of Boko Haram, do not regard the national boundaries of the sovereign states which make them immune from the pursuit, once offshore from the border of a particular state. It is suggested to African states that bilateral or multilateral forces be put in place for the purpose of policing their border areas.

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<sup>96</sup>.ibid

<sup>97</sup>.ibid

<sup>98</sup>. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171015-tchad-niger-redeploiement-troupes-wour-tibesti-boko-haram-lac-diff>

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## Ideology and the Quest for Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East

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### Abstract

*The Middle East is unstable and it has not been able to successfully evolve any effective political system. All experiments with parliamentary democracy, military dictatorship and single party state system seem to have failed. There is tendency towards centralization, state centralism and even despotism. The internal structure of almost all the Arab states is fragile, weak, lacking institutional framework and it is at best in transition. This study establishes that governments in the Middle East are largely unrepresentative and most irresponsive to public sentiments. Ruling cliques in league with vested interests exercise power without responsibility and accountability. As a result, people generally feel left out and neglected. The study argues that people are agitating to remove these basic difficulties in order to lay the foundations of a modern progressive Middle East, able to hold its own in the fiercely competitive world of today. Hence, the study adopts "Political Islam" as a theory to interrogate the discourse while relying on secondary sources to gather the needed information. In a critical sense, the study observes that the main streams of Islamic resurgence can be broadly classified under two heads: one, those which have primarily religious motivation; and two, those which are dominated by socio-political considerations. It concludes that its dynamism is becoming more prominent everyday and its radical character is being underlined with greatest vigor and clarity. In view of this, the study recommends that the West should not perceive contemporary Islamic resurgence as a threat. It should rather appreciate and respect other cultures for peaceful co-existence.*

**Keywords:** Consultation, Health workers, Patients, Prescription, Social media

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### Introduction

Throughout history, the Middle East has been a rich region of enormous cultural significance. It has spawned three of the world's great religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism and has provided many contributions to the emergence of civilization. In the twentieth century, the discovery of the largest petroleum deposits in the world made the Middle East vital to international economy. The region is also strategically important because of its oil assets, its location on the southern flank of Russia and at the crossroads of three continents as well as the client relationships between the United States and Israel on one hand and between the Russia and several Arab States on the other. What happens in the region does not only affect the local people and nations around but also the entire world. The Middle East is not a precisely defined area of the world. It is sometimes referred to as the "Near East" or "Southwest Asia", but not everyone agrees on what countries should be included within these geographic designations. If the Middle East is defined solely as the Arab States and Israel, Iran would be excluded. If it is thought to comprise Israel and the predominantly Muslim states, then all the North African countries – Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya – the Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey would have to be included (Middle East Congressional Quarterly, 1991). The fact that the North Africa are sometimes included to be part of the Arab does not invalidate their inclusion in the Middle East geography.

Retrospectively, the people of the Middle East and Africa experienced enormous economic, political and social changes after World War II. To cope with these upheavals, many people began to reassert traditional values and familiar forms of identity. In the Muslim world, these efforts to cope with change brought on an Islamic resurgence, or a renewed interest in Islam. Religious revival allowed people to reconnect with their traditional past and achieve a sense of continuity while also rejecting western cultural influences (Hanes III, 1997: 787). One of the signs of the new dominant position of governments in Arab societies was that they were able to appropriate to themselves the ideas which could move minds and imaginations, and extract from them a claim of legitimate authority. By this time, any Arab government which wished to survive had to be able to claim legitimacy in terms of three political languages – those of nationalism, social justice and Islam. The first to emerge as a potent language was that of nationalism. Some of the regimes which existed at the beginning of the 1980s had come to power during the struggle for independence, or could claim to be the successors of those who had; this kind of appeal to legitimacy was particularly strong in the Maghrib, where the struggle had been bitter and memories of it were still fresh (Hourani, 1991:451).

In recent years, there had taken place an extension of the idea of nationalism; regimes claimed to be legitimate in terms of economic development, or the full use of national resources, both human and natural for common ends. The second language, that of social justice, came into common political use in the 1950s and 1960s, the period of the Algerian revolution and the spread of Nasirism, with its idea of a specifically Arab socialism expressed in the National Charter of 1962. Such terms as socialism and social justice tended to be used with a specific meaning; they referred to reform of the system of land-tenure, extension of social services and universal education, for girls as well as boys, but in few countries was there a systematic attempt to redistribute wealth by means of high taxation of incomes (Hourani, 1991: 451 – 452). The latest of the languages to become powerful was that of Islam. There is an increasing interest in Islamic activism in both academic and media circles. Baker (1990:45), the author of *Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul*, notes that:

Casual studies, despite their veils of distance and objectivity, carry indirect but potent political messages. Their claims to objectivity are always suspect.

The basic theme that Baker (1991:47) invokes in his article is best captured in this statement:

We chose to avoid the complications of being drawn into different human political worlds. In the quest for causes, we avoided encounters and dialogues - with the radicals, and perhaps of more importance, even with the moderate mainstream of the Muslim current.

The ideas propounded by Baker (1991) are evident in Lewis's and Huntington's arguments. For example, Lewis (1990:60) writes:

In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent -shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to Central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.

By the 1980s, however, Islamic language had become more prominent in political discourse than it has been a decade or two earlier. This was due to a combination of two kinds of factor. On the one hand, there was the vast and rapid extension of the area of political involvement, because of the growth of population and of cities, and the extension of the mass media. The rural migrants into the cities brought their own political culture and language with them. There had been an urbanization of the migrants, but there was also a "ruralization" of the cities. Cut off from the ties of kinship and neighbourliness which made life possible in the villages, they were living in a society of which the external signs were

strange to them, the sense of alienation could be counter balanced by that of belonging to a universal community of Islam, in which certain moral values were implicit and this provided a language in terms of which they could express their grievances and aspirations. Those who wished to arouse them to action had to use the same language. Islam could provide an effective language of opposition: to western power and influence, and those who could be accused of being subservient to them; to governments regarded as corrupt and ineffective, the instruments of private interests, or devoid of morality; and to a society which seemed to have lost its unity with its moral principles and directions (Hourani, 1991: 41).

The *raison d'être* of the resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world is the inherent strength of religion in the minds of Muslims; they attach great significance and importance to Islamic ideology in both their private and public lives. The recent resurgence has emerged in different parts of the Muslim world in different circumstance. In some cases it has had to assert itself against a dictatorial regime, as in Iran, while in countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, it has the active support of the ruling authorities. Another case is the *jihad*, of the Afghan freedom fighters against the mighty military force of a super power (the then USSR). In the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, the Palestinian freedom-fighters are waging *intifadah* against an oppressive and brutal regime; their material weapons are only bricks and stones. Yet in all these movements, the real strength is provided by a dynamic ideology which has inspired Muslims all over the world in their struggle against all forms of injustice and suffering (Choudhury, 1993: 194). The current domestic and international conditions of many Middle Eastern countries have increasingly led to visible Islamic activism or, as it is often called, an Islamic revival.

Therefore, the focus of the study is to unveils mounting religious fervor or resurgence of Islam that has been sweeping the Middle East region. Muslims, particularly in the Middle East, are discovering their spiritual roots and reasserting the political power of the Islamic way of life and ensuring Islam's continued relevance to Muslims' life in all its dimensions. The resurgence of Islam has become the subject of great debate in the West, among orientalist, political leaders, the intelligentsia and students. The phenomenon is still unfolding and sometimes may even appear bewildering, but no serious student of contemporary world affairs can afford to ignore it. There are divergent interpretations of the Islamic revival as a political force in world affairs.

### Understanding the Middle East

Mention the Middle East and many people think instantly of oil. Yes, there is a lot of it, but only in certain places. Oil has made some of the inhabitants obscenely rich; others remain obscenely poor. Mention the Middle East and many people think of wars and terror. Yes, but there are millions too who spend their lives quietly, without ever firing a shot. Mention the Middle East and many people think of Arabs and Muslims. Yes, again, but once you scratch beneath, the surface there are Alawites, Arinenians, Assyrians, Baha'is, Berbers, Chaldeans, Copts, Druzes, Ibadis, Ismailis, Jews, Kurds, Maronites, Sahrawis, Tuareg, Turkman, Yazidiz, Zaidis and no doubt a few others. The Middle East is not so much a geographical entity as a geopolitical concept. It was invented, just over 100 years ago, by the British and the Americans. "The Middle East" entered the English language little more than a century ago (Whitetaker, 2009:206).

The very terms Middle East and Near East indicate the central location of the area in the geography of the Eastern Hemisphere. Both terms came into use in the days when "the sun never set on the British Empire". Great Britain was at one end of this planet and China (the "far East") was at the other and Near East was the term used prior to World War II, especially in the nineteenth century, when it referred to relations between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. During World War II, the term Middle East came into common usage and it is now used inter changeable with Near East, although the former is predominant unlike terminology elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world, where the Gold Coast has become Ghana and the far East has become East Asia in order to remove imperialist origin. The nations of the Middle East could not agree on another form because any available historic one would connote the former dominance of one Middle Eastern people over another (Borthwick, 1980). In fact, wide differences of option exist among scholars and statesmen over what territory is included within the Middle East. These differences exist because this is an area spanning three

continents that is defined by culture, not by geography. Cultural regions do not have distinct borders as do geographical areas, which are delimited by mountain ranges, oceans and rivers. Culture is a way of living that transcends geographical barriers whenever people feel the superiority of its way and put it into practice in their lives.

However, it was agreed that, it is an area of the world in which Islamic culture predominates, but they divided into two camps in regard to the extent of the area. The “minimalist” say that it is the triangle formed by Turkey, Iran and Egypt and all the countries inside it. This is the region of the world in which Islam was born and in which all the great Islamic empires and their capitals emanated. It excludes the fringe areas of the Muslim world in which Islam has only recently become established or which throughout history, have only been loosely attached to the centre of the Muslim world, if at all. The “maximalists” start with this area and add to it all the Muslims areas of the world are contiguous to it: North Africa, Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan Cyprus, the Sudan, and Somalia on the Horn of Africa. However, they exclude Indonesia, Malaysia and the Muslim regions of the West Africa, because of their distance from the centre of the Muslim world (Borthwick, 1980: 16). According to Borthwick (1980:17):

The Middle East comprises the Arab states, including Israel, Turkey and Iran. This region includes all countries populated by the Arabs, the first believers in Islam, plus the homelands of the Turks and the Persians, two nations that have given Islam some of its greatest power and glory. The Jewish States of Israel would appear to be let out of a definition of the Middle East that is based on the culture of Islam. However, when Islam is thought of as a civilization more than as a region such is not the case. Christian and Jewish minorities have lives in Muslim countries since the time of Muhammad, and while they have not believed in the faith he proclaimed, they have adopted the culture that emanated from it and have made major contributions to it in literature, philosophy, and science.

The Middle East is at the centre of the Eastern Hemisphere and touches each of the continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. On its periphery are powerful nations that have throughout history conquered portions of it. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the crusaders came from Western Europe; from the eleventh through the fourteenth centuries, the Turks immigrated from central Asia; and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Russians moved down from North-eastern Europe while the French and British came across the Mediterranean from Western Europe. Indeed, while the Middle East has suffered from destruction wrought by its conquering neighbours, it has also benefitted from the infusion of fresh ideas, dynamic leadership and new institutions. For example, the Mongols destroyed the irrigation system of the Tigris-Euphrates valley and sacked Baghdad, but they brought a strong administration, mighty armies and a Chinese influence on Islamic art and architecture. The British and the French extracted huge profits from the Middle East through the exchange of its raw materials for their industrial products, the granting of loans to the local government and the establishment and operation of businesses, but they also brought to the region technical knowledge, modern systems of administration and law, new principles of government and different social and literary ideas (Borthwick, 1980:22).

The Middle East has already gone through enormous change. In the twentieth century, three pivotal event redefined the region: one, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which dominated the Middle East for five centuries, redrew the map and gave birth to modern states after World War I; two, the creation of Israel in 1948 changed the region’s political dynamics and spawned the world’s longest conflict; and three, the 1979 Iranian revolution which introduced Islam as an alternative political idiom. All three had spillover worldwide (Wright, 2008: 15).

### **Role of Ideology in the Middle East**

Clearly, the sources of ideological agitation in the Middle East on the one hand is the social dislocation and the crisis of identity, a new pattern of social differentiation and stratification; on the other, it is the need to establish a new cohesive social and political order with an identity of its own, capable of

reaching the material and intellectual standards of contemporary civilization and of solving the conflicts in the social body. Modern ideology began to develop in the Middle East as a search first for a collective and then for modernist goals. The search was conditioned by the society's own historical sense of identity and by the political goals of the modern states in which the new social arrangement took place. Each ethnic group glorified its own national characteristics. Turks, Arabs and Iranians reinterpreted history to prove that they preserved their national identity and creative genius, which were not destroyed by alien influences, but only prevented from keeping abreast of modern civilization. Turks and Iranians did not hesitate to blame religion for the backwardness of their society. Arabs, being intimately identified with Islam, accused the Iranians and Turks of imprinting on Islam, their authoritarian concepts of government and rigid class differentiation in reality, less than a century ago, Turks and Arabs share a common Islamic affiliation under the Ottoman Empire (Karpant, 1982:47).

Nonetheless, ideology is very significant in the interpretation of the world history. It creates a sense of pride in the past and confidence in the future, and to identify an ethnic group with a geographic region. It also operated in the field of social reconstruction, attempting to redefine the relations among social groups, to establish new division of labour and to assign responsibilities, with the ultimate purpose of achieving social cohesion and national solidarity. Moreover, ideology sought to relieve social tension by introducing the idea of social justice. The Middle East also performed an intellectual function within the general framework of modernization. It introduced new ideas by adapting them to indigenous forms of expression and values, and eventually claimed to have created a new-albeit eclectic-national ideology. The claim to possess a national ideology strengthened newly acquired political identities and facilitated further borrowing of ideas and values from other cultures without risking internal opposition. Ideology broke the limitations imposed by the old culture on the freedom and scope of thought. It added new dimensions to thought by introducing to it economic, social and political elements, (Malcolm:51).

Thus, it helped achieved a sort of intellectual liberation, a renaissance (as it is often referred to in the Middle East), and a recognition of man's empiricism, on which the humanist edifices of modern culture and science could more easily be built. The idea that change, progress, better living, in a word, modernity was induced scientifically by man was popularized through ideology. All currents of thought in the Middle East had a common background and, as different aspects of the same, continuous process of change, they remained related to each other. The successful execution of the course of action advocated by the ideology required some sort of directing authority. This authority turned out to be the government. Consequently, state intervention in economic, social and cultural activities was advocated in one form or another by all major ideologies and became a common characteristics of Middle Eastern political thought. In this respect, all Middle Eastern ideologies may be considered statist. The state thus becomes the "source of inspiration and of authority for action (and built up its image) as a source of power, knowledge, wisdom, (and) resourcefulness" (Albert, 1963:123). When the state espoused radical methods, it was able to justify them as necessary for the creation of the new life.

Noticeably, nationalism and socialism in the Middle East are ideologies of transition. Their basic functions are to establish a modern political organization and rejuvenate society, thus completing the transition to a new phase of life (Hourani, 1963:123). The ideologies of transition in the Middle East enabled society to acquire a modern identity and to adopt itself to new forms of modern organization. These ideologies are bound to disappear or to change in form and content once the main phase of the transition is completed. Subsequently, after the emergence of differentiated social, political and economic systems, one may expect Middle Eastern ideologies to reflect more accurately the views of various social groups, rather than those of the government elites. Further structural differentiation in the Arab world coupled with freedom of thought may stabilize the ideologies.

Indeed, nationalism and socialism were also essentially part of the drive for decolonization and the search for identity. The first objective was to rid the native culture of the accretion of foreign elements imposed from the top or "voluntarily" adopted under the pressure of outside forces alien to the native society and its culture. Once this initial goals was accomplished, the thrust was towards changes as indicated by the conflicting meanings given the term "reforms", "civilization", and "progress" until about the 1905's and thereafter. In the first phase, "reform" meant chiefly borrowing institutions, ideas



and manners from the civilization of the West. In the second phase, “reform” was changed to “revolution”, and revolution included also the rejection of the social arrangement that made possible the penetration of ideas and attitudes from the West (Thompson, 1966:141).

The basic purpose of nationalism was to remove the obstacles, that is, the foreign political domination and the social and cultural accretions that had produced alienation that stood as barriers to the authentic personality and identify of the native masses and their own cultural understock (Zattzer, 1975:17). The intellectual elites acquired a key role in deciding what to retain or acquire in order to achieve the goals of nationalism. It is essential to point out that this process, which was called also a revitalization or revivalist movement, borrowed its theoretical arguments from the very West it was rejecting. Thus, the new concepts that sprang out of nationalism and moved it toward Marxism in the late 1960 and 1970s were anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, populism and violence. The anti-colonist and anti-imperialist literature has already being instrumental in the 1940s and 1950s in mobilizing the masses to push the Britain and French from the area. The former colonialist and imperialist regimes established directly by the West or by natives following Western models were accused now not only on having dominated the area politically and exploited its economic resources but also of having undermined and destroyed the native social order and caused degeneration of its culture.

This interpretation, different from that of the early nationalist who attributed the Western domination chiefly to cultural or historical motive laid the emphasis on economic and social factors. Whereas the early thinker saw imperialism and colonialism as the continuation of the crusades and the animosity between Islam and Christianity and the consequence of the irreconcilable ways of East and West need of raw materials and markets in the East. It is in this context that Marxism began to find wide acceptance throughout the Middle East, not in the form of classical Marxist parties but as a new approach and method for understanding and evaluating the society’s transformation. Indeed, most of the reformist, nationalist, and even socialist movements in the Middle East had paid scant attention to the question of the material bases of their society or analyzed its social and economic structure using inductive methods and empirical avoidance gathered on the spot.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study adopts "Political Islam" to interrogate this discourse. This is because, there existed polemical views of Islam in Western societies, defining it as a terrorizing and deviating belief system. This viewpoint has been enhanced by some of the movements that have come from within the Islamic world: the Iranian Revolution, the crisis of the American embassy hostages, the assassination of Anwar Al Sadat, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the Arab – Israel’s conflict, the Algerian and Afghani crises, and the recent situations in the Gulf and the Iraq, in particular. The Western media’s handling of these issues pointed to new hostilities after the collapse of the communist bloc. With every international act of terrorism that has been associated with Islam, the so-called “clash of civilizations” these has gained strength. In contrast to the heavy emphasis on Islam as a political actor, there is still little scholarly interest in the theological aspects of Islam. This lays bare the intellectual and ideological roots of the tendency in the Western imagination that insisted, and continues to insist, on reading Islam at a political level.

Two aspects of the political Islam theory is germane to this discourse. First, under the influence of the great ideologies of the twentieth century, the movements of political Islam have tried to define Islam, first and foremost, as a political system. Second, they consistently employed a discourse related to “getting back to the origins”. This was undoubtedly a new movement of thought. It favoured not the fourteen centuries of tradition, but the Islamic sources directly (the Qur’an and the *Sunnah*), and the way of life of the first group of believers. The political Islam views Islam from the framework of the city and contemporary politics. Islam was now more a political and ideological system rather than a system of heart – felt, spiritual, and divinely transcending values. The Islamists wanted their conception of political Islam to penetrate all fields, from the individual, to the social, to the scientific. It wanted Islam to resist colonialism in Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia. In Egypt and India, Islamists sought to fight poverty and economic crises apart from colonialism; in Turkey and Iran, it was expected to tackle the problem of modernization. It had to address all political and social discourses developed by all factions, from the pretentious intelligentsia, of the Middle East; to all the

tribal rural and local cultures in the Far East; to the Marxist, liberal, nationalist, and Universalist ideologies of the West (Ergene, 2009:36-37).

Therefore, this theory is germane to the discourse because the Islamists has tried to turn Islam into the manifesto of a reactionary ideology. They present Islam more an ideology than a religion. In fact, basic sources were reinterpreted in a way so as to stress human reason, to prove that Islam could develop modern concepts in the face of Western values.

### **The Quest for Islamic Resurgence**

A combination of social and economic ills and external reverse were responsible for Islam's social and political revival. Internally, developmentalist projects and ideologies had failed to deliver on their promises, at least not adequately and not for a large enough number of people. In particular, most Muslim countries had failed to absorb all the newly educated population into full employment in either government or in private sector. Meanwhile, the skewed pattern of modernization had created a deep cultural divide within Muslim societies without any precedent. On one side were the more or less Westernized elites and, on the other, the uneducated masses as well as the newly educated but culturally a drift classes. This cultural rift had far-reaching implications for societal relations and in the competition for power and privilege among different segments of society. Because in all societies there is a close connection between the dominant cultural-ideological paradigm and the equation of power and privilege, these cultural differences became inextricably linked to issues of power who wield it and who benefits from it (Hunter, 2009:17).

Burke and Lapidus (1988:26 - 27) include three types of change that cause Islamic activism: one, the "indigenous" movement in a region, a rebound reaction to colonialism; two, the "incorporation" of the region into the world's market economy; and three, the legitimacy crisis of local elites who are viewed as agents of European power and hegemony.

The gradual political decline of the Muslims in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provided the backdrop for one of the most important developments in the Muslim world for several hundred years. This was the growth of a revival movement, fuelled by the spirit of religious renewal and regeneration, which began in the middle of the eighteenth century and spread to virtually every part of the Muslim world. The movement had as many variations as there were different Muslim communities and traditions: in some areas it was spearheaded by the orthodox *ulama*, in others by the mainstream sufi brotherhood. Yet however it manifested itself, the movement had but one central message: the cause of the decline of the Muslim world is the decline of Islam itself. The true practice of Islam, it was argued, had been sullied by centuries of foreign, un-Islamic accretions and innovations, while the continued closure of the "gate of *ijtihad*" had led to the ossification of jurisprudence, thus robbing Islamic law of its dynamism. As a result, Muslims had fallen away from the true path. To halt this decline, it was asserted, Muslims must therefore return to the first principles – the Qur'an and the Sunnah – for guidance, and in so doing revive the pure faith of the Prophet and his companions (Turner, 2006: 167-168).

At the end of World War II, Western educated elites fought and successfully seized the control of the newly emerging independent Muslim nation states. Irredeemably weakened by several years of total warfare, the European powers were not able to resist the growing political struggle for independence across the world. But, ironically, those who led the various resistance to colonial domination were educated in the schools and universities of the very rulers from whom they sought emancipation. Thus, the new governments embraced the ideals of secularism, socialism and nationalism that they learnt from their former rulers. Legal codes were put into place that owed more to the various European systems than to the Muslim *shari'ah*. In addition, the secular ideal that separates religion and politics, placing the former firmly in the private individual domain rather than public institutional life, conflicted with the Muslim world view, which regarded all aspects of life as part of God's domain. Secularism and the ideal of the nation state were for some in opposition to the classic Muslim ideal of an overriding Islamic identity of a united community of believers (Geaves, 2005: 87).

Throughout, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in most Muslim nations, the *Shari'ah* was modernized by the replacement of traditional Islamic legal codes with those from the legal systems of the former European colonial powers. In some places, even Muslim family law, the heart of the *Shari'ah* consisting of the laws of inheritance, divorce and marriage expressly addressed by the Qur'an and the major force for governing the social lives of Muslims everywhere in the Islamic world, began to be tampered with by the new Muslim rulers even though usually left intact by the former colonial rulers. An Islamic rationale was provided by Muslim governments wishing to reform their legal codes, who proclaimed the right to practice *ijtihad* in order to revitalize the Muslim world in line with modern western nation states. The *ulama* either cooperated with the governments by working as state-sponsored imams in government-built mosques and *madradas* or alternatively felt powerless to halt the process even while they viewed it as profoundly contrary to the revelation of God enshrined in the Qur'an and Muslim tradition. The New Muslim nation states have inherited all of the above problems of governance since their independence and have not been able to challenge the dominance of western political, economic or military power. So far, they have not been able to create a society which claims the allegiance of all their people, nor have they established themselves as the primary locus of Muslim identity.

Besides the conflicts between the Western-influenced ruling classes and the traditional *ulama*, there exists a third major division. The massive injection of European ideas gave impetus to the Islamic revivalist groups whose central tenets had always included the idea of removing foreign cultural accretions to revive Islam by restoring its pristine purity. Although similar movements had existed in the past, they tended to criticize sufi adherents of Islam as the innovators who introduced alien religions practices into the religion, but, in the twentieth century, revivalist movements appeared with an agenda to remove Western influences from Muslim nations. The leaders of these tightly knit, well-organized movements did not belong to the *ulama* and, unlike the earlier revivalists and reformers, they were not formed around the teachings of *madrassa* – trained members of the *ulama*. Prominent examples of such movements are *Jama'at-Islami* founded by Mawlana Abu A'la Mawdudi in the Pakistan subcontinent and the *Jama'at al-Ikhwana al-Muslimun* founded in Egypt by Imam Hassan al-Banna.

The common demand of the revivalists was addressed towards Muslim nation to implement the *Shari'ah* in its entirety and revolutionise their governments and society to become Islamic states freed from western influence (Geaves, 2005: 88-89). According to Dessouki and Cudsi (1981:113):

The main hypothesis (Islam and Power) is that the revival of Islamic groups and associations is invited by a particular social environment. It is a product of a crisis situation characterized by economic difficulties, moral and ideological confusion and political instability.

In agreement with this fact, Vatikiotis (1981:193) suggests that:

The current Islamic resurgence, with its reassertion of an essentially religious political identity in the sense of a declared adherence to the ethnic and values of Islam, is the result of the disorientation caused by rapid economic development and the disaffection with social change brought about by the transplantation of certain aspects and appurtenances of modernity.

Similarly, Dekmejian (1985: 29), in his work, *Islam in Revolution*, explains that because of “five catalysts: identity, legitimacy, elite misrule, class conflict and military importance”, Islamic activism is on the rise. Dekmejian (1985:25) also writes that:

The ideologies of these movements are both comprehensive and rigid, reflecting the responses of typically charismatic leaders to situations of crisis. It is no mere accident that fundamentalist movements in various political contexts have acquired spiritual and socio-political potency when two interrelated conditions are met: the appearance of a leader of charismatic propensity and a society in deep turmoil.

As argued by Hiro (1989:274), there is an increase in Islamic activism as a result of migration from rural to urban settings. To him:

(the) reservoir of alienated masses packed into the poor quarters of urban centers provides a ready audience and recruiting ground for radical and revolutionary groups, secular and religious. Muslim fundamentalists try to rally the alienated and underprivileged on the basis of Islam.

Whereas, in the work of Tibi (1990:127), he identifies the North-South conflict, rapid change, and a “legitimacy crisis with secular oriented political system”, as the causes for Islamic activism.

However, consonant with Esposito’s (1992) work, Haddad *et al* (1991:54) describes the Islamic activism:

The strength of contemporary revivalism remains with a growing moderate majority of Islamic activists have become part of mainstream Muslim life. Their vision of Islam is holistic. They believe that a faithful, righteous Islamic community is one that observes God’s mandate to worship Him and to create a *socially just society*. This long-term process, which is weaving its way into political and social institutions, will have significance both for the development of Muslim societies and for their relationship with the West.

All these are indications that, an understanding of what the basic of social injustice entail under Islamic law might throw light on the inception of grievances in Muslim societies and could eventually help to explain Islamic activism. Thus, the other side of the coin is injustice or as Dabashi (1993:505) put it, *Zumt*, which according to Islamic activists is the cause of the current social/political phenomenon that is supposedly gaining momentum and popularity in Muslim societies.

It is realized that in all aspects including political, economic, social, moral and psychological they have decisively failed. What does it imply? Obviously, the failure of the Western model. In the first half of the twentieth century the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the *Jama’at-Islami* (Islamic society) in South Asia became prototypes of present day Islamic movements (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009: 175). Undeniably, a deeper malaise within Islamic societies also drove the revival. According to Hashemi (1996:74):

The Islamic revival (was) a complex mix of elements both unique to the Muslim world and shared with other post-colonial societies. The Islamic challenge is trivialized if explained as merely resentment of the power and wealth of the west. It derives its vitality and its appeal from a much more elemental factor: the wide spread conviction that Islamic history has gone horribly astray, and that Muslim realities for centuries have been widely divergent from Islamic ethics. The fact today that Muslim countries are characterized by some of the most notoriously authoritarian regimes provides a powerful internal dynamic to the use of Islam as a revolutionary force. The fact that Muslim countries range in economic prosperity from the fabulously wealthy to the hopelessly impoverished provides a second powerful internal dynamic to the upsurge of religiously based calls for social justice. Muslim countries themselves contain ample domestic sources for the infusion of Islamic ideologies in the political arena.

The return of Islam was particularly strong among young people, even those with a Western education. For many, the values of modern Western society seemed too secular, materialistic, and even self-centered. Islam provided a secure sense of belonging to a community. For many in the Western world, on the other hand, the resurgence of Islam often seemed a frightening or threatening movement. Perhaps nowhere did it seem to display both its power and its potential destructiveness to westerners more than in the Iranian revolution (Hanes III, 1993: 787-788).

The resurgence of Islam takes several forms. One is a call for return to *Shari'ah* rather than secular law derived from European codes. The feeling of the orthodox is that the world must conform to the divine law, rather than diluting the law to accommodate it to the material world. For example, Egypt has made it illegal for its Muslim citizens to drink alcoholic beverages in public. In Saudi Arabia, morality squads actively enforce the obligatory prayers, and women are not allowed to leave home unless they are accompanied by a close male relative. In Iran, an attempt has been made to shape every aspect of life according to *Shari'ah*. Fasting during Ramadan is strictly enforced in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and restaurants in many Muslim countries lose during the fasting hours (Fisher, 1999: 385). At least, four functional modalities have characterized the emergence of contemporary Islamic resurgence: one, a spiritual medium of escape from alienation; two, an ideology of protest against socio-political injustice; three, an ideology of revolutionary mobilization and; four, the ideological foundation of a political community – an Islamic order. In these functional areas, the Islamist alternative appears to possess varying degrees of viability.

Hence, Islamic movements represent an alternative framework and model. Muslim masses, particularly the Muslim youth, seem to be enthusiastically turning towards the Islamic movements and actively working for Islamic resurgence. Ahmad (1983:61) observes:

Muslim youths have been inspired by a new vision to rebuild their individual and social life in accordance with the ideals and principles given by Islam and to strike to establish a new social order, not only within their own countries but to see that a new world order is established ensuring peace, dignity and justice to the oppressed of the world.

But many Western scholars still perceive such aspirations and activities of the Islamic revivalists and of the Muslim youth as a threat. They failed to understand that the driving spirit for modernization and development for Muslims is no more the + “West” but Islam. Lewis’s (1990:34) leading article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” which has reinforced the stereotypes of Islamic revivalism in terms of rage and violence against the West illustrates this fact. Commenting on this article, Esposito (1992:59) observes:

The shift in Muslim attitudes towards the West from admiration and emulation to hostility and rejection is reduced by Bernard Lewis to a clash of separate and distinct (almost mutually exclusive) civilizations: Fundamentalists leaders are not mistaken in seeing in Western civilization the greatest challenge to the way of life that they wish to retain or restore for their people. Fundamentalists wage war against modernity: secularism, Western capitalism and democracy.

Lewis (1979:41) feels too uncomfortable with Muslims rejection of secularisation. He comments that Muslims have no choice between Caesar and God because in Islam “there was no Caesar, there was only God. Although Lewis understands quite well that the Islamic revival has rejected the Western model of modernization because of its secular world view, yet he interprets it in a different way. Indeed, with persistence quest for Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, the majority of the Muslim societies are proscribed, and several are permitted to operate with tacit official sanction, often granted with reluctance. While most of the militant organizations have been suppressed, there is little reason to doubt their continued underground existence and threat potential. Despite their proscribed status, new Islamist groups, both passive and militant, continue to mushroom throughout the Middle East countries in response to local crisis conditions. As a rule, these groups are founded by charismatic who gather around them a small number of disciples to propagate their peculiar version of Islam.

### **Islamic Resurgence: Issues and Perspectives**

The rational and scientific foundations of Western modernity have challenged all religious faiths since the eighteenth century. However, even at the start of the twenty-first century, religion retains a grip of the mind of humanity. The Islamic revival from the 1970s was one of the great phenomena of the century (Murden, 2001: 456). The concepts of renewal (*tajdid*) and reform (*islah*) are fundamental

components of Islam's world view, rooted in the Qur'an and sunnah of the prophet. Both concepts involve a call for a return to the fundamentals of Islam (the Qur'an and Sunnah). *Islah* is a *Qur'anic* term used to describe the reform preached and undertaken by the prophets when they warned their sinful communities and called on them to return to God's path by realigning their lives as individuals and as community, within the norms of the *Shari'ah*. This *Qur'anic* mandate, epitomized in the lives and preaching of the prophets, especially that of Muhammad, coupled with God's command to enjoin good and prohibit evil (Qur'an 3:10, 110), provides the time-honoured rationale for Islamic reformism, however, diverse its manifestations in history (Esposito, 1992: 115).

However, one aspect of this powerful reawakening among Muslims seems to be clear: its main urge is the rejection of what is regarded as alien to Islamic values and a vigorous search for renewal strength from Islamic ideals and principles. There is a new realization in world of Islam that the era of the last two centuries, during which the Muslim world had been oppressed, colonized, remained backward and lost its initiatives, has, at last, come to an end and a new era of unity and inward strength based on the broad teachings of Islam had dawned on the Islamic community (Lewis, 1979:32). Clearly, after experiencing the devastating impacts of colonialism, Muslims did not wish to gain only their political independence. They also wished to assert their own religious and cultural identity. Though, from the 18<sup>th</sup> century onward Muslim reformers appeared upon the scene who sought to reassert the teachings of Islam and to reform society on the basis of Islamic teachings. As Western influence began to penetrate more deeply into the fibre of Islamic society, organizations gradually grew up whose goal was to reform society in practice along Islamic lines and prevent its secularization. As Esposito (1992:41) puts it:

“... revival and reform have been dominant themes in Islam since the eighteenth century, as Muslims responded to internal and external forces that challenged their faith and social orders. Islam was used effectively in the formation of Islamic socio-political reform organizations and Islamic modernist movements ... which demonstrated the power of an appeal to Islam in providing a rationale for community decline and initiating religious-political movements bent on social and moral reform.”

Simply, Islamic revivalism builds on a considerable legacy of activism and reform. A common theme was the need to purify Islam through the suppression of foreign (un-Islamic) practices and to return to the fundamentals of Islam – the Qur'an and the model of Muhammad as well as the early Muslim community.

The current Islamic resurgence, whether in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, has no doubt, local, regional and ethnic differences, but beneath these local diversities, it is all inspired and influenced by the broad teachings and message of Islam which is trans-sectarian and trans-national. The resurgence is based on the fundamentals of Islam and not on the Western concept of 'fundamentalism'. It is based on Islam as 'an all-embracing system of life – a faith as well as an ideology and programme of life (Saikal, 1987:51). Despite two centuries of Western colonial rule, suppression and oppression of the Muslim world, Islam is still a vibrant and dynamic faith. It gives Muslims all over the world a sense of spiritual reinforcement and a new source of a reawakening and reassertion. The resurgence of Islam in the 1970s and 1980s in Muslim countries has become a major factor in global politics. It is watched and reviewed by both Western and the old communist countries, by both super powers, the USA and the demised USSR – the former for its security and economic interests in the strategically important areas of the Middle East. The Persian Gulf, South-West, South and South-East Asia, while the Kremlin leaders are concerned over its potential in the Central Asian Republics, since more than 50 million Muslims who lives there are likely to be affected by this re-awakening of Islam (Choudhury, 1993: 192). Humphreys (1982: 67) writes:

The events of recent years have demonstrated anew how readily the religion of Islam can be transformed into political ideology of enormous scope and force, such a situation is hardly unexplained, of course; it has occurred countless times in the course of Islam's 14 centuries. Still, it is hard to think

that a movement of this kind has ever been simultaneously so intense and widespread as is the case today. Moreover, even experienced students of the Muslim world have been surprised by the appeal of Islamic ideology to the technocratic elite – that is, to precisely those professionals, scientist, bureaucrats, and military officers whom it had been supposed were committed to one or another secular vision of society and for whom religion seemed at most a matter of personal belief and morality.

There have been various interpretations and explanations of the current resurgence in Islam. What has led Muslims to turn to Islam in reconstructing their political, social, economic and international order? Since the 1970s, many scholars, writers and political leaders, both Muslims and non-Muslims, have offered various explanations for the unique resurgence in the world of Islam. No one factor or interpretation can adequately explain this recent trend in the Islamic *ummah* (Choudhury, 1993: 192).

Apparently, the 1970s and 1980s were a time of religions revitalization in most of the Muslim world. The movement was in part prompted by the Muslim public's disappointment over the inability of secular nationalist parties to make good on their promises of economic prosperity and political progress (Juergensmeyer, 1993). But the resurgence also reflected a basic change in Muslim culture and social organization. Muslim society in the 1950s and 1960s was deeply affected by the expansion of mass education, which made the bulk of the population literate for the first time in the world history (Eickelman&Piscatori, 1996). With literacy, one saw a spectacular increase in the market for inexpensive and accessible religions publications for ordinary Muslims. Ordinary people began to show an interest in defining their religions in their own terms. These developments prepared the ground for a far-reaching change in Muslim knowledge and authority in the 1970s. Education brought into existence a new generation of Muslim activists and intellectuals who challenged the monopoly of religious authority long enjoyed by the classically trained specialists of Islamic knowledge, the *ulama*. Whereas *ulama* are graduates of classical Muslim schools, most of the new intellectuals typically came from secular universities.

While the *ulama* are masters of esoteric commentaries on religion and law, the new Muslim intellectuals tend to be eclectic in their interests and training. They apply their knowledge of Islam not just to the classical concerns of Muslim jurisprudence but to issues affecting the lives of ordinary Muslims: changing sex roles, the anomie of urban life, economic hardship, corruption and political injustice. The broader scope of the current religions revival, again, its importance, should be recognized but not exaggerated. History reveals that “religions resurgence is a cyclical phenomenon (Smith, 1951: 36). Thus, Haynes (1994:155) argues “There is no reason to doubt that the current wave of religion-oriented political ideas and movements will in time give way ... to (a) partial resurrection of secular ideologies. Whereas Burgat (quoted in Hunter, 1998:73) looks at the Islamic resurgence as “the third phase of the process of decolonization. He contends that the first phase of Islamic resurgence was political, the second was economic and the third was cultural”. However, the cultural revivalism of the time was substantially related to the pressures created in societies by increasing levels of globalization and multiculturalism. A revival of religions was one of the most important manifestations of cultural and social insecurity: religion looked like a fixed cultural totem, even if it was not. To varying degrees, most societies and cultures adapted to the momentous changes brought by globalization but the stresses did produced real resistance. Religious fundamentalism was the most significant form of resistance, and became the principal opposition to multiculturalism, to existing governments, and to the forces of globalization.

Cultural revivals represented “glocal moments” of reaction and resistance to the new globalized hegemony, although they seemed unlikely to halt the march of global capitalism and culture in the long run. Localized cultural rearward actions would continue to be fought into the twenty-first century, but the imaginings of cultural authenticity were not only those of the parochial backwater, but were an impossible dream in the age of globalization (Murden, 2001: 468). In fact, the contemporary Islamic resurgence has challenged the relationship between secularization and modernization. Voll (1994: 3) argues that:

The Islamic resurgence is part of a global experience of religious revival which surprised many analysts in the 1980s. In the past, an established part of the theories of modernization was that modern development involves “the secularization of the polity” as a “prerequisite for significant social change”. The contemporary experience in Muslim societies shows clearly that the old assumption of a direct correlation between modernization and secularization must at least be re-examined, if not rejected.

Hence, he further argues that the assumption that religion is totally removed from the socio-political life in a modernized society is an invalid assumption. Instead, an assumption that religion is less important in a modern society is a valid assumption. He contends that “Islamic resurgence is a product of both developments within global modern society and within the global Islamic experience” (Voll, 1994: 289).

In contrast to these scholars, there are some other Western scholars like Huntington (1996: 96) who hold the opinion that Islamic resurgence is a threat to the Western civilization and this will lead to clash of civilizations. To him “the religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence ...” He elaborates the views of William McNeill who contends that the revival of non-western religions is not a rejection of modernity but a rejection of the west and westoxification. It is a bold declaration of cultural independence from the west and open manifestation of confidence in their own non-Western religions and cultures. Huntington (1996:4) points out that both Asians and Muslim stress the superiority of their cultures to western culture. ‘Islam is the solution’ is epitomized in Islamic resurgence. He asserts that ‘this Islamic resurgence in its extent and profundity is the last phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the “solution not in Western ideologies but in Islam” (Huntington, 1996: 109).

Further, Weiner (2007: 60) has observed that in the past, little attention was paid to the socio-cultural and psychological determinants of political behaviour and more emphasis was given on the political outcomes of the economic changes. Consequently, the importance and significance of Islamic resurgence have been under-estimated which have rejected secularism and modernization. He also points out that Islam is the only religion which has rejected “much of what is generally regarded as modern in the twentieth century; secularism, democracy and even nationalism. He further contends that the way Islamic resurgence has rejected many of the concepts related to modernization is striking because other religions have already accepted most of them. He writes:

In this request Islam has come to play quite a different role from that of the religions of modernization – Christianity, Judaism, Confucianism, Shintoism even Buddhism and Hinduism. Each of these religions, in its own way, has been interpreted or reinterpreted so as to induce people to behave in ways conducive to modernization (Weiner, 2007: 61).

Related to this, Esposito (1992: 203) have also pointed out that although Islamic resurgence was growing since early seventies, not much attention was paid to it. His observations on this phenomenon are illuminating:

Why is it that with remarkable consistency the resurgence of Islam in many countries and its political implications has often been acknowledged only at the eleventh hour? While revivalism was growing in Egypt, Libya, Pakistan and Malaysia in the early seventies, few notices or gave it any attention (Esposito, 1992: 203).

But, according to Esposito (1992: 3), such views on Islamic resurgence are based on “mutual distrust and condemnation”. There is a greater demand of political liberalization and democratization on one side throughout the world and on the other side, there is continued vitality of Islam and Islamic movements. Moreover, he asserts that ‘risk exists’, because there cannot be risk-free democracy. Those also fear about the future power of Islamic movements, they have a “legitimate concern”.



He further points out that during the 70s any discussion on the role of Islam, in socio-political development attracted hardly six to nine people. Whereas, today the same number of participants are found on the panel alone at many professional meetings (Esposito, 1992: 204). For Esposito (1992), unlike Weiner (2007), Islamic revival has not rejected modernization but westernization. He delineated six important points which he described as an ideological framework of Islamic revivalism. One of the fifth points is related to modernization

Although the Westernization society is condemned, modernization as such is not. Science and technology are accepted, but they are to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values in order to guard against the westernization and secularization of Muslim society (Esposito, 1988).

It implies that according to Esposito, Islamic revivalism makes a clear distinction between westernization, secularization and modernization. For Esposito (1992: 217), Islamic resurgence is not essentially anti-Western and anti-democratic. He observes:

For many Muslims, Islamic revivalism is a social rather than a political movement, whose goal is a more Islamically minded and oriented society, but not necessarily the creation of an Islamic state. For others, the establishment of an Islamic order requires the creation of an Islamic state. In either case, Islam and most Islamic movements are not necessarily anti-western, anti-American or anti-democratic.

This reminds us a statement of Ahmad (1983: 224), an ideologue of Islamic movement, who pointed out the following:

The movement clearly differentiates between development and modernization on the one hand and westernization and secularization on the other. It says “yes” to modernization but “no” to blind westernization. The Islamic movement seeks to provide a new leadership to the society, a leadership which, although called from the modern and the traditional hinterland of the society is not identified with any one of these two extreme groups but nonetheless preserves the best in both.

Gellner (1992: 72), like others, attributes current Islamic activism to deprivation, humiliation, disruption, and discrimination. As a result, Islamic activism is viewed as a temporary malaise of sorts, or a more reaction to the deprivation and humiliation that are imposed on Muslim societies.

Fundamentally, the common and prime aim of the Islamic resurgence is the application of *Shari'ah* to Muslims' everyday socio-political-economic life, in fact, in all spheres of life (MacIntyre, 1998: 13). But the *Shari'ah* must be given new and dynamic interpretations. The four schools of Islamic law which evolved about eight centuries ago must be thoroughly overhauled in the context of changing times and circumstance. The Qur'an gives Muslims enough scope and opportunities to interpret its basic principles. The narrow and rigid orthodox “*ulama*” interpretation of eight centuries ago must be replaced by a proper one. Islam does not allow any compartmentalization of the different spheres of human life. Throughout the Islamic *ummah*, the decade of the 1970s was a period of dynamic development. Clearly, as a Western observer pointed out:

Islam was not a dying force and its vitality was shown in a variety of ways that ranged from major revolutions to the reorientation of the dominant ideologies (Voll, 1982: 347).

The same ideology has acted as a beacon for the Islamic *ummah* for the last fourteen centuries, in their aspirations to establish a just, fair, equitable and free society. Islam is regarded by Muslims as the will of Allah revealed in the Qur'an and practices by the prophet of Islam. The vast majority of Muslims believe, and believe genuinely, that Islamic principles must be the guiding factor, the foundation of their political, social and economic order. In order to achieve this supreme objective, Muslims must abide by the Islamic law, the *Shari'ah*. The *Shari'ah* is not something static and fixed once and for all.

*Shari'ahis* a dynamic process in which the historical stages in the past are available for study and guidance but of which the proper present and future developments are matters of creative extrapolation (Smith, 1951: 25).

The Islamic revival carries within it the tremendous resources of a reburgeoning culture that looks forward to healthy growth, blossoming and fruition, and a splendid future for mankind. It represents the cosmic forces of the renewal of humanity. On the other hand, the Western civilization carries within itself the chronic diseases at self-destructiveness. Its mania for power and aggressiveness and its phobia of the equality and dignity of nations, its zest for slavery and for cultivating slaves and its unlimited passion for militarism, its unscrupulous interests and its interventionist instincts, its talent for deceit and its genius for self-deception, and above all, its moral bankruptcy and its spiritual blindness – all focus on the marvel of a suicidal civilization surviving from year to year and from decade to decade (Al-Tawhid, 1409: 8). Obviously, some of the Islamic movements have proved to be the most effective opposition to authoritarian regimes “through reaffirmation of the Islamic identity”. Though, the demands for democratization in the Muslim world reinforce and given “added strength” to the Islamic resurgence.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The Islamic resurgence occurred because Islam has avoided the stigma of failure that has accompanied the secular philosophers. In the twentieth century, capitalism, socialism, marxism, and secular nationalism have all been tried, and each has ended in failure. Only Islam offers hope for a renewal of Middle Eastern society without the taint of defeat, corruption, or association with colonialism. In whatever form it takes, Islam is today, as it has always been, the central factor in the lives of millions of people. Within this context, the West must be enlightened that, Islamic resurgence is not anti-Western, anti-American and not anti-democratic but definitely anti-Westernization, anti-Americanization and is anti-Western form of global democratization. Obviously, Islamic resurgence is against Western imperialism whether it is militaristic or political, or economic or cultural or all of these.

The contemporary Islamic resurgence carried within it popular disillusionment with progress and disenchantment with what governments have achieved after several decades of independence from colonial rule. The governments in the Middle East are largely unrepresentative and most irresponsible to public sentiment. Ruling cliques in league with vested interests, exercise power without responsibility and accountability. As a result, people generally feel left out and neglected. Hence, people are agitating to remove these basic difficulties in order to lay the foundations of a modern progressive Middle East, able to hold its own in the fiercely competitive world of today. But, most fundamentally, is the evidence of an attempt to assert the continuing validity and vitality of Islam in the context of the modern world.

Basically, Islam is a universal religion not only because it can speak to the conditions of human beings in every age, but also because it is universal in its capacity to explain all the phenomena of nature and of human society. It is a unique and coherent divine message communicated by God to humanity through the Prophet Muhammad in the Qur'an. Clearly, the revival of Islam has potentially enormous significance for the global position of Muslims. Over one billion Muslims worldwide constitute majorities in over forty states while the Muslim diaspora in the West numbers in the millions.

In sum, therefore, the first steps in the revival of Islam as a factor in contemporary world affairs is unity among the countries of the world of Islam. The unifying bond cannot be any 'ism' borrowed from Washington or Moscow or Beijing. For Muslims, it is Islamic ideology which can enable them to establish a model of international order, and history shows that such an order was established in the early days of Islam. In other words, Islamic ideology must be given a dynamic interpretation. There is no difficulty in achieving this objective because Islam is a dynamic force capable of proper interpretation and adjustments without sacrificing the fundamental principles of Islam. The fundamentals are broad and universal, Islam is not meant for any particular age or a particular country or group of countries. If the modern generation doubts the efficacy of Islam, that is due to lack of

appreciation of the universal applicability of *Qur'anic* teaching and a lack of knowledge of Islamic history. The remedy lies in the acquainting oneself with the principles of Islam and with Islamic history and not in discarding them.

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# Behavioural change message exposure and acceptance among select staff and students of Ekehuan campus of University of Benin, Nigeria

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## Abstract

*The study investigated social behavioural change message exposure and factors militating against behavioural change message acceptance among select staff and students of Ekehuan campus of University of Benin in Nigeria. The objective of the study was to determine the extent of exposure to behavioural change message and reasons behind non acceptance of behavioural change message among the target group. Premised on the behavioural change theory, the paper adopted the survey research and obtain primary data by means of 5 points Likert scale questionnaire. 250 respondents which cut across staff and students were surveyed for the study. Findings showed that respondents are highly exposed to behavioural change message campaign in the media and that behavioural change communication is not enough to cause change of attitude and behaviour of target audience. There are other factors which can mar or make the impact of behavioural change communication effort. The paper therefore concluded that behavioural change communication is grossly insufficient to cause change in behaviour. It recommended that before embarking on behavioural change communication campaign plan, indepth research should be conducted to ascertain the extent to which external and internal factors could either jeopardize or enhance behavioural change campaign efforts.*

**Keywords:** Behavioural Change Communication, Social Behavioural Message Exposure, Social Behavioural Message Acceptance, Staff, Students

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## Introduction

The concept of development communication is well determined. It was coined by Nora Quebral in 1972 to show how communication could be used for development programmes and projects. Ekwuazi (2008, p.191) defines development communication as “the art and science of human communication linked to a society’s planned transformation from a state of poverty to one of dynamic socio-economic growth that makes for greater equity and larger unfolding of individual potential.” This implies that development communication could be regarded as a planned systematic deployment of the process, principles and strategies of communication in the development of the society through project development initiation. Wikens (2008) as cited by Ekwuazi (2008) asserts that development communication is the process of strategic intervention toward social change, initiated and engaged by organizations and communities. One of the major objectives of development communication is behavioural change through the altering of an existing behaviour that does not conform with societal norms and values with goal of societal improvements, advancement, transformation and general development.

Behaviour Change Communication (BCC) is one of the basic technique through which organizations, communities and institutions engaged in development communication. Thus, BCC is a critical aspect of development (Buluso, 2018) as cited by Shem & Vakkai, (2023). While some scholars also refer to BCC as Social and Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC), others such as Fabrizio, Liere & Pelto (2014) as well as the Manoff Group, (2012) as cited by Olu-Egbor, Amah and Sanda (2023) have attempted to distinguish them. According to Briscoe & Aboud (2012) BCC or SBCC is a participatory

process for encouraging positive health behaviour change in individuals and communities through strategic application of targeted messages, and the provision of a supportive environment.

Koenker et al (2014, p.1) see BCC as a kind of communication, which “encompasses health communication, social and community mobilization which evolved from information, education and communication (IEC) strategies. This implies that BCC or SBCC could be regarded as any form of communication targeted at specific audience for the purpose of influencing and changing a pre-disposed or already disposed behaviour positively with the aim of achieving change in the society. The concept of BCC or SBCC would therefore, in the discourse, means all forms of strategic communication and media campaign aimed at re-orienting the minds of target audience for the purpose of achieving positive change in feelings, attitudes and behaviour.

The idea of BCC goes beyond health information. It also involves social information and mobilization (Portsmouth, Trede & Olsen, 2012) as cited by Olu-Egbor, Amah and Sanda (2023). This implies that BCC could be adapted to suit any form of communication that target to provide information, knowledge and alter the attitude and behaviour of targets audience. Behavioural Change Communication (BCC) is essentially the acceptance of new ideas and values that alter the attitudes of individuals and groups for societal change, progress, advancement and development. This is because development communication objective cannot be realized without change in attitude and behaviour of target audience. Behavioural change communication cannot make meaningful impact for socio-economic, socio-technological advancement and development without remarkable change in behaviour and attitude through behavioural change message. This implies that for change of behaviour to take place, there must be behavioural change message which must be accepted by the target audience.

Since the inception of independent Nigeria in the 1960s, various social campaigns aimed at fostering new orientation and change in behaviour of Nigerians have been launched. These campaigns include Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) by the military regime of Olusegun Obasanjo, which was intended to instill the culture of agriculture and farming for food sustainability in Nigerians. This programme/campaign could not adequately provide the impetus that could galvanized the average of majority of Nigerian back to agriculture. Behaviour change communication though widely used for health related interventions could be applied to other social behaviour change. Lavenack (2017) posits that it is a widely used intervention which manifested through approaches such as communication for development (C4D) water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and social behaviour change communication. Despite various behavioural change communication initiatives in Nigeria by various government and non-government organizations (NGO) to mount various campaign aimed at fostering attitude and behaviour changes, there are no tangible successes. Behavioural change communication such as ‘Get It Together’ campaign aimed at encouraging family planning; *Change Begins With Me* media campaign aimed at value orientation; *Nigeria Good people; Great Nation* campaign; anti-cultism campaigns in schools; “The anti-Japa syndrome” campaign aimed at encourage young Nigerians to stay in Nigeria and develop it. These are efforts that yielded little or no result. It is against this backdrop that the researcher examined behavioural change message exposure and acceptance as well as factors militating against behavioural change communication / message acceptance among staff and students of Ekehuan campus of the University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Behaviour change communication (BCC) is a communication strategy use for the purpose of change in behaviour in individuals and communities. It is a strategy that enable society/communities to adopt healthy beneficial and positive behavioural practices (Moemeka, 2008, Ekwuazi, 2008). This implies that behaviour change communication involves all strategies, processes, tactics and methods employ to encounter individuals, communities and societies to achieve health and positive changes in attitudes and behaviours of target audience. Though there is dearth of literature in factors that influence behavioural change message acceptance, several scholars have documented the strategies for communication for development.

The behaviour of a country’s population determines how well a country will develop. This is because without the people, change cannot take place (Shem & Vakkai, 2023). Shem & Vakkai (2023) note

that the issue of behavioural change is not a new subject in Nigeria. Various behavioural change messages in form of campaigns have been launched in Nigeria. These campaigns, among others, include *Get It Together*, aimed at encouraging family planning, *Change Begins with me* aimed at value orientation Nigeria: Good people, *Great Nation*. However, it has been observed that these campaigns could not effectively create the necessary behavioural and attitudinal changes required in line with the campaign objectives. For instance, President Buhari's *War Against Indiscipline* and Obasanjo's *Heart of Africa* were both unsuccessful and failure (Shem & Vakkai, 2023). John (2016, p.16) captured the consistent failure of behavioural change message acceptance thus:

Many fruitless or unsuccessful attempts to "re-orient" the Nigerian people towards a "positive" attitudinal orientation have been tried in the past. With the advantage of hindsight, we can more readily recall Buhari's abrasive "war against Indiscipline", Obasanjo's disastrous "Heart of Arica Project" razzmalazz and Dora Akunyuli's badly packaged or poorly labeled "Rebranding Nigeria". The campaigns were not successful since their conception had a weak foundation.

The questions are what is the extent of behavioural change message exposure and acceptance among staff and student of Ekehuan campus of University of Benin? Why are the behavioural change communication .campaigns failing in Nigeria? What are the factors responsible for inability of Nigerians to accept behavioural change messages? How can we reverse this trend in Nigeria? These are the thrust of the study.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of the study is to determine the extent to which Nigerians are exposed and accept behavioural change messages and factors militating against behaviour change message acceptance among Nigerians. The specific objectives of the study are as follows:

- i.) To determine the extent to which staff and students of Ekehuan campus of University of Benin are exposed to behavioural change messages.
- ii.) Ascertain the extent to which behaviour change messages are failing in Nigeria.
- iii.) To determine reasons behind failed behaviour change messages in Nigeria.
- iv.) Find out factors militating against behavioural change message acceptance in Nigeria.
- v.) Determine ways to reverse non acceptance of behavioural change messages among Nigerians.

The above constitute the introductory section of the paper. The paper is organized in five sections. Section 2 gives insight into relevant literature and empirical dimension. Section 3 provides the framework for the methodology for the study while section 4 presents analysis of data, section 5 concludes the paper and provides recommendations for the study.

### **Literature and Empirical Reviews:**

#### **Conceptual Clarification**

Behavioural Change Communication (BCC) is a concept in the fields of communication and health and has been defined in various ways by different scholars in the fields of health and media studies. However, two definitions would suffice in this paper. Koenker et al (2014, p.1) see BCC as a kind of communication which "encompasses health communication, social and communication (IEC) strategies. The United States Agency for International Development (2014, p.3) defines BCC as a venture which "involves communication related processes and strategies to change individual's knowledge attitudes and beliefs". While some authors also refer it as "Social and Behaviour change communication (SBCC) some have attempted to distinguish between the terms "BCC" and "SBCC" (Fabrizio, Liere & Peltó, 2014, The Manoff Group, (2012) as cited by Olu-Egbor Amah and Sandas (2023). According to Briscoe & Aboud, (2012), BCC or SBCC is a participatory process for encouraging positive health behaviour change in individuals and communities through the strategic application of targeted messages, and the provision of a supportive environment.



BCC goes beyond the mere dissemination of perceived necessary health information Portsmouth, Trede & Olsen, (2012) as cited by Olu-Egbor Amah and Sandas (2023). It is rather a two way process that involves three cyclical stages – listening, dialoguing and auctioning (Portsmouth, Trede & Olsen, 2012). For the purpose of this study, the research will align with the definition of Shrivastava, 2014, p.4 as cited Mohammed Yusuf and Jayeola (2023) which says that Behaviour Change Communication is a process of implementing communication strategies for the welfare of individuals or communities to encourage them to adopt positive behaviours suitable to local problem and the settings. To this end, it is important to note that the concept of BCC as it relates to the study is essentially communication strategies and campaign that is intended to re-orient target audience, crate a new consciousness and awareness and to establish in an individuals or group behaviours and attitudes needed for national unity, cohesion, integration, development and improvement for the collective well-being of a group, province, state, city, town or village.

This is in line with the submission of Emwenromwankhoe, Olley & Asemah (2023, p.166) that BCC has to do with “any form of communication that is ultimately geared towards triggering a change in the behavioural patterns of people. For example, if a message disseminated via the mass media revolves around making a group of rural girls use sanitary pads during menstruation rather than wool or other material – then it is called BCC”. Thus, the study is situated under all communications that are intended to change people’s perception and attitudes about issues, existing behaviour, feelings and actions.

Citing FHI (2002), Dickson and Okedi (2023) define BCC as an interactive process with communities to develop well-tailored messages and approaches using a variety of communication channels to develop positive behaviours, promote and sustain individuals, community, and societal behaviours. Scholars like Briscoe & Aboud (2012), Portsmouth, Trede & Olsen (2012), Shrivastava, 2014, and Koenker et al, (2014) also supported this view. However, Ngigi and Busolo (2018) as cited by Dickson and Okedi (2023) are of the opinion that BCC employs systematic phenomenon with research and behaviour analysis. Perhaps, this is why Portsmouth et al (2012) cited earlier see BCC as a two way process that involves three cyclical stages – listening, dialoguing and auctioning. Listening enables health professionals (communicators) to learn about their target audience while dialoguing aims at developing culturally appropriate and easy to understand strategies auctioning deals with implementing and maintaining changes often in partnership with the professionals. BCC occupies a strategic position in health promotion, as research shown that theory driven and evidence-based BCC interventions are essential to the successful health promotion programmes (Korda and Itans, 2013) as cited by Olu-Egbor, Amah and Sanda (2023).

BCC has been noted to be effective in the areas of hygiene and sanitation (Curtis et al 2001) as cited Olu-Egbor et al; (2023) family planning and HIV prevention (Wakefield et al, 2010), nutrition (Ruel et al 2008) and many other diseases (Snyder, 2007). Ogata-Jones, Denham and Springston, (2006) as cited by Olu-Egbor et al; (2023) aver that to use BCC to reach the target audience, communication channels are often employed. These channels range from interpersonal to multi-level mass media channels such as radio, television and the social media. Depending on the communication objectives and the expansion of the target audience, channels with potential large audience reach are required and the traditional mass media and the social media are the best option in this regard (Moorhead et al, 2013).

### **Behavioural Change Message Exposure, Acceptance and Non-acceptance.**

Behavioural Change Communication is a core part of health promotion and one of the most significant strategies health professionals deploy to achieve the objectives of public health (Olu-Egbor, Amah & Sanda, 2023). However, Olu-Egbor et al (2023, p. 209) reported that “health awareness and availability of appropriate information does not necessarily translate to change in health behaviour or adoption of healthier life styles, despite the efforts and wishes of health professionals”. This implies that target audience could be exposure to BCC but would not accept it or cause the necessary change in behaviour. It is against this backdrop that the study investigated factors which could affect non-acceptance of behavioural change messages among selected staff and student of Ekehuan campus of the University of Benin.

Anwumabelem, & Asemah (2023) in their work *Exposure and Responsiveness to Covid-19 Media Campaigns among Edo State Residents* using survey research method reported that the mass media has enormous potential for raising public awareness about the need of maintaining a healthy lifestyle. The study of Isreal (2016) and Asemah, David & Akpabio (2022) as cited by Anwumabelem and Asemah (2008) also support the findings. Behavioural change is basically the replacement of some or all of a person's actions, inactions, reactions and mannerism in relation with themselves, environment or a cause based on a better alternatives. This behaviour is formed by different factors. These factors are willpower, knowledge and skills, social motivation, social ability, structural motivation and structural ability. Faisal (2016) notes that information is a major factor that facilitate societal and attitudinal change and the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has greatly facilitated the flow of knowledge to socially marginalized group just as Ogbuabor, Agu & Kalu (2017) observed that (ICTs) have made developmental and behavioural change message accessible to Nigerians.

### **Methodology**

The study adopted the survey research method for the study. The survey method is considered appropriate because it enable researchers to elicit information about attitude, perception, feelings, influence and impact from respondents (Asemah, et al, 2022, Okwechime, 2016, Okoro and Ekwueme, 2013. The population of the study consists of all staff and students of Ekehuan campus of the University of Benin, Benin city, Nigeria. Available records at the time of the study shows 117 staff in the Departments of Theatre Arts and Music, Mass Communication, Institute of Public Administration and Extension Services, (IPAES), Institute of Education and Fine and Applied Arts. On the other hand, there are 1,860 undergraduate students in the campus. The population therefore consists of 1977 respondents. The sample size of 250 respondents made up of staff and departments was deployed for the study. Out of the 250 respondents, the researcher surveyed 60 staff and 190 students. 38 students were selected from each institute/departments. The purposive sampling technique was used for the selection with 5 points scale questionnaire constructed to elicit data from the respondents. Well-constructed 5 point likert scale questionnaire of Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Strongly Disagree (SD), Disagree (D) and Not Sure (NS) with an accept able mean value of 3.5 and above was used as instrument for data collection.

To achieve the validity of instrument, five researchers who are colleagues were invited to go through the instrument. The reliability of the instrument was tested through pilot-testing of twenty (20) respondents drawn from the various departments. The instrument was administered physically with the assistance of four research assistants who are postgraduate diploma students of the researcher.

**Data Presentation and Analysis**

**Table 1: Showing the extent of respondents’ exposure to behavioural change messages in Nigeria.**

The data collected from respondents is presented and analysed as follows:

Variables	SA	A	SD	D	NS	Total	X	Decision
	5	4	3	2	1			
I am exposed to behavioural change messages to a very high extent.	160 64% 800	50 20% 200	10 4% 30	15 6% 30	15 6% 15	250 100 <sup>1075</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	4.3	Accepted
I am exposed to behavioural change messages to a high extent.	112 48.8 560	48 19.2% 192	40 16% 120	15 6% 30	35 14% 35	250 100% <sup>937</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	3.7	Accepted
I am exposed to behavioural change messages to low extent.	- - -	5 2% 20	170 68% 510	60 24% 120	15 6% 15	250 100% <sup>665</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	2.7	Rejected
I am exposed to behavioural change messages to a very low extent.	- - -	- - -	212 84.8% 636	20 8% 40	18 7.2% %	250 100 <sup>694</sup> / <sub>250</sub> 18	2.8	Rejected
I am not exposed at all to behavioural change messages.	- - -	- - -	192 76.8% 576	42 16.8% %	16 6.4% %	250 100 <sup>676</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	2.7	Rejected
				84	16			

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Data collected from the field shows that respondents are highly exposed to behavioural change messages. This implies that they are conversant with the various behavioural change messages in the media.

**Table 2: Showing the extent behaviour change messages have failed in Nigeria.**

Variables	No of Respondents	Percentage
Very high extent	231	92.4%
High extent	10	4%
Very low extent	03	1.2%
Low extent	02	0.8%
Not sure	04	1.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Data collected showed that majority of respondents are of the view that behavioural change messages in Nigeria have failed completely because the messages could not achieve its objective for sustainable change and development.

**Table 3: Showing reasons behaviour change messages fail in Nigeria**

Variables	SA	A	SD	D	NS	Total	X	Decision
	5	4	3	2	1			
Messages are not effectively packaged	- - -	- - -	238 95.2% 714	08 3.2% 16	04 1.6% 4	250 100 734/250	2.9	Rejected
Messages do not appeal to majority of the people	- - -	25 10% 100	99 39.6% 297	126 50.4% 252	- - -	250 100% 649/250	2.5	Rejected
Messages are packaged to bamboozle the public	89 35.6% 445	100 40% 400	15 6% 45	26 8% 40	26 10.4% 26	250 100% 956/250	3.8	Accepted
Messages are not done with sincerity of purpose	190 76% 950	45 18% 180	10 4% 30	105 2% 10	- - -	250 100 1170/250	4.6	Accepted

Source: Field Survey, 2023

The major reasons behaviour change messages is not effective in Nigeria is because some Nigerians believed that the behavioural change messages are not package in good faith. This is as majority of the respondents also believed that the campaigns are not done with sincerity of purpose. Messages preach change in attitudes and behaviours but the proponents of those messages have not changed. This makes the messages unbelievable. Thus, respondents are of the opinion that the messages are packaged to bamboozle them. This makes majority of Nigerians to see the messages as an art to influence them for the purpose of continual enrichment of politicians and those at the hem of affairs in Nigeria.

**Table 4: Showing the factors militating against behavioural change message acceptance.**

Factors	SA	A	SD	D	NS	Total	X	Decision
	5	4	3	2	1			
Economic factor	133 <sup>^</sup> 53.2% 665	54 21.6% 216	30 12% 90	25 10% 50	08 3.2% 8	250 100% 1029/250	4.1	Accepted
Ethnicity	221 88.4% 1105	13 5.2% 52	10 4% 30	04 1.6% 08	02 0.8% 02	250 100% 1197/250	4.8	Accepted
Illiteracy	229 91.6% 1145	15 6% 60	- - -	03 1.2% 06	03 1.2% 03	250 100% 1214/250	4.8	Accepted
Reinforcement of existing belief	210 84% 1050	12 4% 40	10 4% 30	20 8% 40	- - -	250 100 1160	4.6	Accepted
Lack of appropriate media / channels of communication	212 84.8% 1060	7 2.8% 28	10 4% 30	19 7.6% 38	02 0.8% 02	250 100% 1158	4.6	Accepted
Styles of leadership	221 88.4% 1105	14 5.6% 56	2 2.8% 21	03 1.2% 06	05 2% 05	250 100% 1193	4.8	Accepted
Poverty	220 1100	13 52	07 21	05 10	05 05	250 1188	4.7	Accepted
Poor infrastructural development	198 79.2 990	25 10% 100	03 1.2% 09	04 1.6% 08	20 8% 20	250 100% 1127	4.5	Accepted

Religion / cultural factor	210 1050	08 32	09 27	08 16	15 15	250 1140	4.6	Accepted
Age and status	213 85.2% 1065	15 6% 60	04 1.6% 12	08 3.2% 16	10 4% 10	250 100 1163	4.6	Accepted
Mental health issues	234 93.6% 1170	10 4% 40	4 1.6% 12	2 0.8% 04	- - -	250 100% 1226	4.9	Accepted
Corruption	240 96% 1200	- - -	03 1.2% 09	05 2% 10	02 0.8% 100%	250 100% 1221	4.9	Accepted
Reinforcement	211 1055	15 60	11 33	08 16	05 05	250 1169	4.7	Accepted
Sugar coated freedom of the press	05 2% 25	- - -	13 5.2% 39	221 88.4% 442	11 4.4% 11	250 100% 517	2.0	Rejected
Environmental influence	216 1080	16 64	8 24	10 20	- -	250 1188	4.7	Accepted
Mass media influence	25 10% 125	- - -	13 5.2% 39	212 84.8% 424	- - -	250 100% 588	2.3	Rejected
Attitude and behaviour	- - -	- - -	30 12% 90	190 76% 380	30 12 30	250 100 <sup>500</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	2.0	Rejected
Capabilities and self efficacy	- - -	25 10% 100	206 82.4% 618	19 7.6% 38	- - -	250 100% 756	3.0	Rejected
Experience	209 84% 1045	30 12% 120	- - -	10 4% 20	- - -	250 100% <sup>1185</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	4.7	Accepted
Politicking	- - -	18 7.2% 72	- - -	212 84.8% 424	20 8% 20	250 100% <sup>516</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	2.1	Rejected
Language barrier from the communication process	11 4.4% 55	15 6% 60	08 3.2% 32	216 86.4% 432	- - -	250 100% <sup>579</sup> / <sub>250</sub>	2.3	Rejected
Political apathy	13 5.2% 65	05 2% 20	- - -	180 72% 360	52 20.8 %	250 100% 497	2.0	Rejected

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Data collected from the study showed that there are fifteen (15) factors militating against behavioural change message acceptance in Nigeria. These are corruption, reinforcement, environmental influence, experience, economic factors, ethnicity, illiteracy, lack of appropriate media / channels of communication, leadership style, poverty, religion and cultural factor, age and status and mental health issues. This is because all these factors have the acceptable mean scores of 3.5 as shown from the data presented.

**Table 5: Showing respondents' perception on ways to reverse non-acceptance of behavioural change messages in Nigeria.**

Variables	SA	A	SD	D	NS	Total	X	Decision
	5	4	3	2	1			
Fulfillment of campaign promises by politicians.	180 72% 900	30 12% 120	18 7.2% 54	18 7.2% 36	4 1.6% 4	250 100 1114/250	4.4	Accepted
Patriotism	- - -	- - -	160 64% 480	83 33.2% 166	7 2.8% 7	250 100% 653/250	2.6	Rejected
Ethnic integration	184 73.6% 92.0	158 23.2% 232	8 3.2% 24	- - -	- - -	250 100% 1176/250	4.7	Accepted
Aggressive media campaign programme	- - -	21 8.4% 84	194 77.6% 582	35 14% 70	- - -	250 100 736/250	2.9	Rejected
Sincere poverty reduction programme	200 80% 1000	25 10% 100	15 6% 45	5 2% 10	5 2% 5	250 100 1160/250	4.6	Accepted
Social mobilization programme	10 4% 50	46 18.4% 184	164 65.6% 492	30 12% 60	- - -	250 100 786/250	3.1	Rejected
Transparent electoral processes	191 76.4% 955	58 23.2% 232	- - -	- - -	1 0.4% 1	250 100 1188/250	4.7	Accepted
Structural adjustment programme	- - -	- - -	194 77.6% 582	56 22.4% 112	- - -	250 100 694/250	2.8	Rejected
Socio-economic and political development programme	51 20.4% 255	183 73.2% 732	10 4% 30	- - -	6 2.4% 6	250 100 1023/250	4.1	Accepted
National orientation	09 3.6% 45	12 4.8% 48	201 80.4% 603	10 4% 20	18 7.2% 18	250 100 734/250	2.9	Rejected
Safety and protection of Nigerians	30 12% 150	169 67.6% 676	34 13.6% 102	4 1.6% 8	13 5.2% 13	250 100 949/250	3.8	Accepted
Religion tolerance	35 14% 175	152 60.8% 608	23 9.2% 69	20 8% 40	20 8% 20	250 100 912/250	3.6	Accepted
Cultural tolerance	171 68.4% 855	36 14.4% 144	21 8.4% 63	10 4% 20	12 4.8% 12	250 100 1094/250	4.4	Accepted
Nationalism	- - -	- - -	163 65.2% 489	45 18% 90	42 16.8% 42	250 100 621/250	2.5	Rejected
Infrastructural development	- - -	- - -	72 28.8% 216	178 71.2% 356	- - -	250 100 572/250	2.3	Rejected
National educational revitalization	5 2% 25	9 3.6% 36	32 12.8% 96	204 81.6% 408	- - -	250 100 565/250	2.3	Rejected

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Data collected from the survey shows that there are eight perception of respondents to reverse non acceptance of behavioural change messages in Nigeria. these are fulfillment of campaign promises by politicians the integration of all the ethnic groups in Nigeria, sincere poverty reduction programme that is sustaining and all inclusive, transparent electoral processes, socio-economy and political development, safety and protection of Nigerians, religion tolerance and tolerance. All these items are more than the acceptable threshold of 3.5 mean scores.

## **Discussion of Findings**

### **Factors Militating against Behavioural Change Message Acceptance in Nigeria**

Majority of the respondents (231) representing 92.4% of the total population agreed that behavioural change messages have failed to achieve its objectives in Nigeria (see table2). Many of the respondents believed that behavioural change messages failed to achieve its objective because the messages are packaged to bamboozle the public and not done with sincerity of purpose (see table 3).

The study revealed that staff and students of Ekehuan campus of the University of Benin who are mainly Nigerians are highly exposed to social behavioural change communication. This is because 160 and 50 respondents respectively out of the 250 respondents representing 64% and 20% of the total number strongly agreed and agreed that they are exposed to behavioural change message to a very high extent. This is as majority of the population also said that they are exposed to behavioural change messages to a high extent (see table 1).

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society and highly pluralistic. From study, there are fifteen factors which militate against the extent behaviour change messages are accepted by Nigerians. Behavioural change message acceptance is difficult in Nigeria because it has been observed that promises made by various Nigeria leaders on how to improve the economy are not fulfilled. This has affected their perception and messages especially as it concerns behavioural change and the degree of acceptance. This is closely related to corruption where many Nigerian leaders speak with different side of their mouths. They produce jingoes' and the behavioural change messages intended to create attitude change about corrupt tendencies, whereas, the leaders that want this corrupt free Nigerian are growly and crassly corrupt and promote corruption in secret. This has affected the way Nigerians respond to the various behavioural change messages which invariably militating acceptance of those messages.

It is pertinent to note that the negative impact of ethnicity and tribalism is fast eroding the 'Nigerianess' of Nigerians. The raging war between the east and the north; the lack of trust and the sense of betrayal between the west and the east; the feeling of the south that produce the black gold that has magnificently benefitted the north without adequate development of the southern region as well as the various 'flags' of nepotism displayed by mainly the northern oligarchy have affected the extent behavioural change messages are accepted. Nigerians, often, tend to believe in their tribesmen and the promotion of their ethnicity and collective instead of the patriotic development and unity of the Nigerian state.

With more than fifty percent of Nigerians being illiterates and dwell in the rural areas, without basic amenities such as constant electricity, it becomes not only difficult for them to access but comprehend behavioural change messages due to the high level of illiteracy. Often, illiterate people find it difficult to accept correction. They are rigid, pragmatic and dogmatic. They hold firm to whatever they think they know. Hence, no matter the degree of behavioural change messages they encountered, they would rather remain in the state they are instead of learning and embracing new things.

This is closely related ot poverty and poor incentives. While it is difficult for poor persons to buy and access basic receiver of electronic communication gadgets such as radio, television and good internet connected phones, they would rather listen to whatever they feel can cure their hunger and thirst. Lack of incentives and poverty are major factors militating against behaviour change message acceptance in Nigeria.

The degree of behavioural change messages reinforcement of existing beliefs and cultures also affect the extent of acceptance of the messages. The credibility of the source of message could also affect the

acceptance of the messages. Thus, Nigerians who are Christians would rather listen and accept the message of a fellow Christian than Muslims.

Inappropriate use of channels of communication have also affected behavioural change message acceptance in Nigeria. A behaviour change message of Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) intended for commercial bus drivers placed on television between late morning and afternoon hours cannot be accessed by Nigerian drivers. Radio, is more appropriate for communicating behavioural change messages to drivers in Nigeria because most drivers have car stereos and radios that provide information to them when working.

While the environment and state of mental health of Nigerian have greatly affected behavioural change message acceptance in that it is dependent of the degree of comprehensive and acceptance of the messages, the various experiences of the receiver always determined the extent to what they accept or reject. Nigerians who fall under the age bracket of 45 – 70 years accept behaviour change messages compared to those who fall under the age bracket of 15 – 44 years. The younger Nigerians want radical and violent approach to change and development while the older one are more conservative and want round table, negotiation and dialogue approach and discussion to change in behaviour. The findings supported and confirmed the work of Lavenack (2017) as cited by Dickson and Okedi (2023) that they are factors that could militate against behavioural change message acceptance.

To reverse the non-acceptance of behavioural change messages in Nigeria, the study revealed certain attitude, behaviours and orientations that should be encouraged among Nigerian leaders and followers. From the study, it can be deduced that most Nigerians perceived behavioural change messages as mere cosmetics which are packaged to hypnotized the mass as well as bamboozle them. To reverse the trend of non-acceptance of behavioural change messages, the study revealed that politicians and leaderships must fulfill their campaign promises.

This will create credibility in behavioural change messages. There should be ethnic integration to foster genuine oneness of the Nigeria nationality like other clime, the government must engage in sincere poverty reduction programme. There should also be transparency in the various political processes. This is as there should be a sustainable socio-economy and political development. Other ways to reverse the trend of non-acceptance of behavioural change messages in Nigeria are the ability to protect Nigerian citizens both at home and abroad. This is as cultural tolerance is an important factor in the extent to which behavioural change message would be accepted.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Based on the findings, the researcher concluded that behavioural change communication is not enough to cause change behaviour and attitude of target audience. There are other factors which can make or mar the impact of behavioural change messages.

Behaviour change message acceptance is difficult in Nigeria due to several factors enumerated above. These factors are not by any means exhaustive and conclusive as there could also be other factors. However, proper consideration should be given to the various factors listed so as to pass appropriate behaviour change messages that would be accepted and will bring about the development of Nigeria through various development communication approaches.

Importantly, to achieving a holistic behavioural change and message acceptance among Nigerian, the following recommendations are sine-quo-non.

There should be ethnic integration and sustainable political governance for concrete development in Nigeria; the Nigerian media should focus on collaborative, integrative and strategic communications designed to provide constructive non-partisan news and information that would shape citizens attitudes and behaviours; a cultivation of a culture of breaking barriers and providing a conducive environment where citizens are able to contribute their initiative, creativity and intellectuality equally and continuously; mass education and poverty reduction programmes aimed at empowering the Nigeria citizens; corruption free Nigeria, where there will be no ethnic, tri bal religion, cultural, social



economic and education barriers; the use of appropriate channels of communication to pass behavioural change messages. These channels can be identified after adequate audience and media researches; Nigerian leaders should display sincerity of purpose, honesty, high level of transparency, equity and justice as well as fighting corrupt practices. This will add credibility to behavioural change messages from government which will result to their acceptance.

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# Innocent Asouzu's Complementarism and Global Existential Harmony: Perspectives in Philosophy and Social History

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## Abstract

*Irrespective of place, the world is replete with difficult problems; and seemingly unsolvable ones which remain as lasting challenges for renewed human rational engagement. If peaceful and harmonious globalization can be made possible and reflected in academic theorization, the question is: would there not be need for acknowledgement that each people's culture and epistemic rationality are necessary for authenticity, truth, and directionality in existence? But how can this be actualized as a way forward to harmonious co-existence in a pluralistic world? Will it not result in exclusivism? Will all be recognized? Using critical analysis and hermeneutic method, the paper examines and crystallizes the instruments of existentialism in Asouzu's philosophy of complementation. It argues that the existential predicament in globalization crippling human existential fulfillment can be resolved through certain measures outlined in Asouzu's complementary ontology. The paper concludes with the affirmation that Asouzu's complementarism is a panacea for integrative humanism that reconciles racial differences and trans-cultural valuation. The emphasis that we are all ambassadors of the earth is the objective of this study. Protection of the earth and all its entities through the prisms of our cultural relations and beyond is its primary recommendation.*

**Keywords:** Ontology, Africa, Existentialism, Globalization, Fulfillment, Being and History

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

For globalization, one can argue that 'Man – the historical subject is benefiting greatly'. From all facets, it appears the whole process has contributed immensely to his overall experience; to his comfort and well-being, and even, to his greater understanding of the world he lives in. Despite these apparent benefits, it is worthy to note that the rapid development of new information and communication technologies, obviously, has facilitated the speed globalization that affects man. And this influence to a large extent, as it is captured in the constitution of UNESCO (2004), represents a challenge for cultural diversity. This is because globalization has proven to be a key-player in the formation of man's identity. In his PhD dissertation on the title *A Critical Analysis of Cultural Pluralism in the Philosophy of Alain Leroy*, Ejegbavwo, Fidelis Oghenero affirms: "What we see on television, what we hear on the radio, and what we read in magazines shapes our values and ideologies and forms our identities. In some respects, this is a good thing as we have increased choices.<sup>1</sup>" Through globalization which is a "cross country flows of information, ideas, technologies, goods, services, capital, finance and people<sup>2</sup>," integration takes place in the economies, societies and cultures of the world. By so doing, globalization is a process into homogenization of ideas, cultures, values and even life styles, and making the world a global village. Though globalization is capable of increasing our choices and even, creating immeasurable material comfort for the historical man, there remains the irony that: "no former generation has had to experience so much bad news as we face today...<sup>3</sup>"

As His Holiness, The 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama of Tibet would expect “any sensitive and compassionate person<sup>4</sup>” to question, in the face of all “this constant awareness of fear and tension<sup>5</sup>”: has globalization really facilitated progress in the evolutionary process of the historical man? Or has it merely become a passage for some few individuals and nations to subjugate and exploit other periphery countries; thereby making it obvious to all that the historical man has lost his direction in the world? From all indications, if we take Heidegger's phenomenological analysis on man seriously, with all these happenings in our modern world in the name of globalization, the historical man must be in his “fallenness<sup>6</sup>” where he is hidden from truth by some bifurcating mechanisms which Asouzu calls “the phenomenon of concealment.<sup>7</sup>” He must have been closed off from the ambivalence of his human conditions, and thus losing direction in the sense of connection to the world and others (being-in and being-with relations).

This ability to connect the world and others through selfless management of the dual nature of his interest is what supplies context of directionality for man. But if man is now so dominated by his one-sided selfish interests and desires, he must have lost his sense of direction in the world. Historically, Man has done more harm to himself and the world. The result of this is disregard for the well-being of others which has come with great consequence. The genesis of wars between nations, clash of civilizations and terrorism, insurgency, human devaluation, climate change, misery, diseases, death e.t.c. are almost man-made. The emphasis that we are all ambassadors of the earth is the objective of this study. Protection of the earth and all its entities is its primary recommendation.

On March 6, 1991, following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, President Bush saw the urgency to bring the historical subjects of cultural pluralism, cultural relativism and complementarism on track. The mission he revealed in his speech to Congress which is today cited as the US administration's principal policy statement on the new order in the Middle East. Bush calls this New Order 'our uncommon coalition.'<sup>8</sup> The project he believed “must now work in common purpose to forge a future that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human nature.<sup>9</sup>” To build such future, he raised a strong voice on the need for nations to work together to create shared security arrangements; to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them; to create new opportunities for peace and stability; and, foster economic development together for the sake of peace and progress.<sup>10</sup> This trend of ‘all-historical subjects-working together’ and some of the ideals driving it, is known as globalization.

In Asouzu's analysis, globalization is an “operational concept<sup>11</sup>”, and should transcend the obstacles imposed by such particularities as culture, nationality, religion, language etc. In all facets, it should bring a global family (one world, one people) where human beings make spirited efforts to surmount some of the artificial barriers that keep people apart for higher values.<sup>12</sup> In the face of the above anomalous situation where the historical man has lost his direction in the world, and closed off permanently in the Platonic cave of illusion, inauthentic existence, “fallenness”, and darkness, Asouzu's complementary reflection as a new philosophical attitude for a universal understanding within the African Milieu, is a packaged therapeutical weapon to address the confusing phenomenon of Man's “facticity<sup>13</sup>” of its ambivalent existential conditions; how well this new philosophical attitude can salvage the human situation, and bring the historical subjects back on track to the context of directionality, wholeness and responsibility gives rise to this research.

The rest of the paper is organized in 6 sections. In what appears next is the second section which discusses the paradox of globalization and human relations. Section 3 treats the background to asouzu's philosophy, while four crystalizes the existentialist thought in asouzu's philosophy of complementation, five discusses the pragmatic relevance of asouzu's philosophy of complementation to our contemporary world and the sixth section concludes this paper.

## **2. THE PARADOX OF GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RELATIONS**

There will be no need of theorizing where there is no problem. And it is the nature of problems to provoke investigations, speculations, and all speculations are in “a search for direction<sup>14</sup>” to life. It

implies that problems themselves are necessary for the ultimate meaning of life. “In a rapidly changing world which is increasingly bringing people of various cultures in closer interaction with each other”<sup>15</sup>, many expectations beg for fulfillment. One of such anticipations is Man’s manifestation of its authenticity and directionality through its understanding and co-operation amidst diversity. This is not the case in our advanced world with all the unprecedented material benefits of science and technology. Any sensitive and compassionate person is forced to question the progress of the present historical man. Why does it think of its own first, even at the expense of the other- self? Can a world in which there is freedom and respect for human rights find home among all nations? Can human beings really find connection of ideas, cultures, values and even life style through complementarity? What happens to their “artificial barriers”<sup>16</sup>? What happens to their natural inclinations to subjugate the others and ‘over-power’? That complementarity “works for the ants (*danda*); does it mean it can work for man?”<sup>17</sup> What exactly is complementarity? The above questions are fundamental when interpreting the epistemic framework of complementary reflection, especially, as it seeks to harmonize our parochial interests so as to accommodate others in line with public good, believing strongly in the spirit of New World Order.

The purpose of this research is to show how complementary reflection can harmonize our parochial interests so as to accommodate others in line with public good, and how that harmony opens up Man into authenticity, truth and directionality. It attempts to evaluate the principle of integration in Asouzu by analyzing his ideas of philosophy, history, peace and progress. It is a fact of experience that no one people have the monopoly of rationality, and none may be inferior to others, each has something to add to the unveiling process of life, especially in this epoch of globalization. This study argues that what is necessary for peaceful co-existence is complementarity in which every individual being is accorded his position as ‘missing-link’<sup>18</sup> of reality. If investigations disclose that globalization can escape clashes of civilizations, then the many fearful speculations from our prophets of doom failed. If it turns out to be that clashes are inevitable, humanity is at least shown, with one, among many of the plans of some few individuals and nations to imperialize the peripheral countries and destroy the world, and as such must be vehemently revolted against with distrust and suspicion. Whichever way, this work is of great importance to philosophy of global civilization grappled with within the same framework.<sup>19</sup>

### 3. BACKGROUND TO ASOUZU’S PHILOSOPHY

The idea of complementation to start with, is as old as the hills. The corollary is that those early thinkers such as Gautama Buddha, Plato, Hegel, Immanuel Kant, and others who found it out, discovered it rather than inventing it. We must understand therefore, that it is not in the scope of this study to attempt a review of complementation generally, owing to the fact that such endeavor would be an out-of-way activity. Hence, we shall explore complementation within the method and principles of complementary reflection in the works of Asouzu. Asouzu’s book *The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and beyond African Philosophy*, since its first publication in 2004 there have been numerous reactions to the principles embedded therein. Some of which are encomiums while others are constructive attacks, aimed to neutralize the whole philosophy also known as *Ibuanyidandaism*. In the preface to this Asouzu’s book, Obi Oguejiofor from the Seminary at Enugu declares this philosophy of missing links as an advantage and as “a clear indication of its originality... it charts its unique course in contriving a special theory of complementary reflection.”<sup>20</sup>

In the words of Obi Oguejiofor:

One can say that Fr. Asouzu’s Method and Principles is such a work of genius. Its excellence is not only predicated on the originality of its theme... A clear indication of its originality is the fact that, unlike most writings in contemporary African Philosophy, it does not dwell on discussions of theories and contention about past writers... it attempts to reduce by this method, the inherent hermeneutical tension between philosophy’s tendency towards universalism and the inevitable demands of contextualism.<sup>21</sup>

This special theory of complementary reflection, Oguejiofor believes, is such a work of genius which is a master key that has opened wide the door for 'African philosophy to emerge'. This he presents expressly as follows: "Theophilus Okere, after arguing that the way to African philosophy is a path of hermeneutics of culture, added that a touch of genius is necessary for African Philosophy to emerge. One can say that Fr. Asouzu's Method and Principles is such a work of genius."<sup>22</sup> Less we misunderstand the idea of 'special theory' in Oguejiofor's critical appraisal on Asouzu's Method and Principles, Professor Udo Etuk from the University of Uyo in the Department of Philosophy posits that: "Complementarism was not Asouzu's discovery or invention; but he has raised it to the level of a philosophy and doctrine (and as such, Etuk believes that it) must be seen as philosophy at its best."<sup>23</sup> From the above, it appears Asouzu's work of genius which Etuk describes as 'philosophy at its best' frees itself from all weaknesses. This is not true from Heinz Kimmerle, Zoetermeer's approach to African studies as he argues in his essay titled: Reactions to Innocent Asouzu's Approach to African Philosophy and the Context of other Interpretations that:

The historical context of reassuring African culture of its value (is cleverly not captured in Asouzu's complementarism) ... it is true that communalism, by which a somehow idealistic picture of the African sense of community is drawn, has a limited meaning compared to complementary reflection of societal relations. It could help to show this by a more detailed argumentation.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. EXISTENTIALIST THOUGHT IN ASOUZU'S PHILOSOPHY OF COMPLEMENTATION

##### 4.1. General Idea of Existentialism

The focus here is to analyse Asouzu's philosophy of complementation as enshrined in The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection, with a view to reviewing what defines Asouzu as true existentialist. F. H. Heinemann first coined the term "*Existenzphilosophies*" in 1929 in a book, *Neue Wege der Philosophies*. He understood "existence" as a new principle which seeks to overcome the one-sidedness of both the rationalist and irrationalist schools and instead of beginning with Descartes' "cogito" as consciousness and thought begins with the subject standing in the threefold relationship with man, the Universe and God.<sup>25</sup> Existentialism dwells on the human condition in the world (object, others, self), and tries to understand it (existence).<sup>26</sup> Valentine Obinyan argues that "existentialists take the existing human being as a starting point. For them, the existing human is distinct from objective nature as a whole because she is subject, undetermined by laws of nature."<sup>27</sup> He is taken for granted as subject, thrown in the midst of a world of things which are opaque to him and which he cannot understand, but try to understand. In Buber terminology, he is taken as the 'Ego'<sup>28</sup>. He is the homeless sheer individual; a concerned being who is weighed down with anxiety, despair and cares. He is concerned about how he can overcome his cosmic limitation, his solitude, how he can transcend it to be at home; how he can be a fulfilled personality.

Buber locates realization and meaningfulness in relations between I-Thou (man, nature and spirit). Overcoming our solitude, which tends to oscillate between conceiving of the self as absorbed in the all (collectivism) and the all as absorbed into the self (solipsistic mysticism), we realize that we always exist in the presence of other selves, and that the self is a part of reality only insofar as it is relational<sup>29</sup>.

In the language of Gabriel Marcel; he is "homo-viator"<sup>30</sup> - a pilgrim making attempt to escape the problematic finitude of its existence as a being in the world. He is aware of the facts; the 'facticity' of his existence that he was 'thrown' into the world. The facts of his past; that he didn't cause his birth, his sex, colour. That he didn't choose all the negative aspects of his personality are enough to discourage him. The negative forces in the world including various types of evil and catastrophes natural and man-made, makes man a victim of dread. In the light of Heidegger, these facts make man helpless, live in fear and worry. In the face of all these forces of evil in the world, man is dragged helplessly to do anything to survive. Asouzu affirmed that in this process of trying to survive, his life becomes selfish, egocentric. In Hobbessian terms, "nasty, brutish, and short."<sup>31</sup> He sometimes engages

himself in one-way dimensional approach to pursue his self-interest, and this makes him to seek totality and absoluteness in negative way.

Asouzu believed, man begins to lose control of his being. Here also, he starts to live phony and 'inauthentic existence.' The existentialists such as Albert Camus, Friedrich Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Rahner, Martian Heidegger, J.P. Sartre, Soren Kierkegaard had keyed into these facts of human existence. They made a plinth of them to erect human freedom. Freedom 'to be or not to be.' One thing stands out in all their radical existential philosophies, and it is the overemphasis they placed on human responsibility, alienation, meaninglessness, suffering, abandonment, anguish, absurdity of birth and death of human existence. J.P. Sartre declares in his Existentialism as Humanism that "Man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If man... is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself".<sup>32</sup>

#### **4.2. Existentialist Thought in Asouzu's Philosophy of Complementation**

In the introduction to the book: *The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and beyond African Philosophy*, Asouzu outlines three facts that define human existence.

First, the fact that "ideas...change the world." Second, the fact that "ideas... [on their own which] cannot be translated into action remain virtually dead". And third, the fact that actions which give life to ideas "are intricately related to those interests that inspire and energize them".<sup>33</sup>

Asouzu posits that "philosophy, in a complementary perspective, seeks to explore the close relationship between ideas, action and human interests."<sup>34</sup> The main thesis of Asouzu's' existential philosophy, namely, that the experience of moment of concealment, is an unavoidable condition of human existence. This condition of human existential situation is a manifestation of human inability to manage the ambivalent nature of his interest. Asouzu posited that training the mind to become aware of the ambivalence of its situation is a very essential step towards overcoming this moment of concealment, and the awareness encourages a complementary inward and outward movement to higher, authentic and ultimate level of reality.

Essentially, it provides a basic opportunity to realize the meaning of life. Man's meaningful existence starts from the understanding of the fact that his fellow humans and everything out there are aspects of his being to complete and perfect him. So that, any harm he may do to them could be as good as harm done to himself. His actions therefore, he must well guide to aim respect, solidarity and love. Man, by deciding his being he is forsaken in anguish to decide for the whole world. It is such a great burden for him that he can't choose selfishly. If he must choose, he can only choose selflessly. This is what will make his choice agreeable to the whole. Man's life is the sum total of the actions he takes. These actions determine the strengths and weaknesses of his feelings and interests.

For instance, If Augustine feels that he loves Nigeria enough to sacrifice everything else for her – the only way he will be proven to be true lover is through his action and adventure when he becomes patriotic, good citizen who hates corruption, and in his capacity promote peace, unity and love. If, on the contrary, he feels that he can't die for Nigeria, rather Nigeria should die for him; this idea will reflect when he joins other to steal her national treasury, siphon public funds met for good roads, boreholes, infrastructural developments. This is how one estimates the strength of a feeling and interest. The value of his feeling for his country, Nigeria was determined precisely by the fact that he was determined to shun evil of looting and do good. J.P. Sartre reasons that "I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it."<sup>35</sup>

Augustine may say, "I love Nigeria enough to sacrifice my life for her," if actually he has sacrificed his life for her. He can only estimate the strength of this affection if he has performed an action by which it is defined. But if he then appeals to this affection to justify his action, according Sartre, "(he



finds (him)self-drawn into a vicious circle.<sup>36</sup> Asouzu believed that Augustine may not choose to sacrifice his interest for the ‘otherness’ (Nigeria in particular or the world in general) because he is unaware of the ambivalent situation that will resurface the moment anything that concerns his cherish interest appear. In this case his most cherish interest is to ‘hammer’-make quick money at the expense of the other missing links which form the reality of Nigeria. Asouzu affirms expressly that “if there is anything philosophy makes us understood better, it is the fact that all human actions have interests guiding them.<sup>37</sup>” The human interest therefore, becomes central to Asouzu’s philosophy of complementation, and an awareness of the ambivalent nature of its condition is the vista to human authenticity, truth and directionality for the historical subject.

#### **4.2.1. Asouzu’s Phenomenological Analysis on Man**

In Asouzu’s existential philosophy it is taken for granted that nothing changes except ideas, and ideas on their own do not change without the human intentional act, and every intentional act, as Asouzu would argue, are interest guided, interest-inspired and energized. According to him, “we are beings that live [move, think, explore, and make decision] from our interests.<sup>38</sup>” Aside our interest man is nothing. His existence is connected to how far he can realize himself through his interest-inspired actions. In Asouzu’s philosophy of complementation, human interest is consequential. Asouzu’s phenomenological on man reflects scholars such as Martian Heidegger and J.P. Sartre. On that plinth, man is a historical subject that must be understood in relation with its past, present and future.

##### **4.2.1.1 Asouzu and Human Facticity**

It is the fact that man didn’t choose its biological instincts, drives and colour nor did he choose all the negative aspect of his personality. The negative forces in the world including various types of evil and catastrophes- natural and man-made are not his choice. His birth he didn’t call for, neither his death. Both remain total absurdities which are mere contingent facts for him. He didn’t determine the ambivalent situation of his interest which conceals a dimension of its nature for him. It just dawned on man suddenly that he found himself in the public world unprepared, and must face the struggle to survive.

Man was thrown into needs, drives and motives which subsist in his natural inclination to self-preservation. In this case, our actions, in all existential situations are driven by the natural law of self-preservation. According to Asouzu “understanding human existence as attempts at self-preservation has far-reaching implications. One... we can easily fall into the temptation and illusion of the assumption of the “nearer the better and the safer.<sup>39</sup>” This is the background behind failed judgments. Under this condition where human reason is blind from its true human interest, its ambivalent condition has all it takes to deceive him. Thus, we can misjudge people’s intention, and we can overestimate or even underestimate our own wants and needs. The fact is that man’s ambivalent situations conceal a dimension of their nature for him; they are fundamentally characterized by concealment.

This phenomenon of concealment is the cause of our inability to manage the ambivalence of our situation well. It makes the natural man to always seek his due at any given opportunity, to grab the whole for himself only. This is the foundation to build the fact that man always seek totality and absoluteness but in a negative manner. Upon this negative approach of seeking totality and absoluteness, we base the misuse of power; the misconception of ourselves as demigods. According to Asouzu this “issue of misuse of power in asymmetrical situations is a universal human problem’ and ‘It is one of the indicators of our deviation from the fundamental transcendent ontological structure of our being.<sup>40</sup>” Such indicator of ego-centredness proves us incomplete and inauthentic. It proves our inability to assume our position as ‘being-in-control’. It proves our human incapacity.

Asouzu believes that:

The many cases of ethnic cleansing, failed government, obnoxious laws, against perceived foes, wars and conflicts, racial discrimination, religious intolerance, and the many paradoxical situations that have become problem to our world have their root in this human incapacity.<sup>41</sup>

#### 4.2.1.2 Asouzu's Historical Subject and Falleness.

Falleness is absorption in selfish interest insofar as this drive is guided by the super-maxim of the nearer the better and the safer, disjunctive exclusivist-reasoning, and the passion for exclusiveness. It is unawareness of the ability of man to search for its ontological roots. It is a fall into the Platonic cave of illusion, in-authenticity, and darkness where the historical subjects are closed off from the truth and authenticity, and where he lost his direction in the public world is there, he begins to seek to have all dispassionately for itself. Asouzu affirms that

No person is immune from the illusions, which our ambivalent situations can create such that the mind can be held perpetually in bondage. Over and above all, we have to bear in mind that *obi/mmuoeziokwu* (the harmonizing faculty) is always under the threat arising from the operations of *uche/obi akolo* or *ucheaghugbo* (an absolute ideal form of hegemonic reason).<sup>42</sup>

On this note Apostle Paul affirms that “we have all fallen and come short of the glory of God.”<sup>43</sup> This falleness which is an absorption in selfish drive has a deep-rooted socio-pathological dimension that has to do with the fallen man's incapacity to manage fears and feeling of insecurity in the face of competition and the fundamental human inclination to self-preservation. In this sense, the historical man's falleness is all about the fall of the will, which brought the mind rebellion to always refuse “to subjugate itself to the processes needed towards the harmony of differences.”<sup>44</sup> Asouzu believes that in this state of refusal of the will: “The mind is not being realistic to itself, since the measures it adopts to lord it over other, imagining itself to be absolute are the same measures needed to tear it apart in its incessant attempts to guard its interests against outside intrusion and to protect itself from others.”<sup>45</sup> In this Platonic cave of illusion, human reason is blind and hegemonic, even if it claims otherwise. According to Asouzu, the fallen state is “those moments where reason is capable of violating its own laws and still considers this the wisest and most intelligent thing to do.”<sup>46</sup> This is the state the historical subject seizes to be in charge. In other words, it is such a condition where the ego has lost control. The reason is built on the fact that at this state:

The ego fails to affirm other missing links in the process of self-affirmation or positive self-assertiveness it invariably runs the risk of total negation of the foundation on which its own existence is erected: this can happen to a point of total self-annihilation... in such a situation, the subject has lost control.<sup>47</sup>

And where the historical subject has lost control, he lost directionality. The fallen state becomes ‘the magic box’ therefore, which the selfish drives of man has tapped to begin its outpouring of chaos, wars, diseases, catastrophes, corruption, leadership problems, intolerance, Jihad, terrorism, fundamentalism to humanity.

#### 4.2.1.3 Asouzu on Man's ‘Becomingness’

The urge to self-preservation, according to Asouzu is “a general burden of humanity.”<sup>48</sup> Inauthentic existences happen where we seek to carry it alone in a public world of indifference. This state of mind to act in a one-dimensional absolute exclusivist way takes place when the historical subject gets absorbed in his facticity which is characterized by its lack of awareness concerning the vicissitudes arising from its ambivalent situations. This condition also defines its lack of control when he is incapable to affirm other missing links in the process of self-affirmation or positive self-assertiveness. Authentic existence is to be in control. And to be in control is understanding. It is “an awareness that the mind must be in tune with those transcendent categories (which include fragmentation (relativity), unity, totality, universality, comprehensiveness, wholeness and future reference) that form its character that the human person can be led safely to a harmonized form of existence; at least to that measure that is allowable to it on account of its relative structure.”<sup>48</sup> It is only a being-in-control that can understand all it takes to carry the burden of self-preservation. This is because the urge to self-preservation which is a general burden of humanity “is a burden which we must carry collectively with honesty, openness, courage, resourcefulness and dignity... and in a comprehensive and complementary manner.”<sup>49</sup> And

historical subjects who have lost control are not capable of generating such virtues. This is the reason for the global paradox where there is “an unhealthy climate of mutual suspicion and distrust among dissimilar and even similar ideological camps that easily ignites.”<sup>50</sup> This is a fact that, when we attempt to carry the burden alone, we can run into a region of fallenness where our rebellious will seeks totality and absoluteness in a negative manner. This negative approach lays the entrance to inauthentic existence. At this region of in-authenticity, the ego seeks to be in absolute control, imagining that it is the efficient cause, God which other missing links of reality must worship and adorn.

Asouzu holds that:

Authentic existence subsists in managing these structural elements of our being in a way that channels them to their authentic ends. Where this does not happen, we dissipate our energies in those negative acts that are given by self-interest but which are not in harmony with the nature of our being.<sup>51</sup>

All forms of ego-centricism are signs of disharmony, as such, signal of inauthentic existence. When we live only for ourselves, we bring ourselves two major setbacks. One, we refuse to respond fully to the authentic structure of our being. Two, we refuse to reach out to the opposite-other...other than ourselves as constitutive dimensions of our beings.<sup>52</sup> Asouzu believes that overcoming these two major setbacks is a “necessary condition towards the realization of the transcendent ontological pre-conditions of legitimization of our being as historical subjects.”<sup>53</sup> As a pathway into the region of the experience of truth, directionality and authenticity, Asouzu outlines certain measures that would enable the historical subject overcome his ambivalent natures to include: restoration of true personal autonomy through noetic pedagogy or training of the mind; recourse to the transcendent categories of unity of consciousness (*akara obi/okarammuo*) and full personal autonomy through “*Ima-onwe-onye*” (being-in-control).<sup>54</sup> Neotic pedagogy will help the ego as Asouzu says, to eliminate the broken unity as to help restore the subject to true self such that it can affirm insightfully that to be is to be in mutual complementary relationship with all missing links of reality. According to Asouzu:

This approach is insightful because a thing cannot be contrary to its nature and a thing is authentic and true in the measure it confirms to its nature. In other words, all world immanent symbols and myths, all world immanent common goods and interests, all forms of pretensions and rationalizations, in short, anything that exists can uphold its truth and authenticity to the extent it is true to its nature.<sup>55</sup>

Existentiality involves projection of the historical subject to live true to its nature. Living true to its nature is a pathway to regain and sustain conscious values which potentially belong to the mind. These values, which Asouzu admonishes, must be learnt and kept awake in a conscious process of education of the mind (neotic pedagogy) and watchfulness are as follow: “Benevolence, heroism, sense of justice and fair play, altruism, love of peace and harmony, friendship, truthfulness, sincerity, integrity, control of one’s pride, interest for other cultures, authentic interpersonal relationship, respect and acceptance of strangers, etc.”<sup>56</sup>

#### **4.3. Authentic and Inauthentic Existence in Asouzu’s Existentialism**

Authentic existence is being-in-awareness of the ambivalence of our situation, and being-able-to manage- the structural elements of our being in a way that channels them to their authentic end. Inauthentic existence is grounded in preoccupation with actuality. It does not see the importance of possibility of integrating into a unified consciousness those unintended objects and events that characterize our historicity, so that we can share the world joyously and meaningfully with others, even with those who do not share our views. Inauthentic existence is characterized by a loss of human interest-awareness and abandonment to the tyranny of human ambivalent situation.<sup>57</sup> The historical subject’s unawareness persists even to the point of not wanting to know about the various “transcendent categories of unity of consciousness (*akara obi/mmoo*). These categories include fragmentation (relativity), unity, totality, universality, comprehensiveness, wholeness and future reference,<sup>58</sup> and are

implicit in the phenomenology of being-in and being-with relations. The distance between authentic existence and inauthentic existence is awareness. While the former “the mind is fully aware of its ambivalent situation, as to be able to control the threat arising from all the missing links of their ambivalence (which is the highest form of self-consciousness),<sup>59</sup>” the latter is unaware, blind and hegemonic.

## 5. PRAGMATIC RELEVANCE OF ASOUZU’S PHILOSOPHY OF COMPLEMENTATION TO OUR CONTEMPORARY WORLD

According to Asouzu, “what Africa needs is adaptation to positive new ideas and the change of obnoxious values. This pragmatic spirit is in tune with authentic complementary African spirit. This spirit is characterized by its unfathomable capacity to adapt to all forms of positive ideas...<sup>60</sup>” And such positive ideas as the restoration and enthronement of religious liberty and freedom that has been sacrificed at the altar of religious fanaticism, secondly, there building of interpersonal existential communication that has been offered at the altar of disjunctive exclusivist-reasoning of the so-called superior man over the so-called inferior woman, and thirdly, the restoration and enthronement of conscious, conscientious, complementary and effective leadership that has been sacrificed in the altar of self-aggrandizement, imposition and actualization of self-interest, victimization, embezzlement, hunting of enemies, and impoverishment of the masses.

Religious fanaticism, according to Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya and Azubuike Ugoha in their paper titled: Religious Fanaticism in Nigeria and Asouzu’s *Ibuanyidanda* Philosophy, “is an irrational practice of religion in which religionists make use of violence to promote their religious faith and teachings and give this evil practice a religious backing.<sup>61</sup>” It is the control of religion and religious beliefs by these religious leaders to protect their vested interest, even to the point of using of violence. This kind of emotional attitude is not only evil but irrational use of religion. S. P. I. Agi argues that there are six faces of religious violence in Nigeria, and these include: Muslim-ATR, Muslim-Muslim, Christian-ATR, Christian-Christian, Muslim-Christian, Muslims-the rest of us.<sup>62</sup> It is also worthy of note that religious fanaticism and fundamentalism has led to a high level of insecurity of human lives and property. Lucky Uchenna Ogbonnaya and Azubuike Ugoha submit that the worst effect of religious fanaticism on the Nigerian society is that it hinders national integration and social harmony. It denies Nigeria their right to peaceful co-existence and breeds mutual suspicion among members of different religions.<sup>63</sup>

As earlier stated in preceding above, *Ibuanyidanda* philosophy is structured on the two principles of which are principle of integration and the principle of progressive transformation. The former which Asouzu calls the metaphysical variant holds that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality or that whatever exists has head and tail-end (*ihedi, nwereisinaodu*). This philosophy therefore admits of no division under no matter what appearance. Asouzu argues that all human problems can be addressed and solved through a pre-education of the mind where the problem stems from. According to Asouzu, it is the mind that has the capacity to bifurcate and polarize reality. On religious scale, it is the minds of the religious fanatics which has been mis-educated and mis-informed that cause them to bifurcate and polarize the world along the line of religion and elevate their religion to an absolute instance. The minds of today’s people need a re-education through what Asouzu calls noetic propaedeutic – a pre-education of the mind. It is through this act of re-education of the minds of our today’s people that everybody will come to see religion for what it truly is. It is at this level that they will come to realize that no religion like being or reality is self-sufficient.

Asouzu’s existential philosophy when implemented on education and interpersonal relationship, is effective to resolve most of the ills in our today’s world. Asouzu argues on this regard that

National development is understood not in the sense of a one-sided development but as something that is aimed at fostering all those factors, human and otherwise, that contribute towards a healthy society. Thus, national development is not, only a factor of economic and technological forces, but also, deeply connected with good human development and interpersonal relationship.<sup>64</sup>

In Nigerian universities, as a starting point, it is believed that some disciplines such as Medicine, Engineering, Law, are the necessary and important based on their practical utility while the other theoretical disciplines such as History, Philosophy, English and other humanitarian courses are inconsequential. Asouzu believes this bifurcating spirit of comparison is “not only unscientific, but somewhat embarrassing.”<sup>65</sup> In fact, Humanistic education is a form of technology, and as a technology, it is not only defined by its practical aspect; it refers in the widest sense to the acquisition of basic skill, i.e. any skill which helps man in his bid for creativity and search for truth. In this sense, all skills which our universities can impart become important as something technologically oriented, “the art of speaking, auto mechanic, panel-beating, trading, shoe-making, pottery, engineering, medicine, and other skills, arts and crafts. All these arts and crafts become technology if they aimed at digging out the truth.”<sup>66</sup> If they aimed at the satisfaction of our basic needs. In the modern race for more adaptable technologies, Asouzu believes that there is “the need to view technology from its orientation to truth’, this necessity he affirms, “is often overshadowed by pragmatic and utilitarian considerations.”<sup>67</sup>

The hegemonic and absolute mindset of selectiveness, belittling and making nothing of something is very glaring in Aristotle’s discriminative class consciousness where he uses the analogy of the type of relationship existing between the master workers and the manual workers to drive home his message that *Metaphysics* is a superior science than other sciences. “We think also that the master workers in each craft are more honourable and know in truer sense and are wiser than the manual worker, because they know the causes of things that are done.”<sup>68</sup> The misconceptions we can gather from this bifurcating way of looking at reality, if it is not addressed, are bound to have serious consequence in the overall development of a nation. In Nigeria today, it has been the evil that destroys her economy.

After the oil-boom of the 70s, Nigerians swiftly became discriminative against other natural resources, and that mentality became her undoing. Since the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in Nigeria in 1956 and the oil boom of 1970s, oil was elevated to the most important and necessary which Nigeria couldn’t do without. At the expense of other missing-links of natural products like cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, yam, cassava, “oil now accounts for more than 90 percent of the country’s exports, 25 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and 80 percent of government total revenues.”<sup>69</sup> A consequence of this heavy dependence on oil revenue is that the economy of the country has been substantially unstable. The whole idea is that the oil boom led to neglect of agriculture and other non-oil tax revenue sectors, deterioration of financial discipline and accountability. The neglect, brought mental, physical and spiritual laziness as everyone relied on a monthly state allocation to squander and use on things of no relevance to national development such as siphoning monies to Dubai, France, South Africa e.t.c. for their own selfish interests. This trend takes the radical form of the urge to acquire wealth and power at the detriment of fundamental common sense and good taste but in view of some good purposes. The boomeranging effect is deterioration of financial discipline and accountability, and has brought Nigeria a systemic failure where virtually nothing is working.

Corruption becomes the boomeranging effect. Nigerians of today are so lazy mentally that all their hope is oil tax revenue. Only few Nigerian youths think of farming, auto mechanic, panel-beating, trading, shoe-making, pottery, teaching as something worth engaging. The belief is that all these departments do not open ways to steal the oil-money. Thus, the attitude has created a Nigeria that can only consume but lack all it takes to produce. Asouzu posits: “A nation which embarks on the acquisition of technology in a way that suggests that the foundation on which such a technology rests in not commensurately harmonized with the transcendent humanistic dictates of practical reason creates more problems than it can solve.”<sup>70</sup>

## 6. CONCLUSION

Given that Asouzu has shown life as one big living organism that requires the interdependence of its parts to develop, to realize authenticity and realness, then the best way to live it cannot be a division where the *haves* (the knowledgeable and powerful) think of the *have-nots* (the ignorant and powerless) as mere accidents, where the easterners, westerners, think of the southerners, northerners as

dispensable. As different parts make up the body, so differences in age, in sex, in nationality, in religion, in language, in ethnicity, in tribes, in race, in culture, in ideologies, are expressions of this multidimensional reality. What this claim implies is simple. No group or tribe or nation, irrespective of possession of wealth, position, and education is absolutely independent.

No part can be understood without reference to other parts of the multidimensional reality. It goes on and on. Where one part suffers, the whole body is in pain. Nigeria as a part of the global family is itself a whole body which requires the interdependence of its various religions, cultures, ideologies, ethnicities, to develop. If there is any problem in Nigeria, it is simply tied to her non complimentary and one-sided approach to human interest. The Igbo man believes he is enough in himself, so is, the Yoruba man, Hausa man. We have gradually lost the working understanding having anchorage on the law of complementarity which is the first law of thought of the African logic. It is part of the customary logic that a Hausa man cannot be understood where the Hausa man thinks that a reference to Igbo man, Yoruba man, Ijaw man, is irrelevant. According to Innocent Asouzu, “a tribe or nation which sees itself as the center of the world can easily underestimate its fragility and finitude and overestimate its power.”<sup>71</sup>

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# Enhancing Employee Productivity through informed Communication in Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Bonny, Rivers State

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## Abstract

*The study investigated informal communication use and enhancement of work place relationship in Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas. The study was hinged on Social networking system. identify the different informal communication channels utilised by NLNG employees to build and strengthen interpersonal connections and examine the role of informal communication in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG). It adopted survey research design with an in-depth interview (quantitative and qualitative study) with a total population of 3,740 workers and 3 management staff. It used Taro Yamane to arrive at 400 on quantitative approach and used questionnaire and question guide as the instruments of data collection. The results revealed that the most commonly reported channels informal communication channels employed by NLNG employees were in-person conversations, social event chats during informal gathering and causal talks and rumour were the major informal communication that play significant roles in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG). The study recommends that NLNG should encourage and support informal interactions among employees by providing designated spaces for breaks and social activities. This will facilitate the organic growth of relationships and collaboration.*

**Keywords:** Communication, Information Communication, Enhancement, Work Place Relationship, NLNG

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## Introduction

The argument that communication whether formal or informal in every organisation is capable of effecting changes, influence actions and the welfare of enterprise is on. Informal communication holds a significant role in providing valuable information to both management and employees. It plays a crucial role in fostering and enhancing personal relationships within the workplace. Informal communication enables managers to gain insights into employees' contributions to the organization, as noted by (Kibe, 2014). Additionally, it is seen as a vital tool for employees to establish meaningful interpersonal connections, fulfill their social needs, exercise a degree of control, and build useful professional and personal networks, as highlighted by (Glomer, 2011). Moreover, informal communication offers managers a window into the values and ethics of their organization, identifies issues that are of importance to employees, and facilitates a connection with their perspectives. It caters to employees' requirements and cultivates a sense of camaraderie and friendship among those who exchange information, as described by (Fay, 2012).

Consequently, the significance of informal communication is most evident in well-structured private sector and established organizations where it is actively embraced as a means to achieve corporate objectives. However, in government-established enterprises like NLNG, the influence of politics and government often impacts the channels and methods of communication, as well as employee relationships in the workplace. Therefore, it is crucial to explore the correlation between informal communication and workplace relationships, particularly in government-established enterprises.

There seems to be some informal communication among workers of NLNG, Bonny. Sometimes, the conversations among workers of NLNG come in form of rumour among security, cleaners, even among managers. Majority of decisions organisations take in their companies are discussed informally before a former setting. For instance, the reaction from NLNG for the set-back delays in the investment decision meeting involving stakeholders of the company on the Train 7 gas project was a result of rumour (information communication) that linked from the organisation in the public through informal communication. This prompted Sophia Horsfall, the Manager of Corporate Communication and Public Affairs at Nigerian LNG, to reassure the public and stakeholders that the company remains committed to the gas project despite the setback. She emphasized that actions were underway to ensure the final investment decision is successfully reached.

The conventional perception of informal communication, encompassing elements like rumors, gossip, and casual talk, generally carries a negative connotation within organizations. This is primarily because informal communication is not subject to management control and is often seen as more credible and reliable by most employees than official communication from top management. It typically serves the interests of specific groups and can jeopardize the security of an organization, creating an environment of mistrust among employees, leading to work-life conflicts, and increasing office politics, as observed by (Memduhoglu and Saylik, 2012). Organizations that suffer the consequences of informal communication, such as gossip and rumors, tend to struggle in maintaining stability, control, and trust among their employees. Fay in 2012 compares informal communication, particularly gossip, to a virus that can have a detrimental impact on a company's bottom line, affecting morale, productivity, and resulting in issues like increased sick leave, resignations, and premature job searches, as noted by (Morrison, 2004).

Unfortunately, the effects of informal communication on organizations have largely been overlooked, as previous studies have primarily focused on formal communications, with limited research of notable significance concerning the impact of informal communication on employee relationships.

The effect of informal communication on the organisation has largely been ignored as existing studies focused on formal communications (Neves & Eisenberger, 2012; Nebo, Nwankwo & Okonkwo, 2013; Shafique, Ahmad, Abbas & Hussain, 2015; Adegbuyi, Adunola, Worlu & Ajagbe, 2015) with limited studies of citable significance on the effect of informal communication on employee relationship. Therefore, the study examines how informal communication can enhance work place relationship in Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Workplace relationships are pivotal to the organisation's success, employee well-being, and overall productivity especially in an organisation like the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG). However, there exists a gap in understanding the significance and impact of informal communication in fostering and enhancing workplace relationships among NLNG employees. While formal communication channels are well-established, the role of informal communication in bridging gaps, building trust, and fostering collaboration remains relatively unexplored.

The problem lies in the limited awareness and recognition of the potential benefits that informal communication can bring to the NLNG work environment. The absence of a comprehensive understanding of how informal communication influences employee interactions, job satisfaction, knowledge sharing, and overall organisational dynamics hinders NLNG's ability to harness the full potential of informal channels to create a harmonious and productive workplace.

Furthermore, the diverse cultural background of NLNG's workforce adds another layer of complexity to workplace relationships. Understanding how informal communication can be leveraged to promote inclusivity and intercultural understanding among employees is crucial for maintaining a cohesive and engaged workforce.

Moreover, the potential challenges associated with informal communication, such as the exclusion of certain employees from informal networks or the spread of rumours and misinformation, need to be addressed. Without a clear understanding of these challenges, NLNG may inadvertently allow communication barriers to persist, leading to potential conflicts, reduced employee morale, and decreased productivity. It is on this basis the study examines how informal communication enhances workplace relationship in Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas,

### **Objectives of the Study**

The following objectives guided the study

1. identify the different informal communication channels utilised by NLNG employees to build and strengthen interpersonal connections;
2. examine the role of informal communication in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG).

### **Research Questions**

From the above objectives, the following research questions were formulated:

1. What are the common informal communication channels employed by NLNG employees to establish rapport and build trust with their colleagues?
2. What are the role of informal communication in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG)?

### **Review of Related Literature**

#### **Thematic analysis of informal Communication**

Informal communication is a dynamic and essential aspect of organisational interaction that occurs outside the bounds of formal structures and channels. It encompasses the spontaneous exchanges of information, ideas, and feelings among employees in an unstructured manner (Robbins & Judge, 2018). This form of communication often takes place during breaks, social gatherings, or even impromptu conversations, and it serves as a conduit for building relationships, sharing knowledge, and enhancing organisational cohesion (Kaulio, 2015).

The fluidity and personal nature of informal communication enable employees to establish connections that transcend hierarchical boundaries (Bolino, Long, & Turnley, 2016). Through these interactions, employees create networks that allow them to access information and resources that might not be readily available through formal channels. The concept of informal communication aligns with social network theory, which highlights the role of relationships in facilitating the flow of information (Cross, Parker, & Borgatti, 2002).

The impacts of informal communication on organisational dynamics are substantial. It contributes to the development of an open and trusting atmosphere where employees feel comfortable expressing their opinions and concerns (Miller & Monge, 1986). Furthermore, informal communication plays a pivotal role in fostering a sense of belonging and shared understanding among employees, enhancing their engagement with the organisation (Knight & Patterson, 2004).

However, the informal communication landscape is not devoid of challenges. Cultural differences, language barriers, and the potential for rumors and gossip are some of the obstacles that can hinder effective informal communication (Barge & Fuller, 1997). To mitigate these challenges, organisations

should encourage an inclusive environment that respects cultural diversity and emphasizes the importance of accurate and ethical communication (Guffey & Loewy, 2015).

In the modern era, digital communication tools have transformed the landscape of informal communication. Platforms like Slack, Microsoft Teams, and WhatsApp enable employees to maintain connections even in remote work settings (Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013). This highlights the adaptability of informal communication in keeping pace with technological advancements and changing work patterns.

People that employ informal workplace communication typically do so out of self-interest. It is defined by a lack of supervision from upper management and is seen to be more flexible and dependable than traditional official communication (Robbins & Judge, 2010). In today's businesses, work-oriented communication frequently takes the shape of informal conversation.

Members of the organisation create informal links with one another, which facilitate the sharing of informal information through an informal communication network. Informal communication transcends organisational borders as individuals inside the network share information with others they encounter (Greenberg & Baron 2008). Additionally, casual contact is typically carried out verbally. As a result, the information is typically widely disseminated quickly (Greenberg & Baron 2008).

Informal communication serves as a vital aspect of organisational interaction, enabling employees to form relationships, share knowledge, and strengthen engagement. Its ability to transcend formal boundaries and foster a collaborative atmosphere underscores its significance in contemporary workplaces. Organisations that acknowledge the potency of informal communication and address its challenges can harness its benefits to cultivate a more connected and productive workforce.

### **Employee Productivity**

Employee productivity is a pivotal concept within organisational dynamics, signifying the effectiveness and efficiency with which employees perform their assigned tasks and contribute to the attainment of organisational goals (Koopmans, 2017). It is a multidimensional construct that encompasses not only the quantity of work accomplished but also the quality of output, resource utilization, and the alignment of individual efforts with the organisation's objectives (Podsakoff et al., 2017). Several factors contribute to the measurement and enhancement of employee productivity. Job performance, which encompasses the execution of tasks and responsibilities, serves as a fundamental indicator (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). Additionally, individual attributes, such as skills, knowledge, and motivation, influence how effectively an employee translates inputs into desired outputs (Campbell, 1990).

The relationship between employee productivity and organisational success is reciprocal. Increased customer happiness, lower expenses, and improved operational efficiency are all impacted by productive workers (Kinnie et al., 2013). Furthermore, organisations that emphasize employee productivity often experience higher levels of innovation and adaptability, as engaged and motivated employees are more likely to contribute creative ideas and actively seek process improvements (Shipton et al., 2006).

A crucial factor influencing employee productivity is the work environment. A positive organisational culture that promotes collaboration, recognition, and continuous learning can significantly impact an employee's motivation and commitment to achieving high levels of productivity (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Furthermore, effective leadership that provides clear goals, regular feedback, and opportunities for skill development can foster an environment conducive to enhanced productivity (Avolio & Yammarino, 2013).

However, it's important to note that employee productivity is not solely an individual effort. The context in which employees work, including team dynamics, technological tools, and organisational

support systems, plays a significant role in facilitating or hindering productivity (Parker & Wall, 1998). Moreover, the balance between work demands and employee well-being is critical; excessive demands can lead to burnout and decreased productivity (Bakker & Demerouti, 2017).

### **Empirical Review**

Asamu (2014) investigated how employees' performance was affected by communication in a particular Lagos State, Nigerian organisation. The study's findings demonstrated a connection between workers' performance, dedication, and production and effective communication. According to the study, managers should have frequent communication with staff members in order to increase dedication and output. Onifade, Opele, and Okafor (2018) looked at communication as a useful method for improving worker performance at Unilever Nigeria Plc in a related study. The study's findings demonstrated a strong correlation between worker performance and efficient communication. As a result, it was advised that businesses work to implement effective communication as a key approach for obtaining high employee performance.

Ayofe and Akinbo (2022) examined staff performance and interpersonal relationships in a particular Nigerian bank. The findings demonstrated that the three measures of interpersonal relationships are frequently given high ratings by the respondents, with an average mean of 4.04 for social support, 4.02 for team building, and 4.07 for effective communication. It also showed that an increase in effective communication inside the company raises employee performance over the 68% mark. The results also showed that having strong interpersonal relationships enhances an employee's ability to succeed at work through increased motivation, cooperation, communication, and mutual assistance.

Nwinyokpugi (2018) examined staff productivity and organisational change management in the Nigerian banking industry. The findings from the data analysis showed that every The study suggested that change implementation should start at the top and work its way down to the employee, and that change communication should be methodical.

Employee performance and work satisfaction in organisations were studied by Dugguh and Ayaga (2014). The study's findings showed that a variety of elements, including accomplishment, acknowledgment, accountability, compensation, and working environment, positively impact employees' performance in companies. It was advised that managers make advantage of the variables that affect workers' performance in order to improve the working environment, their happiness, and their well-being.

Solomon, Hashim, Mehdi and Akintunde (2012) investigated organisational success and employee motivation in multinational corporations, as well as rewards for contented personnel. The disclosed information indicated that Cadbury Nigeria Plc provided sufficient incentives. Additionally, there is a strong association between staff productivity and improved communication.

A research on the effect of business communication on organisational performance in Nigerian enterprises was carried out by Udegbe and Udegbe (2012). The study discovered that the questioned Nigerian organisations place a fair amount of emphasis on effective business communication. The "level of emphasise" is a matter of degree, though. Additionally, it was shown that the size and kind of organisation (manufacturing vs services) were associated with the degree of successful business communication practises. The use of respondents' self-assessed performance and the confounding impact of differences within and across industry kinds of firms and industry sectors restrict the research findings. There may be some lessons for practitioners and researchers in other developing nations from the established study, which goes beyond the typical framework of wealthy western economies. Noah (2012) looked at the attitudes of workers in a Nigerian workplace on their work environment and attitude. The results showed that respondents' attitudes about their jobs and the work environment were significantly correlated. In particular, it was discovered that the workplace presented physical and social challenges, which in turn caused several unfavourable behaviours in the employees, including poor dedication, indifference, and absenteeism.

Abah and Nwokwu (2016) investigated employee productivity and work place motivation in Nigerian public organisations: a Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) research. The study's conclusion showed that increased employee productivity and motivation are positively correlated. Gberville (2010) investigated staff performance and organisational retention techniques at Zenith Banks in Nigeria and discovered that implementing effective employee-retention strategies—like maintaining a positive organisation reputation, involving staff in decision-making, offering a regular and improved salary, and treating employees with compassion—is more financially advantageous for businesses as a means of improving organisational performance. Additionally, Iheriohanma and Nwokocha (2012) examined new developments in employee retention tactics in Nigeria's expanding global economy.

Anya and Ezeekiel (2019) studied communication as a tool for effective secondary education management in Nigeria. The results of the findings revealed among others that free flow of information enhances effective management; that the grapevine helps in the fast dissemination of information. Also that horizontal communication channel fosters relationships among peers in secondary schools in Rivers State, Nigeria. Anasi (2020) examined the effects of physical work environment, workload, and work relationships on the job of a librarian in the southwest region of Nigeria. The findings show a substantial linear association between job happiness, work environment, workload, and work relationships. Workload is not a statistically significant predictor of librarians' job satisfaction among the factors analysed; nevertheless, the work environment and relationships with coworkers have a statistically significant relative impact.

Olubayo (2015) looked into how organisational structure affected workers' happiness in the finance sector in Nigeria. The study's conclusion showed that there is a connection between employee happiness and organisational structure. The study conducted by Gibson, Fourné and Agarwal (2020) delves into the intricate relationship between organisational culture, communication patterns, and employee productivity. The study conducted by Ren Argote and Fahrenkopf (2018) explored the intricate relationship between information sharing within teams and their overall performance. The study uncovers several key findings that illuminate the importance of information sharing for team performance: The study conducted by Jackson, Perry and Wang, (2019) delved into the intricate relationship between informal communication networks within organisations and their impact on employee productivity. This research investigates how informal ties and communication patterns influence information flow, problem-solving, and overall work effectiveness. The research establishes that employees embedded within strong informal communication networks have better access to critical information. These individuals can leverage their relationships to quickly obtain information, leading to quicker problem-solving and more informed decision-making.

**Methodology** The study adopted mixed-method research approach, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods to gain a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between informal communication and productivity. In a mixed-methods approach, the researchers used both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The quantitative method involved gathering and statistically evaluating numerical data via survey questionnaires. The qualitative approach entailed gathering non-numerical data through observations and interviews, then examining it to look for trends and themes. Based on meticulously gathered data, the population for this study is all direct and indirect NLNG workers, or 3,740 people from both Human Resource and Contracting Departments of the organisation. The 3,740 staff were retrieved from the NLNG and adopted as the population on the quantitative approach. However, three (3) staff, the Manager, human resource, Head of Corporate and Public Affairs and Public Relations manager were interviewed and this served as the population on the qualitative approach. The sample size for this study was determined to be 380 using survey monkey, an online sample size calculator with an error margin of 5% from this population, both respondents for the survey and the interview were drawn. The census sample was adopted on the qualitative approach.

Nonetheless, stratified random sampling technique was employed on the quantitative approach. This technique divides the population (NLNG employees) into distinct groups (strata) based on specific characteristics, such as departments, type of employment (main staff or contract staff) or job levels.

From each stratum, a sample will be randomly selected, ensuring that different roles and responsibilities are adequately represented in the study. This approach helps prevent bias and allows researchers to draw more accurate conclusions about the entire employee population. There was no need for any sampling techniques on the qualitative approach since it adopted census sample. Rather, 3 members of top management – Head of corporate communications/Public Affairs, the Human Resource Manager and public relations manager were interviewed.

An interview guide and a structured questionnaire were the research tools employed in this study. The research questions guided the formulation of the questionnaire. There were two portions in the questionnaire design: A and B. Every question in section A was designed with the intention of eliciting demographic data from the respondents (age, sex, education qualification, marital status etc.) while the remaining items in section B were psychological variable. And they are made up of 16 items. Accordingly, four of the items were structured on close ended questions while 12 designed for four likert scale. Items 1 -9 were used to address research question one which sought to identify common informal communication channels employed by NLNG employees to establish rapport and build trust with their colleagues. Nevertheless, items; 10, 11, 11 and 12 were used answer research question two (2), this sought to examine the role of informal communication in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG). For the quantitative phase, a survey was conducted among the selected NLNG employees.

However, for the qualitative phase, data was gathered through interviews with top management of the organisation. Nevertheless, secondary data were gathered from book, journals and the Internet. The data were analyzed using Weighted Mean Score. For qualitative data collected through interviews, the data was thematically analysed. This involved the identification of recurring themes and patterns in participants' responses and categorising the responses to uncover insights into employees' experiences with informal communication and its impact on productivity.

In the end, the researcher compared the quantitative findings with the qualitative insights. This process of triangulation strengthened the overall validity of the conclusions of the study.

**Data Presentation**

**Table 4.1.3: Response on common informal communication channels employed by NLNG**

Statement	SA	A	D	SD	TOTAL	WMS	RMK
The channel of informal communication is in-person conversations during breaks	141	86	129	24	1041	2.7	Accepted
The channel of informal communication is online chat platforms	79	66	15	185	729	1.9	Rejected
The channel of informal communication is Social events organised by the company	172	103	78	27	1180	3.1	Accepted
The channel of informal communication is informal gatherings after work	135	98	112	35	1093	2.9	Accepted
I am not sure of the channel of informal communication	41	57	104	178	721	1.9	Rejected

The data on Table 4.1 reveal that the most commonly reported channels informal communication channels employed by NLNG employees were in-person conversations, social event chats during informal gathering.

**Table 4.2: Responses on the role of informal communication in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG)**

Statement	SA	A	D	SD	TOTAL	WMS	RMK
Causal talk plays a role in enhancing workplace relationship at NLNG	131	115	173	61	1276	3.4	Accepted
Rumour plays a role in enhancing workplace relationship at NLNG	153	126	49	52	1140	3.0	Accepted
Gossips plays a role in enhancing workplace relationship at NLNG	51	62	96	171	753	2.0	Rejected
Whispering plays a role in enhancing workplace relationship at NLNG	41	76	99	164	754	2.0	Rejected

Causal talks and rumour were the major informal communication that play significant roles in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG).

**Results and Discussions**

**Research question 1:** identify the different informal communication channels utilised by NLNG employees to build and strengthen interpersonal connections;

The study found that social event and informal gathering were the major channels of information communication among NLG workers. The data in table 4.1. found 2.5 above indicated significant majority of respondents, agreed that in person conversation during, social event and informal gathering were the major channels of information communication among NLG workers. They are reported used these channels of communication to build interpersonal connections. This aligns with research by Robbins and Judge (2019), who emphasized that face-to-face interactions play a vital role in creating a sense of rapport and camaraderie among employees.

Additionally, the survey unveiled those 175 respondents (46.1%) utilized "online chat platforms" to strengthen interpersonal connections. This finding resonates with the evolution of workplace communication technologies, as highlighted by Wellman and Haythornthwaite (2002), emphasizing that online platforms facilitate both social and professional interactions.

Interestingly, "social events organised by the company" were reported as an informal communication channel by 140 respondents (36.8%). This finding underscores the importance of structured social activities in fostering a sense of community and relationship-building, a concept supported by Baker and Dutton's (2007) research on positive organisational networks.

The data also revealed that "informal gatherings after work" were utilized by 210 respondents (55.3%). This finding is in line with the research by Marsden and Campbell (1984), who discussed the role of social interactions outside work hours in developing informal relationships and strengthening connections among colleagues.

**Research question 2:** examine the role of informal communication in enhancing workplace relationships at Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG).

The study also found that information communication immensely contribute in fostering good relationship in NLNG, Bonny. The data revealed a prevalent belief among respondents regarding the



positive influence of informal relationships on workplace alliances. Many respondents highlighted that informal communication relationships contribute significantly meaning they create a foundation of trust and understanding that extends beyond formal interactions. This is true because the data on table 4.2 indicating 2.5 above showed that information communication immensely contribute in fostering good relationship in NLNG, Bonny. This finding is consistent with the research of McAllister (1995), who proposed that trust is a key factor in building effective alliances among individuals.

Furthermore, respondents emphasised that informal relationships promote open communication and encourage collaborative mindsets. These findings align with research by Ganesan (1994), who discussed how relational norms established through informal connections can lead to more cooperative behaviors, enhancing the success of alliances. Thus, there is a connection between employees' performance, dedication, and productivity and effective communications (Asamu, 2014). Effective communication and worker performance were found to be significantly correlated by Onifade, Opele, and Okafor (2018) supplying sufficient incentive through Cadbury Nigeria Plc. Additionally, there is a strong association between staff productivity and improved communication (Solomon, Hashim, Mehdi & Akintunde, 2012).

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the research underscores the importance of informal communication as a catalyst for enhancing employee productivity within NLNG. The findings highlight that informal interactions build strong relationships among employees, promote knowledge sharing, and break down hierarchical barriers. These factors collectively contribute to a cohesive work environment that boosts morale, job satisfaction, and overall employee productivity.

### **Recommendations**

#### **The study recommends that:**

1. NLNG should encourage and support informal interactions among employees by providing designated spaces for breaks and social activities. This will facilitate the organic growth of relationships and collaboration.
2. Acknowledge and reward employees who actively participate in fostering a positive work environment through informal communication. This can serve as an incentive for employees to engage more in such interactions.

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## **The Paradox in Frantz Fanon's Liberation Contestation in the Context of Humanism**

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### **Abstract**

*Various dimensions have emerged in man's understanding of humanism, and ample space has been accorded thoughts about violence and pacifism. African philosophers like Frantz Fanon and Nelson Mandela have taken a position in this debate. The question that has remained unanswered is whether the endorsement of violence as a tool of liberation is not dialectically opposed to the trappings of humanism. The struggle for political evolution in various nations in African presently is one of the numerous motivations of this study. Across history and even in contemporary times, various violent activities have been justified by allusions to liberation and restoration of humanism. Frantz Fanon's contestation and advocacy of violence, in his quest for decolonization in Algeria, represent a liberation philosophy that raises questions about the pursuit of humanism with seemingly non-humane means. Could such actions be contextualized in humanism? Is it not a camouflage? What is humanism? Is there in-humanism in humanism? This paper engages critical analysis examine what appears to be contradictions in Fanon's humanism. The paper traces how Fanon's theory of violence has affected humanity and to what extent this contributes to sharpening the struggle for national integrity and egalitarianism in Africa.*

**Keywords:** Humanism, In-humanism, Africa, Philosophy, Colonialism and Violence.

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### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Humanism is a term freely applied to a variety of beliefs, method and philosophies that place central emphasis on the human realm. According to Merriam – Webster Dictionary, Humanism is “a doctrine, attitude or ways of life centered on human interests or values, a philosophy that usually rejects supernaturalism and stress an individual's dignity and worth and capacity for self – realization through reason<sup>1</sup>. Oxford Advance learner's dictionary define humanism as, “a rationalist outlook or system of thought attaching prime importance to human rather than divine or supernatural matters”<sup>2</sup>. However, the term is used with reference to a system of education and mode of inquiry that developed in Northern Italy during the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century and later spread through continental Europe and England alternatively known as Renaissance humanism. Humanism sought to emphasize on the value and dignity of people. This work investigates the humanism of some philosophers such as Frantz Fanon and extract in-humanism from his theory of humanism. Nevertheless, this work will crystallize the work of Frantz Fanon during his quest for decolonization in Algeria where he explores the role of violence as the perfect revolutionary weapon in which the colonize man liberate himself from the shackle of colonialism. In Fanon's work “*The wretched of the earth*”, he argues that the colonized world is “a world divided into compartments, divided into two to cater for two different species”<sup>3</sup>.

It can be argued that this special divide which seeks to establish boundaries is that in which the “colonized was localized and positioned and essentially made to perform the role of a foreigner, in his or her own country.”<sup>4</sup> Fanon is of the view that a compartmentalized colonial city perpetuates itself even after a ‘successful’ independence. He was able to understand the pain of the colonized because of his knowledge as a psychologist. He understood and pointed out all forms of oppression that the Negro undergoes and draw their justification from a simply biblical source that allows them to rationalize the lack of humanity in whoever is been oppressed. Thus, in chapter six of Fanon’s book, “*Black Skin White Mask*”, he presents a brief, but deep, psycho-analysis of colonized black people and proposes the inability of black people to fit into the norms (social, cultural, racial) established by white society, and that “a normal Negro child having grown up in a normal Negro family will become abnormal on the slightest contact of the white world”<sup>5</sup>. Such an extreme psychological response originates from the unconscious and unnatural training of black people from early childhood to associate “blackness” with “wrongness” while “whiteness” is considered “virtue” and for Negro to liberate himself from this inferiority complexes, it requires violence that Fanon poised as the perfect revolutionary weapon to escape from colonialism.

Various violent activities against humanity are been projected under the canopy of humanism and such dehumanizing actions are attack on the values and dignity of humans. Thus, Frantz Fanon in his work “*The Wretched of the Earth*” starts out with a dialectical analysis of violence. His primary concern is decolonization. He understands colonization to be the substitution of one species of humankind for another that he also referred to as racism. Fanon referenced a work by Aime Cesaire, which compares lynching in America, worldwide discrimination against Jews and the legalization of forced labor in Africa to the action of Adolf Hitler to prove his point that oppression is a universal concept that does not vary its intensity whatsoever.

He also contends that a particular segment of a society is not more or less responsible for racism when he paraphrases Francis Jeanson’s statement that, “every citizen of a nation is responsible for the actions committed in the name of that nation”<sup>6</sup>. Fanon also argued that France is a racist country, which was been revealed in their modus operandi in Africa where they made black to feel inferior and see themselves as been superior. Inferiority complex usually occur among the minority in population. However, in Africa such was not the case, the white minority made themselves superior over the black majority. Fanon reminds us in his work:

In Martinique, there are 200 whites who consider themselves superior to 300,000 people of color, in South Africa there are two million white against almost thirteen million native people and it have never occurred to a single black to consider himself superior to a number of the white minority.<sup>7</sup>

Fanon insists that there is a correlation between the feelings of inferiority experienced by people of color and the feelings of superiority shown by whites and that “it is the racist who creates his inferior”<sup>8</sup>. Here, the oppressed individual must either develop feelings of inferiority or remain dependent on the colonizers as experienced by the black man. Fanon’s dream was to rid-off this inferiority complex, on the part of the colonized, not by remaining in the place of dependence but by becoming aware of the source of his subconscious conflict and choosing action against colonial structures or else remaining passive. However, Fanon suggested violence as the ultimate weapon for decolonization and for the colonized to liberate himself from the shackles of racism, but this work is to remind Fanon’s protagonist that his advocacy of violence goes against the value and dignity of human and such should not be projected under humanism. This work will analyze the condition of the colonial reality and critically analyze an overwhelming number of issues drawing from racial formation, identity, decolonization, liberation struggles, language nationalism and violence and the various ways in which they shape and alter the relationship between the colonizers and the colonized. Thus, crystallizing Frantz Fanon theory of violence, which was his fundamental premise in the quest for decolonization in Africa; juxtaposing it with the universal theory of humanism and debunking this theory as dehumanizing as it affects humanity. Humanism is a system of thought attaching fundamental

importance on human rather than other supernatural matters. It is problematic to describe humanity as purity of thought and rationality as thinking according to absolute rules of inference and then “locate human existence exclusively within Europe”<sup>9</sup>. This, however, runs a “risk of confining and condemning non-Europeans to irrationality or cognitive underdevelopment”<sup>10</sup>. This, therefore, is a rethinking of humanity in a critical way. Critical humanism entails the rethinking of the *problematique* of being or existence outside the confines of metaphysics of ‘presencing’ in the Globe. Reflecting on Fanon, it is believed that “each generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it”<sup>11</sup>. As a generation of a disbanded revolution in our underdeveloped countries, this work emphasizes the need to continuously question, challenge and resist the neo-liberal technocrat thinking and the legacy of colonialism and also help on the “maturing of the struggle of our lifetime”<sup>12</sup>. This work is therefore divided into five parts namely; Frantz fanon concept of humanism, Types of violence in fanon, The necessity of violence in decolonization, In-humanism in fanon’s humanism and Conclusion

## 2. FRANTZ FANON CONCEPT OF HUMANISM

For a long time, humanism was a broad movement in thought and action in which key radical thinkers explicitly located their work. In 1844, Marx wrote, “communism is humanism”.<sup>13</sup> and in 1945, Sartre gave his famous lecture “existentialism is humanism”. Humanism still appealed to Biko in the early 1970’s but for the contemporary reader; humanism is best seen as a naïve anachronism and at worst, dangerously repressive. Fanon’s vision throughout was underwritten by a call to human solidarity. A challenge to both black and whites, and to all human beings to move away from the inhuman voices of their respective ancestors so that a genuine communication can be born”<sup>14</sup>. Uninterested in debates as to which “race” was superior and which is inferior. Fanon asks, “why not simply try to touch the other, feel the other, discover each other? Was my freedom not given me to build the world of you man?”<sup>15</sup>. Fanon claims on the first page of his book, *black skin white masks*, that he writes “for a new humanism”<sup>16</sup>. He ends his last book, “the wretched of the earth” written after the exposure to the full barbarism of French colonialism, and the FLN’s violent resistance with these famous words. “For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must change, we must work out new concepts and try to set a foot a new man”<sup>17</sup>. Fanon’s views on revolutionary practice are wholly known for their emphasis on violence as “*sin quo non*” for authentic decolonization. These views were been expressed in his writings, which include *black skin white mask*, “*A dying colonialism*”, “*The wretched of the Earth*” and “*Towards the African revolution*”.

Now, we may ask, what does fanon mean by violence? The issue of violence is an important one in fanon’s thought. It is in view of this that it became necessary for us to make distinction between his thesis that the colonial situation is an inherently violent one and his ethical justification of violence as a potent instrument for liberation. For as L.A Jinadu puts it “Failure to make this distinction or to emphasize it as major defect in much of the discussion of the aspect of Fanon’s thought”. One reason for this one-sided treatment of violence in Fanon, according to Jinadu, is that much of the discussion are devoted not so much to Fanon’s claim that the colonial situation is by nature violence as to his claim that violence is degenerating and spiritually purifying. What we see in fanon is a total condemnation of the violence inflicted on the colonized people by the colonizer. He believes that such violence is not conducive to the self-realization of the colonized. He reorganizes the instrumental value of violence as a means to a desirable end when socially organized and ideologically directed to achieve the liberation of the colonized. In this sense, Fanon regards violence as the praxis for decolonization and freedom as self-realization.

### 2.1 TYPES OF VIOLENCE IN FANON

Fanon conceives violence as socio-psychological, political as well as economical defects inherent in colonial rule and domination. He also claims that, “violence is the cleaning force, it frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction, it makes him fearless and restores self-respect”<sup>19</sup>. He gave three types of violence namely, physical, structural and psychological violence.

1. Physical violence: It involves bodily injury inflicted on human beings, the most radical manifestation of which is the killing of an individual. This conception of violence as involving the killing or wounding of human beings is reflected in many passages in the wretched of the earth. Thus, when Fanon claims that “colonialism is violence in its natural state”<sup>21</sup> part of his meaning is that colonial rule is being preceded, inaugurated and maintained, by the use of physical violence.
2. Structural violence – structural violence on the other hand is what fanon pointed out during colonial operation. In this sense, structural violence is a condition of social injustice. According to Fanon, the abject poverty of the colonized is in stark contrast to the affluence of the colonizer.

The colonial world is a world divided into compartments; it is probably unnecessary to recall the existence of native quarters and European quarters; schools for natives and schools for Europeans. In the same way, we need not recall apartheid in South Africa<sup>22</sup>.

In Fanon's views, the purpose of colonialism and indeed the essence of the colonial states is the perpetuation of this condition of social injustice. According to Fanon, the colonizers are less concerned with bridging the gulf that separates them from the colonized than while sapping the colony of its economic wealth. This assumption obviously runs counter to the view that colonies were economically unprofitable and, therefore, burdensome to the colonizer. According to fanon, “in every concrete way Europe has stuffed herself inordinately with the gold and raw materials of the colonial countries”<sup>23</sup> Now the question, which comes to mind, is if there is any relationship between physical and structural violence. The answer to this question would involve another reference to Fanon's belief in influence of socio-economic and political structures on the behavioral calculus of individuals. For example, Fanon's thesis is also partly that structural violence as condition of social injustice invariably drives the colonized people to desperate ends and to the conviction that one way to reduce the condition is to resort to the use of physical violence. The truth is that the privileged position of the colonizer is been envied by the colonized who as a result is likely to run the radical political action to change the situation.

Psychological violence – Here Fanon means the injury or harm done to human psyche according to Jinadu<sup>24</sup>. This includes brain washing, indoctrination of various kinds and threats, all of which not only serve to decrease the victim's mental potentialities but also constitutes “violence that works in the soul”<sup>25</sup>. In other words, this form of violence molds the consciousness of the colonized psychological violence represents the attempts, conscious or unconscious by the colonizer to create alienated colonized individuals who reject indigenous values and institutions because they are deceived or brain washed into believing these values and institution are inferior to those of the colonizer. The colonized people, therefore, embrace the values of institutions of the colonizer and “wear white masks” psychological violence then becomes a form of cultural imperialism, in the context of the colonial situation, and this according to Fanon, prevents its colonized victims from achieving self-realization. This situation becomes very pathetic when one recalls what fanon wrote: “in the man of color, there is constant effort to run away from his own individuality, to annihilate his own presence”<sup>26</sup>. In developing this thesis on psychological violence of psychic alienation, Fanon owes much to Sartre the existentialist philosopher. Sartre argued that a person, in this case, the Jew, is defined by the Anti-Semitic gaze of others. According to Sartre, the mistake of the “inauthentic” Jew is to have allowed himself to be poisoned by the Stereotype that the other had for him. It is in this sense that the action of the “inauthentic” Jew is over determined from the inside<sup>27</sup>. In this view Fanon claims that it is this same vein that the alienated colonized individual accepts the stereotype view that equate black with evil, he or she became the object of the other's view that derives him or her of humanity. Hence, fanon's argument goes further than Sartre's in that the Blackman experiences alienation as an individual as well as outside himself because of his color. Then we can now ask the question. To what extent is Fanon's three-fold categorization of violence useful?

## 2.2. THE NECESSITY OF VIOLENCE IN DECOLONIZATION

Frantz Fanon's approach to violence and its effects on the individual is uniquely being guided by his lived experience. Fanon was born and raised as a colonial subject in the Antilles. He then undertook medical and psychiatric training in France. Fanon was later an employed psychiatrist in Algeria, where he eventually joined the revolution against the French. Fanon outlines both the potentialities and negative aspects of violence. His most famous and controversial remarks are those around the cathartic and self-actualizing effect that violence can have on a colonial subject. However, these are often taken out of context, because Fanon is certainly not an advocate of gratuitous violence. However, this work will first interrogate the Fanonian position on the negative and positive effects of violence on an individual. Fanon, using Algeria as his example, notes that:

Decolonization is the encounter between two congenitally antagonistic forces that in fact owe their singularity to the kind of reification secreted and nurtured by the colonial situation, their first confrontation was colored by violence and their cohabitation-or rather the exploitation of the colonized by the colonizer-continued at the point of the bayonet and under cannon fire<sup>28</sup>.

In other words, colonial rule is maintained through violence and repression. Fanon strongly emphasizes that colonial rule 'brings violence into the homes and minds of colonized subject.'<sup>29</sup> Fanon even asserts that violence is the 'natural state' of colonial rule. This violence derives from the denigrating views that the colonizer has about the colonized subjects. The colonizer often inscribes the colonized subject with ideas of backwardness and a lack of empathy and rationality. The colonial subject is therefore 'dehumanized' by colonialism to such an extent that it turns him into an animal. It then becomes possible for the colonizer to deploy violence in the colonial struggle. For the colonial subject, freeing himself or herself of colonialism through violence can be a cathartic experience. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon introduces the idea of 'collective catharsis'. Collective catharsis is described as "in every society, in every collectivity, exists – must exist – a channel, an outlet through which the forces accumulated in the forms of aggression can be released'. Catharsis is translatable from Ancient Greek as, 'to purify, cleanse or purge'<sup>30</sup>

Aristotle used this term to describe a situation where there are feelings of pity and fear which are then relieved by an intervening event. For Fanon, this term is inextricable from the colonized subject's experience of violently ridding themselves of colonial rule<sup>31</sup>. The violence is the intervening event, which is able to remove their feelings of self-loathing, which have been internalized after constant manipulation by the colonial power. The colonial subject is also able to restore their self-esteem and control over their political life. Accordingly, for the Algerians, violence is cathartic insofar as it allows them to restore the sense of self that was destroyed by colonialism. This cathartic violence, also allows an individual to reclaim their humanity. The physical act of violence perpetrated by the revolutionaries reminds them of the humanity that they share with their colonizers. Sartre's introduction to *Wretched of the Earth* usefully described the process of anti-colonial revolution as 'man recreating himself'. It also provides a sense of physical, mental and metaphysical 'freedom'.

Fanon suggests that 'violence frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect. So, revolutionary violence is not just cathartic, but it also allows the colonial subjects to recreate themselves or restore the way that they were prior to colonialism. It allows the colonized person to resume a free and self-determining existence. Violence also has the ability to rectify mental health problems. In the preface to *Wretched of the Earth*, Sartre usefully summarizes Fanon's analysis of violence and situates it within medicalized discourse by stating that the native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. To explain this, Fanon draws upon examples from his psychiatric practice. Fanon notes that the colonial context and the 'systemic negation' of the colonized subject over a sustained period of time forces them to question their identity by asking themselves in reality, who am I?'



Fanon later suggests that Algeria is a favorable breeding ground for mental disorder because of colonial rule and ideology. Fanon suggests a category of psychiatric illnesses called 'psychosomatic disorders', which stems from the colonial context. The symptoms of these disorders include ulcers, menstrual pain, hair whitening and others. These disorders demonstrate the way that it is not necessary to be wounded with a bullet in order to suffer from the fact of war in body as well as in mind. For Fanon, revolutionary violence has a therapeutic effect as he sees patients freed from some of these symptoms following revolutionary violence. In this way, Fanon views violence as a 'cleansing force'. Accordingly, Fanon suggests that violence is able to provide a cure to some of the mental illness of the colonial subjects. Despite seeing potentiality in violence, Fanon does not think that violence should be used lightly or as an end unto itself. Fanon also documents the dangerous and negative effects of violence. The initial and most obviously negative aspect of violence is the physical harm that it inflicts upon people.

In all of Fanon's works, the physical and human cost of violence is interrogated. Expressing frustration, he notes that 'when the native is tortured, when his wife is killed or raped, he complains to no one'<sup>32</sup>. As Fanon views violence as the currency of colonialism, it becomes an omnipresent feature of daily life for the colonial subject. The true horror of daily violence was present to Fanon as a psychiatrist in the largest psychiatric hospital in Algeria. The physical violence, which pervades colonialism, is exacerbated by the structural violence of the colonial system, which sees the 'systematic negation' of the colonial subject's humanity. Fanon recalls numerous examples from his practice of physical and mental trauma that was caused by the colonial context.

One patient presented to Fanon a case of sexual impotence. The patient, a taxi-driver, told Fanon how his wife had been beaten for two days and raped, after the French troops found his abandoned taxi with FLN materials inside. On hearing this, the patient, who was fighting away from his family, suffered from persistent headaches and insomnia, which Fanon attributed to the acts committed by the French against the patient's wife. Another patient, 'DJ' presented to Fanon with hallucinations and insomnia. 'DJ' was the only male in his household. After he joined the ALN (a liberation organization affiliated with the FLN), word was sent to him that his mother and sisters had been killed by French soldiers. Fanon notes that whilst in a state of being 'temporarily insane', 'DJ' then went to the house of an 'agent' for the French and murdered the agent's wife. Shortly following this, he presented to Fanon, who could not suggest a cure. Fanon suggests that 'time alone' can cure such psychiatric disruption. Accordingly, the physical harm of violence is an undoubtedly negative effect, as well as the ensuing mental health issues that arise.

The physical and mental effects of violence also affected the French and their families. Fanon retells the story of one patient, a French police inspector, 'R', who presented himself after tying up and beating his wife and young children in their home. In their consultation, it became apparent that inspector 'R' was heavily involved in the questioning and torture of Algerian revolutionaries. R was a heavy smoker and was unable to deal with large amounts of noise. Fanon wanted to write a medical certificate for 'R' exempting him from work. However, the police inspector refused to accept this, as he did not want to be seen as weak by his colleagues. Fanon also wrote extensively about tortures, which was a 'fundamental necessity of the colonial world'<sup>33</sup>. Because of the brutality that the police are required to inflict upon the Algerians, Fanon noted that from the beginning of 1956, 'cases of insanity among police agents became frequent'. He extensively lists the symptoms and effects of this insanity, which included 'threatening to kill their wives, inflicting severe injury on their children suicide and coming to blows with colleagues'. Thus, the physical effects of violence are common to both the Algerians and the French colonizers. Violence does not discriminate in the mental and physical torment that it inflicts upon both parties. Noting the great physical and mental consequences of violence, it becomes evident that violence cannot simply be an end unto itself. Violence for Fanon must have a clearly prescribed purpose. He cautions:

The militant who faces the colonialist war machine with the bare minimum of arms realizes that while he is breaking down colonial oppression, he is building up yet another

system of exploitation. This discovery is unpleasant, bitter, and sickening: and yet everything seemed so simple before<sup>34</sup>

Without a clear vision and plan in place for when decolonization occurs, the Algerians would be doomed to reproduce the power relations of oppression and violence, with the only difference being, the parties to this power relation. Fanon stresses crucially the ensuring that all revolutionaries are involved in the political process of formulating a new reality and not just the political elite – this will prevent segregation and alienation within the group. Fanon further warns that the revolutionaries should not place their future in ‘the hands of a living god’<sup>35</sup>. Thus, Fanon urges that mere violence is not enough to construct a positive new reality.

The inclusion of all of the people into the creation of the new political reality is of the utmost importance to ensure that strong foundations are set for a coherent and sustainable state. In this way, Fanon places conditions on the use of violence to ensure that it is properly channeled towards meeting its aims and does not become gratuitous. Creating a new cultural identity after usurping a colonial power is also incredibly difficult. Fanon notes that after a prolonged period of colonization ‘*there comes about a veritable emaciation of the stock of national culture*’<sup>36</sup>. After years of living under colonial rule, which seeks to negate the identity of the colonial subject, it also becomes difficult for the newly liberated subject to reclaim his or her own identity. A colonized person must alter their behavior under colonial rule to ensure that they can live in peace without excessive repression from the colonizers. For the colonial subject, it is difficult to give up these particular ways, which became crucial to their survival.

Fanon succinctly summarizes the consequence of a failure to construct a positive new identity by saying that ‘there will be serious psycho-affective injuries and the result will be individuals without an anchor, without a horizon, colorless, stateless, rootless’<sup>37</sup>. Therefore, after any widespread revolutionary violence there will be psychological trauma as the colonial subjects attempt to re-forge a positive identity for themselves. Having lived in a state of fear for so long, forming a positive new identity can be a difficult process. Frantz Fanon provides a useful account of both the positive and negative effects of colonial violence on individuals. Violence has the potential to be liberating and cathartic, in the sense that it allows a colonial subject to free themselves and recreate a positive new identity after a long time of enduring colonialism.

### 3. INHUMANISM IN FANON’S HUMANISM

Many scholars have criticized Fanon’s theory of violence. Among these is the unsystematic and incoherent nature of his work. Fanon has been criticized on the point that he was carried away by his emotion in treating the issue of violence. Among those scholars who gave such criticism are Connor Cruise O’Brien, Lewis Coser and Fred Gohbei and many more. Lewis Coser on his part claims that, Frantz Fanon’s *the Wretched of the Earth* is badly written, badly organized and chaotic, that the author’s reasoning is often shoddy and obviously defensive, and that this is not a work of analysis. It appeals not to the intellect but to the passion.<sup>38</sup> Another critic named Hannah Arendt says that Fanon’s view on violence is theoretically excessive. Kedouri Elie says that Fanon is the most eloquent panegyrist of violence<sup>39</sup> L. Jinadu criticizes him in the area of physical violence<sup>40</sup> while Zenate Zahor takes up on psychological violence. In addition, Professor Rostislav Ulyanovsky enumerated three basic flaws in Fanon’s assessment of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry.

The first was that “Fanon believes that the description of the European proletariat as the main motives force of the revolution is inapplicable to the colonial society where the working class is among the privileged strata deriving benefits from the colonial regime”<sup>41</sup>. Fanon says that on the colonies only the peasantry is the true proletariat in the sense that it has nothing to lose. Therefore, he does not think that the colonial working class is a revolutionary or even national force<sup>42</sup>. Rostislav also claim that Fanon’s work is riddle with contradictions. He sometimes warns of the dangers of the city “opposing” the village but many of his provisions are objectively directed against the union between the working class and the peasantry, the union that offers the main hope for a non-capitalist socialist development

of the former colonies<sup>43</sup>. Another flaw of Fanon's work, according to Rostislav, is that Fanon approach to "motive force" of the revolution is anti-historical; he ignores its stage and determines the motive forces for the last time. He failed to give thought to whether the motive force at the stage of the independence struggle and of anti-capitalist development would be the same. However, other ideologists of natural democracy after him like Kwame Nkrumah did. The third error of Fanon's work posed by Rostislav is the question of the stage of revolutionary movement.

Fanon failed to notice the class differentiation within the peasantry regarding it as homogenous social group with a common stand. The processes of stratification were undoubtedly more advance and made them exceedingly important factors in determining the peasantry's revolutionary potential at the stage of independence. Struggle and at the stage of anti-capitalist development. Another error in fanon's work is that he failed to take into account the influence of existing socialism and the international communist movement.

However, Fanon's theory of violence made him fail as a humanist; he did not acknowledge the basic principle, which serves as the yardstick for determining a humanist. He moved beyond be a humanist and he never respected the dignity, values and happiness of the colonizer even if the blacks were being maltreated and dehumanized. Two wrong cannot make a right Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. took to pacifism by posing violence theory for the emancipation and liberation of their country. Engaging in a liberal rational discussion with the colonizers solved the problem of colonialism. For Gandhi violence add to the escalating spiral and cause eventual disintegration of the community and it may become the part of the society even after independence. It is unfortunate that Fanon did not live to experience and witness the vantage ground of his revolutionary struggle. He did not live to see peace restored to an autonomous Algeria. If he were still to be alive, he would have had a rethink on his theory of violence and embraces non-violent theory because violence has caused more harm to the nation than good.

Finding also noted that the argument that violence creates healing for marginalized bodies exists only in one's imagination and not in reality. Indeed, Frantz Fanon, who spoke about violence, later admitted that violence dehumanizes both the perpetrator and its victim. Probably, more than any other figure, of course, Frantz Fanon carried anxiety and contradictory ideas of the usefulness of violence to create social change. Speaking from a subjective position of an anti-colonial theorist and a practitioner, Frantz Fanon demanded a national liberation for colonized subjects but insisted that the revolutionary project should lead to a deliberate production of the new humanity. It seems that fanon himself was much more doubtful about violence than his admirers were.

Fanon knew the danger of uncontrollable violence, which oftentimes misdirect the vision, and goals of a movement to create changes. He realized that humanity is chasing after peace without realizing that peace is not a destination but a journey itself. Thus, he did not only object to European imperial powers that "had wrongly deprived colonial subject of their humanity",<sup>44</sup> but also appealed to colonized subjects to seek for social change that respects and maintains human dignity, justice fairness and equity. Fanon did not live long enough to explain exactly what he meant by the "new humanism". Gandhi and king were no doubt, outstanding non-violent strategist who believe that the exercise of power depend on the consent of the ruled and not the ruler. Thus through the acts of discipline, fearlessness, love and non-violence, the oppressed can stand and overcome the might of the oppressor.

#### **4. CONCLUSION**

To conclude, what remains significant about this work is the rethinking of Frantz Fanon's humanism in a critical way. Reflecting on Fanon drives one to the conclusion that "each generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission, fulfill it or betrays it"<sup>45</sup>. Fanon sees the colonial situation as an inherently violent one and at the same time sees ethical justification of violence as a potent instrument for liberation. He developed his theory of violence from the praxis of the Algerian liberation struggle. He condemned and rejected the violence inflicted on the colonized by the colonizer; he sees this type of violence, physical violence, structural violence and psychological violence as the basis of

decolonization, freedom and self-realization. Fanon sees no other alternative means to decolonization except the use of counter violence against the colonizer. However, do such actions still qualify him as a humanist? With the universal humanist beliefs which places emphasizes on the protection of values and dignity of human being (either black or white) and the solving of human problem with the help of reason. This pointed out the lacuna in his humanism.

However, Mahatmas Gandhi and Martin Luther king Jnr.'s non-violence theory in the quest for decolonization have set a standard to debunk violence means. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* (truth-force theory) and Martin Luther King Junior's Christian approach to political liberation serves as a paradigm shift. Although Nietzsche's claims faulted this belief, holding that Christian ethics is design for the weak and coward. Nevertheless, Martin Luther king Jnr. raised a question, why do we love. He says, we love because it can generate goodness and enhance our personality. He finally says '*love can transform our friends to be friendly and our enemies to be friends*'<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, Gandhi issued four grounds for the rejection of violence, namely, the ontological, epistemological, moral and prudential ground. For Gandhi, acts of violence add to an escalating spiral and cause the eventual disintegration of the community from which no one benefits and it may become part of the society even after independence. For him, violence was not a proper method of struggle against the British. However, the highlight of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jnr non-violence theory has shed light and has unveiled Fanon's theory of violence as a lacuna to the universal theory of humanism and that his theory went contrary to the general humanist beliefs and traditions<sup>47</sup>.

Hence, his advocacy of violence projected under the canopy of humanism seen as a liberation philosophy for decolonization in Algeria was a camouflage and exhibits in-humanism in his humanism.

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#### END NOTES

1. Merriam–Webster Dictionary 11<sup>th</sup> Edition (Merriam – Webster Inc. 2003). p. 1124
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5. Frantz Fanon, '*Black Skin, White Mask* ' (New York: Grove Press, 1967), p.145.
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7. *Ibid.*, p.92 - 93.
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9. Marina Paola, Banchetti – Robino Headly, '*Shifting the Geography of Reason, Gender, Science and Religion* ' (Cambridge Scholar Publisher 2006), p.7
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11. Fanon, '*The Wretched of the Earth* ', p.205.
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14. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin White Mask*, (New York: Grove Press 1967) p.206.

15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, p.7
17. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press 1963), p.255.
18. Fanon 1967, *Black Skin White Mask*. p.39
19. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth.*, p.61.
20. *Ibid.*, p.40.
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# Multiple Insurgencies and Nigeria's Quest for National Security: A Discourse of the Boko Haram and ISWAP Activities in the North East.

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## Abstract

*Since the last decade, the global security landscape has been inundated by terrorist groups of diverse backgrounds, persuasions and motivations. In Nigeria, the rise of multiple insurgencies such as Boko Haram and ISWAP in the North East posed a significant threat to national security. These groups have caused widespread destruction leading to significant loss of lives and property, and disruption of socio-economic activities. This study interrogates the complex nature and operations of these insurgent groups in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The paper adopts the "Relative Deprivation Theory" as its framework of analysis. It argues that a combination of factors, such as corruption, economic deprivation, political repression, and extreme religious beliefs are some of the key motivations at the roots of multiple insurgencies in Nigeria. It further argues that through the use of the kinetic counter-insurgency approach, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) has been able to significantly degrade the Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgents. However, the threats posed by these groups still remain a source of concern to internal and regional security. Therefore, the study recommends a multi-pronged approach to counter-insurgency. It suggests the need to address poverty and socio-economic grievances that fuel the conflict and further collaboration by the Lake Chad Basin countries, beyond the level of the current Multinational Joint Task Force. The findings corroborate and fill the gap in the existing literature. Finally, the article recommends nipping corruption in the military in the bud, reforming recruitment strategies, and effective peacebuilding as strategies for ending multiple insurgencies.*

**Keywords:** Security, insurgencies, Boko Haram, conflict, counter-insurgencies.

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## Introduction

The global security landscape has been inundated by terrorist groups of diverse origins, interests and motivations since the dawn of the new millennium. Over the years, the destructive activities of these terrorist groups have assumed alarming security threats for many countries in the global South. In fact, the fear of terrorist attacks has dominated the contemporary security agenda of many states in the international system. (Gastrow & Hübschle, 2006). Sub-Saharan Africa is not exempted from this international reality. Indeed, it has become the centre of terrorist activities led by a cluster of terrorist groups who are either subsidiary of notable global jihadist networks or home-grown terrorist groups in search of global attention. To be sure, terrorist attacks in many African countries have witnessed a considerable increase and rising civilian casualties. For instance, in 2015, data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) revealed that 381 attacks in Africa targeted civilians, resulting in about 1,394 fatalities. Since then, the figures have drastically increased. In 2020, there were 7,108 attacks on civilians, leaving 12,519 people dead. (Mroszczyk & Abrahms, 2021).

Like many other African countries, Nigeria has been faced with devastating multiple insurgencies from the northeast to other parts of the country. First, was the emergence of the existential threats posed by Boko Haram in 2009. Second, was the emergence of the destructive and deadly Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015. Apart from being two of the deadliest terrorist groups in Africa, Boko Haram and ISWAP's terrorist activities have also made Nigeria one of the most terrorised nations in the world. (Global Terrorism Index reports, 2016-2019). Many scholars and experts have attributed the emergence of these terrorist groups in Nigeria and other African countries and the threats they posed to human lives and properties to different factors. For instance, Schuurman (2018), attributed the growing rate of terrorist groups and the intensification of terrorist activities in the continent to the fact that it offers a favourable atmosphere, easy recruits and vulnerable targets.

There has been a growing debate in literature about the motivation and objectives of insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP. In this sense, long-term inquiries on the motivations of terrorists have elicited a wide range of responses. Scholars such as Isyaku (2013), and Schuurman (2018), believe that terrorists are different in terms of their actions, motivations, networks, financing, effects on security, and outcomes. According to Martin (2017), the categorization of terrorism that manifests in many forms depends on the perpetrators and the motive. Martin recognised five major classifications of terrorist groups: State-Sponsored Terrorism, which is a form of terrorist act through which a state or government seeks to undermine another state or government; terrorist acts committed by groups that have rebelled against their government are known as "dissent terrorism"; religious terrorism emanates from fanatical religious beliefs and doctrines; political or ideological terrorism has political ideology at its core; Criminal Terrorism is categorised as terrorist activities to further criminal gains (Martin, 2017). From a correlative point of view, Mair (2003), Alex (2016), and Akepe et al, (2016) have pointed at a combination of factors, including economic deprivation, corruption, political repression and extreme religious belief as some of the major motivations at the root of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This corroborates the perspective of the "Grievance Theory" or "Relative Deprivation Theory" by John Burton, which holds that insurgencies are products of unmet socio-economic or political expectations of certain groups (Burton, 1990).

### Geographical Focus and Context

Figure 1: Map of North-Eastern States of Nigeria



Source: Google Maps



This article focuses on a geographical area within West Africa, particularly in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The north-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria comprises six states, namely: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states. The zone is strategic for its agricultural potential and large mineral deposits. It borders Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon as well as Lake Chad.

It is the birthplace and the most affected by the Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgencies currently ravaging the country (International Crisis Group 2017 and Higazi (2015) describe the zone as the recruitment hotbed for both insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP and against them in the mode of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF).

Over the years, violence linked to these extremist groups has become the primary cause of death in this geo-political zone. The evidence available suggests that since 2014, Boko Haram has continued to rank as one of the deadliest terrorist organisations in the world. (Global Terrorism Index, 2015) This was published by the Institute for Economics and Peace Research. According to the Institute, there has been a yearly increase in the terror capability of Boko Haram and associated groups. Therefore, with an emphasis on the multiple insurgencies, a qualitative case study was employed to approach this research in order to properly investigate and characterize the ideas present in insurgency and national security as well as response to violence. As the two terrorist groups have rapidly evolved over the past decade, their terrorist activities have constituted existential threats to national stability in Nigeria. In essence, the multipolar character of the insurgency has further complicated the nation's security landscape and attendant challenge to peace and national stability. Also, the dangerous competition for resources, influence and dominance between the two groups has led to increased violence, chaos and dislocation of civilians. Thus, without any doubt, the spate of persistent attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgents in the northeast and elsewhere in the country have resulted in the loss of many human lives and the destruction of properties. This has also impacted an already fragile and dysfunctional economy reeling from decades of corruption and mismanagement.

### **Root Causes of Insurgency in Nigeria**

Several studies have investigated insurgency from diverse viewpoints as a result of the lethal operations attributed to insurgent organizations' operations in the northeastern parts of Nigeria and the aftermath. For instance, studies by Lanshima (2018), Combs (2013), Fwatshak (2012), Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018), Ogbonna, Jiménez (2017) contend that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is linked to three main connected premises: politics, religion, and socioeconomic factors. According to Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018), the genesis of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria was sparked by socioeconomic causes like poverty, rights violations, corruption, and denial of human rights. Scholars such as Agbibo (2014); Onuoha, (2013); Ibukun (2020) and Owonikoko (2022) all see the current insurgency in Nigeria as a social issue that was sparked by political, economic, and religious causes. However, the religious incentive seems to be the strongest motivation in the Nigerian context (Onyebuchi & Chigozie 2013).

The available evidence suggests that the Boko Haram sect originally adhered to the Salafi philosophy, which upholds a sacred Islamic order free from influence from the West and other Muslim sects like the Sufis and Shiites (Nwogu 2011, p. 48). According to the Salafi doctrine, the only way to revive Islam is to do away with all outside influences and emulate the early Muslim ummah. The only way to achieve this is to destroy other institutions that have influences on Islam. Although there are many justifications for the insurgency's inspiration and support, it seems that religious ideology still plays a major role. The cult wanted to implement sharia across all Nigerian states by rejecting Western education (Onyebuchi & Chigozie 2013).

Indeed, insurgency is one aspect of Nigeria's political, economic, religious, and social issues, which is endangering the country's continued existence. The challenge is that terrorist violence consistently poses a threat to Nigeria's security, sovereignty, and citizen security.

## **Origins of the Boko Haram Insurgents**

Essentially, Nigeria is not new to internal security challenges such as religious crises, ethnic conflict, armed robbery and cult clashes. Yet, violent extremism has never constituted a permanent concern to the nation's national security. However, the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009 completely changed such narrative. Since then, the group has remained a fundamental challenge to the security of Nigeria and recently to neighbouring countries such as Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon (Connor, 2017). Interestingly, the Boko Haram insurgency is not the first to occur in Nigeria. As Comolli (2015) argues, insurgent groups have frequently sprung up in the area since the 18<sup>th</sup> century's Usman Dan Fodio-led jihad in Northern Nigeria. Citing the example of the Maitatsine riot of the early 1980s, Briggs (2018) corroborated the view that northern Nigeria is not new to radical Islamic preaching and its attendant radicalization of followers. While their radical approach to issues of faith has drawn sharp comparison from scholars, however, unlike Boko Haram, Maitatsine could not capture and control territory as its insurgency operation was short-lived haven been decimated by the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) and paramilitary forces in record time (Agbibo 2013).

According to Adesoji (2011), the inherent social and economic dissatisfaction which gave rise to the Maitatsine uprising in the early 1980s also played a major role in the emergence of Boko Haram decades later. Although founded in Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect has extensive and intricate political, social, cultural, and economic linkages that extend throughout the Lake Chad Basin to strengthen its foundation and enlist supporters and fighters (Agbibo 2015). The group's official name in Arabic is Jama'atu AhlisSunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (JAS), which translates to "People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad." Its doctrine is based on the practice of orthodox Islam. According to Akanji (2009), Boko Haram's objectives are to destroy the Nigerian government, stir up religious conflict through terrorism, and finally establish an Islamic state in Nigeria based on Sharia law. Hussaini (2017) provides further clarification about the emergence of the group. He argues that the dissident group led by Mohammed Yusuf took up arms against the Nigerian government in July 2009 in a last-ditch effort to impose a self-declared Sharia legal system as an alternative to the country's secular system of government, (Hussaini, 2017).

## **Internal Division within Boko Haram and the Emergence of Multiple Insurgencies**

Since the emergence of Boko Haram, insurgency and terrorism have been the most significant security challenges facing the country. The emergence of the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015 further compounded the insecurity situation in the country, particularly in the North-East. According to Fineman (2022), several Boko Haram terrorists left the organisation due to internal conflicts and started their own group, which later became known as the ISWAP. In March 2015, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, swore allegiance to the Islamic State. The organisation adopted the name ISWAP as a result of this pledge of allegiance. However, Shekau was replaced by Abu Musab al-Barnawi in August 2016 by the Islamic State central command following disagreements over tactics and the treatment of civilians. Shekau's breakaway branch then reverted to the Islamic State's original name after Shekau renounced his allegiance to it. The persistence of their conflicts led to more divisions within Boko Haram. ISWAP benefited tremendously from this conflict. Its base was in the border regions that were difficult for the Lake Chad Basin states to regulate and had abundant natural resources including fish, and farms, and imposing taxes on the locals enabled it to reinforce and fund its operations (Crisis Group 2023).

The split, which is often described as 'jihadist infighting,' has resulted in the militants focusing their weapons on one another. The eventual death of Abubakar Shekau in Sambisa Forest in 2021 was a result of the clashes between Boko Haram and ISWAP. This has enhanced ISWAP's influence in the forest as well as in the islands around Lake Chad. With the emergence of ISWAP, Sambisa and Alagarno Forests became strategic positions for attacks and predation on larger urban centres. The ISWAP group has consolidated its power by adding the provision of social amenities, such as Islamic education and rudimentary healthcare, it has also mixed taxing trade routes and economic operations

with a less ruthless treatment of people than was the case under the late Boko Haram leader Shekau (Sampaio 2022). The local support enjoyed by ISWAP is a product of its fair treatment of civilians. Unlike Boko Haram which labelled civilians as infidels and regularly targets them for murder through suicide bombings and kidnapping, ISWAP is seen as a more friendly group as it regularly provides palliatives for the people in its domains and also does not kill civilians unjustly. However, life has remained difficult for the people. The North-East continues to be extremely dangerous because of the intra-jihadist struggle, and many displaced people are unable to go back to their homes. As more civilians who once resided in Boko Haram-controlled areas moved to new locations the number of displaced people has greatly increased (Crisis Group 2023).

Another significant change in insurgency approach as regards ISWAP, as opposed to Boko Haram, is its focus on military targets and urban centres. ISWAP claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the north-central states of Niger, Jigawa, Taraba, Kogi, and the Federal Capital Territory, and a South-Western state, Ondo, in 2022 and 2023. Consequently, in recent times, ISWAP's operations have become far more widespread beyond its northeastern base (Oxford Analytica, 2022). This is demonstrated by the recent attack on a Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State by the group (Kalu 2023; Agbaenyi 2022). According to Oxford Analytical (2022), ISWAP has also prioritized attacks against foreign targets in Nigeria. It can thus be inferred that the formation of ISWAP has caused the insurgency-related insecurity to degenerate in the Northeast as the Armed Forces of Nigeria struggle to counter the organisations. The two militant groups have occupied dozens of army bases and killed hundreds of soldiers in the north-east since August 2018. (Crisis Group 2019).

### **ISWAP and its Local Recruitment Strategy**

The available evidence suggests that one of the ingredients that drives the ongoing insurgency is the persistent recruitment of locals into the group through enticement. Boko Haram has always depended on enticement and coercion to recruit new members, but ISWAP has completely changed the face of insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin such that it is the youths who are voluntarily enlisting. According to newspaper reports, the recruitment of young people as combatants by the ISWAP fighting around Lake Chad has increased (Punch 2023). To be sure, one of the factors enabling the massive recruitment of children by ISWAP is the vulnerabilities of local communities in the Lake Chad Basin, which allows the groups to take charge of out-of-school children, the local economy and religion. ISWAP controls many local communities where the presence and impact of governance are hardly felt. They control the local trade routes and license only those who pay tax and allegiance to them to operate. For instance, widespread insecurity has interrupted the supply of food and other produce from surrounding LGAs to Maiduguri, the Borno State capital. As a result, ISWAP opened a fishing market in the Lake Chad Basin that attracts tax-paying traders from Maiduguri and other areas. This brings the insurgent group close to the people, who in turn join them for economic benefits (Sampaio 2022). Large-scale farmers are also taxed heavily before they are allowed to either cultivate or harvest their crops. Through this strategy, ISWAP is able to dictate the pattern of food supply, with preference for areas they control and earn revenue in the form of taxation in the process. This is not restricted to Nigeria.

### **Impact of Insurgency on National Security**

Insurgency in the North-East is one of the most compelling sources of danger to Nigeria's national security. It must be emphasized that the failure of the government to tackle poverty and address other issues and factors that propelled the emergence of insurgent groups encouraged the development of ambitious political objectives like seizing and holding of territories, the quest to overthrow the Nigerian government as well as their notorious expansion into neighbouring states. Indeed, scholars have recognised the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's first leader, Mohammed Yusuf, by Nigerian security forces in 2009, as another factor that propelled the group's dangerous ideology (Walker 2012; Aguwa 2017). The consequence is the ever-persistent danger of insecurity that pervades not just the North-East but the entire country.

From its feeble beginning as a haphazard, loosely planned, and inchoate movement, Boko Haram has evolved into a significant danger to national security. Over the years, insurgent groups have developed the ability to project strategic power, gather strategic intelligence, and create extensive connections (Akubo, & Okolo, 2019). In addition, the group's tactics, modes of attack, geographic reach, and targets of choice have all grown increasingly violent and audacious. They even carried out a deadly strike on the United Nations building in Abuja in August 2011. In the second half of 2022, many Western nations and international agencies evacuated their diplomatic staff from Abuja over intelligence indicating impending ISWAP attacks.

Tracing the causes of multiple insurgencies in Nigeria's northeast, It has been pointed out that internal factors such as corruption, nepotism, marginalization, mediocrity, poverty, illiteracy, and religious fanaticism are the primary causes of the insurgencies. It has also been established that the pool from which insurgent groups recruit members is mainly the illiterate Almajiri children who are easily brainwashed and radicalised. The government is therefore encouraged to change its attitude towards education, poverty and inclusivity in the region.

Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency has constituted one of the greatest challenges to Nigeria's internal security. Continuously, lives are lost as a result of avoidable insecurity. Since the group's declaration of jihad against the Nigerian state in 2009, it has undertaken a number of high-profile bombing attacks on the country's government and civilians, leading former President Goodluck Jonathan to call for the group to be designated as an international terrorist organization at the time (Ibikun, 2020). According to UNDP (2017) report, insurgency in the north-east has caused more than 20,000 direct deaths, over 2 million forced displacement and loss of livelihoods. It is estimated that the conflict has had an impact on 14 million people in six states, with 8.5 million of them constantly in need of humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, the emergence of ISWAP has resulted in not only the escalation of violence but also in its attendant cost on human lives, destruction of properties and unprecedented displacement among Nigerians who have fled in their thousands into refugee camps in Cameroon, Niger Republic and Chad (Reuters, 2021; OCHA 2021). According to the UNDP (2022), in the context of displacement, more than 2.8 million Nigerians have been displaced by the conflict, with 2 million in various refugee/IDP camps in Nigeria, while others flee to neighbouring countries amidst challenging humanitarian circumstances (Ibrahim 2021). Participants further buttressed the ugly nature of the lives of victims of insurgency. Markets, schools, places of worship and government offices are targeted for destruction...the menace of child soldiers is also on the rise with Boko Haram and ISWAP intensifying their use of children for fighting and suicide bombing. To be sure, the emergence of ISWAP and indeed that of multiple insurgencies have made life more difficult for civilians in the North-East. The constant confrontations between ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters, particularly around Lake Chad have resulted in massive displacement of innocent civilians who are often caught up in such fighting. As a result of the emergence of ISWAP, insecurity has further degenerated with the Nigerian military struggling to contain the groups. Since August 2018, the two insurgent groups have killed hundreds of soldiers and overrun dozens of military bases in the northeast. (Crisis Group, 2019). For ISWAP, which is associated with the defunct Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) the focus is on military targets.

Security in northern Nigeria and the surrounding areas of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon is seriously threatened by ISWAP's years-long consolidation of authority in rural Borno following its victory over Boko Haram. ISWAP's adapting strategies seem to have made recent gains possible. It has established some level of control over the rural area it occupies in Borno. Civilians are free to move about, which encourages more of them to live and conduct business in areas under its authority (Crisis Group, 2022). Then, taxes are levied on them to raise money to further insurgent activities. Other consequences include a general slowdown in the economy and the rising cost of food arising from the disruption of

farming by insurgent groups, growing unemployment, rural-urban migration, and citizens turning to self-help (Olanrewaju, Folarin, & Folarin, 2017).

ISWAP is expected to keep getting stronger and look for chances to grow if the current trend is not reversed. Although the Nigerian military has recently boosted the use of air power to attack ISWAP targets and has improved air and ground (combined) forces coordination, so far, neither its military efforts nor those of its regional allies have been able to stop ISWAP's advancements and ideological acceptance in rural communities (Crisis Group, 2022). This has further undermined Nigeria's national security.

### **Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Strategies**

Understandably, the activities of insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP as well as their operations and ideological goals continue to endanger Nigeria's national security. The frequency and severity of the horror that insurgent attacks wreak across the nation makes it imperative for necessary counterinsurgency strategies to be formulated. At the initial stage, the Nigerian authorities downplayed the severity of the emerging terrorism in the country. This initial inaction by the government gave Boko Haram room to quietly recruit more fighters and stockpile weapons. The killing of Boko Haram's leader, Muhammed Yussuf, was a critical turning point as it backfired and encouraged many people to join the group. In fact, the FGN did not handle the initial stage of Boko Haram activities in the country with the seriousness it deserved. After treating the insurgency lightly at the initial stage, the FGN resorted to the use of extreme force against insurgent groups. The use of military force has been the predominant approach used by the government against terrorists. Following repeated attacks by insurgent groups, targeted at the government, its institutions, and officials, as well as churches, markets, parks, and sometimes, mosques, the situation resulted in increased frustration by innocent Nigerians who daily bore the brunt of Boko Haram's heinous destructions. Consequently, the entire north-eastern region of Nigeria was placed under a state of emergency at the start of 2012 by Goodluck Jonathan's administration. The parliament also passed the Nigeria Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013, as the legal basis to prosecute terrorists and anyone caught aiding them. Similar sanctions were imposed on Boko Haram by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), including assets freezes, travel bans, and an arms embargo. This prompted the FGN to adopt the use of maximum force by the military. Under this approach, the military was deployed across the north-east to face Boko Haram and ISWAP under different operational codenames with a charge to defeat the groups. Some of these codenames include "*Operation Lafiya Dole (OPLD)* and *Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK)*. However, despite the international sanctions and the all-out military approach, all of which had no noticeable effect on the group, due to its informal structure, Boko Haram was able to gain a swath of territories, which included many LGAs across three states in 2014.

Over the years, Nigeria has engaged its military in more training and procured more sophisticated weapons. In order to be better prepared to face Boko Haram's unconventional warfare tactics, the Nigerian military has undertaken specialised training in counterinsurgency tactics and concepts. Additionally, training and assistance have been given by international partners like the United States and other Western countries. Some of the newly acquired military weapons include EMB-314 Super Tucano trainer aircraft; Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS); ZTL-09 armoured vehicles; CH-3 and CH-4 armed UAVs; SH-5105 self-propelled guns, among others. These were bought from Canada, Brazil, the US, the UK, Turkey, and South Africa. (Yakubu, Aideloje, & Babawale, 2022). Unfortunately, some of these high-calibre weapons are regularly lost to the insurgents. In fact, Nigeria's military often loses military equipment to Boko Haram and ISWAP, especially during ambushes in dangerous and difficult terrain. ISWAP has shown some of the various models of armoured vehicles, Rocket rocket-propelled guns (RPG), self-propelled guns, and operational HiLux vehicles in their propaganda videos.

Remarkably, the contributions of the CJTF to the nation's war on terror cannot be overemphasized. The CJTF originated from local communities when citizens and local authorities came together to

defend their areas from incessant Boko Haram attacks. Since many of them have firsthand knowledge of the devastation the insurgency has caused to their families and communities, their participation stems from a sense of duty and self-defence. Indeed, the CJTF's capacity to acquire intelligence on Boko Haram and ISWAP's operations and movements within the North-East, particularly around Maiduguri has been one of its most important contributions. Because they are so familiar with their neighbourhoods, CJTF members often give the military and other security services vital intelligence that helps in the planning and execution of operations against the insurgent groups. In order to conduct joint operations against multiple insurgencies, the CJTF members work in conjunction with the Nigerian military and other security agencies. They frequently serve as guides, guiding security personnel through challenging terrain and pointing out probable rebel hiding places. However, many CJTF members have been killed by insurgents who target them for the information they provide to the military. (Alli, 2011)

Furthermore, the resort to a regional military effort through the creation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2016 demonstrates the understanding that the multiple insurgencies had become a regional threat as well as a national issue. The MNJTF is an LCBC offensive and stabilisation tool. Combating multiple insurgencies has been a major goal for the members of the Lake Chad Basin: Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Following the threat to national and regional peace and security that multiple insurgencies represent, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in November 2014 approved its formation in 2014 to check arms supply and undertake military operations and patrols to stop the expansion of terrorist activities (African Union, 2015). Ever since the MNJTF has helped to better coordinate regional efforts against Boko Haram and the ISWAP insurgencies in Nigeria's northeast and that of its neighbours. This conclusion corroborates various opinions in the literature. Tar and Bala (2021) have argued that a regional approach was needed to defeat multiple insurgencies in the Lake Chad basin. To be sure, the need for regional cooperation is because ISWAP and Boko Haram frequently used neighbouring nations as safe havens for regrouping before launching attacks.

Evidently, a major component of the MNJTF's operations has been the sharing of intelligence among member nations. The MNJTF's unified command structure has made it possible to effectively coordinate military operations across international borders. This coordinated strategy has increased coordination, reduced operational gaps, and increased the overall efficacy of counterinsurgency tactics against multiple insurgencies not only in Nigeria but across the Lake Chad Basin. This further corroborates the argument in the literature (Maiangwa, & Kondu, 2019, Yakubu, Aideloje, & Babawale, 2022).

Beyond national and regional responses, multiple insurgencies in the Northeast have elicited significant international attention from global powers and international organisations. For instance, the United States, Canada, Germany, France, and China have provided significant assistance ranging from intelligence sharing, military assistance, and support for humanitarian efforts. (Fwa, 2017). Also, international NGOs, UNDP, the Red Cross, and others have provided crucial support and humanitarian efforts. Indeed, the United States particularly has leveraged her counterinsurgency experience in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide Nigerian leadership with useful counterinsurgency measures to apply against Boko Haram terrorists. Other areas where external powers have impacted Nigeria's counterinsurgency approaches include the disruption of terrorist financing and funding for terror networks in Nigeria and the Sahel specifically by the US and UN (Fineman, 2018).

### **Effectiveness of State Strategies**

Nigeria's counterinsurgency measures have centred on the use of coercive state power along with regional and international collaborations. The significant role played by the military so far against Boko Haram and ISWAP has been the use of the kinetic approach. For instance, the military's kinetic approach led to the reclaiming of the territories previously held by Boko Haram before the 2015 general

elections. Furthermore, the kinetic approach has constantly pushed back the insurgent groups without which they would have overrun the whole country and established their dream caliphate.

However, despite this great effort, the counterinsurgency strategies have failed to completely decimate Boko Haram and ISWAP. In general, Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts to combat terrorism in the country have not had the expected impact. For instance, despite an all-out military approach, the insurgents were still able to hold territories and conduct regular attacks and kidnapping of over 200 school girls from Chibok in 2014 and Dapchi in 2018 respectively. Up till now, (October 2023) many of these girls are yet to be released. The deprivation theory sees abject poverty, lack of strong political will, excessive politics, corruption in the military and internal sabotage by politicians and soldiers who hold allegiance to the terrorists as the factors preventing the success of counterinsurgency measures. This aligns with the view presented by Fineman, (2022). Similarly, poverty, hunger, and radicalisation are responsible for many children who are daily enlisting into ISWAP's fold in Borno state.

Furthermore, some scholars have argued that Nigeria's counterinsurgency measures have failed because the conflict with Boko Haram and ISWAP is not a traditional war requiring conventional tactics. Indeed, Fineman, (2022); Crisis Group, (2022) and Olanrewaju, Folarin, & Folarin, (2017) argue that the military lacked efficient equipment at the national level, and there was a lack of coordination and collaboration between the militaries of the surrounding nations at the regional level. This is believed to be responsible for the massive number of casualties that the military records on a regular basis. We, therefore, agree that the lack of necessary intelligence and resources significantly impacts the performance of Nigeria's counterinsurgency forces.

It must also be added that while MNJTF was indeed very instrumental in restoring some measure of normalcy and security to the Lake Chad Basin region, by destroying insurgents' training camps and conducting targeted aerial bombardment into their stronghold in Sambisa, most of the gains seemed to have been undone by lack of proper coordination, lack of trust among member states who share different colonial background, poor leadership and command structure. According to three responders, "the tempo and energy with which MNJTF confronted Boko Haram and ISWAP initially has diminished drastically".

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The rise of multiple insurgencies poses a significant threat to national stability in many countries, including Nigeria. This study contributes to filling the gap in knowledge through interviews with some crucial stakeholders to understand multiple insurgencies and their impact on socio-economic stability and national security. This research is significant as it puts forward strategies to improve approaches to counterterrorism efforts in the northeast as well as across the Lake Chad Basin as a whole. Essentially, the FGN needs to look beyond its present kinetic approach. It needs multipronged counterinsurgency measures to defeat the current multiple insurgencies ravaging the north-east. The constitution clearly stipulates the primary duty of government as the protection of the lives and properties of Nigerian citizens. However, in the last 13 years, the Nigerian state has come short of this responsibility. As a result, violence has intensified resulting in record levels of property devastation, human casualties, and forced emigration and displacement of thousands of Nigerians. Some have fled into refugee camps in Cameroon, Niger Republic, and Chad. (Reuters, 2021; OCHA 2021). As Burton's Relative Deprivation Theory indicates, a major source of the multiple insurgencies in Nigeria rests in poverty, deprivation, corruption, and political exclusion. To end these insurgencies, the FGN must use a comprehensive and multifaceted approach that addresses their origins. To achieve this, we recommend the following:

1. FGN must address poverty and socio-economic grievances not only in the North-East but throughout the country. It must develop programmes that are specifically aimed at the impacted areas to solve socioeconomic issues and combat poverty and unemployment. This will help the vulnerable populations live healthier, more prosperous lives, and appropriate

resources to infrastructure development, healthcare, education, and employment opportunities.

2. The government should create and implement comprehensive counter-radicalization initiatives that promote tolerance, moderation, and interreligious dialogue while challenging extreme ideology. Also, Former Boko Haram members should receive assistance and counselling to help them reintegrate into society.
3. Regional cooperation is key to the eventual defeat of Boko Haram and ISWAP. Therefore, beyond the current shape of the MNJTF, we recommend that a deeper level of cooperation and collaboration within the Lake Chad Basin Countries should be cultivated. Consequently, there is a need for the government to undertake a deeper level of engagements that are not subjected to colonial ties.
4. The capacity of the military and the security apparatus must be strengthened through massive recruitment, up-to-date tactical training, acquisition of modern weapons and state-of-the-art technology, and emphasis on intelligence-driven security systems and operations. The setbacks often suffered by the military against ISWAP and Boko Haram in recent times show that there is a need for a general overhaul of the national security and counterinsurgency approaches.
5. The recruitment process for the various arms of the military should be overhauled. Only passionate, dedicated, and patriotic citizens should be allowed into the military. This will help eliminate the ugly incidences of unpatriotic insiders and insurgents' sympathizers who leak sensitive information to ISWAP and Boko Haram.
6. The military hierarchy must eliminate corruption and misuse of resources meant for national security. An analysis of events over the past decade shows that a large amount of money provided for personnel training and equipping the military ended up being stolen or misappropriated.

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